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Most	  of	  the	  major	  drugs	  of	  abuse	  in	  the	  Untied	  States	  have	  a	  relatively	  uniform	  
distribution.	  	  	  Their	  use	  may	  cluster	  in	  cities,	  for	  example,	  but	  that	  general	  pattern	  
tends	  to	  repeat	  itself	  in	  every	  region	  of	  the	  county.	  	  This	  is	  not	  true	  of	  the	  stimulant	  
methamphetamine,	  which	  today	  shows	  a	  decidedly	  uneven	  distribution.	  	  
Confounding	  the	  matter	  more	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  because	  it	  is	  a	  synthetic	  drug,	  it	  is	  
theoretically	  possible	  to	  make	  methamphetamine	  anywhere.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  made	  
everywhere.	  	  In	  fact,	  for	  much	  of	  its	  history,	  the	  drug	  has	  been	  concentrated	  in	  the	  
American	  West.	  	  Further	  complicating	  our	  understanding	  is	  the	  public’s	  general	  
amnesia	  regarding	  methamphetamine’s	  long	  history	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Without	  
that	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  explain	  the	  drug’	  present	  geography.	  	  This	  
dissertation	  traces	  the	  evolution	  of	  the	  various	  networks	  that	  have	  coalesced	  
around	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  methamphetamine	  and	  finds	  that	  much	  of	  
the	  drug’s	  current	  geography	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  various	  
groups	  responded	  to	  official	  attempts	  to	  stem	  the	  supply	  of	  the	  precursors	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Introduction	  
Uneven	  Menace:	  The	  Strange	  Geography	  of	  Methamphetamine	  
	  
	  
	   In	  2003,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  the	  national	  methamphetamine	  epidemic,	  the	  Office	  
on	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy’s	  deputy	  director	  of	  state	  and	  local	  affairs,	  John	  C.	  
Horton,	  attempted	  to	  explain	  to	  the	  United	  States	  House	  of	  Representatives	  why	  
methamphetamine	  production	  was	  booming.	  	  Public	  concern	  over	  the	  drug	  was	  at	  
an	  all-­‐time	  high.	  	  Law	  enforcement	  officials	  had	  shut	  down	  9,324	  meth	  labs	  
nationwide	  in	  2002,	  and	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  year	  in	  which	  Horton	  was	  testifying,	  that	  
total	  would	  be	  10,332	  (NCLSS	  2011).1	  	  The	  reasons	  Horton	  gave	  did	  little	  to	  appease	  
the	  Senators	  present.	  	  Meth	  production,	  he	  claimed,	  was	  growing	  because	  of	  
continuing	  demand,	  the	  ease	  of	  obtaining	  ingredients,	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  recipes	  
on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  drug	  on	  the	  Internet.	  	  He	  added	  that	  meth	  production	  had	  
become	  part	  of	  the	  culture	  of	  the	  places	  where	  it	  had	  taken	  root	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  2003).	  
	   Horton’s	  final	  point	  should	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  to	  a	  geographer.	  	  
Methamphetamine	  had	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  subculture	  in	  the	  places	  where	  it	  had	  
taken	  root.	  	  But	  meth	  had	  not	  taken	  root	  everywhere.	  	  In	  fact,	  previously	  in	  his	  
testimony,	  Horton	  had	  noted	  a	  “lack	  of	  uniformity”	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  meth	  
epidemic	  (70).	  	  	  In	  certain	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  methamphetamine	  was	  considered	  
the	  most	  significant	  drug	  threat,	  while	  in	  others	  its	  mention	  barely	  even	  sparked	  
recognition.	  	  The	  other	  major	  problem	  drugs	  in	  the	  United	  States—marijuana,	  
cocaine,	  and	  heroin—might	  show	  some	  variation	  in	  threat	  level	  by	  region,	  but	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  These	  numbers	  reflect	  data	  extracted	  from	  the	  National	  Seizure	  System	  in	  January	  2011.	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variation	  was	  negligible	  compared	  to	  the	  one	  exhibited	  by	  methamphetamine.	  	  A	  
map	  of	  drug	  availability	  from	  the	  National	  Drug	  Threat	  Assessment:	  2003	  reflected	  
the	  truth	  in	  Horton’s	  observation	  (Figure	  I.1).	  	  Methamphetamine	  was	  readily	  
available	  west	  of	  the	  Mississippi,	  but	  largely	  absent	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country.	  	  
The	  2011	  version	  of	  the	  map	  reflects	  essentially	  the	  same	  distribution	  (NDIC	  2002b;	  
2011a).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  I.1:	  Drug	  availability	  by	  Organized	  Crime	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Task	  Force	  
region	  (NDIC	  2002b).	  
	  
	   Methamphetamine	  is	  a	  synthetic	  drug.	  	  Its	  production	  does	  not	  have	  any	  
climatic	  or	  soil	  requirements.	  	  In	  theory,	  it	  can	  be	  made	  anywhere.	  	  During	  the	  
height	  of	  the	  epidemic,	  it	  was	  this	  potential	  ubiquity	  of	  supply	  that	  sparked	  the	  most	  
fear.	  	  Meth	  labs	  could	  be	  found	  in	  houses,	  hotel	  rooms,	  trailers,	  car	  trunks,	  suitcases,	  
back	  packs,	  and	  even	  soda	  bottles.	  	  The	  list	  of	  possible	  locations	  for	  production	  was	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and	  is	  almost	  limitless.	  	  However,	  methamphetamine	  is	  not	  made	  everywhere.	  	  In	  
2003,	  only	  three	  methamphetamine	  labs	  were	  seized	  in	  all	  of	  New	  England.	  	  New	  
York	  and	  New	  Jersey	  had	  only	  10	  labs	  combined.	  	  For	  the	  sake	  of	  comparison,	  82	  lab	  
seizures	  occurred	  that	  year	  in	  a	  single	  Missouri	  county:	  Jefferson.	  	  The	  entire	  state	  of	  
Missouri	  had	  over	  a	  thousand	  lab	  seizures	  in	  2003	  (NCLSS	  2011).	  	  
	   Further	  complicating	  matters	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  at	  one	  point	  in	  its	  history,	  
methamphetamine	  was	  available	  in	  numerous	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  and	  prescription	  
preparations.	  	  Every	  part	  of	  the	  country	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  develop	  a	  taste	  for	  
the	  stimulant.	  	  However,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  use	  and	  production	  were	  
concentrated	  almost	  entirely	  on	  the	  West	  Coast.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  twenty	  
years,	  methamphetamine	  markets	  have	  begun	  to	  diffuse	  from	  West	  to	  East	  across	  
the	  United	  States	  (Figure	  5.5).	  	  Yet	  to	  this	  day,	  they	  are	  unevenly	  distributed	  across	  
the	  country,	  and	  have	  yet	  to	  penetrate	  most	  of	  the	  East	  Coast.	  	  	  	  
	   The	  task	  of	  explaining	  why	  the	  geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  has	  evolved	  
in	  the	  way	  that	  is	  has	  is	  further	  complicated	  by	  our	  culture’s	  insistence	  on	  either	  
ignoring	  or	  forgetting	  that	  this	  drug	  has	  a	  long	  history.	  	  The	  titles	  given	  to	  hearings	  
on	  the	  subject	  are	  illustrative	  of	  this	  trend.	  	  In	  1994,	  for	  example,	  the	  House	  of	  
Representatives	  held	  a	  hearing	  called	  “New	  Problems	  Facing	  the	  DEA,”	  and	  in	  1998	  
the	  Senate	  met	  for	  	  “Methamphetamine:	  A	  New	  Deadly	  Neighbor.”	  	  During	  opening	  
remarks	  at	  a	  hearing	  in	  2004,	  Representative	  Mark	  Souder	  of	  Indiana	  made	  a	  
similarly	  erroneous	  claim,	  arguing	  that	  “this	  meth	  phenomenon	  has	  really	  caught	  
the	  political	  attention	  because	  it’s	  a	  new	  drug”	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2004b).	  
These	  assertions	  of	  newness	  are	  hard	  to	  explain.	  	  Representative	  Souder	  had	  been	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present	  at	  no	  fewer	  than	  four	  hearings	  on	  methamphetamine	  before	  he	  made	  his	  
statement.	  In	  fact,	  in	  the	  year	  that	  he	  spoke,	  methamphetamine	  had	  been	  available	  
in	  American	  markets	  for	  seventy	  years.	  	  
Our	  cultural	  blind	  spot	  regarding	  the	  drug’s	  history	  has	  meant	  that	  officials	  
who	  ought	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  methamphetamine’s	  current	  distribution	  cannot.	  	  
For	  example,	  when	  Rogelio	  Guevara,	  the	  chief	  of	  operations	  for	  the	  Drug	  
Enforcement	  Administration,	  was	  asked	  by	  Congress	  to	  explain	  why	  meth	  markets	  
were	  so	  disproportionately	  encountered	  on	  the	  West	  Coast,	  he	  could	  not	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  2003).	  	  Some	  of	  this	  governmental	  ignorance	  regarding	  
methamphetamine	  undoubtedly	  comes	  from	  the	  drug’s	  low	  status	  in	  the	  pantheon	  
of	  hardcore	  addictive	  substances.	  Veteran	  officials	  sometimes	  refer	  to	  meth	  as	  
“kiddie	  dope,”	  and	  Suo	  (2004e)	  has	  claimed	  that	  the	  DEA	  has	  long	  denigrated	  the	  
significance	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  overall	  war	  on	  drugs	  (A1).	  	  
Public	  ignorance	  regarding	  methamphetamine	  also	  stems	  from	  the	  very	  
nature	  of	  the	  drug	  itself.	  	  Jenkins	  (1999)	  has	  argued	  that	  synthetic	  drugs	  have	  been	  
studied	  and	  monitored	  less	  than	  others	  because	  they	  have	  historically	  been	  
consumed	  by	  whites.	  	  With	  the	  focus	  of	  antidrug	  campaigns	  largely	  directed	  at	  
heroin	  and	  cocaine,	  which	  are	  consumed	  predominantly	  by	  minorities,	  data	  
initiatives	  such	  as	  the	  Drug	  Abuse	  Warning	  Network	  (DAWN)	  and	  Treatment	  
Episode	  Datasets	  (TEDS)2	  have	  emphasized	  inner-­‐city	  locations.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  note	  
that	  little	  or	  no	  coverage	  of	  methamphetamine	  existed	  in	  the	  popular	  press	  or	  
academic	  journals	  before	  the	  mid	  1990s.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  DAWN	  monitors	  emergency	  room	  admissions	  and	  coroners’	  reports	  for	  the	  drugs	  responsible.	  	  
TEDs	  monitor	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  seek	  treatment	  for	  addiction	  to	  specific	  drugs.	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Jenkins	  stressed	  that	  the	  dearth	  of	  historical	  studies	  on	  synthetic	  drugs	  gave	  
them	  the	  appearance	  of	  having	  no	  history,	  causing	  us	  to	  perceive	  false	  explosions	  in	  
growth	  from	  long-­‐term	  trends,	  and	  to	  create	  epidemics	  out	  of	  slow	  burns.	  	  “Without	  
a	  historical	  perspective,”	  he	  argued,	  “we	  will	  continually	  be	  surprised	  by	  what	  seem	  
to	  be	  ‘new’	  synthetic	  drug	  problems,	  though	  in	  reality	  these	  situations	  usually	  have	  
deep	  local	  roots”	  (27).	  
	   My	  study	  seeks	  to	  disinter	  the	  roots	  of	  methamphetamine	  markets	  and	  to	  
explain	  the	  drug’s	  unique	  geography	  from	  a	  historical	  perspective.	  	  This	  approach	  
yields	  a	  much	  more	  complete	  understanding	  of	  methamphetamine’s	  present	  
distribution	  and	  should	  be	  useful	  for	  predicting	  future	  patterns.	  Before	  we	  can	  
explore	  that	  history,	  however,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  drug	  
this	  project	  intends	  to	  study.	  	  	  	  
	  
Methamphetamine	  
Methamphetamine	  is	  a	  central	  nervous	  system	  stimulant	  that	  the	  federal	  
government	  has	  labeled	  as	  a	  Schedule	  II	  substance.	  	  This	  scheduling	  means	  that	  the	  
drug	  possesses	  some	  medical	  benefits,	  but	  has	  been	  recognized	  to	  be	  addictive	  and	  
potentially	  dangerous.	  	  Schedule	  II	  drugs	  are	  in	  a	  precarious	  position.	  
Methamphetamine,	  for	  example,	  can	  still	  be	  obtained	  with	  a	  prescription.	  	  It	  is	  
available	  legally	  under	  the	  name	  Desoxyn,	  and	  is	  prescribed	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  
Attention	  Deficit	  Disorder	  in	  children	  and	  adults,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  narcolepsy	  (Covey	  
2007a).	  	  On	  the	  street,	  methamphetamine	  assumes	  another	  life.	  	  The	  volume	  of	  its	  
sales	  increases	  tremendously,	  and	  it	  goes	  by	  many	  names:	  speed,	  crank,	  crystal,	  ice	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and	  more.	  	  In	  Hawaii	  and	  parts	  of	  Asia	  it	  is	  called	  batu	  or	  shabu	  (Laidler	  and	  Morgan	  
1997).	  	  When	  used	  for	  illegal	  purposes,	  it	  can	  be	  ingested,	  snorted,	  smoked,	  or	  taken	  
intravenously.	  	  Methamphetamine	  use	  produces	  an	  intense	  euphoric	  high.	  	  The	  
degree	  of	  its	  effects	  vary	  slightly	  depending	  upon	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  is	  used	  and,	  
more	  significantly,	  on	  the	  dosage	  taken.	  	  	  	  	  
Methamphetamine	  works	  on	  the	  human	  body	  by	  encouraging	  the	  rapid	  
release	  of	  norepinephrine	  (the	  neurotransmitter	  responsible	  for	  stimulation	  of	  the	  
sympathetic	  nervous	  system3)	  and	  dopamine	  (the	  neurotransmitter	  responsible	  for	  
activating	  pleasure	  centers	  in	  the	  brain),	  and	  then	  inhibiting	  their	  re-­‐uptake.	  	  	  The	  
result,	  if	  smoked	  or	  injected,	  is	  a	  profound	  initial	  feeling	  of	  well-­‐being	  often	  called	  a	  
“rush,”	  which	  lasts	  for	  approximately	  thirty	  minutes,	  followed	  by	  a	  high	  that	  can	  last	  
for	  as	  many	  as	  twelve	  hours.	  	  This	  secondary	  high	  is	  often	  compared	  to	  that	  of	  other	  
stimulants	  such	  as	  cocaine,	  however	  the	  buzz	  associated	  with	  cocaine	  only	  lasts	  
between	  fifteen	  minutes	  and	  an	  hour.	  After	  the	  lengthy	  high	  of	  methamphetamine	  
comes	  a	  crash,	  in	  which	  users	  have	  increased	  irritability,	  fatigue,	  and	  depression.	  	  To	  
avoid	  this	  crash,	  heavy	  users	  will	  go	  on	  “runs”	  where	  they	  repeatedly	  use	  the	  drug	  
for	  numerous	  days.	  	  The	  crash	  after	  a	  multiday	  run	  will	  often	  lead	  the	  abuser	  to	  
enter	  an	  unresponsive	  sleep	  that	  can	  last	  eighteen	  hours	  or	  more	  (Iversen	  2006).	  	  	  
The	  short-­‐term	  effects	  of	  methamphetamine	  can	  be	  divided	  based	  on	  the	  
neurotransmitters	  released.	  	  The	  release	  of	  norepinephrine	  can	  cause	  elevated	  
blood	  pressure	  and	  heart	  rate,	  teeth	  grinding,	  appetite	  suppression,	  insomnia,	  
tremors,	  and	  blurry	  vision.	  	  Effects	  caused	  by	  the	  release	  of	  dopamine	  include:	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feelings	  of	  euphoria	  (well-­‐being),	  elevated	  energy,	  increased	  sensory	  
perception,	  improved	  attention,	  excitation,	  intensification	  of	  
emotions,	  perception	  of	  elevated	  self-­‐esteem,	  increased	  alertness,	  
agitation,	  aggression,	  restlessness,	  irritability,	  repetitive	  stereotyped	  
behavior,	  and	  increased	  physical	  activity	  (Wells	  2007).	  	  	  
	  
Many	  users	  report	  first	  using	  meth	  for	  it	  energizing	  effects.	  	  Since	  its	  
introduction	  in	  the	  1930s,	  it	  has	  often	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  working	  class,	  
particularly	  factory	  laborers,	  members	  of	  the	  military,	  students,	  and	  truck	  drivers,	  
all	  of	  whom	  used	  it	  as	  a	  means	  to	  get	  more	  hours	  out	  of	  the	  day.	  	  In	  a	  recent	  study	  of	  
heavy	  users	  in	  Georgia,	  Lende	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  found	  that	  most	  people	  used	  the	  drug	  to	  
improve	  their	  own	  functionality.	  	  Women	  are	  said	  to	  be	  drawn	  to	  it	  for	  the	  extreme	  
weight	  loss	  that	  it	  can	  cause,	  though	  Linnemann	  (2010)	  has	  found	  that	  the	  logic	  
behind	  this	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  gender	  stereotypes	  than	  actual	  fact.	  	  	  Other	  people	  
purportedly	  use	  the	  drug	  as	  an	  enhancement	  to	  sexual	  intercourse,	  where	  it	  is	  
particularly	  popular	  among	  homosexual	  men	  (Morgan	  and	  Beck	  1997;	  Rebeck	  2004;	  
Bonnell	  2008).	  Finally,	  its	  energizing	  and	  euphoric	  effects	  have	  led	  to	  its	  popularity	  
as	  a	  club	  drug	  	  (Owen	  2007;	  Covey	  2007a;	  Iversen	  2006;	  Wilkinson	  1998;	  
Rasmussen	  2008;	  Klee	  1997).	  	  	  	  
Continued	  long-­‐term	  use	  of	  methamphetamine	  can	  lead	  to	  numerous	  serious	  
health	  risks,	  not	  the	  least	  of	  which	  is	  addiction.	  	  According	  to	  the	  Center	  for	  
Substance	  Abuse	  Treatment’s	  Treatment	  Improvement	  Protocol	  for	  Treatment	  for	  
Stimulant	  Use	  Disorders	  (1999),	  methamphetamine	  addiction	  usually	  occurs	  after	  a	  
latency	  period	  of	  between	  two	  and	  five	  years,	  though	  it	  can	  certainly	  happen	  sooner	  
depending	  on	  the	  amount	  used	  and	  method	  of	  consumption.	  	  It	  is	  comparable	  to,	  but	  
no	  worse	  than,	  heroin.	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The	  continued	  excessive	  release	  of	  norepinephrine	  can	  cause	  heart	  
arrhythmias,	  hypertension,	  inflammation	  of	  the	  heart	  muscle	  and	  lining,	  aneurysms,	  
and	  heart	  attacks.	  	  	  However,	  the	  most	  serious	  and	  concerning	  long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  
methamphetamine	  abuse	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  brain.	  	  	  Any	  excess	  dopamine	  that	  
cannot	  be	  reabsorbed	  by	  that	  organ	  must	  be	  broken	  down,	  resulting	  in	  a	  toxic	  
byproduct	  that	  sits	  on	  the	  brain’s	  surface,	  and	  can	  cause	  the	  loss	  of	  fine	  and	  gross	  
motor	  skills,	  memory,	  and	  cognition.	  The	  brain	  of	  a	  serious	  meth	  abuser	  has	  been	  
compared	  to	  that	  of	  a	  patient	  with	  Parkinson’s	  disease.	  	  Such	  brain	  damage	  can	  lead	  
to	  seizures,	  strokes,	  and	  aneurisms	  (Wells	  2007;	  Iversen	  2006).	  	  	  
Short-­‐term	  use	  of	  methamphetamine	  can	  cause	  hallucinations	  and	  feelings	  of	  
paranoia.	  	  Prolonged	  use	  often	  leads	  to	  amphetamine	  psychosis,	  a	  condition	  
characterized	  by	  extreme	  paranoia,	  anxiety,	  and	  vivid	  audio	  and	  visual	  
hallucinations,	  which	  closely	  resemble	  paranoid	  schizophrenia.	  	  Sufferers	  of	  
amphetamine	  psychosis	  can	  injure	  themselves	  and	  others.	  	  They	  often	  believe	  that	  
they	  have	  bugs	  or	  other	  nuisances	  on	  or	  under	  their	  skin,	  and	  will	  have	  tell-­‐tale	  
scabs	  where	  they	  have	  picked	  holes	  trying	  to	  get	  at	  these	  imagined	  pests.	  	  The	  
paranoid	  hallucinations	  of	  amphetamine	  psychosis	  have	  led	  to	  violent	  outbursts	  and	  
even	  murder,	  though	  the	  rate	  at	  which	  such	  violence	  happens	  is	  unclear	  (Iversen	  
2006).	  	  	  
Damage	  also	  occurs	  in	  the	  cells	  involved	  with	  dopamine	  release	  and	  uptake,	  
meaning	  that	  long-­‐term	  users	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  experience	  the	  same	  levels	  of	  
pleasure	  that	  they	  had	  when	  they	  began	  taking	  the	  drug,	  creating	  increasing	  levels	  
of	  tolerance,	  which	  then	  lead	  to	  even	  more	  binging.	  	  This	  sequence	  causes	  addicts	  to	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go	  on	  ever-­‐longer	  runs,	  which	  produce	  a	  series	  of	  stereotypical	  meth-­‐addict	  
features.	  During	  a	  long	  run,	  users	  generally	  do	  not	  eat,	  resulting	  in	  extreme	  weight	  
loss.	  	  They	  also	  tend	  not	  to	  worry	  about	  personal	  hygiene.	  A	  lack	  of	  tooth	  brushing,	  
for	  example,	  combined	  with	  teeth	  grinding	  and	  a	  reduction	  of	  saliva	  production	  
brought	  on	  by	  the	  drug	  can	  result	  in	  “meth	  mouth,”	  a	  series	  of	  yellow,	  rotten,	  and	  
often	  missing	  teeth.	  
	  
Methamphetamine	  Production	  
Methamphetamine	  is	  a	  synthetic	  drug,	  meaning	  that	  it	  can	  be	  produced	  
without	  the	  need	  of	  organic	  ingredients.	  	  Whereas	  cocaine	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  coca	  
leaf	  and	  heroin	  from	  the	  poppy,	  methamphetamine	  can	  be	  made	  entirely	  from	  
products	  found	  in	  most	  homes.	  	  Although	  methamphetamine	  is	  not	  the	  only	  
synthetic	  drug	  to	  have	  achieved	  popularity	  (LSD,	  PCP,	  Ecstasy,	  and	  Fentanyl	  are	  
common	  examples),	  it	  is	  by	  far	  the	  one	  most	  commonly	  manufactured	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  the	  world	  (ONDCP	  2004c;	  UNODC	  2008).	  	  
All	  illicit	  drugs	  are	  a	  drain	  on	  society.	  	  The	  violence	  and	  crime	  associated	  with	  
them	  create	  numerous	  costs	  for	  taxpayers.	  	  Criminals	  are	  imprisoned.	  	  Families	  are	  
broken	  up.	  	  Children	  become	  wards	  of	  the	  state.	  	  High	  drug	  treatment	  and	  
healthcare	  costs	  are	  associated	  with	  drug	  abuse,	  often	  for	  users	  without	  insurance.	  
A	  psychic	  toll	  is	  also	  taken	  on	  communities	  that	  face	  high	  rates	  of	  usage	  and	  
addiction	  (Reding	  2009;	  Garriot	  2011).	  	  In	  a	  study	  conducted	  by	  the	  Rand	  
Corporation,	  Nicosia	  et	  al.	  (2009)	  estimated	  that	  methamphetamine	  cost	  the	  United	  
States	  23.4	  billion	  dollars	  in	  the	  year	  2005	  alone.	  	  Some	  $61	  million	  of	  that	  total	  was	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related	  to	  meth	  labs,	  production	  facilities	  unlike	  those	  found	  for	  any	  other	  major	  
drug.	  	  	  
Obviously,	  all	  illegal	  synthetic	  drugs	  are	  produced	  in	  laboratories.	  	  Some	  of	  
them,	  such	  as	  LSD	  and	  Fentanyl,	  are	  very	  difficult	  to	  make.	  	  Others,	  such	  as	  PCP,	  are	  
easy.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  difficulty,	  methamphetamine	  falls	  somewhere	  in	  the	  middle.	  	  
Despite	  that	  fact,	  since	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  1990s,	  greater	  than	  95%	  of	  all	  the	  
synthetic	  drug	  labs	  seized	  in	  the	  Untied	  States	  have	  produced	  methamphetamine	  
(NDIC	  2005a).	  	  	  
Meth	  can	  be	  made	  in	  numerous	  ways.	  	  Recipes	  or	  methods	  depend	  on	  
different	  raw	  materials,	  the	  most	  important	  of	  which	  are	  precursor	  chemicals,	  which	  
are	  incorporated	  into	  the	  final	  product's	  molecular	  structure	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
production	  process	  (Sevick	  1993).	  	  Different	  recipes	  have	  risen	  and	  declined	  in	  
popularity	  over	  time,	  usually	  as	  a	  result	  of	  governmental	  attempts	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  
particular	  precursors.	  	  Today,	  anyone	  interested	  in	  learning	  how	  to	  make	  the	  drug	  
can	  easily	  find	  a	  recipe.	  	  Books	  such	  as	  Uncle	  Fester’s	  Secrets	  of	  Methamphetamine	  
Manufacture	  (2009)	  can	  be	  purchased	  from	  Amazon.com,	  and	  whole	  websites	  are	  
devoted	  to	  the	  subject.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  labs	  have	  proliferated.	  	  	  
Labs	  vary	  in	  size,	  producing	  quantities	  from	  just	  a	  few	  grams	  to	  fifty	  pounds	  
or	  more.	  	  In	  the	  U.	  S.	  the	  trend	  has	  been	  away	  from	  large,	  immobile	  facilities	  that	  
need	  to	  be	  set	  up	  for	  several	  days	  to	  much	  smaller	  mobile	  ones	  that	  can	  produce	  the	  
drug	  in	  just	  a	  few	  hours.	  	  Most	  labs	  today	  are	  small-­‐scale,	  designed	  to	  produce	  
enough	  product	  for	  the	  “cook”	  and	  perhaps	  a	  few	  others.	  	  These	  facilities	  are	  often	  
referred	  to	  as	  small	  toxic	  labs	  (STLs)	  or	  “mom-­‐and-­‐pop”	  operations.	  	  Large-­‐scale	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operations,	  those	  producing	  greater	  than	  ten	  pounds	  of	  the	  drug	  at	  a	  time,	  are	  
referred	  to	  as	  “superlabs,”	  and	  are	  generally	  associated	  with	  sophisticated	  drug	  
trafficking	  organizations	  (DEA	  2005).	  	  In	  2009,	  85%	  of	  the	  labs	  seized	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  
had	  a	  capacity	  at	  or	  below	  two	  ounces	  per	  batch	  (NDIC	  2010;	  2011a).	  	  Interestingly,	  
though	  the	  size	  of	  labs	  has	  shrunk,	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  meth	  produced	  has	  increased.	  
Chemical	   Hazard	  
Acetone/Ethyl	  Alcohol	   Extremely	  flammable,	  posing	  a	  fire	  risk	  in	  and	  
around	  the	  laboratory.	  	  Inhalation/ingestion	  
causes	  severe	  gastric	  irritation,	  narcosis,	  or	  
coma.	  
	  
Freon	   Inhalation	  can	  cause	  sudden	  cardiac	  death	  or	  
severe	  lung	  damage.	  	  Corrosive	  if	  ingested.	  
	  
Anhydrous	  Ammonia	   Inhalation	  causes	  edema	  of	  the	  respiratory	  tract	  
and	  asphyxia.	  	  Contact	  with	  vapors	  damages	  eyes	  
and	  mucous	  membranes.	  
	  
Red	  Phosphorous	   May	  explode	  on	  contact	  or	  friction.	  	  Ignites	  if	  
heated	  above	  260	  degrees.	  	  Vapors	  from	  ignited	  
phosphorus	  severely	  irritate	  nose,	  throat	  and	  
lungs.	  
	  
Hypophosphorous	  Acid	   Extremely	  dangerous	  substitute	  for	  red	  
phosphorous.	  	  If	  overheated,	  deadly	  phosphine	  
gas	  is	  released.	  	  Poses	  a	  serious	  fire	  and	  
explosion	  hazard.	  
	  
Lithium	  Metal	   Extremely	  caustic	  to	  all	  body	  tissue.	  	  Reacts	  
violently	  with	  water	  and	  poses	  a	  fire	  or	  explosion	  
hazard.	  
	  
Hydroiodic	  Acid	   A	  corrosive	  acid	  with	  vapors	  that	  are	  irritating	  to	  
the	  respiratory	  system,	  eyes,	  and	  skin.	  	  If	  
ingested,	  causes	  severe	  internal	  irritation	  and	  
damage	  that	  may	  cause	  death.	  
	  
Iodine	  Crystals	   Give	  off	  vapor	  that	  is	  irritating	  to	  respiratory	  
system	  and	  eyes.	  	  Solid	  form	  irritates	  the	  eyes	  
and	  may	  burn	  skin.	  	  If	  ingested,	  it	  will	  cause	  
severe	  internal	  damage.	  
	  
Table	  I.1:	  Hazards	  associated	  with	  the	  common	  chemicals	  used	  in	  
methamphetamine	  production	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2003,	  71).	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Most	  of	  the	  essential	  chemicals	  involved	  in	  methamphetamine	  production	  
are	  hazardous,	  making	  meth	  labs	  toxic	  places	  (Table	  I.1).	  Today,	  police	  officers	  are	  
required	  to	  take	  a	  forty-­‐hour	  course	  before	  being	  certified	  to	  enter	  a	  lab,	  and	  have	  to	  
don	  haz/mat	  suits	  before	  entering	  a	  building	  where	  they	  know	  a	  lab	  is	  present.	  	  
Such	  caution	  is	  justified,	  as	  the	  DEA	  estimates	  that,	  for	  every	  pound	  of	  
methamphetamine	  created,	  five	  pounds	  of	  toxic	  waste	  are	  produced	  (DEA	  2005).	  
Not	  surprisingly,	  these	  byproducts	  are	  rarely	  dealt	  with	  properly.	  	  More	  often	  then	  
not,	  they	  are	  dumped	  down	  a	  drain	  or	  left	  outside	  to	  leach	  into	  the	  ground,	  thus	  
extending	  contamination	  well	  beyond	  the	  structure	  in	  which	  the	  meth	  was	  cooked.	  	  
Law	  enforcement	  is	  responsible	  for	  removing	  lab	  equipment	  and	  chemicals	  from	  a	  
location,	  but	  property	  owners	  must	  cover	  the	  cost	  of	  remediation,	  or	  “the	  cleanup	  of	  
residual	  contamination	  after	  gross	  removal	  has	  occurred”	  (EPA	  2009,	  3).	  	  
	  
Researching	  Methamphetamine	  	  
	   Though	  other	  disciplines	  have	  devoted	  great	  amounts	  of	  time	  and	  energy	  to	  
the	  study	  of	  drugs,	  few	  geographers	  have	  bothered	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Rengert	  (1996)	  
produced	  the	  seminal	  study,	  in	  which	  he	  explored	  the	  diffusion	  of	  illegal	  drugs	  in	  
general	  across	  the	  U.	  S.	  	  Among	  geographies	  of	  a	  single	  drug,	  Crooker	  (1985,	  1987,	  
1988,	  1992a,	  1992b)	  has	  produced	  several	  studies	  of	  opium	  production	  in	  Asia,	  and	  
25Steinberg	  (2000)	  took	  a	  political	  economy	  perspective	  in	  examining	  the	  
connections	  between	  drug	  trafficking	  and	  military	  juntas	  in	  developing	  countries.	  	  
	   Geographical	  analyses	  of	  methamphetamine	  have	  been	  limited.	  	  Lu	  and	  
Burnum	  (2008)	  conducted	  a	  statistical	  analysis	  of	  lab	  seizures	  around	  Colorado	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Springs,	  while	  Weisheit	  and	  Wells	  (2010)	  performed	  a	  similar	  analysis	  for	  lab	  
seizures	  for	  the	  entire	  United	  States,	  and	  Gilbreath	  (2010)	  ran	  spatial	  regressions	  on	  
seizure	  data	  from	  Jefferson	  County,	  Missouri.	  	  Although	  offering	  important	  insight	  
into	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  methamphetamine	  labs	  and	  producing	  
snapshots	  of	  a	  process	  that	  is	  still	  evolving,	  these	  studies	  offer	  little	  in	  terms	  of	  
understanding	  the	  drug’s	  geography	  in	  a	  historical	  context.	  
	   The	  nature	  of	  methamphetamine’s	  production	  sets	  it	  apart	  from	  the	  other	  
major	  drugs	  in	  America.	  	  Cocaine	  and	  heroin	  are	  extracted	  from	  plants	  that	  are	  
harvested	  and	  processed	  outside	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Marijuana	  cultivation,	  while	  
occurring	  in	  significant	  amounts	  within	  our	  borders,	  is	  spatially	  extensive.	  	  Meth	  is	  
the	  only	  significant	  drug	  that	  can	  actually	  be	  made	  anywhere.	  	  As	  such,	  it	  makes	  
sense	  to	  study	  methamphetamine’s	  geography	  through	  time,	  and	  from	  the	  supply	  
side.	  	  By	  answering	  the	  two-­‐fold	  question	  of	  who	  has	  controlled	  methamphetamine	  
production	  in	  different	  decades,	  and	  how	  they	  have	  produced	  it,	  this	  dissertation	  is	  
able	  to	  explain	  the	  drug’s	  unique	  distribution.	  	  	  
	   To	  recreate	  the	  historical	  geography	  of	  methamphetamine,	  this	  study	  relies	  
on	  a	  number	  of	  sources.	  	  Rasmussen	  (2008)	  and	  Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  (1975)	  
have	  thoroughly	  documented	  the	  early	  history	  of	  amphetamines	  in	  America,	  though	  
not	  from	  a	  geographical	  perspective.	  	  I	  supplement	  their	  work	  with	  newspaper	  and	  
magazine	  articles	  as	  well	  as	  those	  from	  professional	  journals.	  	  The	  writings	  of	  
forensic	  scientists	  have	  been	  particularly	  useful	  in	  tracking	  emerging	  production	  
trends.	  	  As	  the	  war	  on	  drugs	  has	  become	  more	  formalized,	  primary	  sources	  become	  
more	  numerous.	  	  Reports	  from	  government	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  National	  Institute	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on	  Drug	  Abuse	  (NIDA),	  the	  Substance	  Abuse	  and	  Mental	  Health	  Services	  
Administration	  (SAMHSA),	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy	  (ONDCP),	  and	  
Drug	  Enforcement	  Administration	  (DEA),	  as	  well	  as	  transcripts	  from	  hearings	  
before	  both	  houses	  of	  Congress	  begin	  to	  be	  abundant	  in	  the	  1980s.	  
	   Statistics	  regarding	  drug	  use	  indicators	  become	  available	  in	  the	  1970s.	  	  The	  
National	  Household	  Survey	  on	  Drug	  Use	  began	  in	  1974,	  and	  evolved	  into	  the	  
National	  Survey	  on	  Drug	  Use	  and	  Health.	  	  Unfortunately,	  methamphetamine-­‐specific	  
questions	  did	  not	  enter	  this	  survey	  until	  the	  1990s.	  	  The	  Drug	  Abuse	  Warning	  
Network	  (DAWN)	  is	  a	  nationwide	  system	  used	  to	  track	  drug-­‐related	  emergency	  
department	  (ED)	  visits	  and	  drug-­‐related	  deaths	  examined	  by	  coroners.	  	  This	  system	  
records	  such	  events	  in	  Metropolitan	  Statistical	  Areas	  across	  the	  country,	  and	  has	  
done	  so	  since	  1972.	  	  Though	  the	  methodology	  has	  changed	  over	  time	  and	  
comparisons	  between	  specific	  eras	  of	  the	  DAWN	  system	  should	  be	  done	  only	  with	  
caution,4	  the	  system	  was	  specifically	  designed	  to	  track	  emerging	  trends	  in	  drug	  use	  
and	  is	  ideally	  suited	  to	  the	  designs	  of	  this	  project	  (Caulkins	  et	  al.	  1995).	  	  
	   Two	  distinct	  systems	  have	  tracked	  admissions	  for	  drug	  abuse	  treatment	  for	  
the	  entire	  United	  States:	  the	  Client-­‐Oriented	  Data	  Acquisition	  Process	  (CODAP)	  and	  
the	  Treatment	  Episode	  Data	  Sets	  (TEDS).	  	  CODAP,	  which	  began	  in	  1972,	  was	  
designed	  to	  track	  drug	  treatment	  admissions	  in	  all	  facilities	  that	  received	  federal	  
funding.	  	  The	  project	  ran	  until	  1981.	  	  The	  TEDS	  system	  expanded	  coverage	  to	  
include	  facilities	  that	  receive	  state	  funding	  or	  federal	  block	  grants.	  	  Unfortunately,	  
TEDS	  did	  not	  begin	  until	  1992,	  creating	  an	  eleven-­‐year	  gap	  in	  treatment	  data.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  exception	  here	  is	  when	  the	  Substance	  Abuse	  and	  Mental	  Health	  Services	  Administration	  
(SAMHSA)	  releases	  reports	  that	  have	  normalized	  the	  data.	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CODAP,	  TEDS,	  and	  DAWN	  all	  report	  incidents	  and	  not	  individuals,	  so	  individuals	  
may	  be	  counted	  multiple	  times	  if	  they	  are	  involved	  in	  more	  than	  one	  incident	  in	  a	  
given	  year.	  	  	  
	   Data	  on	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  are	  also	  available	  to	  varying	  degrees.	  	  
Before	  2000,	  no	  formalized	  system	  existed	  to	  track	  seizures	  by	  state	  or	  local	  police	  
agencies.	  	  The	  DEA	  kept	  statistics,	  but	  published	  them	  only	  erratically	  and	  some	  
hard-­‐hit	  states	  kept	  their	  own	  statistics.	  	  Often,	  the	  DEA	  numbers	  underreport	  the	  
actual	  number	  of	  labs	  seized	  by	  all	  agencies.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  California,	  which	  has	  
been	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  methamphetamine	  production	  for	  most	  of	  the	  drug’s	  
history,	  the	  state’s	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  Enforcement	  almost	  assuredly	  took	  down	  far	  
more	  methamphetamine	  labs	  than	  the	  DEA	  during	  the	  1980s,	  but	  their	  data	  
collection	  and	  reporting	  processes	  were	  inconsistent,	  so	  we	  must	  rely	  on	  DEA	  totals.	  	  	  
Even	  today,	  when	  the	  DEA	  runs	  the	  National	  Clandestine	  Laboratory	  Seizure	  
System	  (NCLSS),	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  be	  the	  national	  clearinghouse	  of	  lab	  seizure	  
data,	  numbers	  often	  vary.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  National	  Drug	  Threat	  Assessment	  2011	  
(NDIC	  2011a)	  states	  that	  6,032	  labs	  were	  seized	  in	  2009,	  while	  the	  National	  
Methamphetamine	  Threat	  Assessment:	  2010	  puts	  the	  total	  that	  year	  at	  5,306	  (NDIC	  
2010).5	  	  Such	  discrepancies	  are	  significant.	  	  All	  statistical	  analyses	  of	  lab	  seizures	  in	  
this	  study	  use	  data	  obtained	  from	  the	  DEA	  through	  a	  Freedom	  of	  Information	  Act	  
request	  and	  reflect	  data	  extracted	  from	  the	  system	  in	  January	  2011.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Further	  complicating	  matters,	  states	  or	  municipalities	  may	  report	  labs	  differently.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  
lab	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  operation	  might	  be	  classified	  as	  a	  lab	  seizure	  in	  one	  jurisdiction	  and	  as	  a	  
dump-­‐site	  in	  another.	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   In	  combination,	  these	  various	  sources	  have	  allowed	  me	  to	  trace	  the	  historical	  
geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  America.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  hope	  to	  accomplish	  two	  
interrelated	  goals:	  to	  rid	  the	  country	  of	  its	  collective	  amnesia	  about	  the	  drug’s	  past	  
and	  to	  explain	  the	  drug’s	  uniquely	  irregular	  distribution.	  	  Such	  an	  understanding	  
should	  be	  of	  use	  to	  policy	  makers	  and	  academics	  alike.	  	  	  
	   The	  organization	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  largely	  chronological.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  
literature	  review,	  chapters	  are	  organized	  around	  the	  type	  of	  organization	  that	  was	  
dominant	  during	  a	  particular	  era.	  	  First	  comes	  a	  discussion	  of	  pertinent	  literature	  on	  
commodity	  chains,	  organized	  crime,	  and	  drug	  markets.	  	  Chapter	  2	  explores	  the	  
years	  of	  legally	  produced	  methamphetamine.	  	  Next,	  in	  chapter	  3,	  I	  explain	  how	  
methamphetamine	  came	  to	  be	  concentrated	  in	  the	  West.	  	  Chapter	  4	  then	  describes	  
market	  penetration	  by	  international	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations,	  while	  chapter	  5	  
looks	  at	  the	  growth	  in	  small-­‐scale	  lab	  production	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	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  Chapter	  1	  
Actor-­Network	  Theory,	  Commodity	  Chains,	  and	  Drug	  Markets	  
	  
Before	  we	  can	  discuss	  the	  history	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  what	  we	  are	  studying.	  	  	  For	  most	  of	  its	  
history,	  methamphetamine	  has	  been	  a	  controlled	  substance.	  The	  very	  fact	  of	  its	  
illegality	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  research.	  	  Its	  production,	  distribution,	  and	  
consumption	  have	  been	  illicit	  activities	  conducted	  away	  from	  the	  prying	  eyes	  of	  the	  
public,	  police,	  and	  researchers.	  	  This	  has	  led,	  in	  some	  cases,	  to	  exaggerated	  claims	  
about	  the	  drug’s	  prevalence,	  addictive	  nature,	  and	  potential	  for	  growth	  (Jenkins	  
1999;	  Owen	  2007).	  	  	  
Though	  drugs	  often	  come	  drenched	  in	  rhetoric	  and	  hysteria,	  it	  is	  important	  
to	  remember	  that	  they	  are,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  commodities.	  	  They	  are	  produced	  and	  
distributed	  for	  profit,	  oftentimes	  by	  members	  of	  society	  who	  have	  been	  deprived	  of	  
access	  to	  other	  economic	  outlets	  (Natarajan	  and	  Hough	  2000;	  Brownstein	  et	  al.	  
2010;	  Caulkins	  and	  Reuter	  1998,	  2006;	  Eck	  1994,	  1995;	  Gootenberg	  2009;	  Kleiman	  
and	  Young	  1995).	  Historian	  Paul	  Gootenberg	  (2009)	  has	  summarized	  the	  many	  
ways	  that	  illicit	  drugs	  operate	  as	  commodities	  through	  an	  explanation	  of	  the	  heroin	  
trade:	  
The	  again	  booming	  heroin	  trade	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  comprised	  of	  shifting	  
patterns	  of	  supply	  and	  demand,	  profit-­‐seeking	  and	  risk-­‐taking	  
entrepreneurs,	  rationalized	  labor	  and	  flexible-­‐production	  schedules,	  
extensive	  networks	  of	  middlemen	  and	  retailers,	  transport	  and	  
outsourcing	  dilemmas,	  product	  testing	  and	  product	  substitution,	  all	  
under	  crunching	  global	  competition	  (15).	  
	  
	  Any	  commodity	  lends	  itself	  to	  analysis	  via	  the	  sequential	  stages	  the	  product	  
must	  go	  through	  to	  reach	  consumers	  (Hughes	  and	  Reimer	  2004).	  	  These	  stages	  form	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what	  is	  known	  as	  a	  commodity	  chain.	  	  For	  a	  typical	  illicit	  drug	  the	  process	  might	  
look	  like	  this:	  cultivation	  >	  production	  >	  importation/smuggling	  >	  trafficking	  >	  
wholesale	  distribution	  >	  retail	  distribution>	  consumer.	  	  Members	  of	  the	  criminal	  
underworld	  have	  controlled	  these	  various	  links	  since	  methamphetamine	  first	  
became	  a	  controlled	  substance	  in	  1971.	  	  How	  we	  might	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  
that	  control,	  the	  level	  to	  which	  it	  is	  and	  has	  been	  organized,	  and	  the	  structure	  and	  
qualities	  of	  the	  markets	  in	  which	  the	  drug	  is	  sold	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  	  
	  
Actor-­Network	  Theory	  
Perhaps	  the	  most	  promising	  approach	  to	  tracing	  the	  commodity	  networks	  of	  
methamphetamine	  is	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  actor-­‐network	  theory	  (ANT).	  	  
Developed	  by	  Bruno	  Latour,	  John	  Law	  and	  Manuel	  Castells,	  ANT	  is	  a	  
poststructuralist	  social	  theory	  that	  relies	  on	  tenets	  that,	  at	  first	  glance,	  seem	  
controversial	  or	  counterintuitive,	  but	  which	  offer	  useful	  insight	  into	  the	  study	  of	  any	  
commodity	  (Murdoch	  1995;	  Thrift	  and	  Olds	  1996).	  	  It	  is	  particularly	  applicable	  to	  
the	  study	  of	  methamphetamine.	  
	   Latour	  describes	  actor-­‐network	  theory	  as	  a	  sociology	  of	  associations	  (Latour,	  
2005).	  	  ANT	  is	  a	  theory	  and	  methodology	  that	  attempts	  to	  trace	  the	  various	  
associations	  that	  are	  formed	  between	  actors.	  	  These	  actors	  may	  come	  together	  
(form	  associations)	  for	  any	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  commodity	  network,	  
that	  reason	  is	  to	  produce,	  distribute,	  sell,	  and	  consume	  a	  product.	  	  ANT	  uses	  the	  
network	  as	  the	  primary	  metaphor	  for	  these	  groups	  of	  associations	  and	  for	  actors	  
within	  the	  network.	  	  Because	  each	  actor	  (people,	  groups,	  inanimate	  objects	  -­‐-­‐	  this	  is	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a	  broad	  term	  in	  ANT)	  contains	  within	  itself	  all	  the	  associations	  necessary	  to	  exist	  
and	  function,	  an	  actor	  is	  technically	  an	  actor-­‐network.	  	  
	   Actors	  enroll	  (or	  are	  enrolled)	  in	  any	  network	  because	  they	  share	  its	  goals.	  	  
However,	  each	  enrollee	  is	  transformed	  by	  that	  enrollment.	  	  This	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  
translation,	  a	  key	  element	  of	  actor-­‐network	  theory.	  	  A	  second	  major	  tenet	  of	  ANT	  is	  
that	  power	  is	  generated	  by	  the	  size	  of	  a	  network.	  	  To	  extend	  or	  create	  a	  network,	  
new	  entities	  or	  actors	  must	  be	  added.	  	  Power	  emerges	  as	  an	  actor	  incorporates	  and	  
translates	  more	  and	  more	  actors	  into	  the	  network	  and	  gains	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  (to	  
varying	  degrees)	  their	  actions.	  	  Applying	  this	  thinking	  to	  the	  methamphetamine	  
trade	  is	  easy.	  	  Larger	  methamphetamine	  networks	  include	  more	  producers	  and	  
users,	  control	  more	  territory,	  and	  produce	  larger	  profits.	  	  	  
	   Networks	  are	  often	  fleeting	  and	  tenuous	  things.	  	  Actors	  must	  share	  goals	  and	  
associations	  must	  be	  maintained.	  	  If	  an	  actor-­‐network	  does	  not	  succeed	  in	  meeting	  
its	  purpose	  through	  extension	  and	  translation,	  then	  the	  various	  entities	  making	  up	  
that	  system	  will	  drop	  out,	  and	  the	  network	  will	  cease	  to	  exist.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  
that	  translation	  is	  such	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  process.	  	  Presumably,	  it	  is	  
translation	  that	  enables	  success.	  	  Murdoch	  (2006)	  has	  called	  the	  location	  of	  the	  
actor-­‐network	  (single	  entity)	  that	  dictates	  translations	  and	  controls	  the	  network	  the	  
“center	  of	  calculation.”	  	  This	  center	  is	  “a	  discrete	  place	  able	  to	  act	  effectively	  on	  
many	  other	  dispersed	  spaces”	  (64).	  	  In	  Reassembling	  the	  Social,	  Latour	  (2005)	  
offered	  the	  example	  of	  an	  army’s	  control	  center.	  	  Such	  a	  center	  is	  not	  as	  large	  as	  the	  
front	  upon	  which	  the	  battle	  is	  raging,	  but	  as	  long	  as	  it	  remains	  connected	  to	  the	  
theater	  of	  battle,	  it	  can	  control	  what	  goes	  on	  there	  (Latour,	  182).	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   In	  the	  case	  of	  large-­‐scale	  methamphetamine	  commodity	  networks,	  the	  center	  
of	  calculation	  might	  be	  the	  mother	  chapter	  of	  an	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gang	  or	  the	  
home	  base	  of	  an	  international	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organization.	  	  Murdoch	  has	  called	  
rigidly	  defined	  and	  organized	  networks	  with	  strong	  centers	  of	  calculation	  “networks	  
of	  prescription.”	  	  Homegrown,	  small-­‐production	  networks	  probably	  lack	  any	  real	  
center	  of	  calculation.	  	  If	  we	  consider	  individual	  labs	  to	  be	  small	  individual	  networks,	  
then	  the	  cook	  or	  lab	  would	  be	  the	  center.	  	  But,	  if	  we	  put	  all	  clandestine,	  small-­‐scale	  
labs	  into	  a	  larger,	  loosely	  defined	  small-­‐lab	  network,	  then	  no	  clear	  center	  emerges,	  a	  
fact	  that	  helps	  to	  explain	  the	  relative	  weakness	  of	  those	  networks	  and	  the	  federal	  
government’s	  difficulty	  in	  ending	  domestic	  methamphetamine	  production.	  	  There	  is	  
no	  head	  that	  can	  be	  removed	  to	  shut	  down	  the	  network.	  
	   The	  most	  controversial	  aspect	  of	  ANT	  is	  that	  it	  assigns	  agency	  to	  nonhuman	  
actors	  within	  a	  network.	  	  Latour	  has	  argued	  that,	  in	  addition	  to	  serving	  as	  a	  “back-­‐
drop	  for	  human	  action,	  things	  [my	  emphasis]	  might	  authorize,	  allow,	  afford,	  
encourage,	  permit,	  suggest,	  influence,	  block,	  render	  possible,	  forbid,	  and	  so	  on	  [any	  
activity]”	  (Latour	  2005,	  72).	  	  ANT	  theorists	  assert	  that	  the	  study	  of	  associations	  is	  
not	  complete	  until	  the	  roles	  of	  nonhuman	  actors	  are	  fully	  investigated	  and	  
appreciated,	  and	  that	  these	  nonhuman	  actors	  are	  often	  essential	  to	  the	  production	  
and	  maintenance	  of	  any	  network.	  	  	  This	  bold	  assumption	  is	  easy	  to	  appreciate	  in	  
association	  with	  methamphetamine.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  small	  clandestine	  production	  in	  
the	  past,	  the	  government	  was	  not	  able	  to	  curb	  production	  even	  remotely	  through	  
the	  removal	  of	  human	  actors.	  	  Only	  supply-­‐side	  interventions	  that	  removed	  
methamphetamine	  precursors	  from	  the	  network	  have	  had	  success	  in	  disrupting	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production	  (Cunningham	  and	  Liu	  2003	  and	  2005;	  McBride	  et	  al.	  2008;	  NDIC	  2009;	  
Dobkin	  and	  Niciosa	  2009;	  Weisheit	  and	  Wells	  2010).	  	  Furthermore,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  
large-­‐scale	  production	  in	  the	  superlabs	  of	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  production	  is	  not	  even	  
close	  to	  being	  halted,	  and	  Mexico	  recently	  banned	  the	  importation	  of	  any	  products	  
containing	  ephedrine	  or	  pseudoephedrine	  into	  that	  country	  (UNODC	  2008).	  	  In	  this	  
sense,	  the	  key	  actor	  in	  any	  methamphetamine	  commodity	  network	  may	  be	  the	  
precursors	  themselves.	  	  Only	  their	  removal	  halts	  production.	  	  	  
	   ANT	  is	  a	  decidedly	  spatial	  theory	  and	  methodology,	  but	  it	  reconceptualizes	  
space.	  	  The	  main	  tenet	  of	  ANT	  as	  a	  methodology	  is	  to	  follow	  connections	  or	  
associations,	  so	  ANT	  practitioners	  should	  come	  into	  any	  situation	  with	  no	  
preconceived	  notion	  of	  scale.	  	  Latour	  (2005)	  has	  argued	  that	  any	  structuring	  force	  
that	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  global	  (such	  as	  capitalism)	  must	  constantly	  be	  reproduced	  on	  
the	  local	  level.	  	  However,	  any	  place	  perceived	  as	  local	  is	  actually	  connected	  to	  any	  
number	  of	  other	  locales	  through	  its	  enrollment	  in	  a	  network.	  	  A	  small	  lab	  in	  Oelwein,	  
Iowa,	  may	  seem	  entirely	  local,	  yet	  it	  is	  connected	  to	  large	  pharmaceutical	  
corporations	  that	  produce	  ephedrine-­‐	  or	  pseudoephedrine-­‐based	  products,	  that	  are	  
then	  connected	  to	  international	  chemical	  producers	  in	  India	  and	  China	  that	  process	  
those	  necessary	  precursors.	  	  As	  Latour	  put	  it:	  “No	  place	  dominates	  enough	  to	  be	  
global	  and	  no	  place	  is	  self-­‐contained	  enough	  to	  be	  local”	  (204).	  	  
	   By	  following	  the	  associations	  or	  connections	  between	  actors	  in	  the	  various	  
methamphetamine	  networks	  that	  have	  existed	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  over	  time,	  this	  study	  is	  
able	  to	  fill	  in	  a	  number	  of	  holes	  that	  exist	  in	  its	  spatial	  history.	  	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  
folly	  to	  rely	  on	  ANT	  alone.	  	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  literature,	  mostly	  in	  sociology	  and	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criminology,	  that	  addresses	  organized	  crime,	  drug	  markets,	  and	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations.	  	  Without	  directly	  addressing	  ANT,	  their	  finding	  support	  many	  of	  the	  
assertions	  laid	  out	  by	  Latour	  (2005).	  	  My	  deployment	  of	  ANT	  as	  a	  means	  of	  
discerning	  the	  networks	  that	  have	  coalesced	  around	  methamphetamine	  is	  
buttressed	  by	  that	  work.	  
Television,	  movies,	  and	  the	  popular	  press	  all	  seem	  to	  want	  us	  to	  believe	  that	  
the	  criminals	  involved	  in	  the	  business	  of	  drugs	  are	  generally	  intelligent	  and	  crafty,	  
developing	  incredibly	  complicated	  schemes	  to	  move	  enormous	  amounts	  of	  illicit	  
product	  throughout	  the	  country	  via	  carefully	  maintained	  networks	  of	  smugglers,	  
traffickers,	  and	  dealers	  (Felson	  and	  Boba	  2010).	  	  The	  truth	  is	  that	  most	  “organized	  
crime”	  could	  barely	  live	  up	  to	  its	  moniker.	  	  Rarely	  are	  drugs	  supplied	  and	  dealt	  by	  
the	  vertically	  integrated	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  (DTOs)	  depicted	  in	  shows	  
like	  Miami	  Vice	  (Felson	  2009).	  	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  their	  movements	  are	  controlled	  
by	  loose	  associations	  of	  dealers	  or	  individual	  operators	  (Eck	  and	  Gersh	  2000;	  Curtis	  
and	  Wendel	  2000;	  Natarajan	  2006).	  	  As	  Latour	  would	  predict,	  the	  markets	  they	  
establish	  are	  often	  fleeting	  collisions	  between	  motivated	  sellers	  and	  craving	  
consumers.	  	  Fortunately,	  a	  number	  of	  criminologists,	  economists,	  historians	  and	  
geographers	  have	  studied	  illicit	  drug	  markets	  and	  the	  organized	  crime	  associated	  
with	  them.	  	  
	  
Retail	  Drug	  Markets	  
	   Drug	  markets	  come	  in	  a	  dizzying	  number	  of	  varieties	  (Hough	  and	  Natarajan	  
2000).	  	  Variation	  depends	  on	  many	  factors	  including	  the	  type	  of	  distributors	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operating	  in	  the	  market,	  the	  type	  of	  drug	  being	  sold,	  the	  history	  and	  duration	  of	  
drug	  preference	  in	  a	  particular	  place,	  the	  effects	  of	  police	  efforts,	  security	  concerns	  
of	  dealers	  and	  users,	  and	  the	  geography	  of	  the	  market’s	  locale	  (Eck	  1994	  and	  1995;	  
Eck	  and	  Gersh	  2000;	  Rengert	  1996;	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  2000,	  2006;	  Robinson	  and	  
Rengert	  2006;	  Jenkins	  1999;	  Brownstein	  et	  al.	  2010;	  Felson	  and	  Boba	  2010).	  
On	  the	  retail	  level,	  be	  it	  controlled	  by	  independent	  dealers	  or	  cogs	  in	  a	  vast	  
DTO,	  drug	  markets	  occur	  where	  a	  dealer	  with	  product	  to	  sell	  meets	  a	  buyer	  with	  
cash	  or	  goods	  to	  exchange	  for	  that	  product.	  	  Eck	  (1994,	  1995)	  noted	  that	  each	  step	  
of	  this	  transaction	  is	  precarious.	  	  The	  dealer	  is	  in	  possession	  of	  often	  highly	  valuable,	  
but	  illegal	  drugs.	  	  In	  seeking	  out	  consumers	  for	  his	  product,	  he	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  either	  
being	  arrested	  by	  the	  police	  or	  assaulted	  or	  robbed	  by	  a	  competitor	  or	  consumer.	  	  If	  
the	  latter	  should	  occur,	  the	  dealer	  has	  no	  legal	  recourse	  to	  make	  back	  the	  money	  he	  
would	  have	  earned	  from	  his	  sale.	  	  He	  has	  none	  of	  the	  structural	  protection	  given	  to	  
retailers	  in	  the	  licit	  marketplace.	  	  Similarly,	  the	  consumer,	  too,	  is	  in	  a	  precarious	  
spot.	  	  She	  also	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  arrest	  or	  robbery	  without	  legal	  recourse.	  	  These	  two	  
factors	  cause	  both	  dealers	  and	  consumers	  to	  make	  specific	  choices	  about	  where	  they	  
go	  to	  sell	  and	  purchase	  drugs.	  	  
Eck	  (1994,	  1995)	  had	  identified	  two	  types	  of	  retail	  drug	  markets	  for	  illicit	  
drugs.	  	  In	  the	  “routine	  activities	  market”	  buyers	  and	  sellers	  operate	  in	  public	  places,	  
usually	  on	  or	  near	  busy	  thoroughfares.	  	  Hough	  and	  Natarajan	  (2000)	  refer	  to	  such	  
places	  as	  open	  markets.	  	  In	  this	  situation,	  buyer	  and	  consumer	  are	  generally	  
strangers	  to	  one	  another,	  and	  a	  significant	  portion	  the	  buyers	  will	  have	  traveled	  
from	  a	  distance	  to	  purchase	  their	  drugs.	  	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  (2005)	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have	  noted,	  such	  locations	  tend	  to	  develop	  regional	  reputations	  and	  are	  often	  
inadvertently	  promoted	  by	  the	  press	  in	  news	  reports	  about	  a	  regional	  drug	  problem.	  	  
As	  more	  consumers	  are	  drawn	  to	  an	  open	  market,	  more	  dealers	  will	  concentrate	  
their	  efforts	  there	  as	  well.	  	  The	  result	  is	  what	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  described	  as	  
agglomeration	  economies,	  where	  dealers	  and	  users,	  by	  sheer	  virtue	  of	  their	  
numbers,	  are	  somewhat	  protected	  from	  police	  persecution.	  	  
The	  second	  type	  of	  retail	  drug	  market	  is	  the	  “social	  network.”	  In	  this	  situation	  
dealers	  only	  sell	  to	  users	  they	  know	  or	  to	  friends	  of	  friends.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  dealers	  
will	  often	  travel	  to	  the	  homes	  of	  consumers.	  	  The	  need	  for	  security	  is	  less	  in	  this	  type	  
of	  market.	  	  It	  also	  removes	  the	  stress	  of	  having	  to	  seek	  out	  potential	  buyers	  or	  
sellers	  from	  the	  general	  public.	  	  Social	  drug	  networks	  are	  small	  and	  not	  easily	  
joined.	  	  They	  can	  be	  remarkably	  concentrated	  in	  one	  neighborhood	  or	  building,	  or	  
they	  can	  be	  incredibly	  dispersed.	  	  Writing	  about	  San	  Diego	  in	  the	  early	  1990s,	  Eck	  
described	  the	  local	  methamphetamine	  markets	  as	  being	  largely	  social	  in	  nature.	  	  	  
Rengert	  (1996)	  expanded	  on	  Eck’s	  simple	  classification	  system	  and	  identified	  
four	  different	  types	  of	  drug	  markets	  that	  differ	  in	  scope	  of	  operation	  and	  the	  
concern	  for	  security	  of	  both	  dealer	  and	  user.	  	  “Neighborhood	  markets”	  are	  made	  up	  
of	  low-­‐level	  retail	  sales	  between	  friends.	  	  They	  are	  often	  disorganized	  and	  
spontaneous.	  	  “Open	  regional	  drug	  markets”	  are	  located	  near	  areas	  of	  heavy	  
nonresident	  traffic	  such	  as	  shopping	  malls,	  schools	  and	  transportation	  nodes.	  	  These	  
are	  usually	  larger-­‐scale	  markets	  (though	  still	  retail),	  and	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  
“drugmarts,”	  or	  fixed-­‐site	  neighborhood	  sales.	  Sales	  at	  drugmarts	  occur	  mostly	  
between	  strangers.	  According	  to	  Eck	  (1994,	  1995)	  this	  type	  of	  market	  requires	  that	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the	  people	  in	  charge	  of	  running	  and	  informally	  policing	  an	  area	  be	  taken	  into	  
account	  if	  these	  markets	  are	  to	  succeed.	  	  This	  may	  mean	  bribing	  a	  hotel	  manager,	  
having	  a	  complicit	  apartment	  building	  supervisor,	  or	  simply	  having	  lackadaisical	  
policing	  of	  the	  region.	  Rengert’s	  third	  type,	  “semi-­‐open	  regional	  drug	  markets,”	  are	  
ones	  in	  which	  dealers	  restrict	  their	  business	  to	  people	  whom	  they	  know.	  	  Dealers	  in	  
such	  markets	  will	  travel	  to	  sell	  their	  drugs,	  but	  the	  selling	  goes	  on	  within	  an	  
established	  social	  network,	  much	  like	  Eck’s	  description	  of	  methamphetamine	  
markets	  in	  San	  Diego.	  	  The	  fourth	  category	  for	  Rengert	  is	  the	  “closed	  regional	  
network,”	  which	  operates	  over	  wide	  areas	  within	  extremely	  tight	  networks	  of	  
associates.	  	  This	  type	  represents	  the	  scale	  at	  which	  wholesale	  drug	  transactions	  
occur.	  	  	  
	  
Evolution	  of	  Retail	  Markets	  
Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  (2000)	  differentiated	  retail	  drug	  markets	  based	  on	  
technical	  organization	  (where	  drugs	  were	  sold,	  and	  the	  policies	  and	  procedures	  
associated	  with	  sales)	  and	  social	  organization	  (differing	  levels	  of	  cooperation,	  
differentiation	  of	  responsibilities,	  and	  power	  and	  authority	  among	  members).	  	  They	  
identified	  three	  locations	  of	  retail	  sales:	  street	  level,	  indoor	  sales,	  and	  home	  delivery.	  	  
These	  are	  similar	  to	  Eck’s	  typologies.	  	  Home	  delivery	  would	  be	  akin	  to	  his	  social	  
network,	  whereas	  indoor	  sales	  are	  just	  slightly	  different	  from	  street	  sales	  in	  that	  
they	  are	  located	  in	  public	  places	  indoors	  (such	  as	  malls),	  rather	  than	  completely	  in	  
the	  open.	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Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  also	  identified	  three	  types	  of	  social	  organization	  
associated	  with	  drug	  markets.	  	  The	  simplest,	  “freelance	  distributors,”	  are	  
distinguished	  by	  having	  no	  division	  of	  labor	  or	  formal	  hierarchy.	  	  Freelance	  dealers	  
are	  in	  open	  competition	  with	  their	  fellow	  peers.	  	  The	  least-­‐organized	  retail	  drug	  
market	  would	  have	  freelance	  dealers	  operating	  at	  the	  street	  level.	  	  The	  authors	  also	  
noted	  that	  freelance	  distributors	  tend	  to	  dominate	  “whenever	  a	  new	  product	  (or	  
innovation)	  is	  introduced”	  (133),	  and	  they	  are	  also	  most	  often	  users	  of	  the	  drug	  that	  
they	  deal.	  	  Because	  they	  are	  users,	  they	  often	  try	  to	  sell	  their	  product	  as	  quickly	  as	  
possible	  so	  that	  they	  will	  not	  use	  it	  up	  themselves.	  	  Based	  on	  my	  interviews	  with	  the	  
Independence,	  Missouri	  Police	  Department,	  this	  is	  a	  good	  description	  of	  individual	  
methamphetamine	  cooks.	  	  Freelance	  operators	  typically	  struggle	  to	  maintain	  
enough	  cash	  to	  buy	  more	  drugs	  to	  continue	  selling.	  Though	  they	  often	  are	  able	  to	  
create	  a	  client	  base	  quickly,	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  “incompetent	  entrepreneurs”	  who	  do	  
not	  last	  long	  on	  the	  scene	  but	  who	  often	  “pave	  the	  way	  for	  more	  organized	  
distributors	  to	  move	  in”	  (133).	  	  
The	  second	  type	  of	  organization,	  the”	  socially	  bonded	  business,”	  is	  usually	  
based	  on	  family	  or	  ethnic	  ties.	  	  These	  groups	  can	  vary	  between	  an	  egalitarian	  
cooperative	  of	  quasi-­‐freelancers	  to	  a	  fairly	  hierarchical	  organization	  with	  defined	  
roles.	  	  Hierarchical,	  family-­‐based	  distribution	  networks	  often	  have	  roles	  divided	  by	  
gender	  and	  age.	  	  	  Money	  typically	  goes	  to	  the	  head	  of	  the	  family	  who	  then	  
redistributes	  it	  to	  the	  other	  members.	  	  Nonfamily-­‐based	  socially	  bonded	  groups,	  
such	  as	  those	  based	  on	  ethnic	  membership	  will	  also	  frequently	  redistribute	  their	  
funds	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  help	  out	  noninvolved	  members	  of	  their	  community.	  	  This	  makes	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these	  types	  of	  dealer	  networks	  less	  offensive,	  or	  sometimes	  even	  appealing	  to	  
neighborhoods.	  	  Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  noted	  that	  in	  Bushwick,	  Queens,	  socially	  bonded	  
distribution	  networks	  that	  helped	  the	  community	  were	  actually	  protected	  from	  
policing	  efforts	  while	  the	  more	  cutthroat,	  corporate-­‐style	  networks	  were	  
dismantled.	  	  	  
The	  third	  and	  most	  complex	  type	  of	  social	  organization	  is	  the	  “corporate-­‐
style”	  distributor	  network.	  	  These	  have	  complex	  divisions	  of	  labor	  and	  hierarchies.	  	  
They	  may	  exhibit	  the	  ethnic	  or	  family	  associations	  of	  socially	  bonded	  networks,	  but	  
their	  focus	  is	  more	  on	  making	  money	  than	  contributing	  to	  the	  community.	  	  In	  this	  
system,	  low-­‐level	  dealers	  are	  kept	  unaware	  of	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  the	  
organization,	  often	  ignorant	  of	  even	  which	  cartel	  or	  organization	  they	  work	  for.	  
Their	  only	  contact	  is	  with	  the	  person	  directly	  above	  them	  in	  the	  hierarchy.	  	  Such	  
secrecy	  is	  a	  defense	  mechanism,	  of	  course,	  so	  that	  apprehension	  of	  the	  highest	  risk	  
dealers	  cannot	  lead	  directly	  to	  the	  arrests	  of	  those	  who	  run	  the	  organizations.	  	  
A	  strictly	  maintained	  hierarchy	  can	  lead	  to	  discontent	  among	  the	  rank	  and	  
file	  of	  the	  corporate-­‐style	  network.	  Little	  real	  opportunity	  exists	  to	  rise	  up	  within	  
the	  organization,	  and	  lower-­‐level	  employees	  are	  the	  ones	  who	  assume	  most	  of	  the	  
risk	  in	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations.	  	  Because	  of	  such	  tensions,	  corporate	  organizations	  are	  
far	  more	  likely	  to	  rely	  on	  terror	  and	  fear	  rather	  than	  trust	  and	  family	  ties	  as	  a	  way	  to	  
protect	  themselves.	  	  Public	  displays	  of	  violence	  not	  only	  intimidate	  the	  general	  
public	  who	  might	  be	  inclined	  to	  turn	  in	  drug	  dealers,	  but	  also	  keep	  low-­‐level	  
employees	  in	  line.	  	  This	  type	  of	  activity	  is	  associated	  more	  with	  street-­‐level	  
corporate	  distribution	  systems	  than	  with	  indoor	  or	  delivery	  corporate	  systems	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(where	  social	  ties	  were	  still	  relied	  on	  by	  low-­‐level	  distributors	  within	  the	  larger	  
network).	  	  As	  a	  rule,	  the	  further	  a	  distribution	  network	  gets	  from	  the	  street,	  the	  
more	  trust	  is	  incorporated	  into	  the	  process.	  	  	  
Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  (2000)	  acknowledged	  that	  their	  typologies	  are	  somewhat	  
platonic	  ideals,	  with	  the	  reality	  on	  the	  ground	  being	  messier	  and	  more	  difficult	  to	  
discern.	  	  They	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  social	  organizations	  involved	  in	  specific	  retail	  drug	  
markets	  tend	  to	  change	  over	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  new	  drug	  into	  
a	  market	  is	  usually	  dominated	  by	  freelancers.	  	  Distribution	  is	  disorganized,	  chaotic.	  	  
Because	  freelancers	  are	  usually	  users,	  however,	  they	  act	  as	  promoters	  for	  the	  drug,	  
building	  the	  market	  through	  social	  ties	  and	  boosterism.	  	  But,	  once	  sufficient	  demand	  
for	  a	  drug	  exists	  in	  a	  given	  market,	  corporate	  distributors	  will	  move	  in.	  	  These	  
networks	  are	  much	  more	  stable.	  	  They	  do	  not	  abuse	  their	  product	  and	  have	  reliable	  
access	  to	  supply.	  	  Perhaps	  surprisingly,	  given	  their	  complexity	  and	  size,	  corporate	  
distribution	  networks	  are	  also	  more	  adaptive	  than	  freelancers,	  and	  can	  move	  and	  
adapt	  their	  strategies	  based	  on	  policing	  efforts	  and	  competition	  from	  other	  DTOs.	  	  
Freelancers,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  often	  tied	  to	  specific	  locations	  and	  specific	  
suppliers.	  	  	  
As	  a	  market	  slows	  due	  to	  the	  leveling	  off	  of	  demand,	  corporate	  distributors	  
find	  it	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  profits.	  	  They	  face	  increasing	  discontent	  
among	  the	  rank	  and	  file	  of	  their	  business,	  and	  attract	  increasing	  attention	  from	  
police,	  who	  can	  begin	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  low-­‐level	  unhappiness.	  	  Those	  
conflicts	  create	  openings	  for	  socially	  bonded	  distributors	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  and	  
flourish.	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Hamid	  	  (1992),	  like	  Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  (2000),	  has	  posited	  that	  the	  manner	  of	  
distribution	  of	  a	  drug	  changes	  over	  its	  life	  cycle.	  	  He	  argued	  that	  every	  drug	  
epidemic	  is	  characterized	  by	  periods	  of	  “onset,	  incubation,	  widespread	  diffusion,	  
peak,	  decline,	  and	  stabilization,”	  and	  that	  different	  distribution	  methods	  reflect	  
these	  transitions.	  	  He	  also	  argued	  that	  any	  drug	  use	  will	  decline	  and	  stabilize	  
naturally	  after	  an	  epidemic,	  even	  without	  police	  intervention.	  	  Although	  his	  study	  
looked	  specifically	  at	  smokable	  cocaine	  (crack),	  he	  believed	  his	  results	  were	  
transferable.	  	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  stages	  might	  differ	  in	  time	  and	  location,	  but	  every	  
drug	  epidemic	  would	  have	  a	  life	  cycle.	  	  The	  crack	  epidemic	  specifically	  ended	  
because	  the	  drug	  itself	  was	  an	  instrument	  of	  “capital	  depletion,”	  leaving	  the	  
communities	  in	  which	  it	  was	  most	  widely	  used	  without	  the	  population	  of	  consumers	  
and	  dealers	  (due	  largely	  to	  arrests)	  or	  the	  money	  necessary	  to	  sustain	  its	  market.	  	  	  
Factors	  beyond	  capital	  availability	  also	  affect	  drug	  markets.	  	  Consumer	  
demand	  is	  important.	  	  So	  is	  crime	  between	  DTOs	  or	  by	  criminals	  upon	  DTOs.	  	  Licit	  
economic	  activity	  also	  has	  a	  huge	  effect	  on	  markets,	  creating	  changes	  in	  
neighborhoods	  (gentrification,	  business	  relocations,	  real	  estate	  development)	  that	  
affect	  their	  viability	  as	  centers	  for	  illegal	  activity.	  	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  described	  a	  
situation	  in	  which	  open	  markets	  within	  a	  neighborhood	  drove	  away	  so	  many	  
residents	  that	  there	  was	  no	  longer	  sufficient	  population	  to	  support	  the	  market.	  	  	  
Though	  drugs	  undeniably	  represent	  a	  commodity	  and	  their	  sale	  a	  market,	  the	  
usual	  rules	  of	  markets	  do	  not	  always	  apply	  to	  them.	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  
supply	  and	  demand	  in	  such	  markets	  is	  not	  generally	  well	  understood	  or	  researched,	  
but	  recent	  studies	  indicate	  a	  complicated	  relationship	  whereby	  effective	  policing	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efforts	  have	  produced	  surprising	  or	  undesired	  results.	  	  For	  example,	  limiting	  supply	  
keeps	  prices	  high,	  which	  may	  actually	  attract	  new	  sellers	  to	  the	  market	  because	  they	  
receive	  a	  higher	  return	  on	  their	  investment	  (Natarajan	  and	  Hough	  2000).	  	  	  Further	  
complicating	  matters	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  addiction,	  which	  tends	  to	  create	  inelastic	  
demand,	  meaning	  that	  when	  better	  enforcement	  reduces	  supply,	  causing	  an	  
increase	  in	  price,	  a	  corresponding	  reduction	  in	  consumption	  my	  not	  occur,	  
particularly	  among	  heavy	  users.	  Conversely,	  Caulkins	  and	  Reuter	  (2006)	  found	  that	  
lower	  drug	  prices	  actually	  reduced	  consumption	  for	  “jugglers”	  (low-­‐level	  heroin	  
dealers	  who	  are	  also	  users).	  	  Caulkins	  and	  Reuter	  (2006)	  theorized	  several	  other	  
economic	  abnormalities	  that	  can	  occur	  in	  retail	  drug	  markets.	  	  For	  example,	  police	  
action	  that	  removes	  a	  particularly	  violent	  dealer	  from	  the	  street	  may	  actually	  reduce	  
the	  price	  of	  drugs,	  as	  other	  dealers	  no	  longer	  need	  to	  incorporate	  the	  cost	  of	  
protection	  into	  their	  pricing.	  
	  
Drug	  Trafficking	  Organizations	  
Most	  retail	  sales	  occurring	  in	  drug	  markets,	  no	  matter	  which	  of	  the	  forms	  
described	  above	  that	  they	  take,	  cannot	  go	  on	  without	  the	  effort	  of	  a	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organization	  (DTO).	  6	  	  Someone	  must	  be	  responsible	  for	  the	  earlier,	  higher-­‐level	  
links	  in	  the	  commodity	  chain.	  	  Drugs	  must	  be	  produced,	  imported	  (smuggled),	  and	  
distributed	  at	  a	  wholesale	  level	  before	  they	  get	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  retail	  dealers.	  Eck	  
and	  Gersh	  (2000)	  studied	  the	  organization	  of	  DTOs	  that	  operate	  at	  the	  middle	  levels	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  This	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  It	  is	  true	  with	  methamphetamine	  only	  when	  production	  occurs	  at	  a	  
large	  scale	  in	  superlabs	  either	  domestically	  or	  abroad.	  	  Small	  lab	  production	  is	  hardly	  ever	  intended	  
for	  wholesale	  distribution.	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of	  the	  commodity	  chain,	  which	  they	  viewed	  as	  the	  least	  visible	  step	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
drug	  distribution,	  and	  therefore,	  the	  least	  investigated.	  These	  levels	  are	  the	  ones	  
that	  actually	  place	  drugs	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  street-­‐level	  dealers.	  	  Eck	  and	  Gersh’s	  
study	  is	  illuminating	  in	  that	  it	  helps	  to	  expose	  the	  lack	  of	  organization	  that	  is	  so	  
often	  attributed	  to	  drug	  traffickers	  and	  dealers.	  
Eck	  and	  Gersh	  began	  with	  two	  popular	  theoretical	  models	  of	  organized	  
crime,	  and	  then	  posited	  their	  drug-­‐trafficking	  equivalents.	  	  The	  first	  of	  these,	  the	  
“concentrated	  industry	  model,”	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  corporate	  distribution	  network	  
described	  in	  Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  (2000),	  and	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  
conspiracy/bureaucratic	  model	  of	  organized	  crime.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  DTOs	  are	  highly	  
organized	  with	  hierarchical	  roles	  and	  leadership.	  	  Every	  phase	  of	  the	  drug	  chain	  is	  
controlled	  by	  a	  few	  vertically	  integrated	  organizations.	  	  The	  belief	  by	  policy	  makers	  
and	  policing	  agencies	  who	  subscribe	  to	  this	  model	  is	  that,	  if	  one	  or	  several	  of	  these	  
DTOs	  could	  be	  taken	  out,	  a	  severe	  disruption	  in	  U.	  S.	  drug	  markets	  would	  occur.	  	  The	  
authors	  argue	  that	  the	  Office	  of	  National	  Drug	  Control	  Policy’s	  (ONDCP)	  High	  
Intensity	  Drug	  Trafficking	  Areas	  (HIDTA)	  agencies	  were	  established	  with	  this	  model	  
in	  mind,	  quoting	  language	  from	  their	  written	  objectives	  that	  describes	  the	  goal	  of	  
“dismantling	  or	  severely	  disrupting	  the	  most	  significant	  national,	  regional	  and	  local	  
drug	  trafficking	  organizations”	  (quoted	  in	  Eck	  and	  Gersh	  2000,	  245).	  
Natarajan	  (2006)	  argued	  against	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  “concentrated	  
industry”	  DTO.	  	  She	  cited	  the	  paucity	  of	  evidence	  of	  mid-­‐	  and	  upper-­‐level	  dealing	  
being	  controlled	  by	  highly	  organized	  and	  hierarchical	  organizations,	  going	  so	  far	  as	  
to	  say	  that	  even	  famous	  cartels	  such	  as	  Medellin	  and	  Cali	  of	  Columbia	  were	  little	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more	  than	  loose	  syndicates	  of	  independent	  entrepreneurs.	  	  In	  general,	  she	  found	  
that	  mid-­‐level	  trafficking	  and	  smuggling	  was	  usually	  undertaken	  by	  small	  groups	  of	  
“entrepreneurs”	  who	  came	  together	  in	  brief	  cooperation	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  
fleeting	  economic	  opportunities.	  Natarajan	  tested	  this	  assertion	  further	  with	  an	  
analysis	  of	  wiretap	  records	  of	  a	  purported	  heroin	  network	  operating	  in	  New	  York	  
City.	  	  It,	  too,	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  “highly	  fragmented	  business,	  consisting	  of	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  entrepreneurial	  groups	  separately	  engaged	  in	  exploiting	  the	  lucrative	  
opportunities	  presented	  by	  the	  demand	  for	  drugs”	  (189).	  	  Such	  loose	  affiliation	  was	  
actually	  deemed	  a	  strength	  for	  the	  network,	  as	  small	  groups	  with	  few	  ties	  were	  
potentially	  able	  to	  move	  and	  adapt	  more	  easily	  than	  larger,	  more	  rigidly	  structured	  
organizations.	  	  	  
The	  “cottage	  industry”	  model,	  the	  second	  mid-­‐level	  DTO	  described	  by	  Eck	  
and	  Gersh,	  is	  closely	  aligned	  with	  the	  enterprise	  model	  of	  organized	  crime,	  and	  
occupies	  a	  space	  between	  the	  freelancers	  and	  socially	  bonded	  organizations	  
described	  by	  Curtis	  and	  Wendel	  (2000).	  	  Under	  this	  model,	  the	  drug-­‐supply	  chain	  
from	  importation	  to	  retail	  is	  controlled	  not	  by	  a	  few	  vertically	  integrated	  DTOs,	  but	  
by	  numerous	  small	  groups	  and	  individuals.	  	  	  It	  is	  a	  fairly	  easy	  business	  to	  enter	  and	  
to	  leave.	  	  Some	  groups	  may	  have	  specified	  roles	  and	  chains	  of	  command,	  but	  most	  
are	  less	  organized.	  	  Although	  the	  overall	  volume	  of	  drugs	  within	  a	  market	  is	  large,	  no	  
group	  is	  responsible	  for	  a	  significant	  enough	  portion	  of	  the	  product	  that	  their	  
removal	  would	  mark	  a	  serious	  disruption	  in	  the	  market	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	  
The	  authors	  tested	  the	  utility	  and	  veracity	  of	  their	  models	  with	  data	  from	  the	  
law	  enforcement	  agencies	  of	  the	  Washington/Baltimore	  HIDTA.	  	  They	  analyzed	  the	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structures	  of	  DTOs	  investigated	  by	  the	  HIDTA,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  effect	  that	  their	  
removal	  had	  on	  drug	  markets	  in	  the	  area.	  	  Specific	  qualities,	  such	  as	  hierarchical	  
organization	  or	  access	  to	  complicated	  technology	  proved	  important	  in	  
differentiating	  between	  the	  two	  DTO	  models.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  most	  DTOs	  
operating	  in	  the	  HIDTA	  were	  best	  fitted	  to	  the	  cottage	  industry	  model.	  	  	  Thinking	  
more	  generally,	  the	  authors	  noted	  that,	  if	  there	  were	  a	  place	  in	  the	  United	  States	  that	  
did	  not	  fall	  into	  the	  drug	  trade	  as	  a	  cottage	  industry	  model,	  it	  would	  be	  one	  where	  
there	  was	  “a	  great	  deal	  of	  drug	  importation”	  (265).	  	  	  	  
	   Natarajan	  and	  Belanger	  (1998)	  similarly	  found	  evidence	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  
DTOs	  involved	  in	  the	  commodity	  chain	  above	  the	  retail	  level	  did	  not	  fit	  the	  
concentrated	  industry/bureaucratic	  model.	  	  	  They	  examined	  court	  cases	  from	  thirty-­‐
nine	  midlevel	  DTOs	  prosecuted	  by	  federal	  courts	  in	  New	  York	  City	  between	  1984	  
and	  1997	  (cases	  had	  to	  involve	  more	  than	  retail	  sales,	  and	  at	  least	  multikilo	  
quantities).	  They	  divided	  these	  DTOs	  based	  on	  tasks	  performed	  (manufacturer,	  
importer/smuggler,	  wholesale	  distributor,	  or	  regional	  distributor)	  and	  type	  of	  
organization	  (freelance,	  family	  business,	  communal	  business,	  or	  corporation).	  	  They	  
found	  high	  degrees	  of	  specialization	  among	  the	  DTOs,	  with	  only	  40	  percent	  involved	  
in	  more	  than	  one	  of	  the	  tasks	  listed	  above.	  	  Freelancers	  tended	  to	  work	  at	  higher-­‐
level	  tasks,	  and	  corporations	  at	  lower.	  	  No	  organization	  operated	  at	  all	  tasks.	  	  	  	  
All	  of	  the	  organizations	  relied	  to	  some	  extent	  on	  ethnic	  ties	  for	  their	  
membership.	  This	  is	  not	  particularly	  surprising	  given	  that	  ethnic	  minorities	  have	  
consistently	  been	  involved	  in	  drug	  distribution	  and	  sales	  in	  most	  industrialized	  
societies	  (Natarajan	  and	  Hough	  2000).	  	  	  Natarajan	  and	  Hough	  credit	  some	  of	  this	  to	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the	  international	  nature	  of	  drug	  production	  and	  smuggling,	  and	  some	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  
minorities	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  other	  economic	  opportunities	  in	  their	  current	  
countries.	  	  Gootenberg	  (2009)	  echoed	  their	  analysis,	  arguing	  that	  prohibition	  had	  
seriously	  altered	  the	  geography	  of	  drug	  production	  causing	  it	  to	  be	  “scattered	  to	  
zones	  where	  production	  [can]	  be	  safely	  concealed	  and	  pursued,”	  and	  thereby	  
developing	  a	  cycle	  where	  increased	  persecution	  leads	  to	  more	  remote	  sites	  for	  
production:	  
The	  typical	  global	  hot	  zone	  of	  drug	  production,	  whether	  remote	  from	  or	  close	  
to	  their	  final	  markets,	  is	  a	  zone	  of	  refuge	  with	  a	  displaced,	  alienated	  or	  
ethnically	  segregated	  peasantry	  (for	  working	  drug	  plantations)	  and	  an	  
especially	  weak	  state	  or	  ill-­‐defined	  borders	  (23).	  	  
	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  methamphetamine,	  ethnic	  minorities	  did	  not	  become	  heavily	  involved	  
in	  trafficking	  and	  retail	  until	  production	  went	  international.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  drug	  was	  
manufactured	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  its	  production	  and	  sales	  were	  largely	  controlled	  
by	  whites	  operating	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  organization.	  	  However,	  most	  of	  those	  
whites	  were	  from	  economically	  depressed	  locations	  and	  backgrounds.	  
Most	  of	  the	  above	  studies	  focused	  on	  DTOs	  trafficking	  in	  heroin,	  marijuana,	  
or	  cocaine	  and	  not	  methamphetamine.	  I	  argue	  that	  methamphetamine,	  as	  a	  
synthetic	  drug	  that	  for	  much	  of	  its	  history	  could	  be	  produced	  domestically	  without	  
any	  need	  for	  smuggling,	  is	  unique.	  	  Local	  production	  combined	  with	  its	  synthetic	  
nature	  has	  produced	  a	  greatly	  truncated	  commodity	  chain.	  The	  commodity	  chain	  for	  
a	  methamphetamine	  market	  based	  on	  domestic	  production	  looks	  something	  like	  
this:	  production	  >	  retail	  sales.	  	  Such	  brevity	  can	  only	  be	  matched	  by	  other	  synthetics,	  
such	  as	  LSD.	  	  Markets	  based	  on	  imported	  meth,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  should	  be	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expected	  to	  have	  commodity	  chains	  similar	  to	  those	  for	  cocaine	  and	  heroin	  with	  
additional	  links	  for	  importation	  (smuggling)	  and	  wholesale	  distribution.	  	  
In	  the	  remaining	  chapters,	  I	  follow	  the	  tenets	  of	  ANT	  to	  retrace	  associations	  
between	  actors	  and	  identify	  the	  various	  networks,	  both	  legal	  and	  criminal,	  that	  have	  
formed	  around	  the	  task	  of	  supplying	  methamphetamine	  to	  the	  American	  market	  
over	  the	  last	  eighty	  years.	  	  Each	  chapter	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  dominant	  
organization	  type	  for	  a	  particular	  era,	  though	  effort	  has	  been	  made	  to	  identify	  other	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  Benzedrine	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Before	  it	  was	  known	  as	  speed,	  meth,	  crank,	  crystal	  or	  ice,	  methamphetamine	  
had	  commercial	  names	  such	  as	  Methedrine	  and	  Desoxyn,	  and	  was	  marketed	  as	  one	  
of	  the	  many	  drugs	  in	  the	  amphetamine	  family,	  alongside	  such	  pharmaceutical	  
luminaries	  as	  Benzedrine	  and	  Dexedrine.	  These	  drugs	  were	  produced	  by	  some	  of	  
the	  largest	  pharmaceutical	  corporations	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  and	  Europe:	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  
French,	  Burroughs	  Wellcome,	  and	  Abbott	  Laboratories.	  	  They	  were	  hailed	  as	  wonder	  
curatives,	  capable	  of	  treating	  any	  number	  of	  maladies,	  some	  of	  which	  had	  not	  
existed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  synthesis.	  	  The	  amphetamines’	  fall	  from	  grace	  occurred	  
only	  after	  their	  incredible	  potential	  for	  abuse	  was	  reluctantly	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  
1960s,	  some	  thirty	  years	  after	  warning	  bells	  first	  sounded.	  	  The	  early	  history	  of	  the	  
amphetamines	  in	  the	  United	  States	  is	  one	  tied	  directly	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  modern	  
pharmaceutical	  industry,	  military	  industrial	  complex,	  and	  federal	  bureaucracy,	  
together	  with	  changing	  definitions	  of	  health	  and	  sickness.	  
	  
Birth	  of	  a	  Wonder	  Drug	   	  
Amphetamines	  were	  first	  synthesized	  in	  1887	  by	  a	  German	  scientist	  named	  
Edeleano.	  	  Thirty-­‐two	  years	  later,	  in	  1919,	  the	  Japanese	  scientist	  Ogata	  synthesized	  
methamphetamine	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  	  Neither	  discovery	  attracted	  much	  attention	  
from	  the	  medical	  community.	  	  It	  was	  not	  until	  Gordon	  Alles,	  a	  young	  scientist	  whose	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day	  job	  was	  producing	  pollen	  shots	  for	  a	  Los	  Angeles	  allergy	  doctor,	  began	  working	  
with	  different	  formulations	  of	  Edeleano’s	  basic	  amphetamine	  molecule	  that	  the	  
medical	  potential	  for	  amphetamines	  was	  appreciated.	  	  
Alles’	  goal	  was	  to	  find	  a	  better	  asthma	  medication.	  	  In	  the	  1920s,	  asthma	  was	  
treated	  largely	  with	  ephedrine,	  a	  medicine	  that	  could	  be	  extracted	  from	  the	  ma	  
huang	  herb.	  	  As	  the	  best	  of	  the	  available	  bronchial	  dilators,	  it	  was	  an	  incredibly	  
popular	  drug,	  and	  producers	  feared	  that	  ma	  huang	  supplies	  would	  soon	  be	  
insufficient	  to	  meet	  demand.	  	  Alles,	  armed	  with	  a	  Ph.	  D.	  in	  chemistry,	  was	  hoping	  to	  
make	  his	  fortune	  with	  a	  patent	  for	  a	  pill	  form	  of	  asthma	  treatment,	  as	  most	  asthma	  
medications	  at	  the	  time	  were	  given	  in	  inhalers.	  	  After	  several	  attempts,	  he	  produced	  
a	  drug	  that	  he	  thought	  might	  work	  in	  1929.	  	  It	  was	  a	  salt	  version	  of	  Edeleano’s	  
original	  creation,	  which	  he	  called	  amphetamine	  sulfate.	  	  	  
The	  first	  test	  subject	  for	  amphetamine	  sulfate	  was	  Alles	  himself.	  	  He	  noted	  
that	  a	  50	  mg	  injection	  produced	  a	  pronounced	  “feeling	  of	  well-­‐being,”	  and	  a	  
heightened	  level	  of	  talkativeness	  (Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  Further	  experiments	  showed	  
that	  the	  drug	  in	  pill	  form	  was	  not	  particularly	  effective	  at	  fighting	  asthma,	  though	  it	  
did	  consistently	  raise	  the	  heart	  rate	  and	  blood	  pressure	  of	  recipients	  and	  produce	  
the	  aforementioned	  feelings	  of	  euphoria.	  	  	  Though	  undoubtedly	  disappointed	  that	  he	  
had	  not	  found	  the	  new	  asthma	  drug	  of	  the	  1930s,	  Alles	  saw	  enough	  value	  in	  
amphetamine	  sulfate’s	  capacity	  as	  a	  stimulant	  for	  the	  central	  nervous	  system	  that	  he	  
patented	  it	  in	  1932.	  
	   In	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  1930s,	  Alles	  gave	  samples	  of	  his	  new	  drug	  to	  a	  
number	  of	  colleagues	  working	  in	  fields	  as	  diverse	  as	  narcolepsy,	  psychiatry,	  and	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gynecology,	  hoping	  that	  someone	  would	  find	  a	  medically	  beneficial	  use.	  	  In	  1934,	  he	  
approached	  the	  large	  pharmaceutical	  firms	  Merck	  and	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  to	  
assess	  their	  interest	  in	  purchasing	  his	  patent.	  	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  had	  released	  
their	  Benzedrine	  inhaler	  that	  very	  year,	  which	  used	  a	  volatile	  version	  of	  Alles’	  same	  
amphetamine	  sulfate	  to	  promote	  nasal	  decongestion.	  	  Seeing	  value	  in	  a	  pill	  version	  
of	  their	  inhalers,	  and	  perhaps	  hoping	  to	  avoid	  a	  lawsuit	  for	  patent	  infringement,	  
they	  purchased	  the	  patent	  and	  hired	  Alles	  as	  a	  consultant	  (Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  	  
Backed	  by	  the	  company’s	  large	  R&D	  budget,	  clinical	  trials	  were	  soon	  
underway	  to	  test	  the	  drug’s	  safety	  and	  to	  identify	  other,	  potentially	  more	  profitable	  
usages.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  these	  studies	  were	  funded	  by	  Smith,	  
Kline	  &	  French,	  and	  researchers	  were	  usually	  under	  contract	  to	  publish	  results	  only	  
after	  the	  company	  had	  approved	  them.	  	  Any	  negative	  results	  in	  this	  early	  stage	  
therefore	  went	  unpublished	  and	  have	  been	  lost	  to	  history.	  	  	  
Though	  negative	  results	  may	  have	  been	  lost,	  the	  clinical	  trials	  did	  produce	  
the	  first	  documented	  cases	  of	  amphetamine	  misuse.	  	  At	  the	  University	  of	  Minnesota	  
in	  1937,	  medical	  personnel	  were	  surprised	  by	  a	  large	  number	  of	  students	  coming	  to	  
them	  with	  heightened	  pulse	  rates,	  insomnia,	  stomach	  cramps,	  and	  confusion.	  	  They	  
soon	  discovered	  that	  these	  students	  had	  been	  abusing	  samples	  of	  Benzedrine	  that	  
were	  being	  tested	  at	  the	  medical	  school.	  	  Apparently,	  some	  of	  the	  student	  subjects	  
had	  noticed	  the	  energizing	  side	  effects	  of	  the	  drug	  and	  had	  stolen	  them	  from	  the	  lab	  
to	  use	  as	  “pep	  pills”	  to	  help	  with	  final	  exams.	  	  Similar	  reports	  also	  came	  from	  the	  
universities	  of	  Chicago	  and	  Wisconsin	  that	  same	  year	  (Time	  1937;	  Journal	  of	  the	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American	  Medical	  Association	  1937).	  The	  term	  “pep	  pill,”	  would	  forever	  stick	  with	  
the	  amphetamines.	  	  	  
Despite	  these	  early	  examples	  of	  abuse,	  clinical	  trials	  gave	  fruit	  in	  1937,	  when	  
the	  FDA	  approved	  Benzedrine	  as	  a	  viable	  treatment	  for	  narcolepsy,	  Parkinson’s	  
disease,	  and	  mild	  depression.	  	  Studies	  in	  mental	  hospitals	  had	  shown	  that	  the	  drug’s	  
mood-­‐altering	  effects	  were	  highly	  useful	  for	  the	  mildly	  depressed,	  but	  were	  
ineffective	  or	  even	  harmful	  for	  the	  severely	  depressed	  or	  deranged.	  	  Early	  studies	  
had	  also	  shown	  Benzedrine’s	  promise	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  hyperkinetic	  children	  (an	  
early	  term	  for	  ADHD),	  where	  it	  actually	  appeared	  to	  calm	  the	  children	  down,	  rather	  
than	  make	  their	  hyperactivity	  more	  acute,	  as	  one	  might	  expect	  from	  a	  pep	  pill.	  	  
Medical	  journals	  and	  physicians’	  mailboxes	  were	  soon	  filled	  with	  advertisements	  
proclaiming	  amphetamine’s	  utility	  for	  each	  of	  these	  ailments.	  	  	  Specific	  attention	  
was	  given	  to	  the	  treatment	  of	  depression,	  as	  narcolepsy	  and	  Parkinson’s	  disease	  
effect	  relatively	  few	  people.	  	  	  
The	  early	  press	  coverage	  of	  Benzedrine’s	  introduction	  was	  breathless	  in	  its	  
excitement.	  	  A	  1936	  headline	  in	  the	  Chicago	  Daily	  Tribune	  claimed	  the	  drug	  “ends	  
[the]	  urge	  to	  suicide”	  (Daily	  Tribune	  1936).	  	  Reporting	  on	  a	  presentation	  with	  one	  of	  
Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French’s	  researchers,	  Dr.	  Abraham	  Myerson,	  to	  the	  American	  
Psychological	  Association,	  the	  article	  read	  like	  an	  advertising	  pamphlet,	  stating	  that	  
Benzedrine	  had	  been	  “found	  useful	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  nervous	  disease	  caused	  by	  
the	  swift	  tempo	  of	  modern	  living.”	  	  This	  article,	  and	  others	  like	  it,	  put	  more	  emphasis	  
on	  Benzedrine’s	  power	  as	  a	  pick-­‐me-­‐up,	  than	  it	  did	  its	  approved	  indications.	  	  Dr.	  
Irving	  Cutter,	  also	  writing	  in	  the	  Chicago	  Tribune,	  saw,	  perhaps	  before	  others,	  where	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the	  drug	  would	  go,	  stating	  that:	  “Benzedrine	  in	  small	  doses	  will	  undoubtedly	  come	  
into	  use	  as	  a	  psychological	  stimulant”	  (Cutter	  1937).	  
	  The	  Tribune	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  its	  praise	  of	  Benzedrine’s	  potential.	  	  A	  1937	  
Washington	  Post	  article	  on	  yet	  another	  Benzedrine	  presentation	  led	  with	  this	  
sentence:	  “A	  potent,	  yet	  seemingly	  harmless	  drug	  that	  turns	  grouchy	  husbands	  into	  
cooing	  angels,	  reduces	  body	  punishment	  of	  long	  grueling	  motor	  drives	  and	  helps	  
students	  obtain	  better	  grades	  was	  described	  here	  yesterday	  to	  a	  group	  of	  
incredulous	  physicians.”	  	  Years	  later,	  the	  persistent	  abuse	  of	  the	  amphetamine	  
family	  of	  drugs	  by	  these	  same	  truck	  drivers	  and	  students	  bring	  about	  its	  eventual	  
removal	  from	  the	  market.	  	  The	  article	  concluded,	  “Benzedrine	  sulfate,	  the	  drug	  in	  
question,	  can	  provide	  in	  some	  persons,	  a	  new	  and	  more	  pleasing	  personality	  for	  2	  
cents	  a	  day”	  (Washington	  Post	  1937).	  
In	  an	  editorial,	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  (JAMA)	  
bemoaned	  the	  press	  coverage	  of	  Benzedrine,	  and	  implicated	  such	  articles	  in	  any	  
past	  and	  future	  abuse,	  stating	  that,	  “During	  the	  past	  year	  a	  nonvolatile	  salt	  of	  
Benzedrine—the	  sulfate—has	  been	  introduced	  and	  has	  been	  extensively	  exploited	  
as	  a	  stimulant	  for	  the	  brain	  and	  producer	  of	  sleeplessness.	  	  This	  promotion	  follows	  
exaggeration	  in	  newspaper	  accounts	  of	  the	  results	  of	  experiments	  made	  with	  the	  
drug	  in	  psychological	  investigations.”	  	  The	  editorial	  went	  on	  to	  say	  that	  the	  side	  
effects	  of	  Benzedrine	  (euphoria	  and	  increased	  energy)	  meant	  that	  it	  was	  more	  likely	  
to	  be	  abused	  than	  other	  sympathomimetic	  amines,	  and	  called	  on	  university	  doctors	  
to	  issue	  warnings	  to	  their	  students	  to	  steer	  them	  away	  from	  abusing	  amphetamines	  
during	  the	  coming	  exam	  period.	  	  	  The	  authors	  also	  accused	  drug	  stores	  in	  university	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cities	  of	  seeking	  profit	  over	  the	  safety	  of	  students	  by	  selling	  the	  drugs,	  which	  were	  
available	  without	  prescription.	  	  The	  editorial	  concluded	  with	  a	  lamentation	  over	  the	  
drug’s	  fate:	  
Benzedrine	  sulfate	  thus	  becomes	  one	  more	  example	  of	  a	  drug	  which	  is	  
useful	  in	  a	  limited	  field	  of	  therapeutics	  but	  which	  has	  been	  diverted	  to	  
uncontrolled	  use	  by	  the	  public	  for	  related,	  but	  not	  similar,	  purposes.	  	  
If	  the	  situation	  is	  to	  be	  remedied,	  it	  certainly	  must	  be	  as	  soon	  as	  
possible,	  the	  manufacturer,	  the	  druggist,	  the	  student	  health	  
authorities,	  the	  college	  officials	  and	  the	  physicians	  must	  cooperate	  in	  
preventing	  the	  use	  of	  the	  drug	  by	  students,	  who	  through	  ignorance	  
may	  be	  harming	  themselves	  (JAMA	  1937).	  
	  
Though	  at	  the	  time	  this	  editorial	  may	  have	  seemed	  reactionary	  given	  the	  paucity	  of	  
cases	  of	  abuse,	  one	  wonders	  if	  the	  authors	  knew	  how	  prescient	  their	  concerns	  were.	  	  	  
	  Despite	  a	  deluge	  of	  favorable	  press	  and	  marketing	  material,	  as	  early	  as	  1938,	  
narcolepsy	  researchers	  in	  New	  England	  were	  warning	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  
Benzedrine	  to	  induce	  psychosis	  in	  the	  treatment	  of	  their	  patients	  (Young	  and	  
Scovile1938),	  and	  two	  early	  articles	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association	  called	  attention	  to	  the	  potentially	  habit-­‐forming	  qualities	  of	  
amphetamine.	  One	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  remind	  readers	  that	  both	  heroin	  and	  cocaine	  
were	  once	  deemed	  medically	  beneficial	  before	  their	  addictive	  qualities	  had	  been	  
discovered	  (Friedenberg	  1940;	  Tainter	  1941).	  Such	  early	  warnings	  were	  generally	  
disregarded,	  however,	  because	  the	  reigning	  definition	  of	  addiction	  took	  into	  account	  
only	  the	  physical	  dependence	  brought	  on	  by	  heavy	  narcotics,	  such	  as	  heroin.	  	  
Stimulants	  were	  seen	  as	  nonaddictive	  because	  the	  medical	  community	  disregarded	  
psychological	  dependence	  (Iversen	  2006).	  	  	  
A	  1939	  entry	  in	  Dr.	  William	  Brady’s	  “Here’s	  To	  Health”	  series	  in	  the	  Los	  
Angeles	  Times	  sounded	  a	  similar	  alarm.	  	  Using	  fictional	  characters,	  Brady	  sketched	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an	  image	  of	  a	  housewife	  addicted	  to	  Benzedrine.	  	  Said	  the	  imaginary	  housewife,	  “I	  
am	  ordinarily	  inactive	  and	  without	  ambition	  to	  things,	  that	  day	  I	  painted	  the	  porch	  
furniture,	  caught	  up	  on	  garden	  work	  long	  neglected,	  rearranged	  the	  furniture	  in	  
living	  room	  .	  	  .	  	  .	  altogether	  feeling	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  years	  like	  a	  colt.	  	  I	  even	  tried	  
some	  of	  the	  somersaults	  you	  are	  always	  mentioning	  .	  .	  .	  .”	  	  She	  later	  describes	  feeling	  
39	  instead	  of	  55.	  	  “I	  shall	  be	  40—going	  on	  30.”	  	  In	  another	  portrait,	  Brady	  told	  the	  
apocryphal	  story	  of	  a	  student	  who	  died	  during	  final	  exams	  because	  of	  amphetamine	  
abuse	  (Brady	  1939).	  	  
Because	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  controlled	  the	  patent	  for	  Benzedrine	  Sulfate,	  
competing	  firms	  had	  to	  look	  for	  other	  forms	  of	  amphetamines	  in	  order	  to	  enter	  the	  
growing	  market	  for	  inhalers,	  pills,	  and	  antidepressants.	  	  Those	  who	  did	  not	  blatantly	  
violate	  the	  patent	  on	  Benzedrine	  Sulfate	  resorted	  to	  using	  methamphetamine-­‐based	  
products	  because	  no	  company	  had	  a	  claim	  on	  its	  patent.7	  By	  the	  mid	  1940s	  both	  
amphetamine	  and	  methamphetamine-­‐based	  products	  were	  available	  over	  the	  
counter	  throughout	  the	  U.	  S.	  
	  
World	  War	  II:	  The	  Watershed	  Moment	  for	  Amphetamine	  Abuse	  
A	  number	  of	  researchers	  have	  argued	  that	  widespread	  amphetamine	  abuse	  
received	  its	  impetus	  from	  the	  drug’s	  heavy	  use	  during	  World	  War	  II	  (Rawlin	  1968;	  
Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  1975;	  Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  military	  forces	  
on	  all	  sides	  of	  that	  war	  administered	  amphetamines	  to	  their	  troops,	  not	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  here	  that	  methamphetamine’s	  effects	  are	  not	  significantly	  different	  or	  more	  
powerful	  than	  those	  of	  other	  amphetamines,	  and	  most	  users	  cannot	  tell	  the	  difference	  between	  meth	  
and	  other	  amphetamines	  when	  taken	  blindly	  (Iversen	  2006).	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depression,	  narcolepsy,	  or	  Parkinson’s	  disease,	  but	  for	  the	  energy	  increase	  and	  
mood	  lift	  they	  created.	  	  The	  German	  Blitzkrieg	  was	  fueled	  at	  least	  partially	  by	  
methamphetamine	  administered	  to	  the	  Panzer	  troops.	  	  Rasmussen	  (2008)	  has	  
stated	  that	  the	  German	  military	  consumed	  35	  million	  methamphetamine	  tablets	  per	  
month	  between	  April	  and	  June	  of	  1940.	  	  However,	  by	  December	  of	  that	  year,	  
German	  officials	  had	  become	  fearful	  of	  the	  drug’s	  habit-­‐forming	  potential,	  and	  began	  
reducing	  the	  amount	  of	  methamphetamine	  available	  to	  troops.	  By	  1941,	  they	  ceased	  
supplying	  the	  drug	  altogether	  without	  special	  prescription.	  	  	  
In	  Japan,	  amphetamines	  entered	  the	  medical	  market	  in	  1941.	  	  During	  the	  
war,	  methamphetamine	  was	  administered	  to	  troops	  and	  factory	  workers	  to	  increase	  
energy,	  morale,	  and	  productivity.	  	  Afterwards,	  massive	  military	  stockpiles	  of	  the	  
drug	  entered	  the	  black	  market.	  	  This	  was	  coupled	  with	  heavily	  marketed	  licit	  
amphetamine	  produced	  by	  pharmaceutical	  companies.	  	  	  Japanese	  officials	  soon	  had	  
an	  intravenous	  methamphetamine	  epidemic	  on	  their	  hands.	  	  The	  introduction	  in	  
1950	  of	  prescription	  requirements	  did	  not	  stem	  the	  abuse.	  	  By	  1954,	  there	  were	  an	  
estimated	  500,000	  users	  (Yoshida	  1997).	  	  When	  the	  legal	  supply	  was	  cut	  off	  by	  
regulation,	  people	  purchased	  the	  drug	  from	  what	  were	  probably	  the	  world’s	  first	  
clandestine	  meth	  labs.	  	  	  Lab	  crackdowns	  and	  police	  harassment	  of	  users	  finally	  
ended	  the	  epidemic	  in	  1955	  (Yoshida	  1997,	  Lemere	  1963).	  	  	  
The	  allies	  also	  gave	  amphetamines	  to	  their	  armed	  forces.	  	  The	  British	  did	  so	  
largely	  based	  on	  the	  drug’s	  mood-­‐altering	  effects,	  believing	  that	  amphetamine	  use	  
improved	  general	  morale	  and	  fought	  fatigue	  among	  the	  troops.	  	  In	  the	  U.	  S.,	  Ivy	  and	  
Krasno	  (1941)	  released	  an	  extensive	  summary	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  amphetamine	  in	  the	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journal	  War	  Medicine,	  and	  the	  U.	  S.	  ran	  a	  number	  of	  experiments	  on	  the	  potential	  
benefits	  of	  amphetamine	  use	  by	  the	  troops	  throughout	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  war.	  	  
According	  to	  Rasmussen	  (2008),	  the	  primary	  goal	  was	  to	  determine	  if	  
amphetamines	  could	  improve	  performance	  along	  with	  fighting	  fatigue.	  	  While	  the	  
results	  did	  not	  indicate	  great	  performance	  enhancement,	  Benzedrine	  was	  made	  part	  
of	  every	  first	  aid	  kit	  in	  1943,	  primarily	  due	  to	  its	  ability	  to	  raise	  morale	  through	  
mood	  alteration.	  	  	  
Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  (1975)	  have	  estimated	  that	  between	  160	  and	  180	  
million	  amphetamine	  tablets	  were	  administered	  to	  American	  troops	  during	  the	  war.	  	  
Rasmussen	  (2008)	  put	  the	  estimate	  even	  higher,	  at	  between	  250	  and	  500	  million.	  	  
Although	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  Benzedrine	  or	  other	  amphetamine	  pills	  administered	  
to	  U.	  S.	  troops	  either	  by	  British	  or	  American	  medics	  is	  not	  known,	  Grinspoon	  and	  
Hedblom	  persuasively	  argued	  that,	  “if	  only	  10	  percent	  of	  American	  soldiers	  ever	  
used	  amphetamines	  during	  the	  war,	  over	  1.5	  million	  men	  would	  have	  returned	  to	  
this	  country	  in	  1945	  with	  some	  firsthand	  knowledge	  of	  their	  effects”	  (28).	  	  	  
	   Even	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  Americans	  in	  general	  were	  aware	  of	  the	  
energizing	  and	  even	  euphoric	  effects	  of	  amphetamine.	  	  Again,	  according	  to	  
Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  (1978),	  “by	  1943,	  over	  half	  of	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French’s	  
Benzedrine	  sales	  went	  to	  fill	  a	  prescription	  for	  people	  who	  wanted	  to	  lose	  weight,	  
obtain	  a	  temporary	  ‘lift,’	  or	  stay	  awake	  for	  extended	  periods”	  (45).	  	  None	  of	  these	  
uses	  had	  been	  officially	  approved	  by	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  or	  the	  Food	  
and	  Drug	  Administration.	  	  The	  drug’s	  rising	  popularity	  led	  to	  a	  production	  rate	  in	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1945	  that	  Rasmussen	  (2008)	  estimated	  as	  sufficient	  to	  supply	  two	  pills	  daily	  for	  
every	  single	  American	  man,	  woman,	  and	  child.	  
Harry	  “the	  Hipster”	  Gibson	  made	  the	  private	  knowledge	  of	  amphetamine’s	  
popularity	  public	  in	  1947	  when	  he	  recorded	  the	  song,	  “Who	  put	  the	  Benzedrine	  in	  
Mrs.	  Murphy's	  Ovaltine?”	  In	  which	  he	  told	  how,	  “now	  she	  wants	  to	  swing,	  the	  
Highland	  Fling/She	  says	  that	  Benzedrine's	  the	  thing	  that	  makes	  her	  spring.”	  	  
Despite,	  or	  perhaps	  because	  of	  this	  song’s	  success,	  he	  was	  blacklisted	  for	  promoting	  
drug	  abuse,	  and	  never	  again	  received	  the	  fame	  and	  adulation	  he	  had	  in	  the	  1940s.	  
	  
Inhalers:	  The	  First	  Wave	  of	  Amphetamine	  Abuse	  
In	  addition	  to	  1947	  being	  the	  year	  of	  Harry	  “The	  Hipster”	  Gibson’s	  hit,	  it	  also	  
marked	  the	  first	  carefully	  documented	  case	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse.	  	  	  Writing	  in	  the	  
Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  army	  physicians	  Monroe	  and	  Drell	  
(1947)	  described	  the	  persistent	  abuse	  of	  Benzedrine	  inhalers	  in	  a	  military	  prison	  at	  
Fort	  Benjamin	  Harrison	  in	  Indiana.	  	  That	  this	  abuse	  occurred	  among	  military	  
personnel	  certainly	  lent	  credence	  to	  Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom’s	  argument	  for	  the	  
impact	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  	  All	  amphetamine	  inhalers	  were	  available	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  
and	  without	  prescription	  at	  the	  time,	  and	  prison	  doctors	  found	  that	  inmates	  were	  
buying	  the	  inhalers	  from	  guards	  and	  then	  breaking	  open	  the	  canister	  to	  extract	  the	  
amphetamine-­‐soaked	  paper	  inside.	  	  The	  prisoners	  would	  then	  soak	  the	  paper	  in	  a	  
liquid	  to	  extract	  the	  stimulant,	  or	  simply	  ingest	  the	  paper	  in	  order	  to	  get	  a	  buzz	  from	  
the	  large	  (250	  mg)	  dosage	  of	  amphetamine	  it	  contained.8	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  A	  Benzedrine	  pill,	  by	  contrast,	  contains	  10	  mg	  of	  amphetamine.	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The	  authors	  found	  that	  25	  percent	  of	  prisoners	  had	  used	  inhalers	  in	  that	  
abusive	  manner,	  and	  that	  14	  percent	  had	  done	  so	  during	  their	  civilian	  lives	  before	  
joining	  the	  army.	  	  Sixty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  respondents	  had	  been	  aware	  that	  the	  practice	  
existed	  before	  arriving	  at	  the	  post.	  	  If	  these	  results	  are	  accurate,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
reason	  to	  believe	  they	  are	  not,	  they	  show	  that	  amphetamine	  abuse	  was	  not	  confined	  
to	  the	  military.	  	  	  
	  A	  number	  of	  the	  soldiers	  caught	  abusing	  inhalers	  reported	  severe	  
withdrawal	  symptoms	  upon	  stopping	  use,	  causing	  the	  authors	  to	  join	  a	  growing	  
chorus	  of	  experts	  calling	  for	  a	  reassessment	  of	  the	  addictive	  potential	  of	  
amphetamines.	  	  The	  authors	  also	  reported	  the	  onset	  of	  what	  would	  later	  be	  labeled	  
“amphetamine	  psychosis”—bouts	  of	  paranoia	  and	  hallucinations	  associated	  with	  
extensive	  amphetamine	  abuse.	  	  However,	  they	  disregarded	  this	  side	  effect,	  saying	  
that	  the	  victims	  must	  have	  had	  some	  sort	  of	  latent	  mental	  disorder	  that	  the	  
amphetamines	  merely	  tapped	  into,	  rather	  than	  the	  drug	  having	  directly	  created	  the	  
psychosis.	  
Although	  the	  Fort	  Benjamin	  Harrison	  study	  was	  the	  first	  documented	  case	  of	  
amphetamine	  inhaler	  abuse,	  it	  was	  certainly	  not	  the	  first	  incident.	  	  Jazz	  great	  Charlie	  
Parker’s	  biography	  states	  that	  he	  began	  abusing	  such	  inhalers	  in	  Kansas	  City	  as	  
early	  as	  1937	  (Rasmussen	  2008),	  and	  it	  appears	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  other	  jazz	  
musicians	  also	  abused	  Benzedrine.	  	  Other	  people	  did	  so	  too.	  	  Jack	  Kerouac	  wrote	  On	  
the	  Road	  in	  1951	  on	  an	  amphetamine	  binge,	  but	  he	  and	  several	  of	  the	  other	  beats	  
(including	  William	  H.	  Burroughs)	  had	  been	  using	  the	  drugs	  since	  the	  mid	  1940s	  
while	  they	  were	  living	  in	  New	  York.	  	  The	  friend	  who	  introduced	  the	  beats	  to	  inhaler	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abuse,	  Joan	  Vollmer,	  would	  eventually	  become	  the	  first	  female	  case	  of	  amphetamine	  
psychosis	  treated	  at	  Bellevue	  Hospital	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  1946	  (Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  	  
Reacting	  to	  growing	  abuse	  among	  students	  and	  others,	  the	  State	  of	  California	  
sought	  to	  make	  amphetamine	  inhalers	  available	  only	  by	  prescription	  in	  1944.	  	  
Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French,	  believing	  that	  such	  regulation	  would	  destroy	  the	  market	  for	  
their	  product,	  combined	  forces	  with	  state	  pharmacist	  organizations	  to	  fight	  the	  
proposed	  legislation.	  	  After	  the	  manufacturer	  acquiesced	  to	  include	  a	  dye	  and	  a	  
chemical	  that	  would	  promote	  nausea	  if	  ingested,	  the	  California	  legislature	  agreed	  
not	  to	  restrict	  the	  inhalers	  availability.	  	  This	  victory	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  	  	  
Monroe	  and	  Drell’s	  1947	  report	  was	  followed	  by	  others	  highlighting	  inhaler	  
abuse.	  	  The	  University	  of	  Maryland	  student	  newspaper	  estimated	  in	  1948	  that	  at	  
least	  three	  percent	  of	  the	  student	  body	  there	  used	  Benzedrine	  regularly	  as	  either	  a	  
study	  aid	  or	  for	  thrills,	  and	  that	  a	  larger	  percentage	  had	  at	  least	  tried	  the	  drug	  
(Washington	  Post	  1948).	  	  A	  year	  later,	  Alabama	  Congressman	  George	  Grant	  
commissioned	  a	  study	  of	  inhaler	  abuse	  among	  prisoners	  and	  found	  the	  practice	  to	  
be	  rampant	  nationwide.	  Wardens	  from	  Arizona,	  Florida,	  Georgia,	  Maryland,	  New	  
York,	  Washington,	  and	  Wyoming	  all	  reported	  inhaler	  abuse.	  	  Washington	  
Penitentiary	  Superintendant	  O.	  M.	  Smith	  was	  quoted	  as	  follows:	  
It	  is	  definitely	  established	  here	  that	  the	  use	  of	  Benzedrine	  contributes	  
to	  the	  development	  of	  perverted	  practices.	  	  The	  use	  of	  Benzedrine	  as	  a	  
stimulant	  by	  thousands	  of	  persons	  not	  confined	  in	  institutions	  is	  also	  
becoming	  a	  growing	  national	  menace.	  	  It	  is	  a	  well-­‐known	  fact	  that	  
many	  college	  students	  use	  the	  drug	  as	  a	  stimulant	  during	  periods	  of	  
examination.	  	  It	  is	  further	  established	  that	  many	  persons	  in	  the	  
entertainment	  world	  who	  are	  required	  to	  be	  wide	  awake	  and	  
vivacious	  during	  all	  hours	  of	  the	  night	  have	  become	  addicted	  to	  the	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With	  pressure	  mounting	  from	  states	  demanding	  an	  alternate	  version	  of	  the	  
asthma	  inhaler,	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  was	  forced	  to	  introduce	  a	  new	  product,	  the	  
Benzedrex	  inhaler,	  which	  contained	  no	  amphetamine-­‐based	  compounds.	  	  By	  1949,	  
they	  had	  replaced	  all	  Benzedrine	  inhalers	  nationwide	  with	  the	  amphetamine-­‐free	  
version.	  	  	  	  
Despite	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French’s	  decision,	  many	  amphetamine-­‐based	  inhalers	  
remained	  on	  the	  market	  (and	  prescription-­‐free	  in	  many	  states).	  Inhaler	  abuse	  thus	  
remained	  a	  problem.	  	  One	  popular	  brand	  was	  the	  Valo	  inhaler	  made	  by	  the	  Pfieffer	  
Company	  of	  St.	  Louis.	  	  Widespread	  abuse	  of	  this	  particular	  inhaler,	  particularly	  in	  
Kansas	  City,	  Missouri,	  finally	  led	  to	  all	  amphetamine-­‐based	  inhalers	  being	  removed	  
from	  the	  market.	  	  Ironically,	  the	  nauseating	  chemicals	  that	  were	  designed	  to	  prevent	  
inhaler	  abuse	  and	  appease	  state	  legislators	  had	  led	  some	  users	  to	  inject	  the	  liquefied	  
contents	  of	  the	  inhalers	  rather	  than	  suffer	  the	  stomach	  discomfort	  caused	  by	  eating	  
the	  medicated	  paper.	  	  The	  FDA	  finally	  banned	  amphetamine	  inhalers	  from	  over-­‐the-­‐
counter	  sale	  nationwide	  in	  1959	  (Jackson	  1971,	  Time	  1959).	  	  As	  the	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  reported:	  “FDA	  officials	  said	  they	  decided	  to	  insist	  on	  prescriptions	  for	  
amphetamine	  inhalers	  because	  the	  drug	  is	  being	  used	  ‘for	  non-­‐medical	  purposes.’	  
Evidence	  indicates	  that	  many	  persons,	  particularly	  teenagers	  are	  removing	  the	  
amphetamine-­‐soaked	  wick	  from	  the	  plastic	  capsules	  and	  using	  the	  drug	  as	  a	  
substitute	  for	  amphetamine	  tablets,	  which	  can	  be	  bought	  only	  by	  prescription”	  	  
(Wall	  Street	  Journal	  1959).	  	  Even	  then,	  methamphetamine-­‐based	  inhalers	  were	  not	  
banned,	  and	  some	  manufacturers,	  like	  those	  of	  the	  Valo	  inhaler,	  continued	  to	  
produce	  a	  product	  they	  knew	  was	  largely	  abused.	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Diet	  Pills	  and	  Speeding	  Truckers	  
Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  and	  other	  manufactures	  of	  amphetamine-­‐based	  
products	  were	  undeterred	  by	  the	  loss	  of	  the	  inhaler	  market.	  	  By	  the	  late	  1940s	  they	  
had	  begun	  to	  exploit	  another	  burgeoning	  outlet	  for	  their	  products:	  diet	  pills.	  	  
Although	  the	  appetite-­‐suppressing	  qualities	  of	  amphetamines	  had	  been	  
acknowledged	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  their	  introduction,	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  had	  not	  
immediately	  sought	  the	  drugs’	  approval	  as	  an	  appetite	  suppressant.	  However,	  with	  
inhalers	  under	  attack,	  and	  with	  Alles’	  original	  patent	  set	  to	  expire	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  
decade,	  they	  set	  now	  about	  seeking	  official	  approval	  of	  amphetamines	  as	  a	  diet	  pill.	  	  
Testing	  began	  in	  1945,	  and	  by	  1947,	  they	  had	  won	  American	  Medical	  Association	  
(AMA)9	  approval	  to	  market	  the	  drugs	  for	  the	  new	  purpose.	  	  It	  was	  also	  at	  this	  time	  
that	  the	  company	  began	  to	  market	  Dexedrine	  (dextroamphetamine)	  intensely,	  the	  
right-­‐handed	  isomer	  of	  an	  amphetamine	  molecule,	  which	  they	  directed	  explicitly	  at	  
the	  diet-­‐pill	  market.10	  In	  1947	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  sold	  $2.2	  million	  worth	  of	  
Benzedrine,	  and	  $3.6	  million	  worth	  of	  Dexedrine.	  	  By	  1948,	  fueled	  by	  diet-­‐pill	  sales,	  
Dexedrine	  sales	  rose	  to	  $5.2	  million	  (Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  	  	  
With	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  Alles	  patent	  and	  an	  explosion	  in	  diet-­‐pill	  demand	  
created	  largely	  through	  advertising,	  the	  1950s	  was	  a	  boom	  time	  for	  amphetamine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  It	  was	  the	  AMA,	  and	  not	  the	  FDA	  that	  controlled	  the	  acceptance	  of	  drugs	  and	  their	  appropriate	  uses	  
until	  1962.	  	  	  
10	  Amphetamine	  sulfate	  is	  a	  racemic	  molecule,	  meaning	  that	  it	  comes	  in	  right-­‐handed	  and	  left-­‐
handed	  versions	  called	  isomers.	  	  A	  Benzedrine	  capsule	  contains	  relatively	  equal	  parts	  of	  both	  
molecules.	  	  However,	  Smith,	  Kline	  &	  French	  researchers	  found	  that,	  if	  they	  were	  able	  to	  separate	  the	  
right-­‐handed	  isomers	  from	  the	  left,	  their	  drug	  lost	  the	  negative	  side	  effects	  (anxiety	  and	  nausea)	  
associated	  with	  regular	  Benzedrine,	  resulting	  in	  a	  more	  user	  (and	  abuser)	  friendly	  pill.	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sales.	  	  Between	  1949	  and	  1952,	  U.	  S.	  production	  of	  the	  drugs	  quadrupled	  
(Rasmussen	  2008).	  	  	  It	  would	  appear,	  given	  sales	  and	  prescription	  rates,	  that	  anyone	  
who	  wanted	  a	  prescription	  for	  amphetamines	  beginning	  in	  the	  late	  1940s	  and	  early	  
1950s	  could	  get	  one	  by	  claiming	  some	  ailment.	  	  	  	  
It	  is	  not	  surprising	  then,	  that	  it	  was	  at	  this	  time	  that	  the	  World	  Health	  
Organization	  became	  concerned	  with	  prescription	  amphetamine	  abuse	  on	  a	  global	  
scale.	  	  Their	  1953	  report	  called	  for	  careful	  monitoring	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse,	  
recommending	  that	  preparations	  should	  be	  dispensed	  only	  by	  prescription,	  that	  
each	  prescription	  should	  specify	  the	  number	  of	  times	  it	  may	  be	  refilled,	  and	  that	  a	  
careful	  record	  should	  be	  kept	  of	  each	  prescription	  (WHO	  1953).	  	  	  The	  American	  
Medical	  Association	  and	  the	  U.	  S.	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Agency	  did	  not	  jump	  to	  meet	  those	  
recommendations.	  	  	  
The	  popular	  press	  slowly	  began	  to	  turn	  on	  amphetamine-­‐based	  products	  in	  
the	  early	  1950s.	  	  Dr.	  William	  Alvarez,	  in	  his	  weekly	  article	  in	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times,	  
gave	  insight	  into	  the	  drug’s	  popularity	  even	  as	  he	  warned	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  abuse:	  	  
Today,	  more	  and	  more	  people	  are	  taking	  amphetamine,	  Dexedrine,	  
Desoxyn	  [methamphetamine],	  or	  ephedrine	  or	  some	  similar	  drug,	  
either	  to	  pep	  them	  up	  and	  keep	  them	  awake,	  or	  to	  clear	  away	  gloom,	  
or	  destroy	  appetite	  so	  that	  living	  on	  a	  reduction	  diet	  will	  be	  easier.	  	  
For	  some	  years	  now	  these	  ‘pep-­‐pills’	  have	  been	  taken	  by	  college	  
students	  who	  want	  to	  stay	  up	  half	  the	  night	  cramming	  for	  an	  
examination.	  
	  
Though	  he	  avoided	  saying	  that	  the	  pills	  were	  addictive,	  and	  still	  clung	  to	  the	  idea	  
that	  only	  those	  predisposed	  to	  drug	  abuse	  will	  abuse	  them,	  Dr.	  Alvarez	  did	  suggest	  
that	  no	  one	  should	  use	  them	  continuously	  without	  taking	  “a	  short	  vacation	  [from	  
them]	  every	  so	  often”	  (Alvarez	  1953).	  	  The	  medical	  editor	  of	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	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expressed	  similar	  concern,	  stating	  that,	  “housewives	  are	  becoming	  addicted	  to	  these	  
drugs	  because	  of	  the	  ease	  in	  obtaining	  them	  from	  physicians	  who	  prescribe	  
indiscriminately.”	  	  He	  also	  worried	  that	  use	  by	  parents	  had	  removed	  the	  stigma	  of	  
drugs	  for	  their	  children,	  noting	  that	  in	  the	  first	  four	  months	  of	  1961,	  59	  percent	  of	  
all	  juvenile	  arrests	  in	  California	  had	  involved	  amphetamines	  (Nelson	  1961).	  	  	  
The	  1950s	  also	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  governmental	  crackdowns	  on	  the	  
widespread	  diversion	  and	  abuse	  of	  prescription	  amphetamines.	  Between	  1955	  and	  
1959,	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Police	  Department	  saw	  a	  1,679	  percent	  increase	  in	  
amphetamine	  seizures,	  going	  from	  6,987	  to	  117,325	  tablets	  (Rawlin	  1968).	  	  In	  
October	  1955	  the	  government	  issued	  42	  warrants	  covering	  six	  states	  (Georgia,	  
Illinois,	  Indiana,	  North	  Carolina,	  South	  Carolina,	  and	  Virginia)	  resulting	  from	  an	  FDA	  
investigation	  of	  illegal	  amphetamine	  sales	  to	  truck	  drivers	  and	  minors.	  Cafes,	  truck	  
stops,	  service	  stations	  and	  drug	  stores	  were	  targets.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  of	  many	  
governmental	  interventions	  in	  the	  use	  of	  amphetamines	  by	  truckers.	  FDA	  Director	  
George	  P.	  Larrick	  explained	  the	  focus:	  “’Use	  of	  these	  drugs	  by	  truck-­‐drivers	  is	  
particularly	  dangerous	  because	  they	  so	  stimulate	  the	  driver	  that	  he	  stays	  on	  the	  job	  
beyond	  the	  point	  of	  normal	  physical	  endurance.	  	  His	  brain	  tires,	  his	  driving	  
judgment	  and	  his	  vision	  are	  finally	  impaired	  and	  a	  tragic	  accident	  sometimes	  
follows”	  (NYT	  1955).	  
Rawlin	  (1968)	  believed	  that	  most	  amphetamine	  diversion	  in	  the	  1950s	  
centered	  on	  the	  trucking	  industry.	  	  Arthur	  S.	  Flemming,	  Secretary	  of	  Health	  
Education	  and	  Welfare	  (HEW)	  concurred:	  “The	  prevention	  of	  desire	  for	  sleep	  is	  the	  
basis	  for	  a	  large	  illegal	  trade	  in	  amphetamine	  among	  long-­‐haul	  truck	  drivers.”	  The	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FDA	  launched	  an	  investigation	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade	  that	  found	  some	  two	  
hundred	  truck	  stops	  illegally	  selling	  the	  drugs	  (Flemming	  1959).	  	  
Long-­‐haul	  truck	  drivers	  called	  the	  drugs	  “’cartwheels,	  ‘coast-­‐to-­‐coasts,’	  ‘West	  
Coast	  turn-­‐arounds,’	  ‘truck	  drivers,’	  and	  ‘copilots’,”	  and	  used	  them	  to	  meet	  the	  harsh	  
demands	  of	  their	  largely	  unregulated	  industry	  (Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  1978,	  21).	  	  
In	  a	  1971	  hearing	  before	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Alcoholism	  and	  Narcotics	  of	  the	  
Congressional	  Committee	  on	  Labor	  and	  Public	  Welfare,	  three	  truck-­‐driver	  witnesses	  
estimated	  that	  between	  50	  and	  90	  percent	  of	  long	  haulers	  used	  amphetamines	  at	  
least	  occasionally.	  	  One	  witness,	  Robert	  Lyons,	  when	  asked	  where	  he	  got	  his	  pills	  on	  
the	  road,	  said	  that	  he	  would	  not	  name	  specific	  places,	  but	  that	  if	  he	  wanted	  to,	  he	  
could	  easily	  	  “get	  it	  between	  here	  [DC]	  and	  Cincinnati	  on	  my	  way	  home”	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1971,	  65).	  	  	  	  	  
The	  pep	  pills	  circulating	  throughout	  the	  trucking	  industry	  had	  been	  diverted	  
from	  a	  large	  number	  of	  sources	  and	  are	  probably	  indicative	  of	  diversion	  at	  large	  
during	  the	  1950s.	  	  Some	  were	  stolen	  from	  shipments.	  	  Others	  had	  been	  purchased	  
illegally	  in	  bulk	  from	  drug	  wholesalers.	  	  Still	  others	  came	  from	  shady	  doctors	  and	  
pharmacists.	  	  Clandestine	  production	  of	  pills	  was	  also	  a	  source	  (Rawlin	  1968).	  
Two	  themes	  emerge	  from	  truckers’	  abuse	  of	  amphetamines.	  	  One	  is	  that,	  
since	  the	  onset	  of	  the	  pills’	  use	  and	  distribution,	  amphetamines	  have	  been	  
associated	  with	  mobility	  and	  migratory	  groups:	  truckers	  and	  bikers	  early	  in	  their	  
history,	  smugglers	  and	  illegal	  immigrants	  later	  on.	  	  Second,	  amphetamines	  and	  
methamphetamine	  are	  frequently	  tied	  to	  the	  rise	  in	  postwar	  America	  of	  ever	  
increasing	  demands	  upon	  the	  worker.	  	  A	  prominent	  economist	  described	  the	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economic	  recovery	  of	  the	  1940s	  as	  a	  “supersonic	  .	  .	  	  .	  Benzedrine-­‐stimulated	  
economy”	  (NYT	  1952a).	  	  	  It	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  read	  an	  account	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  
amphetamines	  that	  does	  not	  include	  reference	  to	  the	  many	  people	  who	  use	  it	  as	  a	  
work	  aid.	  	  Edison	  (1971),	  in	  no	  way	  a	  proponent	  of	  amphetamines,	  summed	  this	  
sentiment	  well:	  
It	  is	  possible	  that	  amphetamine	  popularity	  reflects	  American	  culture	  .	  .	  
.	  .	  	  The	  amphetamine	  user	  is	  a	  caricature	  of	  many	  widely	  admired	  
America	  traits:	  intense	  activity,	  efficiency,	  persistence	  and	  drive,	  and	  
the	  desire	  to	  excel,	  to	  break	  records,	  and	  to	  move	  with	  ever-­‐greater	  
speed	  (609).	  
	  
The	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Education	  and	  Welfare	  estimated	  in	  1959	  that	  
amphetamine	  production	  was	  approximately	  75,000	  pounds	  (Flemming	  1959).	  	  By	  
1962,	  according	  to	  the	  FDA,	  that	  number	  had	  climbed	  to	  100,000,	  enough	  to	  supply	  
250	  mg	  (20	  to	  50	  doses)	  to	  every	  citizen	  (JAMA	  1965).	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  
any	  numbers	  on	  amphetamine	  production	  before	  1971	  are	  estimates.	  	  Companies	  
were	  not	  required	  to	  disclose	  how	  many	  amphetamines	  they	  were	  producing,	  and	  
frequently	  refused	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Furthermore,	  no	  complete	  list	  exists	  of	  who	  was	  even	  
producing	  the	  drugs,	  and	  those	  lists	  would	  not	  include	  illegal	  or	  clandestine	  
producers	  who	  frequently	  shipped	  in	  knock-­‐offs	  from	  Mexico	  and	  other	  locales	  
(McGlothlin	  1973).	  	  We	  do	  know	  that	  in	  1967,	  31	  million	  prescriptions	  for	  
stimulant-­‐based	  diet	  pills	  were	  written,	  meaning	  that	  as	  much	  as	  8	  percent	  of	  the	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The	  Rise	  of	  High-­Dosage	  Methamphetamine	  Injection	  
In	  the	  late	  1950s,	  medical	  professionals	  began	  to	  prescribe	  amphetamine	  
injection	  for	  some	  medical	  issues.	  	  Methedrine	  (Burroughs	  Wellcome)	  and	  Desoxyn	  
(Abbott	  Pharmaceuticals)	  were	  the	  brand	  names	  for	  methamphetamine	  ampoules	  
for	  this	  purpose.	  	  Obviously,	  having	  methamphetamine	  available	  in	  renewable,	  
injection-­‐ready	  preparations	  was	  a	  situation	  ripe	  for	  abuse.	  	  Though	  a	  few	  people	  
had	  injected	  methamphetamine	  extracted	  from	  inhalers	  in	  the	  1950s,	  the	  early	  
1960s	  saw	  the	  first	  rampant	  intravenous	  abuse	  of	  the	  drug.	  	  As	  is	  often	  the	  case,	  this	  
particular	  abuse	  began	  with	  addicts	  and	  abusers	  replacing	  one	  drug	  with	  another,	  in	  
this	  case	  heroin	  by	  methamphetamine.	  	  During	  the	  Korean	  War	  a	  number	  of	  heroin-­‐
addicted	  GIs	  learned	  to	  inject	  methamphetamine	  while	  on	  leave	  in	  Japan	  when	  
heroin	  was	  scarce.	  	  After	  the	  war,	  many	  of	  them	  came	  back	  to	  the	  West	  Coast	  
looking	  for	  meth.	  	  	  
At	  least	  initially,	  it	  appears	  that	  intravenous	  meth	  abuse	  in	  this	  country	  
began	  with	  the	  best	  of	  intentions.	  	  According	  to	  Kramer	  et	  al.	  (1967),	  physicians	  in	  
San	  Francisco	  began	  prescribing	  large	  quantities	  of	  injectible	  methamphetamine	  to	  
heroin	  addicts	  in	  1960	  and	  1961.	  	  These	  doctors	  were	  apparently	  operating	  under	  
the	  assumption	  that	  Methedrine	  would	  work	  like	  methadone	  as	  a	  means	  of	  breaking	  
addiction.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  more	  unscrupulous	  doctors	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area	  appear	  to	  
have	  begun	  selling	  methamphetamine	  prescriptions	  to	  junkies	  for	  profit.	  	  Robert	  C.	  
Smith	  (1969)	  quoted	  an	  ex-­‐Methedrine	  user	  who	  described	  the	  process:	  
There	  were	  three	  doctors	  at	  the	  time;	  the	  first	  was	  on	  Sutter	  Street.	  	  
He	  was	  the	  first	  one	  that	  really	  went	  strong.	  	  He	  used	  to	  charge	  $7	  a	  
visit.	  	  You	  go	  in,	  sit	  down,	  you	  say—Doctor,	  I	  used	  to	  be	  a	  heroin	  
addict.	  	  I	  can’t	  stand	  the	  prices,	  I	  can’t	  stand	  being	  busted,	  I	  can’t	  stand	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kicking,	  I	  can’t	  stand	  being	  sick.	  	  I	  need	  drugs.	  	  I	  have	  a	  physical	  
dependence	  on	  drugs,	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  use	  heroin—please,	  give	  me	  a	  
prescription	  for	  meth	  .	  .	  .	  .	  	  For	  every	  person	  that	  went	  and	  got	  a	  
prescription,	  there	  were	  ten	  people	  who	  bought	  from	  the	  guy	  who	  had	  
the	  prescription.	  	  It	  was	  very	  easy.	  	  You	  take	  the	  ampoules	  and	  you’d	  
soak	  them	  and	  the	  labels	  would	  fall	  off	  and	  the	  identifying	  mark	  was	  
gone,	  the	  drug	  store	  identifying	  mark,	  the	  registry	  mark,	  the	  date	  and	  
everything	  was	  gone,	  so	  you	  can	  just	  sell	  the	  bottle.	  	  And	  there	  was	  no	  
way	  they	  can	  trace	  it	  back	  to	  you	  once	  it	  was	  out	  of	  your	  hands	  (20).	  
	  
Methedrine	  sales	  reflect	  the	  increase	  in	  abuse.	  In	  1959	  only	  a	  few	  hundred	  
ampoules	  were	  sold	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area.	  	  However,	  in	  1960	  that	  number	  rose	  to	  
280,000.	  	  In	  1961,	  it	  rose	  again	  to	  almost	  580,000,	  and	  nearly	  that	  number	  again,	  
550,000,	  were	  distributed	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  1962.	  	  The	  estimated	  street	  value	  of	  all	  
those	  ampoules	  approached	  one	  million	  dollars	  (Rawlin	  1968).	  	  When	  the	  police	  
began	  to	  crack	  down	  on	  these	  doctors	  and	  other	  sources	  of	  diversion	  around	  1962,	  
the	  first	  clandestine	  methamphetamine	  laboratories	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  appeared	  beginning	  
in	  San	  Francisco11	  (Morgan	  et	  al.	  1997;	  Smith	  1969).	  	  The	  voluntary	  removal	  of	  
injectible	  ampoules	  of	  Methedrine	  and	  other	  similar	  injectible	  versions	  of	  
methamphetamine	  from	  the	  market	  in	  1963	  then	  rapidly	  bolstered	  the	  number	  of	  
such	  labs	  in	  operation.	  	  	  
Former	  hospital	  orderly	  Nick	  Ford	  was	  the	  first	  person	  arrested	  for	  making	  
methamphetamine	  in	  1963.	  	  Operating	  before	  the	  crackdown	  on	  drug	  wholesalers,	  
he	  was	  able	  to	  purchase	  200	  grams	  of	  powdered	  Methedrine,	  which	  he	  then	  
combined	  with	  water	  and	  packaged	  into	  ampoules	  for	  resale	  (Turner	  1963).	  	  
Clandestine	  production	  was	  not	  confined	  to	  the	  Bay	  Area.	  	  Between	  1966	  and	  
1968	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  and	  Dangerous	  Drugs	  seized	  21	  methamphetamine	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  There	  is	  some	  debate	  to	  the	  exact	  date.	  	  Smith	  (1969)	  dates	  the	  first	  labs	  to	  1963	  rather	  than	  1962.	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labs	  and	  7	  amphetamine	  labs	  nationwide	  (Gunn	  et	  al.	  1970).	  	  Though	  the	  majority	  of	  
those	  seized	  (12)	  were	  in	  California,	  they	  were	  also	  found	  in	  Maryland,	  New	  York,	  
Oregon,	  Pennsylvania,	  Rhode	  Island,	  Washington	  and	  Wisconsin	  (Figure	  2.1).	  	  
Figure	  2.1:	  Methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  by	  the	  BNDD	  1966	  -­‐1968	  (Gunn	  et	  al.	  
1970).	  
	  
In	  December	  1967,	  the	  New	  York	  City	  police	  raided	  a	  lab	  operating	  within	  a	  
few	  blocks	  of	  city	  hall.	  	  The	  attorney	  general	  of	  New	  York	  estimated	  that	  the	  lab	  had	  
cost	  $50,000	  to	  set	  up,	  implying	  the	  involvement	  of	  organized	  crime.	  	  A	  year	  later,	  in	  
1968,	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  reported	  that	  a	  lab	  had	  been	  raided	  in	  nearby	  Tarzana.	  	  	  
That	  lab	  was	  described	  as	  “a	  methedrine	  factory,”	  where	  the	  police	  found	  two	  10-­‐
gallon	  containers	  of	  methamphetamine	  “cooking,”	  and	  eighteen	  ounces	  of	  already-­‐
processed	  Methedrine.	  	  They	  estimated	  the	  value	  of	  the	  drugs	  at	  $25,000	  (Hansen	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1968).	  	  In	  1969,	  the	  Washington	  Post	  reported	  that	  a	  “still”	  capable	  of	  producing	  
seven	  million	  dollars	  worth	  of	  amphetamines	  was	  raided	  in	  Arizona.	  	  
Roger	  C.	  Smith	  (1969),	  former	  director	  of	  the	  Amphetamine	  Research	  Project	  
at	  the	  University	  of	  California	  Medical	  Center,	  described	  how	  these	  early	  labs	  
operated.	  The	  first	  ones,	  like	  that	  of	  Nick	  Ford,	  were	  based	  on	  the	  purchase	  of	  legally	  
produced	  amphetamine	  base	  from	  wholesalers,	  usually	  under	  the	  pretense	  of	  
medical	  research	  and	  with	  forged	  credentials.	  	  These	  amphetamine	  bases	  were	  then	  
neutralized	  with	  an	  acid	  and	  sold	  in	  crystallized	  salt	  form,	  to	  be	  combined	  with	  
water	  for	  injection.	  	  After	  the	  police	  effectively	  cut	  off	  diversion	  from	  wholesalers,	  
chemists	  focused	  on	  other	  means	  of	  production,	  which	  begat	  the	  labs	  we	  are	  
familiar	  with	  today.	  	  	  
Most	  labs	  in	  the	  early	  1960s	  were	  operated	  by	  drug	  users	  themselves	  and	  fit	  
the	  freelance	  model	  of	  distribution	  networks.	  	  These	  mom-­‐and-­‐pop	  labs	  were	  
sometimes	  described	  as	  making	  “bathtub	  speed.”	  	  Small-­‐scale	  production	  required	  
little	  outlay	  for	  equipment	  and	  little	  training.	  	  Cooks	  would	  deal	  directly	  to	  users	  or	  
small-­‐scale	  freelance	  distributors.	  The	  key	  for	  the	  proliferation	  of	  these	  labs	  was	  the	  
spread	  of	  recipes.	  	  One	  “cook”	  described	  how	  she	  learned	  to	  make	  meth:	  
I	  moved	  to	  this	  house	  with	  a	  friend	  of	  mine	  in	  Seattle	  and	  this	  guy	  was	  
making	  it	  in	  the	  bathroom,	  and	  I’m	  very	  interested.	  	  I	  like	  to	  learn	  
things,	  so	  I	  just	  stayed	  with	  him	  on	  three	  different	  nights	  and	  would	  
go	  through	  all	  the	  steps	  and	  I	  would	  write	  down	  how	  to	  do	  it.	  	  And	  he	  
taught	  me	  and	  the	  next	  time	  I	  helped	  him	  do	  it.	  	  We	  did	  this	  around	  
five	  times	  and	  I	  learned	  a	  lot.	  	  I	  can	  do	  it	  now,	  and	  I	  know	  most	  of	  the	  
chemicals.	  	  	  I	  have	  all	  of	  it	  written	  down	  and	  I	  have	  to	  go	  by	  it,	  the	  
temperature	  and	  everything.	  	  I	  couldn’t	  remember	  it	  all,	  it’s	  too	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Gunn	  et	  al.,	  (1970)	  of	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  and	  Dangerous	  Drugs’	  
Laboratory	  Operations	  Division,	  believed	  that	  better-­‐educated	  chemists	  were	  able	  
to	  get	  the	  recipes	  for	  amphetamines	  via	  the	  Patent	  Office.	  “Many	  of	  these	  clandestine	  
manufacturers	  are	  as	  well	  aware	  as	  any	  graduate	  student	  of	  chemistry	  how	  to	  use	  
scientific	  research	  as	  a	  resource”	  (Gunn	  et	  al.	  1970,	  55).	  	  They	  claimed	  that	  some	  
raided	  labs	  had	  extensive	  collections	  of	  files	  on	  the	  production	  of	  various	  drugs.	  	  In	  a	  
fascinating	  aside,	  they	  noted	  that	  “great	  advances	  made	  in	  copying	  machines	  [had]	  
also	  assisted	  the	  illegal	  operator	  in	  obtaining	  the	  scientific	  information	  he	  needs,”	  
just	  as	  the	  Internet	  helps	  today’s	  would-­‐be	  cooks	  (55).	  
As	  the	  decade	  wore	  on,	  the	  market	  for	  injectible	  methamphetamine	  matured.	  	  
Many	  of	  the	  labs	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  early	  1960s	  would	  qualify	  today	  as	  super	  
labs,	  ones	  that	  produce	  greater	  than	  ten	  pounds	  of	  finished	  product.	  	  These	  larger	  
labs	  were	  found	  in	  rural	  areas	  outside	  the	  central	  cities	  of	  the	  Bay	  Area.	  	  Smith	  
(1969)	  estimated	  in	  1969	  that	  six-­‐to-­‐eight	  such	  labs	  provided	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
methamphetamine	  used	  in	  Northern	  California	  and	  Hawaii,	  with	  the	  rest	  supplied	  
by	  small-­‐scale,	  mom-­‐and-­‐pop	  labs.	  	  	  
The	  large-­‐scale	  labs	  fit	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  drug	  distribution	  networks.	  
They	  required	  a	  significant	  outlay	  of	  start-­‐up	  money,	  which	  usually	  came	  from	  
“straight	  investors”	  who	  sought	  a	  return	  on	  their	  investment	  but	  had	  no	  
involvement	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operation	  of	  the	  lab	  or	  market.	  	  	  The	  chemists	  in	  these	  
labs	  would	  supply	  several	  wholesale	  dealers,	  who	  would	  then	  supply	  down	  the	  
chain	  to	  small-­‐time	  (ounce-­‐level)	  dealers	  who	  frequently	  sold	  the	  drug	  to	  fund	  their	  
own	  use.	  	  Chemists	  and	  the	  larger	  dealers	  realized	  sizable	  profits	  and	  isolated	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themselves	  from	  risk	  by	  relying	  on	  ounce-­‐level	  dealers	  to	  work	  at	  the	  street	  level.	  	  
Small-­‐scale	  dealers,	  in	  contrast,	  realized	  very	  little	  profit	  and	  faced	  serious	  risk	  of	  
violence	  or	  arrest.	  	  They	  sometimes	  increased	  that	  risk	  by	  cutting	  the	  drug	  with	  
adulterants	  to	  increase	  its	  volume,	  a	  process	  known	  on	  the	  street	  as	  “burning.”	  
The	  chemicals	  needed	  to	  operate	  a	  large	  lab	  were	  not	  easy	  to	  come	  by.	  	  
Though	  rumors	  exist	  of	  mafia	  involvement	  in	  this	  part	  of	  the	  production	  chain,	  the	  
midlevel	  trafficking	  of	  precursor	  chemicals	  described	  by	  Smith	  fits	  into	  the	  cottage	  
industry	  model.	  	  He	  characterized	  the	  people	  who	  handled	  this	  segment	  of	  the	  
commodity	  chain	  as	  “individual	  entrepreneurs,”	  who	  created	  front	  businesses	  in	  
order	  to	  buy	  chemicals	  and	  then	  sold	  them	  to	  chemists	  at	  a	  markup	  of	  25	  percent.	  	  	  
	  
Meth	  Heads	  and	  Speed	  Freaks:	  High	  Dosage	  Amphetamine	  Injectors	  
High-­‐dosage	  amphetamine	  injectors	  represented	  an	  entirely	  new	  
phenomenon	  to	  observers	  in	  the	  police	  and	  medical	  communities.	  	  Coming	  as	  it	  did	  
at	  a	  time	  of	  increasing	  drug	  use	  nationwide,	  and	  during	  a	  period	  when	  drug	  use	  was	  
moving	  from	  the	  societal	  underground	  into	  the	  middle	  and	  upper	  classes,	  concern	  
over	  any	  “new”	  form	  of	  drug	  abuse	  was	  elevated.	  	  Users	  were	  quickly	  labeled	  as	  
“speed	  freaks”	  and	  “meth	  heads”	  (Carey	  and	  Mandel	  1968,	  Cox	  and	  Smart	  1970).	  	  
Meth	  head,	  a	  term	  in	  use	  as	  early	  as	  1967,	  comes	  not	  from	  methamphetamine,	  but	  
from	  its	  most	  common	  commercial	  name,	  Burroughs	  Wellcome’s	  Methedrine.	  	  	  A	  
number	  of	  studies	  were	  produced	  to	  document	  the	  new	  speed-­‐freak	  “scene”	  (Carey	  
and	  Mandel	  1968;	  Griffith	  1966;	  Kramer	  et	  al.	  1967;	  Rawlin	  1968;	  Angrist	  and	  
Gershon	  1969).	  	  The	  authors	  of	  one	  particular	  study	  of	  intravenous	  users	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demonstrated	  that,	  while	  this	  new	  type	  of	  use	  was	  dangerous	  and	  growing,	  certain	  
other	  forms	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse	  had	  become	  generally	  acknowledged	  if	  not	  
acceptable	  in	  society	  by	  the	  1960s.	  	  In	  defining	  the	  population	  of	  their	  study,	  they	  
offered	  the	  following	  clarification:	  	  	  
[High-­‐dosage	  users]	  excludes	  dieters,	  students	  who	  are	  cramming,	  
people	  who	  take	  amphetamines	  to	  improve	  their	  work	  (i.e.	  pilots,	  
truckers,	  Madison	  Avenue	  executives,	  prostitutes),	  even	  when	  the	  
pills	  are	  obtained	  illegally	  and	  regularly	  taken	  at	  several	  times	  the	  
normal	  dosage	  	  (Carey	  and	  Mandel	  1968,	  165).	  
	  
Amphetamine	  injectors	  definitely	  represented	  a	  form	  of	  abuse	  far	  different	  
from	  the	  more	  mundane	  examples	  listed	  by	  Carey	  and	  Mandel.	  	  Intravenous	  meth	  
injectors	  usually	  took	  100	  to	  300	  mg	  of	  amphetamine	  per	  dose,	  compared	  to	  5	  to	  10	  
mg	  doses	  in	  pill	  form,	  a	  quantity	  much	  closer	  to	  the	  amount	  contained	  in	  an	  
amphetamine	  inhaler	  (250	  mg).	  	  As	  tolerance	  to	  the	  drug	  increased,	  users	  were	  
prone	  to	  increase	  their	  dosages	  as	  high	  as	  1,000	  mg.	  	  Kramer	  et	  al.	  (1967)	  described	  
one	  user	  whose	  tolerance	  had	  grown	  so	  high	  that	  he	  used	  more	  than	  one	  gram	  per	  
dose,	  and	  consumed	  as	  much	  as	  15,000	  mg	  per	  day.	  	  	  Also,	  intravenous	  users	  were	  
no	  longer	  trying	  to	  make	  themselves	  more	  efficient	  at	  work	  or	  productive	  at	  home.	  	  
They	  now	  were	  dropping	  out	  of	  society.	  	  Amphetamine	  injectors	  used	  the	  drug	  in	  
“runs,”	  which	  consisted	  of	  two-­‐to-­‐three-­‐day	  binges,	  lasting	  until	  the	  supply	  ran	  out.	  	  	  
Unlike	  heroin	  injectors,	  who	  become	  lethargic	  after	  use,	  amphetamine	  injectors	  
become	  hyperactive	  and	  excitable.	  	  During	  binges,	  users	  often	  would	  distract	  
themselves	  by	  performing	  simple,	  repeated	  tasks	  such	  as	  stringing	  beads,	  cleaning	  
house,	  or	  taking	  apart	  electronics.	  	  They	  also	  generally	  did	  not	  eat,	  causing	  a	  weight	  
loss	  of	  ten	  to	  thirty	  pounds	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  binge	  and	  creating	  an	  emaciated	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appearance	  in	  frequent	  users.	  	  After	  a	  run,	  users	  usually	  slept	  for	  anywhere	  from	  12	  
to	  24	  hours.	  	  This	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  crash.	  	  	  
High-­‐dosage,	  intravenous	  use	  frequently	  leads	  to	  amphetamine	  psychosis	  
after	  several	  months.	  	  	  Resulting	  paranoia	  and	  hallucinations	  would	  sometimes	  lead	  
to	  violence,	  but	  more	  often	  users	  simply	  isolated	  themselves	  from	  the	  outside	  world	  
until	  they	  came	  down	  off	  the	  drug.	  	  	  	  	  
Runs	  were	  usually	  group	  affairs,	  as	  the	  drug	  made	  users	  talkative.	  Runs	  often	  
occurred	  in	  houses	  or	  apartments	  rented	  by	  users	  or	  producers.	  	  Sometimes	  these	  
houses	  contained	  runs	  that	  lasted	  for	  weeks	  or	  even	  months	  at	  a	  time,	  with	  users	  
dropping	  in	  and	  out.	  	  Mandel	  and	  Carey	  (1968)	  described	  how	  such	  houses	  and	  their	  
temporary	  tribes	  of	  users	  would	  inevitably	  fall	  apart	  in	  time.	  	  Perhaps	  they	  would	  
become	  too	  popular	  and	  the	  police	  would	  become	  aware	  of	  them,	  or	  the	  occupants	  
would	  fall	  behind	  on	  rent	  and	  get	  kicked	  out.	  At	  other	  times,	  the	  users	  would	  turn	  on	  
each	  other	  as	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  drug	  money	  arose	  and	  psychosis	  paranoia	  
became	  an	  issue.	  	  	  
It	  is	  not	  entirely	  clear	  who	  the	  typical	  meth	  injectors	  were	  at	  this	  time.	  	  Roger	  
C.	  Smith	  (1969)	  said	  that	  they	  tended	  to	  be	  from	  middle-­‐class	  backgrounds,	  lacking	  
in	  the	  “hustling”	  or	  petty	  criminal	  skills	  associated	  with	  lower-­‐class	  heroin	  users.	  	  
Davis	  and	  Munoz	  	  (1968),	  however,	  came	  away	  from	  their	  study	  of	  “hippies”	  in	  San	  
Francisco’s	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  district	  with	  the	  opposite	  assessment.	  	  	  They	  concluded	  
that:	  “’heads’	  [here	  meaning	  users	  of	  LSD]	  are	  by	  and	  large	  persons	  of	  middle	  and	  
upper-­‐class	  social	  origins	  whereas	  ‘freaks’	  [speed	  freaks,	  Methedrine	  injectors]	  are	  
much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  of	  working	  class	  background.”	  	  They	  may	  have	  shown	  their	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own	  biases	  when	  they	  went	  on	  to	  state	  that:	  “LSD	  equals	  self-­‐exploration/self-­‐
improvement	  equals	  middle	  class,	  while	  Methedrine	  equals	  body	  
stimulation/release	  of	  aggressive	  impulses	  equals	  working	  class”	  (161).	  	  	  Davis	  and	  
Munoz	  went	  on	  to	  characterize	  speed	  use	  as	  more	  frequent	  among	  transient,	  
quasicriminal	  members	  of	  the	  population	  such	  as	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels,	  rather	  than	  
traditional	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  hippies.	  	  They	  also	  stated	  that	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  
on	  the	  West	  Coast	  were	  among	  the	  first	  groups	  to	  abuse	  amphetamines	  in	  general.	  	  	  	  
Carey	  and	  Mandel	  (1969)	  did	  not	  make	  class	  distinctions	  among	  Methedrine	  
injectors,	  though	  they	  did	  note	  that	  these	  people	  tended	  to	  become	  transient	  once	  
they	  were	  living	  in	  the	  Haight.	  	  Finally,	  Kramer	  et	  al.	  (1967)	  described	  their	  sample	  
of	  amphetamine	  injectors	  as	  coming	  from	  such	  diverse	  groups	  as	  “’hippies,’	  middle	  
class	  ‘neurotic’	  drug	  takers,	  and	  former	  heroin	  addicts.	  	  ‘Outlaw’	  motorcycle	  groups	  
are	  said	  to	  be	  large	  purchasers	  of	  amphetamines	  for	  injection”	  (309).	  	  	  
Black	  (1970)	  noted	  that	  “it	  becomes	  more	  and	  more	  difficult	  to	  characterize	  
the	  typical	  amphetamine	  abuser.”	  	  Though	  he	  found	  that	  use	  was	  more	  common	  
among	  petty	  criminals,	  truckers,	  medical	  personnel,	  and	  homosexuals	  (whom	  he	  
noted	  were	  vastly	  overrepresented	  given	  their	  population),	  he	  posited	  that	  “any	  
harassed	  ‘outcast’	  group	  might	  turn	  to	  speed	  with	  its	  promise	  of	  confidence	  and	  
power.”	  	  It	  seems	  safe	  to	  say	  that,	  whatever	  their	  background,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  the	  
members	  of	  this	  new	  class	  of	  Methedrine	  injectors	  fell	  rather	  quickly	  into	  a	  
quasitransient	  lifestyle	  once	  they	  started	  to	  use.	  
Perhaps	  not	  surprisingly,	  the	  hyperactivity,	  paranoia,	  and	  propensity	  for	  
thieving	  of	  “speed	  freaks”	  led	  to	  their	  being	  generally	  disliked,	  even	  among	  other	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drug	  users.	  	  In	  San	  Francisco,	  particularly	  in	  the	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  neighborhood,	  
tensions	  ran	  high	  between	  amphetamine	  injectors	  and	  the	  other,	  mellower	  
members	  of	  the	  counterculture	  scene.	  	  David	  E.	  Smith,	  director	  of	  the	  Haight-­‐
Ashbury	  Medical	  Clinic,	  described	  the	  Haight	  as	  the	  speed	  capital	  of	  the	  world	  in	  
1968.	  	  He	  lamented	  how	  “the	  speed	  freak”	  had	  replaced	  or	  driven	  away	  the	  “acid	  
head,”	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  has	  been	  converted	  from	  an	  acid	  subculture	  
to	  a	  speed	  subculture:	  
The	  “acid	  head”	  community	  cannot	  live	  with	  the	  “speed	  freak”	  
community	  because	  of	  the	  violent	  characteristics	  of	  the	  latter.	  	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  “hippies”	  have	  left	  the	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  district,	  moving	  to	  
the	  country	  where	  they	  can	  establish	  small	  rural	  communes	  which	  
tolerate	  and	  reinforce	  their	  beliefs.	  	  Unfortunately,	  in	  the	  conflict	  of	  
“speed	  freaks”	  against	  “acid	  heads,”	  speed	  always	  drives	  out	  acid	  just	  
as	  in	  the	  broader	  society	  the	  philosophy	  of	  violence	  always	  dominates	  
the	  higher	  aspiration	  of	  non-­‐violence,	  peace,	  and	  love	  (E.	  Smith	  1969,	  
156).	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  conflict	  between	  hippies	  and	  meth	  heads	  led	  in	  1968	  to	  the	  “Speed	  Kills”	  
campaign.	  	  Though	  no	  documentation	  existed	  of	  amphetamine	  overdoses	  resulting	  
in	  deaths	  and	  most	  researchers	  have	  not	  associated	  amphetamine	  abuse	  with	  
consistently	  violent	  behavior	  (any	  more	  so	  than	  any	  other	  drug),	  the	  Do	  It	  Now	  
Foundation	  started	  the	  campaign	  to	  rid	  the	  Haight	  of	  amphetamines	  and	  return	  it	  to	  
the	  more	  favorable	  (to	  them)	  scene	  of	  the	  hippies.	  	  This	  organization	  released	  a	  
compilation	  album	  called	  “First	  Vibration,”	  which	  featured	  Bay	  Area	  rock	  groups	  
singing	  songs	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse	  (i.e.	  Canned	  Heat’s	  
“Amphetamine	  Annie”).	  	  	  The	  group	  also	  produced	  a	  booklet	  called	  “A	  19-­‐Year-­‐old	  
Girl	  and	  Poet	  Allen	  Ginsberg	  Talk	  About	  Speed.”	  	  In	  the	  pamphlet,	  the	  poet	  and	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former	  Benzedrine-­‐abuse	  advocate	  railed	  against	  the	  effects	  of	  speed	  on	  individuals	  
and	  the	  community:	  
Since	  1958	  it's	  been	  a	  plague	  around	  my	  house.	  People	  that	  I	  liked	  or	  
who	  were	  good	  artists	  have	  gotten	  all	  screwed	  up	  on	  it,	  and	  come	  
around	  burning	  down	  the	  door,	  stealing.	  All	  the	  stuff	  I	  brought	  back	  
from	  India	  was	  stolen	  by	  speed	  freaks	  (Do	  it	  Now	  1969)	  
	  	  
As	  surreal	  as	  having	  Allen	  Ginsburg	  talk	  to	  a	  teenager	  about	  speed	  was,	  it	  was	  
nothing	  compared	  to	  the	  group’s	  radio	  campaign,	  which	  featured	  such	  drug-­‐addled	  
rockers	  as	  Steven	  Stills	  and	  Grace	  Slick	  (of	  “White	  Rabbit”	  fame)	  warning	  listeners	  
to	  avoid	  speed.	  	  This	  multifaceted	  campaign	  gained	  a	  lot	  of	  publicity,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  
to	  assess	  its	  impact	  on	  actual	  speed	  usage.	  	  	  
At	  least	  initially,	  speed’s	  popularity	  continued	  to	  grow	  in	  the	  Haight	  to	  the	  
point	  that	  in	  1970,	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  was	  calling	  the	  district	  a	  disaster	  zone.	  	  
Former	  “summer	  of	  love”	  shops	  were	  boarded	  up.	  	  The	  streets	  once	  full	  of	  peace-­‐
and-­‐love	  hippies	  were	  now	  occupied	  by	  “knots	  of	  hard-­‐eyed	  drug	  pushers	  and	  
motorcycle	  toughs”	  (Los	  Angeles	  Times	  1970).	  	  	  
	   Though	  most	  research	  and	  press	  coverage	  focused	  on	  the	  Bay	  Area,	  
methamphetamine	  injection	  was	  in	  no	  way	  confined	  there.	  	  Writing	  in	  the	  New	  York	  
Times,	  Jonathan	  Black	  (1970)	  claimed	  that	  the	  FDA	  had	  found	  meth	  for	  injection	  
“readily	  available”	  in	  New	  York,	  Dallas,	  Minneapolis-­‐St.	  Paul,	  and	  Seattle	  in	  addition	  
to	  California.	  	  Denver	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  Crystal	  City	  by	  its	  drug-­‐using	  residents.	  	  On	  
the	  East	  Coast,	  the	  East	  Village	  of	  Manhattan	  was	  considered	  the	  speed	  capital.	  	  
There,	  much	  like	  in	  San	  Francisco,	  the	  drug-­‐using	  population	  turned	  against	  their	  
speed-­‐using	  brethren.	  	  The	  Village	  Voice	  described	  meth	  injectors	  as	  “a	  distinct	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subgroup,	  semi-­‐quarantined,	  and	  often	  regarded	  with	  apprehension	  by	  their	  fellow	  
hippies”	  (Angrist	  and	  Gershon	  1969).	  	  
Not	  every	  user	  was	  shooting	  up.	  	  As	  one	  New	  York	  Times	  article	  put	  it,	  
“thousands	  and	  probably	  millions	  use	  amphetamines	  without	  becoming	  wild-­‐eyed	  
‘speed	  freaks.’	  They	  drop	  pills	  to	  finish	  papers,	  wax	  floors,	  lose	  weight,	  write	  songs,	  
sing	  songs,	  have	  conferences,	  sculpt,	  wake	  up	  and	  think	  more	  clearly”	  (Black	  1970).	  	  
The	  1960s	  saw	  studies	  on	  amphetamine	  abuse	  in	  Oklahoma	  (Griffith	  1966),	  St.	  Louis	  
(Rawlin	  1968),	  New	  York	  (Angrist	  and	  Gershon	  1969),	  Washington	  state	  (Greenberg	  
and	  Lustig	  1966),	  and	  Wisconsin	  (Jackson	  and	  Reed	  1970).	  	  
	  
A	  Chain	  Made	  for	  Diversion	  
The	  diversion	  of	  amphetamines	  from	  legal	  to	  illegal	  uses	  continued	  in	  
relatively	  unabated	  fashion	  during	  the	  1960s.	  	  This	  was	  easy	  to	  do	  because	  the	  links	  
of	  this	  commodity	  chain	  for	  legally	  produced	  amphetamines	  allowed	  numerous	  
points	  of	  diversion.	  	  In	  1966,	  seven	  manufacturers	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  produced	  
amphetamines.	  	  These	  seven	  did	  not	  produce	  pills	  themselves.	  	  Rather,	  they	  shipped	  
amphetamine	  in	  powder	  form	  to	  either	  dosage-­‐form	  manufacturers	  or	  chemical	  
brokerage	  firms	  that	  acted	  as	  middlemen	  between	  chemical	  manufacturers	  and	  the	  
big	  drug	  firms.	  	  Dosage-­‐form	  manufacturers	  then	  shipped	  the	  drugs	  in	  usable	  form	  
to	  pharmacists,	  researchers,	  hospitals	  and	  doctors	  (Sadusk	  1966).	  	  	  
Any	  one	  of	  these	  points	  of	  intersection	  represented	  a	  moment	  when	  
diversion	  could	  potentially	  occur.	  For	  example,	  the	  FDA	  prosecuted	  two	  firms	  in	  
1966	  for	  shipping	  amphetamines	  to	  unlicensed	  drug	  manufacturers.	  	  This	  was	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diversion	  from	  the	  point	  of	  initial	  manufacture.	  	  Others	  took	  advantage	  of	  dosage-­‐
form	  manufacturers.	  	  In	  1962,	  a	  single	  individual	  was	  able	  to	  obtain	  13,500,000	  
amphetamine	  pills	  from	  firms	  all	  over	  the	  East	  Coast	  by	  forging	  thousands	  of	  
prescriptions.	  	  A	  person	  diverting	  pills	  from	  the	  dosage-­‐form	  manufacturer	  could	  
buy	  a	  thousand	  tablets	  for	  a	  dollar	  and	  then	  sell	  those	  same	  pills	  for	  approximately	  
$40,	  or	  if	  they	  had	  the	  time,	  at	  five	  to	  ten	  cents	  per	  pill	  (Sadusk	  1966).	  	  	  
Many	  pill	  manufacturers	  would	  ship	  their	  product	  to	  Mexico	  without	  doing	  
any	  background	  checks	  on	  the	  “pharmacies”	  that	  ordered	  the	  drugs	  there.	  	  Bates	  
Laboratories	  of	  Chicago	  reportedly	  shipped	  millions	  of	  amphetamine	  pills	  to	  a	  man	  
who	  was	  referred	  to	  as	  “The	  Pep	  Pill	  King	  of	  Tijuana”	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  1960s.	  	  
Federal	  agents	  became	  suspicious	  only	  when	  they	  found	  the	  delivery	  address	  to	  be	  
the	  eleventh	  hole	  of	  the	  Tijuana	  Country	  Club	  (Wall	  Street	  Journal	  1969).	  Donald	  
Rice,	  testifying	  before	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Crime,	  reported	  that	  he	  would	  
spend	  $4,500	  on	  300,000	  Benzedrine	  tablets	  in	  Tijuana	  and	  then	  sell	  them	  to	  
workers	  at	  the	  Ford	  Motor	  Company	  and	  General	  Motors	  plants	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area	  for	  
$12,000	  (Lembke	  1969).	  	  
Illegal	  drug	  diversion	  had	  reached	  a	  total	  of	  four	  billion	  tablets	  per	  year	  by	  
1965	  (half	  of	  all	  estimated	  production),	  when	  the	  federal	  government	  passed	  the	  
Drug	  Abuse	  Control	  Amendments.	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  force	  each	  link	  in	  the	  
amphetamine	  commodity	  chain	  to	  document	  where	  their	  product	  ended	  up,	  and	  to	  
be	  able	  to	  produce	  that	  documentation	  at	  will	  for	  inspectors.	  	  These	  amendments	  
were	  part	  of	  Senator	  Thomas	  Dodd	  of	  Connecticut’s	  long	  fight	  against	  the	  
pharmaceutical	  industry	  over	  amphetamine	  abuse.	  	  It	  appeared	  at	  first	  that	  the	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amendment	  would	  greatly	  increase	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  FDA	  to	  control	  drug	  production	  
and	  levy	  fines,	  but	  the	  law	  was	  vigorously	  protested	  by	  drug	  companies	  and	  
pharmacist	  associations	  and	  actually	  had	  little	  effect.	  	  Prescriptions,	  for	  example,	  
rather	  than	  being	  nonrefillable	  as	  the	  World	  Health	  Organization	  had	  long	  
recommended,	  could	  be	  refilled	  up	  to	  five	  times	  before	  a	  patient	  had	  to	  revisit	  the	  
doctor.	  	  Although	  record	  keeping	  provisions	  were	  maintained	  in	  the	  final	  law,	  the	  
FDA	  was	  severely	  understaffed	  for	  checking	  the	  paperwork.	  
In	  another	  strike	  at	  amphetamine	  abuse	  in	  1965,	  the	  FDA	  finally	  removed	  
methamphetamine	  inhalers	  from	  the	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  market.	  	  Commissioner	  
George	  P.	  Larrick,	  in	  issuing	  the	  order,	  cited	  the	  growing	  abuse	  of	  the	  products.	  	  The	  
FDA	  had	  received	  153	  reports	  of	  cases	  involving	  methamphetamine-­‐based	  inhalers	  
in	  1964	  from	  states	  throughout	  the	  Midwest	  including	  Colorado,	  Illinois,	  Iowa,	  
Kansas,	  Kentucky,	  Missouri,	  Nebraska,	  Oklahoma,	  and	  Texas.	  	  Those	  153	  were	  up	  
from	  54	  cases	  in	  1963,	  and	  only	  5	  each	  for	  1962	  and	  1961	  (Chicago	  Tribune	  1965).	  
	  
The	  Medical	  Community	  Responds	  
While	  most	  of	  the	  effort	  in	  Senator	  Dodd’s	  1965	  amendments	  was	  aimed	  at	  
stopping	  diversion	  and	  the	  public	  was	  primarily	  distracted	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  
intravenous	  meth	  abuse,	  the	  medical	  community	  was	  becoming	  keenly	  aware	  of	  two	  
other	  aspects	  of	  the	  problem:	  the	  potential	  of	  amphetamines	  to	  cause	  addiction	  and	  
the	  growing	  rates	  of	  abuse	  among	  people	  who	  were	  receiving	  the	  drugs	  legally	  by	  
prescription.	  	  Connell	  (1966),	  writing	  in	  a	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association	  special	  edition	  on	  non-­‐narcotic	  addiction	  (specifically	  barbiturates	  and	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amphetamines),	  stated	  that	  “these	  drugs,	  which	  are	  prescribed	  so	  widely,	  are	  not	  as	  
safe	  as	  had	  been	  previously	  suggested,	  and	  .	  .	  .	  a	  new	  look	  into	  their	  real	  value	  in	  
clinical	  medicine	  is	  needed”	  (719).	  	  He	  further	  noted	  that	  most	  amphetamine	  
abusers	  were	  not	  doing	  so	  at	  the	  street	  level,	  but	  had	  been	  introduced	  to	  the	  drug	  by	  
their	  physicians.	  	  	  
Cox	  and	  Smart	  (1970)	  commented	  that	  patients	  receiving	  amphetamine	  
prescriptions	  were	  rarely	  warned	  of	  their	  addictive	  potential.	  	  Edison	  (1971),	  
writing	  in	  the	  Annals	  of	  Internal	  Medicine,	  described	  amphetamines	  as	  “perhaps	  the	  
most	  serious	  drug	  of	  abuse	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  (608).	  	  The	  American	  Medical	  
Association’s	  Committee	  on	  Alcohol	  and	  Addiction	  and	  Council	  on	  Mental	  Health,	  in	  
a	  statement	  on	  amphetamine	  dependence	  released	  shortly	  after	  the	  new	  laws	  were	  
put	  into	  effect,	  listed	  eight	  common	  reasons	  for	  amphetamine	  prescription,	  and	  
judged	  all	  but	  the	  treatment	  of	  narcolepsy	  and	  hyperkinetic	  children	  as	  being	  of	  
dubious	  value.	  	  The	  crux	  of	  their	  argument	  and	  that	  of	  others	  (Edison	  1971,	  Connell	  
1966,	  Ellenwood	  1971,	  JAMA	  1965,	  Committee	  on	  Alcoholism	  and	  Addiction	  and	  
Council	  on	  Mental	  Health	  1966)	  was	  that	  amphetamines	  prescribed	  in	  any	  long-­‐
term	  treatment	  produced	  tolerance	  and,	  if	  continued,	  dependence.	  	  One	  writer,	  
describing	  amphetamine	  treatment	  for	  the	  obese	  stated:	  “obese	  patients	  may	  use	  
the	  drug	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  ‘speed	  freak’	  does—to	  obtain	  a	  ‘high’”	  (Edison	  1971,	  
607).	  
Despite	  these	  mid-­‐decade	  warnings	  in	  the	  medical	  literature,	  doctors	  
continued	  to	  prescribe	  amphetamines	  for	  as	  many	  as	  thirty-­‐six	  different	  indications.	  	  
Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  (1975)	  and	  Rasmussen	  (2008)	  both	  attributed	  this	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primarily	  to	  massive	  advertising	  budgets	  of	  the	  drug	  companies.	  	  Others	  have	  
suggested	  more	  nuanced	  reasons.	  	  Edison	  (1971)	  posited	  six	  reasons	  why	  a	  
physician	  might	  still	  be	  prescribing	  amphetamines.	  	  According	  to	  his	  logic:	  1)	  most	  
physicians	  had	  not	  seen	  the	  effects	  of	  high-­‐dose	  amphetamine	  addiction;	  2)	  many	  
physicians	  felt	  pressed	  to	  offer	  a	  solution	  to	  obesity	  when	  they,	  in	  fact,	  knew	  there	  
was	  none;	  3)	  the	  economic	  value	  of	  amphetamine	  sales	  had	  encouraged	  an	  effective	  
advertising	  campaign	  (the	  Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  argument);	  4)	  addicted	  patients	  
are	  effective	  at	  coercing	  their	  doctors	  into	  refilling	  prescriptions;	  5)	  physicians,	  who	  
abuse	  drugs	  more	  often	  than	  the	  general	  public,	  may	  have	  difficulty	  thinking	  
objectively	  about	  their	  utility;	  and	  6)	  amphetamines	  reflect	  American	  culture	  (the	  
drive	  to	  succeed,	  to	  get	  more	  hours	  out	  of	  the	  day,	  to	  work	  ever-­‐harder).	  	  Edison	  
ended	  his	  editorial	  with	  a	  call	  to	  arms:	  “We	  must	  begin	  taking	  steps	  now	  to	  end	  the	  
epidemic	  overuse	  and	  misuse	  of	  amphetamines”	  (609).	  	  His	  hope	  (which	  reflected	  
the	  stance	  of	  most	  physicians	  and	  the	  AMA)	  was	  that	  the	  medical	  community	  could	  
avoid	  legislation	  that	  would	  limit	  potentially	  useful	  drugs	  by	  policing	  themselves.	  	  	  
	  
The	  1970	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  Act	  
By	  1969	  it	  was	  apparent	  that	  the	  1965	  Drug	  Control	  Amendments	  had	  been	  
ineffective	  and	  that	  self-­‐policing	  was	  not	  going	  to	  reduce	  the	  rate	  of	  amphetamine	  
prescription.	  It	  fell	  once	  again	  to	  Congress	  to	  attempt	  to	  draw	  the	  reins.	  	  Beginning	  
in	  September	  of	  that	  year,	  the	  Senate,	  again	  led	  by	  Thomas	  Dodd,	  began	  debating	  a	  
new	  bill,	  The	  Controlled	  and	  Dangerous	  Substances	  Act,	  that	  would	  limit	  access	  to	  
and	  production	  of	  dugs	  based	  upon	  a	  scheduling	  system.	  	  Schedule	  I	  drugs	  would	  be	  
	  
	  
	   78	  
deemed	  dangerous	  and	  without	  medical	  benefit.	  	  Schedule	  II	  drugs	  were	  recognized	  
as	  addictive	  but	  with	  limited	  medical	  benefits.	  	  	  These	  drugs	  would	  have	  firm	  
production	  quotas	  and	  their	  prescriptions	  could	  not	  be	  refilled.	  	  Schedule	  III	  drugs	  
would	  have	  less	  restrictive	  rules	  regarding	  production	  and	  prescriptions.	  	  	  The	  bill	  
(as	  proposed	  by	  Nixon’s	  attorney	  general,	  John	  Mitchell)	  would	  put	  amphetamines	  
into	  the	  schedule	  III	  category,	  creating	  no	  quotas	  on	  their	  production,	  and	  limiting	  
penalties	  for	  possession	  and	  abuse.	  	  Dodd,	  in	  the	  Senate,	  and	  others	  in	  the	  House	  
sought	  to	  change	  that	  designation.	  	  	  
John	  Ingersoll,	  head	  of	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  and	  Dangerous	  Drugs	  (BNDD),	  
backed	  the	  schedule	  III	  designation	  for	  amphetamines	  despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  
according	  to	  his	  own	  sources,	  92	  percent	  of	  the	  amphetamines	  abused	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  
had	  been	  produced	  legally,	  not	  by	  clandestine	  laboratories.	  	  Expert	  medical	  
testimony	  also	  called	  for	  stiffer	  controls	  while	  it	  affirmed	  the	  widespread	  abuse	  of	  
amphetamines	  in	  many	  diverse	  subgroups	  of	  the	  population.	  	  	  Though	  the	  medical	  
community	  universally	  recognized	  only	  two	  indications	  for	  amphetamines—
narcolepsy	  and	  hyperkinetic	  disorder—Dr.	  Sydney	  Cohen	  of	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  
Mental	  Health	  said	  that	  99	  percent	  of	  prescriptions	  for	  amphetamines	  were	  for	  diet	  
control.	  	  Amphetamine	  researcher	  and	  Vanderbilt	  University	  School	  of	  Medicine	  
doctor	  John	  D.	  Griffith	  argued	  that	  “a	  few	  thousand	  tablets	  (of	  amphetamines)	  would	  
supply	  the	  whole	  medical	  needs	  of	  the	  country”	  	  (Graham	  1972,	  19).	  	  Not	  
surprisingly,	  the	  National	  Association	  of	  Retail	  Druggists,	  the	  American	  
Pharmaceutical	  Association,	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Manufacturers	  Association,	  and	  the	  
National	  Wholesale	  Druggists	  Association	  all	  testified	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  schedule	  III	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classification	  for	  amphetamines,	  though	  they	  said	  it	  would	  be	  a	  burden	  on	  their	  
constituents,	  the	  cost	  of	  which	  they	  threatened	  to	  pass	  on	  to	  the	  consumer.	  	  	  
In	  an	  excoriating	  summary	  of	  the	  law’s	  debate	  and	  passage	  in	  the	  journal	  
Society,	  James	  M.	  Graham	  (1972)	  noted	  how	  the	  executive	  branch	  and	  
pharmaceutical	  companies	  guided	  all	  discussion	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse	  towards	  
usage	  by	  high-­‐dose	  injectors	  and	  away	  from	  the	  large	  numbers	  of	  people	  who	  
abused	  their	  prescriptions	  or	  diverted	  pills.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  debate	  largely	  
overlooked	  the	  largest	  section	  of	  abusers	  and,	  not	  coincidentally,	  the	  largest	  source	  
of	  the	  pharmaceutical	  companies’	  profits.	  	  The	  goal,	  according	  to	  Graham,	  was	  “a	  
national	  policy	  which	  declares	  an	  all-­‐out	  war	  on	  drugs	  which	  are	  not	  [author’s	  
emphasis]	  a	  source	  of	  corporate	  income”	  (15).	  	  	  	  
As	  debate	  continued	  in	  the	  Senate	  and	  House,	  the	  FDA	  began	  to	  publicly	  
threaten	  action	  of	  its	  own	  on	  amphetamines.	  	  In	  May	  1970,	  they	  told	  the	  Wall	  Street	  
Journal	  that	  they	  planned	  to	  demand	  proof	  of	  efficacy	  on	  all	  amphetamine-­‐based	  
drugs.	  	  This	  would	  be	  the	  first	  step	  in	  plans	  to	  eliminate	  its	  use	  for	  all	  indications	  but	  
narcolepsy	  and	  hyperkinetic	  disorder.	  	  Even	  though	  any	  move	  by	  the	  FDA	  was	  
bound	  to	  be	  challenged	  in	  court,	  they	  formally	  passed	  strict	  regulations	  on	  the	  
claims	  that	  amphetamine	  producers	  could	  make	  in	  their	  advertisements,	  allowing	  
only	  indications	  for	  the	  treatment	  of	  narcolepsy	  and	  hyperkinetic	  disorder.	  	  	  
Meanwhile,	  the	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  Act	  was	  
signed	  into	  law	  in	  October	  1970.	  	  Only	  liquid	  injectible	  methamphetamine	  was	  
classified	  as	  schedule	  II,	  establishing	  serious	  quotas	  on	  its	  production	  and	  
prescription.	  	  All	  amphetamine	  pills	  (methamphetamine	  included)	  were	  placed	  in	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schedule	  III,	  with	  little	  or	  no	  regulation.	  	  Many	  observers	  noted	  that	  the	  new	  law	  
would	  have	  limited	  impact.	  	  Since	  1963,	  liquid	  meth	  had	  been	  sold	  only	  to	  hospitals,	  
so	  its	  scheduling	  would	  have	  little	  effect	  on	  misuse	  (it	  was	  the	  least	  abused	  member	  
of	  the	  licitly	  produced	  amphetamine	  family).	  	  Congressman	  Charles	  Wiggins	  asked	  
rhetorically	  why	  liquid	  amphetamines	  were	  restricted	  but	  easily	  dissolved	  and	  
injected	  pills	  were	  not.	  	  Antiamphetamine	  crusader	  Representative	  Claude	  Pepper	  of	  
Florida	  called	  the	  act	  	  “virtually	  meaningless.”	  Missouri	  Senator	  Thomas	  Eagleton,	  in	  
assessing	  the	  end	  result	  of	  the	  debate	  and	  vote,	  noted	  that:	  “When	  the	  chips	  were	  
down,	  the	  power	  of	  the	  drug	  companies	  was	  simply	  more	  compelling”	  than	  the	  
public	  good	  (Graham	  1972,	  53).	  	  	  	  
Fortunately	  for	  the	  public	  weal,	  members	  of	  Congress	  were	  not	  entirely	  
accurate	  in	  their	  assessment	  of	  the	  law.	  	  Though	  it	  had	  failed	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  curb	  
amphetamine	  production,	  it	  had	  given	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  and	  Dangerous	  Drugs	  
the	  power	  to	  reschedule	  drugs	  if	  the	  attorney	  general	  found	  evidence	  of	  street	  
abuse,	  or	  if	  an	  interested	  party,	  such	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  Health,	  Education	  and	  
Welfare,	  requested	  it.	  	  	  The	  medical	  community	  denounced	  the	  new	  drug	  laws	  and	  
the	  new	  power	  of	  the	  BNDD	  (Maddock	  1972,	  Edison	  1971),	  but	  these	  new	  powers	  
would	  prove	  to	  be	  vital	  in	  the	  reduction	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  
In	  May	  1971,	  Attorney	  General	  John	  N.	  Mitchell,	  based	  on	  the	  
recommendation	  of	  Health	  Education	  and	  Welfare	  Secretary	  Elliot	  Richardson,	  
among	  others,	  cited	  the	  “high	  potential	  for	  abuse,“	  of	  the	  amphetamine	  family	  of	  
drugs,	  and	  moved	  to	  restrict	  the	  production	  of	  amphetamines.	  	  The	  Justice	  
Department	  stated	  that	  it	  intended	  to	  reclassify	  all	  amphetamines	  as	  schedule	  II	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drugs,	  establishing	  production	  quotas	  and	  nonrefillable	  prescriptions.	  	  This	  would	  
be	  the	  first	  reclassification	  under	  the	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  and	  Control	  Act.	  	  	  
The	  department	  set	  1971	  production	  at	  40	  percent	  of	  1970	  levels.	  	  In	  February	  
1972,	  they	  made	  even	  more	  draconian	  restrictions,	  setting	  amphetamine	  production	  
for	  that	  year	  at	  20	  percent	  of	  1971	  levels.	  	  The	  actual	  reductions	  were	  83	  percent	  for	  
amphetamines	  (1,564	  kilograms	  from	  9,356),	  and	  80	  percent	  for	  methamphetamine	  
(969	  kilograms	  from	  4,928).	  	  	  
The	  laws	  would	  prove	  remarkably	  effective	  in	  removing	  licitly	  produced	  
amphetamines	  from	  the	  streets.	  	  However,	  the	  experiences	  of	  clandestine	  cooks	  in	  
the	  1960s	  could	  not	  be	  erased	  from	  public	  memory.	  	  Though	  Benzedrine,	  Dexedrine,	  
Methedrine	  and	  Desoxyn	  were	  no	  longer	  available	  for	  diversion,	  a	  generation	  of	  
amateur	  chemists	  still	  existed	  who	  knew	  how	  to	  make	  methamphetamine	  given	  the	  
proper	  chemicals.	  	  Simultaneously,	  a	  generation	  of	  drug	  users	  had	  developed	  a	  taste	  
for	  central	  nervous	  system	  stimulants,	  not	  just	  the	  much-­‐publicized,	  high-­‐dosage	  
injectors,	  but	  also	  students,	  professionals,	  and	  housewives	  who	  had	  been	  abusing	  
pill	  dosages.	  	  Networks	  would	  soon	  develop	  to	  meet	  the	  demand	  left	  behind	  by	  the	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Chapter	  3	  
West	  Coast	  Booms	  and	  East	  Coast	  Busts:	  
The	  Evolving	  Geography	  of	  Methamphetamine	  Between	  The	  Controlled	  
Substances	  Act	  and	  1989	  
	  
	  
	   At	  the	  time	  the	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  and	  Dangerous	  Drugs’	  (BNDD)	  made	  the	  
amphetamines	  schedule	  II	  substances	  in	  1970,	  abuse	  of	  the	  drugs	  was	  diffuse.	  	  
Methamphetamine	  injection	  received	  public	  attention	  in	  the	  Bay	  Area	  and	  New	  
York,	  but	  studies	  revealed	  it	  also	  to	  be	  present	  in	  small	  percentages	  of	  the	  
population	  in	  intermediate	  locations	  such	  as	  Minneapolis,	  St.	  Louis,	  and	  Oklahoma	  
City.	  	  Prescription	  amphetamine	  abuse	  in	  the	  late	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s	  potentially	  
could	  occur	  anywhere	  there	  were	  doctors	  to	  prescribe	  them	  and	  pharmacies	  to	  dole	  
them	  out.	  	  	  Still,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  amphetamine	  abuse	  was	  almost	  
nonexistent	  and	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  was	  primarily	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  
western	  United	  States,	  with	  DEA	  agents	  in	  San	  Diego	  referring	  to	  that	  city	  as	  “the	  
meth	  capital	  of	  the	  world”	  (Wiedrich	  1987).	  	  	  	  	  
	   That	  title,	  “meth	  capital	  of	  the	  world,”	  is	  one	  that	  changed	  hands	  frequently	  
between	  1971	  and	  1989.	  	  In	  1980,	  Philadelphia	  earned	  that	  status	  according	  to	  
witnesses	  at	  a	  government	  hearing	  on	  illicit	  methamphetamine	  laboratories	  in	  the	  
Delaware	  Valley	  area	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1980).	  	  Later	  in	  the	  decade,	  
Portland	  (Oregon),	  Dallas,	  and	  of	  course,	  San	  Diego,	  would	  all	  claim	  the	  moniker	  as	  
methamphetamine	  abuse	  and	  production	  became	  increasingly	  concentrated.	  
	   How	  did	  the	  formerly	  diffuse	  phenomenon	  of	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  come	  
to	  focus	  in	  the	  West?	  Why	  did	  abuse	  of	  amphetamines	  largely	  disappear?	  	  The	  
answers	  to	  these	  questions	  lie	  in	  the	  push	  and	  pull	  between	  government	  actions	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against	  the	  various	  forms	  of	  amphetamines	  and	  the	  way	  that	  drug	  supply	  networks	  
responded	  to	  those	  actions.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Stopping	  Diversion	  
	   After	  passage	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  Prevention	  and	  Control	  Act	  
of	  1970,	  the	  BNDD	  and	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  Administration	  (FDA)	  dramatically	  
reduced	  legal	  production	  of	  amphetamines	  in	  1971	  and	  1972.	  	  In	  April	  of	  1973	  they	  
went	  even	  further,	  sending	  notification	  to	  some	  three	  hundred	  amphetamine	  
manufacturers	  that	  they	  were	  recalling	  all	  diet	  pills	  that	  contained	  amphetamines.	  
The	  goal	  of	  the	  recall,	  according	  to	  a	  spokesperson,	  was	  to	  “end	  the	  use	  of	  injectible	  
amphetamines	  and	  closely	  related	  chemicals,	  and	  all	  combination	  diet	  pills	  that	  
include	  amphetamine	  and	  other	  ingredients	  such	  as	  vitamins	  or	  sedatives”	  
(Schmeck	  1973a,	  1).	  Combination	  diet	  pills,	  particularly	  those	  that	  mixed	  
barbiturates	  with	  amphetamines,	  had	  been	  the	  fuel	  that	  powered	  the	  amphetamine	  
boom	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,12	  and	  were	  estimated	  to	  make	  up	  72	  percent	  of	  the	  
diet	  pill	  market	  (480	  million	  doses	  per	  year)	  in	  1972.	  	  
Also	  in	  1973,	  the	  FDA	  lowered	  production	  of	  amphetamines	  yet	  again,	  setting	  
quotas	  at	  40	  percent	  of	  1972	  levels,	  or	  a	  90	  percent	  reduction	  from	  the	  peak	  
production	  year	  of	  1971.	  	  The	  new	  allowable	  amounts	  would	  be	  561	  kilograms	  of	  
amphetamine,	  and	  342	  of	  methamphetamine.	  	  In	  a	  statement,	  the	  FDA	  said	  that	  the	  
new	  levels	  were	  “intended	  to	  reduce	  inventories	  to	  a	  minimum	  during	  the	  current	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year	  and	  thus	  lessen	  the	  chance	  of	  theft	  from	  drugstores,	  wholesalers,	  and	  
manufacturers”	  (Schmeck	  1973b,	  26).	  	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  granting	  the	  power	  to	  restrict	  production	  of	  controlled	  
substances,	  the	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  and	  Control	  Act	  of	  1970	  established	  
firm	  record-­‐keeping	  laws	  designed	  to	  track	  the	  substances	  from	  production	  to	  retail.	  
By	  immediately	  identifying	  the	  sources	  of	  the	  abused	  drugs,	  these	  regulations	  
allowed	  law	  enforcement	  to	  quickly	  squash	  several	  outbreaks	  of	  amphetamine	  
abuse.	  	  The	  case	  of	  Washington	  DC	  in	  1972	  is	  exemplary	  of	  the	  process.	  	  
	   Amphetamines	  had	  been	  abused	  at	  the	  street	  level	  in	  DC	  since	  the	  early	  
1960s,	  but	  had	  never	  displaced	  heroin	  as	  the	  drug	  of	  choice	  for	  most	  of	  the	  city’s	  
estimated	  18,000	  addicts.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  spring	  of	  1972,	  the	  city	  experienced	  a	  
severe	  heroin	  shortage	  that	  resulted	  in	  higher	  prices	  and	  lower	  quality.	  	  
Concomitant	  to	  this	  decline	  in	  heroin	  availability,	  amphetamine	  abuse	  soared.	  	  The	  
number	  of	  urine	  samples	  testing	  positive	  for	  amphetamines	  among	  patients	  
entering	  the	  city’s	  Narcotics	  Treatment	  Administration	  rose	  almost	  500	  percent	  
between	  June	  and	  September.	  	  Positive	  samples	  in	  the	  court	  system	  increased	  267	  
percent	  over	  the	  same	  time	  period.	  In	  July,	  amphetamines	  were	  found	  in	  the	  blood	  
of	  four	  of	  the	  seven	  victims	  of	  acute	  opiate	  overdose	  in	  the	  DC	  coroner’s	  office.	  	  
Between	  February	  and	  September,	  the	  number	  of	  amphetamine	  seizures	  per	  month	  
rose	  from	  seven	  to	  fifty-­‐six	  (Greene	  and	  DuPont	  1973).	  
Police	  and	  health	  officials	  in	  the	  District	  determined	  that	  regular	  heroin	  users	  
had	  begun	  supplementing	  the	  degraded	  heroin	  available	  on	  the	  street	  with	  
amphetamines	  in	  order	  to	  extend	  and	  improve	  their	  high.	  	  Standard	  practice	  was	  to	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grind	  up	  two	  15	  mg	  tablets	  (methamphetamine	  was	  the	  most	  common	  
amphetamine	  used),	  dissolve	  them	  in	  water,	  and	  then	  inject	  them	  along	  with	  the	  
heroin.	  	  The	  pills	  that	  were	  being	  ground	  up	  and	  injected	  were	  not	  clandestinely	  
manufactured,	  but	  had	  been	  diverted	  to	  the	  black	  market	  after	  being	  purchased	  
through	  prescriptions	  obtained	  from	  corrupt	  physicians.	  
In	  order	  to	  curtail	  the	  epidemic,	  police	  began	  to	  monitor	  amphetamine	  
shipments	  and	  prescriptions	  during	  the	  summer	  of	  1972.	  	  They	  found	  that,	  while	  
most	  pharmacies	  in	  the	  District	  received	  only	  modest	  amounts	  of	  amphetamines	  
from	  wholesalers	  each	  month,	  a	  group	  of	  seventeen	  pharmacies	  had	  ordered	  an	  
average	  of	  1,900	  tablets	  per	  month	  over	  the	  summer.	  	  In	  August	  these	  orders	  
increased	  to	  14,000	  doses	  per	  store.	  	  Similar	  monitoring	  reveled	  that	  six	  area	  
doctors	  were	  responsible	  for	  12,602	  amphetamine	  prescriptions	  between	  June	  and	  
August.	  	  One	  physician	  alone	  was	  responsible	  for	  nearly	  half	  that	  total,	  and	  had	  been	  
selling	  printed	  prescriptions	  for	  60	  pills	  at	  $25	  a	  pop	  to	  whomever	  could	  afford	  
them.	  	  	  The	  police	  estimated	  that	  the	  doctor	  had	  made	  $115,000	  by	  selling	  the	  
prescriptions.	  	  	  	  
In	  cooperation	  with	  the	  police,	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  Medical	  Society	  
requested	  that	  medical	  manufacturers	  reduce	  the	  number	  of	  amphetamine	  tablets	  
being	  sent	  to	  the	  District	  and	  established	  rigorous	  guidelines	  for	  the	  prescription	  of	  
amphetamines.	  	  Simultaneously,	  the	  district	  attorney	  used	  the	  prescription	  data	  
along	  with	  the	  Medical	  Society’s	  guidelines	  to	  build	  a	  criminal	  case	  against	  the	  
offending	  physicians.	  	  Then,	  within	  three	  months	  of	  the	  removal	  of	  these	  sources,	  
the	  indicators	  of	  amphetamine	  abuse	  all	  returned	  to	  pre-­‐epidemic	  levels.	  	  Without	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the	  record-­‐keeping	  statutes	  included	  in	  the	  Comprehensive	  Drug	  Abuse	  and	  Control	  
Act	  of	  1970	  and	  the	  drug-­‐use-­‐monitoring	  data	  available	  in	  Washington,	  this	  
epidemic	  may	  well	  have	  grown	  out	  of	  control.	  	  Similar	  outbreaks	  around	  licit	  
sources	  were	  discovered	  and	  squashed	  in	  Wisconsin	  (Treffert	  and	  Joranson	  1981)	  
and	  Texas	  (Tempest	  1983).	  	  
In	  1974	  the	  federal	  government	  effectively	  squashed	  another	  amphetamine	  
supply	  chain	  when	  it	  unsealed	  102	  indictments	  involving	  an	  international	  
conspiracy	  to	  import	  illegally	  produced	  amphetamine	  pills	  from	  Mexico.	  	  The	  head	  
of	  the	  Drug	  Enforcement	  Administration	  (DEA),13	  John	  R.	  Bartels	  Jr.,	  said	  that	  the	  
indictments	  targeted	  a	  network	  of	  “interlocking	  conspiracies”	  that	  was	  responsible	  
for	  putting	  three	  billion	  illegal	  amphetamines	  on	  the	  street.	  	  These	  pills,	  called	  
“mini-­‐bennies,”	  had	  an	  estimated	  value	  of	  $1.6	  billion	  per	  year.	  	  The	  bust	  was	  
described	  as	  the	  “the	  broadest	  single	  attack	  against	  such	  a	  nationwide	  series	  of	  
trafficking	  rings	  in	  history”(Farber	  1974,	  25).	  
Mini-­‐bennies,	  which	  are	  ten-­‐milligram	  illegally	  produced	  knock-­‐off	  
amphetamine	  pills	  produced	  in	  Mexico,	  had	  begun	  to	  appear	  on	  the	  illicit	  drug	  
market	  in	  the	  American	  West	  around	  1971.	  	  They	  had	  been	  the	  primary	  source	  for	  
amphetamines	  in	  states	  that	  had	  effectively	  stopped	  black-­‐market	  diversion.	  	  
According	  to	  Smith	  (1973),	  several	  different	  supply	  networks	  developed	  around	  the	  
illegally	  produced	  pills.	  	  	  Major	  distributors	  would	  go	  directly	  to	  Mexican	  producers,	  
purchase	  large	  quantities,	  and	  arrange	  for	  the	  manufacturer	  to	  smuggle	  the	  pills	  to	  a	  
predetermined	  location	  within	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Los	  Angeles,	  San	  Diego,	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  The	  BNDD	  was	  folded	  into	  the	  DEA	  in	  1973.	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Nogales,	  Arizona,	  were	  popular	  drop-­‐off	  points.	  Some	  midlevel	  distributors,	  to	  keep	  
up	  with	  the	  larger	  operators,	  were	  known	  to	  pool	  their	  resources	  in	  order	  to	  hire	  
professional	  smugglers	  to	  bring	  in	  the	  pills.	  Lower-­‐level	  distributors,	  who	  lacked	  the	  
connections	  or	  finances	  to	  make	  large	  purchases,	  had	  to	  buy	  their	  pills	  from	  the	  
large	  distributors	  who	  imported	  the	  drugs	  rather	  than	  the	  Mexican	  producers	  
themselves.	  This	  meant	  paying	  a	  higher	  price.	  
However	  they	  were	  imported,	  mini-­‐bennies	  were	  sold	  to	  distributors	  in	  
groups	  of	  a	  thousand.	  	  If	  an	  operation	  was	  purchasing	  more	  than	  fifty	  thousand	  pills,	  
they	  could	  expect	  to	  pay	  between	  $25	  and	  $30	  per	  thousand.	  	  	  If	  they	  were	  buying	  
less,	  the	  price	  would	  rise	  to	  $35	  or	  more.	  	  Wholesalers	  would	  then	  sell	  to	  street	  
dealers	  at	  prices	  approaching	  $10	  per	  hundred	  pills.	  	  On	  the	  street,	  prices	  varied	  
depending	  on	  availability.	  	  In	  well-­‐supplied	  areas,	  a	  person	  might	  get	  ten	  pills	  for	  a	  
dollar.	  	  In	  less	  well-­‐supplied	  areas,	  a	  dollar	  might	  only	  buy	  three	  or	  five	  pills.	  	  Mini-­‐
bennies	  were	  big	  business,	  and	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  right	  to	  crow	  about	  its	  
1970	  indictments.	  
By	  reducing	  legal	  production	  steadily	  over	  time	  and	  attacking	  illicit	  
production	  such	  as	  the	  smuggling	  ring	  described	  above,	  government	  officials	  were	  
able	  to	  dramatically	  reduce	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  drugs	  available	  to	  users.	  	  Morgan	  and	  
Kagan	  (1978)	  conducted	  a	  study	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  amphetamines	  available	  on	  the	  
street	  after	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  Controlled	  Substances	  Act,	  and	  found	  that	  the	  
legislation	  had	  “forever	  altered	  the	  market”	  (309).	  Using	  the	  results	  of	  street	  drugs	  
sent	  in	  to	  nineteen	  analysis	  laboratories	  throughout	  the	  United	  States,	  they	  found	  
that,	  between	  1970	  and	  1972,	  samples	  sold	  as	  amphetamine	  were	  relatively	  pure,	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with	  55-­‐60	  percent	  containing	  the	  alleged	  amphetamines.	  	  This	  relatively	  high	  
purity	  rate	  reflected	  the	  lingering	  presence	  of	  diverted,	  legally	  produced	  pills	  as	  well	  
as	  illegally	  imported	  “Mexican	  bennies.”	  	  	  	  
By	  1973,	  the	  market	  began	  to	  feel	  the	  effect	  of	  drug	  shortages.	  	  Prices	  went	  
up	  and	  quality	  down.	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  drugs	  sold	  as	  amphetamines	  that	  actually	  
contained	  them	  dropped	  significantly	  by	  1975,	  and	  held	  steady	  between	  twelve	  and	  
fifteen	  percent	  for	  the	  years	  1975-­‐1977.	  	  The	  authors	  concluded	  that	  smuggling	  and	  
clandestine	  labs	  were	  not	  able	  to	  meet	  demand	  for	  amphetamines.	  	  Instead,	  the	  
market	  became	  unreliable,	  with	  users	  more	  likely	  to	  receive	  caffeine,	  ephedrine,	  or	  
any	  other	  number	  of	  chemicals	  rather	  than	  the	  amphetamines	  they	  sought.	  	  	  
The	  decline	  in	  quality	  of	  street	  amphetamines	  contained	  a	  corollary,	  
however.	  	  The	  same	  authors	  who	  described	  the	  fall	  in	  purity	  noted	  that	  the	  quality	  
of	  methamphetamine	  available	  on	  the	  streets	  had	  actually	  risen	  in	  1975	  and	  1976.	  	  
The	  reason	  had	  to	  do	  with	  experience.	  	  Meth	  cooks	  had	  been	  making	  the	  drug	  since	  
the	  mid	  1960s,	  when	  liquid	  meth	  was	  pulled	  from	  the	  market,	  and	  thus	  had	  a	  decade	  
to	  perfect	  their	  craft	  before	  federal	  action	  forced	  the	  other	  amphetamines	  into	  a	  
similar	  situation.	  	  	  
Newmeyer	  (1978),	  in	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  epidemiology	  of	  amphetamines,	  
described	  the	  family	  of	  drugs	  as	  “a	  fading	  favorite”	  for	  which	  the	  cohort	  of	  users	  was	  
aging	  and	  the	  number	  of	  new	  users	  diminishing	  (293).	  	  He	  attributed	  the	  declining	  
popularity	  to	  problems	  of	  quality	  within	  the	  amphetamine	  marketplace.	  	  However,	  
he	  was	  not	  convinced	  that	  these	  drugs	  would	  stay	  in	  decline:	  “The	  intrinsically	  
attractive	  qualities	  of	  amphetamines	  argue	  for	  their	  continued	  popularity.	  	  Also,	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their	  psychoactive	  effects	  are	  well-­‐suited	  to	  the	  Zeitgeist	  of	  the	  late	  1970s-­‐-­‐
increased	  competitiveness,	  Disco-­‐dance	  energy	  and	  a	  certain	  spirit	  of	  narcissism	  
and	  assertive	  pleasure	  seeking”	  (301).	  	  If	  amphetamines	  did	  not	  make	  a	  comeback,	  
Newmeyer	  posited	  that	  another	  stimulant,	  cocaine,	  might	  fill	  the	  void	  left	  by	  the	  
amphetamines	  because	  it	  had	  none	  of	  the	  “degenerate	  street	  quality	  and	  ‘meth’-­‐
tarnished	  reputation”	  of	  amphetamines	  (301).	  	  	  	  	  
The	  typical	  American	  street	  user	  of	  amphetamines	  in	  the	  1970s	  was	  likely	  to	  
be	  from	  the	  Western	  states,	  male,	  and	  living	  in	  a	  city.	  	  They	  were	  generally	  young	  
and	  poorly	  educated.	  	  The	  cohort	  that	  abused	  prescription	  amphetamine	  had	  a	  
much	  larger	  percentage	  of	  females	  and	  appeared	  to	  be	  more	  evenly	  dispersed	  
throughout	  the	  country.	  Most	  people	  who	  reported	  using	  amphetamines	  were	  not	  
hardcore	  addicts,	  but	  rather	  experimented	  with	  the	  drugs	  or	  used	  them	  in	  a	  “quasi-­‐
medical”	  manner	  (301).	  	  Continuous	  usage	  usually	  resulted	  in	  the	  need	  to	  seek	  
treatment	  within	  3.5	  years.	  	  Drug	  Abuse	  Warning	  Network	  (DAWN)	  data	  on	  
emergency	  room	  admissions	  mentions	  and	  Medical	  Examiner	  records	  found	  higher	  
rates	  in	  the	  Midwest	  (Minneapolis,	  Kansas	  City,	  Oklahoma	  City,	  and	  Cleveland)	  than	  
on	  the	  East	  or	  West	  Coasts.	  	  However,	  this	  phenomenon	  may	  have	  been	  due	  to	  less	  
experienced	  users	  in	  the	  Midwest	  rather	  than	  a	  higher	  rate	  of	  usage	  (Newmyer	  
1978).	  	  	  
The	  Client-­‐Oriented	  Data	  Acquisition	  Process	  (CODAP)	  system	  tracked	  
substance-­‐abuse	  admissions	  for	  federally	  funded	  treatment	  programs	  during	  the	  
1970s.	  	  Figure	  3.1	  shows	  amphetamine	  admissions	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  all	  drug	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treatment	  admissions	  for	  1976	  and	  1980.	  	  Neither	  reflects	  a	  particular	  geographic	  
concentration,	  indicating	  that	  amphetamine	  abuse	  was	  widespread.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  3.1:	  The	  percentage	  of	  substance-­‐abuse	  patients	  seeking	  treatment	  for	  
amphetamine	  abuse	  in	  1976	  and	  1980	  according	  to	  the	  Client	  Oriented	  Data	  
Acquisition	  Program	  (NIDA	  1977,	  1981)	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Methamphetamine	  Production	  in	  the	  1970s	  
	   Methamphetamine	  producers	  did	  not	  immediately	  swoop	  into	  the	  void	  left	  
by	  the	  government’s	  crackdown	  on	  amphetamines.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  speed	  injectors	  in	  
former	  epicenters	  of	  abuse	  had	  moved	  on	  to	  other	  drugs,	  particularly	  heroin	  and	  
barbiturates.	  	  The	  Speed	  Kills	  campaign	  had	  also	  tarnished	  meth’s	  reputation	  among	  
drug	  users	  so	  that	  fewer	  individuals	  were	  trying	  it	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  In	  1975,	  only	  
eleven	  meth	  labs	  were	  seized	  by	  the	  DEA	  nationwide.	  	  	  In	  short,	  it	  was	  a	  drug	  in	  
decline	  (Smith	  1973;	  Newmyer	  1978).	  	  
Still,	  even	  at	  its	  national	  nadir,	  meth	  continued	  to	  be	  made	  in	  certain	  regions	  
of	  the	  country.	  	  In	  1975	  the	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  ran	  an	  article	  asking	  if	  Southern	  
California	  had	  become	  the	  illicit	  drug	  production	  capital	  of	  the	  United	  States.	  	  The	  
writer	  began	  with	  the	  story	  of	  a	  police	  raid	  on	  a	  janitorial	  supply	  company	  that	  had	  
the	  necessary	  precursors	  to	  make	  nine	  pounds	  of	  methamphetamine	  per	  day.	  	  The	  
paper	  claimed	  that	  it	  was	  the	  fifth	  such	  raid	  in	  the	  region	  between	  July	  and	  
September.	  	  If	  this	  is	  accurate,	  and	  the	  author	  meant	  methamphetamine	  labs,	  and	  
not	  simply	  illicit	  drug	  labs	  (which	  could	  include	  PCP,	  then	  the	  more	  common	  lab	  
type,	  as	  well	  as	  LSD,	  MDMA,	  and	  several	  other	  drugs),	  then	  Southern	  California	  most	  
certainly	  was	  the	  methamphetamine	  seizure	  capital	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Agent	  Lloyd	  
Sinclair	  of	  the	  DEA’s	  Clandestine	  Lab	  group	  in	  Southern	  California	  told	  the	  paper	  
that,	  “When	  a	  major	  amount	  of	  some	  dangerous	  drug	  like	  PCP	  or	  methamphetamine	  
is	  seized	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  country,	  chances	  are	  that	  it	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  here”	  
(Maxwell	  1975a,	  D1).	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Sinclair	  attributed	  the	  agglomeration	  of	  illegal	  drug	  labs	  in	  Southern	  
California	  to	  two	  factors.	  	  The	  first	  was	  the	  large	  number	  of	  chemical	  firms	  (some	  
400-­‐plus)	  that	  operated	  in	  the	  region	  and	  supplied	  the	  precursors	  necessary	  for	  
drug	  production.	  	  The	  second	  was	  the	  large	  number	  of	  capable	  cooks,	  which	  dated	  
back	  to	  the	  1960s	  period	  of	  early	  manufacture	  and	  epidemic	  usage.	  	  On	  why	  users	  
became	  cooks	  and	  how	  knowledge	  of	  cooking	  methods	  spread	  within	  the	  region,	  
Sinclair	  offered	  this	  assessment:	  	  
People	  who	  are	  into	  dope	  kind	  of	  gravitate	  toward	  manufacturing	  it.	  	  
One	  doper	  can	  teach	  another	  how	  to	  make	  the	  simplest	  drug,	  PCP,	  
rather	  easily,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  network	  of	  underground	  chemists	  
who	  have	  no	  trouble	  with	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  drugs.	  	  Hell,	  there	  
are	  even	  recipes	  for	  some	  of	  the	  drugs	  in	  underground	  books	  you	  can	  
buy	  at	  nearly	  any	  head	  shop	  (D1).	  	  	  
Because	  of	  the	  dearth	  of	  methamphetamine	  labs,	  the	  street	  price	  of	  the	  drug	  
increased	  tenfold	  between	  1965	  and	  1975.	  	  This	  rise	  in	  price	  served	  as	  an	  incentive	  
for	  more	  individuals	  to	  enter	  the	  market,	  and	  as	  the	  decade	  wore	  on,	  the	  number	  of	  
labs	  seized	  began	  to	  climb	  steadily.	  By	  1979	  the	  annual	  total	  had	  risen	  to	  137,	  a	  
1,200	  percent	  increase	  from	  1975.	  	  Between	  1975	  and	  1978,	  more	  of	  the	  seized	  labs	  
were	  making	  PCP	  than	  meth,	  but	  in	  1979,	  the	  numbers	  reversed.	  	  In	  fact,	  meth	  
accounted	  for	  more	  than	  50	  percent	  of	  all	  illicit	  drug	  labs	  seizures	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1980).	  	  	  	  
Whether	  it	  was	  being	  made	  in	  Southern	  California,	  East	  Texas,	  or	  rural	  
Maryland,	  the	  method	  used	  to	  make	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  1970s	  involved	  
phenyl-­‐2-­‐propanone	  (P2P).	  	  That	  particular	  family	  of	  production	  methods	  is	  
characterized	  by	  a	  noxious	  smell	  from	  two	  of	  the	  chemicals	  involved,	  phenyl-­‐2-­‐
propanone	  and	  phenylacetic	  acid.	  	  It	  is	  a	  smell	  often	  compared	  to	  cat	  urine,	  and	  was	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the	  reason	  that	  early	  chemists	  set	  up	  shop	  in	  remote	  places	  to	  avoid	  detection.14	  	  
The	  most	  common	  P2P-­‐based	  production	  method	  combined	  phenyl-­‐2-­‐propanone	  
with	  methylamine,	  mercuric	  chloride	  and	  aluminum	  metal	  in	  alcohol	  (Frank	  1983).	  	  
This	  procedure	  took	  eighteen	  to	  twenty-­‐four	  hours,	  and	  produced	  a	  final	  product	  
sometimes	  referred	  to	  as	  “prope”	  or	  “prope	  dope.”	  	  	  
The	  P2P	  family	  of	  production	  methods	  produces	  racemic	  methamphetamine	  
(EPA	  2009;	  Skinner	  1990;	  Miller	  and	  Heischober	  1991).	  	  Methamphetamine,	  like	  
amphetamine,	  is	  a	  chiral	  compound.	  	  In	  chemistry	  terms,	  a	  chiral	  compound	  is	  one	  
that	  has	  left-­‐handed	  and	  right-­‐handed	  isomers.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  methamphetamine,	  
this	  means	  that	  there	  are	  levorotatory	  (l)	  and	  dextrorotatory	  (d)	  molecules,	  and	  that	  
these	  two	  types	  behave	  in	  different	  ways.	  	  	  The	  levorotary-­‐methamphetamine	  
molecule	  has	  sympathomimetic	  qualities	  (raises	  the	  heart	  rate	  and	  blood	  pressure,	  
causes	  smooth	  muscle	  contraction,	  etc.),	  but	  is	  not	  a	  strong	  central	  nervous	  system	  
stimulant.	  	  Dextrorotary-­‐methamphetamine	  is	  the	  molecule	  that	  provides	  
methamphetamine	  with	  the	  stimulant	  and	  euphoriant	  qualities	  that	  make	  it	  a	  drug	  
of	  abuse	  (Mendelson	  et	  al.	  2006).	  	  A	  racemic	  mixture	  contains	  equal	  parts	  of	  
levorotary-­‐	  and	  dextrorotary-­‐methamphetamine.	  	  	  
	  Though	  the	  amphetamines	  themselves	  were	  regulated	  beginning	  in	  1971,	  in	  
the	  1970s	  all	  of	  the	  chemicals	  necessary	  to	  make	  methamphetamine	  were	  
unregulated	  and	  available	  through	  chemical	  wholesalers.	  	  	  To	  track	  these	  
unregulated	  precursor	  chemicals,	  the	  DEA	  sought	  the	  cooperation	  of	  chemical	  
sellers	  in	  what	  they	  called	  the	  “Precursor	  Liaison	  Program.”	  	  Largely	  educational,	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this	  program	  taught	  chemical	  companies	  to	  look	  for	  businesses	  or	  individuals	  that	  
were	  buying	  the	  necessary	  combination	  of	  chemicals	  to	  make	  illicit	  drugs,	  and	  then	  
asked	  them	  to	  report	  those	  people	  to	  the	  DEA.	  	  Participation	  was	  voluntary.	  	  Norton	  
J.	  Wilder,	  the	  DEA	  agent	  in	  charge	  of	  Philadelphia,	  estimated	  that	  40	  percent	  of	  the	  
labs	  seized	  nationwide	  in	  1979	  had	  been	  detected	  via	  the	  liaison	  program	  and	  the	  
diligence	  of	  the	  chemical	  companies	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1980,	  24).	  
	  
Meeting	  Demand	  with	  New	  Supply	  Networks	  
The	  networks	  behind	  the	  rising	  number	  of	  methamphetamine	  labs	  in	  the	  
1970s	  varied	  significantly	  in	  their	  levels	  of	  sophistication	  and	  organization.	  	  Some	  
were	  individual	  entrepreneurs	  like	  Kent	  Rianda,	  a	  high	  school	  chemistry	  teacher	  
who	  was	  arrested	  for	  operating	  a	  large	  meth	  lab	  in	  the	  mountains	  of	  Southern	  
California.	  	  Mr.	  Rianda	  had	  purchased	  the	  necessary	  chemicals	  for	  his	  lab,	  which	  was	  
purportedly	  capable	  of	  producing	  twenty-­‐five	  pounds	  of	  meth	  every	  three	  days,	  
through	  the	  high	  school	  where	  he	  worked	  (Maxwell	  1974).	  	  A	  Wycoff,	  New	  Jersey,	  
druggist	  was	  similarly	  arrested	  for	  manufacturing	  pill	  dosages	  of	  methamphetamine	  
in	  his	  basement	  where	  police	  found	  14,000	  individual	  doses	  and	  a	  chemist	  
employee	  (New	  York	  Times	  1973).	  
Other	  networks	  were	  maintained	  by	  small,	  well-­‐organized	  groups	  that	  best	  
fit	  the	  cottage	  industry	  model	  of	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations.	  One	  such	  group	  was	  
arrested	  in	  Brooklyn	  in	  June	  1974.	  	  Brooklyn	  District	  Attorney	  Eugene	  Gold	  
estimated	  that	  the	  group	  had	  sold	  as	  much	  as	  $3	  million	  a	  year	  in	  amphetamines	  and	  
methamphetamine	  to	  white,	  middle-­‐class	  areas	  of	  Brooklyn	  and	  Staten	  Island.	  	  The	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group	  included	  a	  postal	  employee	  who	  used	  her	  position	  to	  ship	  drugs	  to	  customers.	  	  
In	  the	  months	  preceding	  the	  bust,	  the	  group	  sold	  undercover	  agents	  fifteen	  pounds	  
of	  methamphetamine	  with	  an	  estimated	  value	  of	  more	  than	  $1	  million	  (Perlmutter	  
1974).	  	  	  
The	  network	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  methamphetamine	  production	  and	  
distribution	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  was	  the	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gang	  (OMG).	  	  In	  fact,	  
one	  of	  the	  drug’s	  street	  names,	  “crank,”	  purportedly	  comes	  from	  it	  frequently	  being	  
hidden	  for	  shipment	  in	  the	  crankcases	  of	  the	  Harley	  Davidsons	  that	  gang	  members	  
rode.	  	  Of	  the	  numerous	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  that	  have	  operated	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  since	  
the	  1950s,	  most	  have	  been	  composed	  simply	  of	  enthusiasts	  with	  an	  antisocial	  bent	  
and	  an	  affinity	  for	  the	  “saloon	  society	  milieu”	  offered	  by	  life	  in	  a	  rebellious	  
motorcycle	  “club”	  (Quinn	  2001).	  	  	  However,	  four	  major	  motorcycle	  gangs	  operating	  
at	  the	  time	  –	  the	  Pagans,	  Outlaws,	  Bandidos,	  and	  Hell’s	  Angels	  –	  were	  definitely	  
involved	  in	  methamphetamine	  supply	  networks.	  	  	  
Each	  of	  these	  “Big	  Four”	  gangs	  was	  formed	  in	  a	  different	  part	  of	  the	  country,	  
and	  each	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  production	  and	  distribution	  within	  its	  home	  
turf	  (Figure	  3.2).	  	  The	  Outlaws	  started	  in	  Chicago	  and	  had	  a	  strong	  presence	  in	  both	  
the	  Upper	  Midwest	  and	  Florida.	  	  The	  Pagans	  dominated	  markets	  on	  the	  East	  Coast,	  
particularly	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  region.	  	  The	  Bandidos	  were	  formed	  in	  Corpus	  
Christi,	  Texas,	  in	  1966,	  and	  were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  the	  drug	  trade	  in	  Texas	  and	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Figure	  3.2:	  Territory	  of	  the	  Big	  Four	  Motorcycle	  Gangs	  in	  2010	  (Barker	  2004;	  hells-­‐
angels.com;	  bandidosmc.com;	  outlawsmc.com).	  	  	  
	  	  	  
Culturally,	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  to	  have	  taken	  an	  
interest	  in	  methamphetamine.	  	  Observers	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  that	  drug’s	  high-­‐dosage	  
injection	  period	  noted	  that	  meth	  was	  popular	  with	  undereducated,	  working-­‐class	  
youths	  (Davis	  and	  Munoz	  1968).	  	  In	  many	  ways	  the	  Speed	  Kills	  campaign	  and	  the	  
overall	  reaction	  by	  “hippies”	  to	  speed	  users	  in	  the	  1960s	  was	  as	  much	  about	  social	  
class	  as	  it	  was	  about	  the	  dangers	  of	  amphetamines.	  	  Black	  (1970)	  described	  speed	  as	  
being	  attractive	  to	  any	  group	  that	  felt	  dispossessed	  and	  powerless	  in	  society.	  	  These	  
are	  all	  characteristics	  that	  journalist	  Hunter	  S.	  Thompson	  found	  in	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  
in	  1966:	  	  
There	  is	  more	  to	  their	  stance	  than	  a	  wistful	  yearning	  for	  acceptance	  in	  
a	  world	  they	  never	  made.	  	  Their	  real	  motivation	  is	  an	  instinctive	  
certainty	  as	  to	  what	  the	  score	  really	  is.	  	  They	  are	  out	  of	  the	  ball	  game	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and	  they	  know	  it.	  	  Unlike	  the	  campus	  rebels	  who	  with	  a	  minimum	  
amount	  of	  effort	  will	  emerge	  from	  their	  struggle	  with	  a	  validated	  
ticket	  to	  status,	  the	  outlaw	  motorcyclist	  views	  the	  future	  with	  the	  
baleful	  eye	  of	  a	  man	  with	  no	  upward	  mobility	  at	  all	  .	  .	  .	  .	  the	  Hell’s	  
Angels	  are	  obvious	  losers	  and	  it	  bugs	  them.	  	  But	  instead	  of	  accepting	  
their	  fate,	  they	  have	  made	  it	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  full-­‐time	  vendetta	  (quoted	  
in	  Thornton	  1982).	  
Though	  apparently	  not	  organized	  originally	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  interstate	  
drug	  distribution,	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  were	  (and	  are)	  ideally	  suited	  for	  that	  
purpose.	  	  Their	  organizations,	  though	  extremely	  dispersed,	  are	  hierarchical	  with	  a	  	  
mother	  club	  and	  a	  central	  government	  that	  control	  the	  activities	  of	  all	  other	  
chapters.	  	  Regional	  chapters	  pay	  dues	  to	  the	  mother	  club	  and	  are	  at	  its	  beck	  and	  call.	  	  
New	  chapters	  can	  be	  added	  either	  through	  an	  application	  process	  or	  a	  “patching	  
over,”	  in	  which	  rival	  clubs	  are	  either	  peacefully	  or	  forcefully	  converted.	  	  Clubs	  
measure	  success	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  much	  territory	  they	  control,	  and	  they	  define	  
territory,	  not	  in	  the	  blocks	  or	  neighborhoods	  of	  more	  traditional	  street	  gangs,	  but	  in	  
terms	  of	  entire	  cities,	  states,	  and	  regions	  (Quinn	  2001).	  
The	  1960s	  and	  1970s	  were	  a	  time	  of	  great	  expansion	  for	  the	  Big	  Four,	  and	  as	  
they	  expanded,	  they	  came	  into	  contact	  with	  rival	  gangs.	  The	  resulting	  conflict,	  in	  
turn,	  caused	  the	  Big	  Four	  to	  move	  towards	  organized	  crime	  (Quinn	  2001).	  	  	  OMGs	  
needed	  money	  to	  buy	  the	  weaponry	  necessary	  to	  protect	  and	  expand	  their	  territory,	  
and	  so	  entered	  into	  drug	  dealing,	  prostitution,	  money	  laundering,	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  
racketeering.	  	  Then,	  as	  chapters	  became	  sources	  of	  illicit	  profit,	  the	  need	  to	  control	  
territory	  became	  associated	  not	  just	  with	  prestige,	  but	  also	  with	  income.	  The	  stakes	  
were	  raised	  higher	  still.	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Meth	  distribution	  was	  a	  natural	  choice	  for	  the	  gangs.	  	  First,	  it	  was	  already	  
popular	  among	  club	  members.	  	  Second,	  its	  price	  per	  ounce	  made	  it	  profitable	  even	  in	  
small	  amounts.	  	  One	  member	  of	  the	  DEA	  explained	  the	  drug’s	  appeal	  for	  OMGs	  as	  
follows:	  	  	  
It	  is	  very	  concealable.	  There	  is	  a	  high	  profit	  margin	  in	  it	  where	  they	  
can	  control	  if	  from	  the	  lab	  clear	  on	  down	  through	  the	  distribution	  
networks.	  	  They	  have	  their	  own	  chapters	  throughout	  the	  country,	  
their	  own	  clubs	  that	  they	  can	  ship	  it	  back	  and	  forth	  to.	  .	  .	  .	  They	  have	  
no	  boundaries;	  it	  is	  not	  like	  a	  regionalized	  gang	  of	  methamphetamine	  
traffickers.	  These	  people	  go	  across	  the	  country	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1980,	  56).	  	  	  
A	  member	  of	  the	  Bandidos	  explained	  the	  importance	  in	  less	  sophisticated	  terms.	  	  
“Everything	  in	  the	  whole	  club	  revolves	  around	  crank.	  	  You	  can’t	  ride	  a	  $10,000	  
motorcycle,	  have	  a	  big	  gun	  collection,	  and	  take	  care	  of	  three	  19-­‐year-­‐old	  ladies	  
working	  in	  no	  body	  shop”	  (Isikoff	  1989,	  A22).	  
A	  regionalized	  network	  of	  chapters,	  a	  hierarchical	  governance,	  and	  a	  
propensity	  towards	  crime	  and	  secrecy	  made	  OMGs	  an	  ideal	  system	  of	  organization	  
for	  the	  distribution	  of	  drugs.	  	  Their	  levels	  of	  organization	  fit	  the	  corporate	  model	  of	  
drug	  trafficking,	  while	  the	  intense	  interpersonal	  connections	  between	  members	  and	  
chapters	  matched	  a	  socially	  bonded	  one.	  	  The	  end	  result	  is	  a	  powerful	  blend:	  
corporate	  efficiency	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  loyalty	  than	  one	  might	  expect	  in	  a	  large	  
drug-­‐trafficking	  organization.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  mobility	  of	  OMGS,	  their	  very	  raison	  
d’être,	  made	  them	  nearly	  impossible	  to	  police	  because	  their	  activities	  fell	  within	  no	  
single	  jurisdiction.	  As	  Gil	  Amoroso,	  a	  DEA	  agent	  in	  Philadelphia,	  explained:	  “They	  
have	  no	  boundaries.	  	  It’s	  nothing	  for	  them	  to	  get	  on	  a	  motorcycle,	  a	  car,	  a	  van,	  and	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drive	  to	  Florida	  at	  the	  spur	  of	  a	  moment,	  whereas	  your	  local	  officials	  can’t	  go	  outside	  
their	  jurisdictional	  boundaries”	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1980,	  52).	  	  	  
Billie	  A.	  Rosen,	  the	  special	  assistant	  to	  the	  United	  States	  Attorney	  in	  Northern	  
California	  elaborated	  on	  the	  government’s	  frustration	  in	  trying	  to	  stop	  such	  gangs.	  	  	  
He	  testified	  that	  “The	  fact	  that	  virtually	  every	  such	  gang	  has	  chapters	  in	  more	  than	  
one	  state	  (and	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  have	  chapters	  in	  various	  foreign	  countries),	  and	  
share	  their	  criminal	  ventures	  with	  their	  fellow	  chapters	  compounds	  the	  difficulties	  
local	  law	  enforcement	  faces.	  	  State	  laws	  are	  frequently	  inadequate	  to	  lead	  to	  
successful	  prosecutions”	  (17).	  	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  police	  action	  in	  one	  city	  or	  state	  
simply	  caused	  OMGs	  to	  move	  their	  illicit	  activity	  into	  another	  portion	  of	  their	  
territory.	  	  Frank	  Hazel,	  the	  district	  attorney	  of	  Delaware	  County,	  Pennsylvania,	  
believed	  that	  the	  Pagan	  Motorcycle	  Club	  actively	  monitored	  the	  law	  enforcement	  
capabilities	  of	  different	  portions	  of	  Philadelphia	  and	  its	  surrounding	  counties,	  and	  
moved	  their	  operations	  to	  locations	  where	  the	  police	  presence	  was	  weakest.	  	  
	   In	  1980,	  federal	  officials	  estimated	  that	  OMGs	  controlled	  fifty	  percent	  of	  the	  
methamphetamine	  trade	  nationwide	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1980).	  However,	  
the	  ways	  they	  engaged	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  differed	  by	  gang	  and	  region.	  	  
On	  the	  West	  Coast,	  where	  little	  traditional	  organized	  crime	  existed,	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  
appear	  to	  have	  controlled	  of	  a	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  industry	  at	  every	  level	  of	  the	  
supply	  chain,	  from	  material	  acquisition	  through	  production	  and	  on	  to	  distribution	  
(Los	  Angeles	  Times	  1979).	  	  On	  the	  East	  Coast,	  the	  Pagans	  and	  Warlocks	  operated	  in	  
cooperation	  with	  traditional	  organized	  crime	  around	  New	  York	  and	  Philadelphia.	  	  
Philadelphia	  DEA	  agent	  Gil	  Amoroso	  explained	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  regional	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differences	  in	  OMG	  prominence.	  “I	  don’t	  think	  any	  motorcycle	  club	  [on	  the	  East	  
Coast]	  .	  .	  .	  is	  in	  a	  position	  to	  argue	  with	  organized	  crime”	  (Washington	  Post	  1982,	  A2)	  
Quinn	  (2001)	  has	  argued	  that	  most	  trends	  within	  the	  world	  of	  outlaw	  
motorcycle	  gangs	  follow	  a	  progression	  from	  the	  West	  Coast	  to	  the	  industrial	  
Midwest	  and	  Northeast,	  with	  eventual	  diffusion	  to	  the	  South.	  Meth	  appears	  to	  fit	  this	  
description.	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  were	  the	  first	  club	  to	  manufacture	  
and	  distribute	  methamphetamine.	  	  They	  were	  certainly	  well	  positioned	  for	  it.	  	  The	  
modern-­‐day	  Hell’s	  Angels	  were	  born	  out	  of	  a	  collection	  of	  young	  delinquents	  who	  
came	  together	  in	  Oakland	  in	  1957.	  	  They	  grew	  in	  prominence	  and	  power	  in	  the	  early	  
1960s	  just	  as	  the	  injectible	  methamphetamine	  epidemic	  hit	  in	  the	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  
district	  of	  San	  Francisco	  (Barker	  2005;	  Barker	  2007;	  Barger	  2001).	  Davis	  and	  
Munoz	  (1968)	  described	  bikers	  as	  among	  the	  first	  groups	  to	  take	  up	  meth	  injecting.	  	  
The	  Angels	  actually	  started	  their	  drug	  production	  and	  distribution	  with	  LSD,	  but	  
moved	  into	  the	  meth	  business	  in	  the	  early	  1970s	  (Thornburgh	  1989).	  	  In	  1977,	  a	  
former	  gang-­‐member-­‐turned-­‐government-­‐informant,	  Richard	  LaFrentz,	  said	  that	  
the	  Angels	  had	  rules	  regarding	  meth	  dealing	  built	  into	  their	  bylaws.	  Violators	  of	  the	  
rules	  were	  expelled	  from	  the	  club	  (Coakley	  1977).	  	  	  
Newspaper	  stories	  from	  the	  mid	  1970s	  show	  that	  smaller	  motorcycle	  gangs	  
also	  got	  into	  the	  act.	  	  In	  Chicago,	  four	  members	  of	  the	  Elgin	  Old	  Stylers	  were	  
arrested	  after	  selling	  $3,000	  worth	  of	  methamphetamine	  to	  undercover	  agents	  
(Chicago	  Tribune	  1973).	  	  On	  the	  East	  Coast,	  members	  of	  the	  Warlocks	  	  and	  
Confederate	  Angels,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  Pagans,	  were	  arrested	  on	  meth	  charges	  
(Washington	  Post	  1980,	  New	  York	  Times	  1977).	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By	  the	  1980s,	  the	  Bandidos	  were	  heavily	  involved	  in	  Texas	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  In	  
1985	  they	  were	  the	  object	  of	  a	  massive	  FBI	  bust	  that	  took	  in	  over	  80	  Bandidos	  
(Sawyer	  1985).	  	  A	  rundown	  of	  the	  states	  in	  which	  they	  were	  arrested	  gives	  a	  sense	  
of	  the	  size	  and	  dispersion	  of	  their	  methamphetamine	  network.	  Bandidos	  were	  
arrested	  in	  Arkansas,	  Colorado,	  Louisiana,	  Missouri,	  South	  Carolina,	  South	  Dakota,	  
Texas,	  and	  Washington.	  	  A	  similar	  1985	  crackdown	  on	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels,	  dubbed	  
“Operation	  Rough	  Rider,”	  resulted	  in	  a	  similarly	  widespread	  zone	  of	  arrests:	  	  Albany,	  
Boston,	  Charlotte,	  Cleveland,	  Newark,	  New	  Haven,	  New	  Orleans,	  Omaha,	  Phoenix,	  
Richmond,	  Sacramento,	  San	  Diego,	  and	  San	  Francisco	  (Werner	  1985).	  	  	  
	  
Scheduling	  Precursors	  and	  the	  Response	  to	  P2P	  Scarcity	  
	   On	  February	  11,	  1980,	  the	  DEA	  made	  phenyl-­‐2-­‐propanone	  a	  Schedule	  II	  
substance.	  	  It	  was	  a	  move	  that	  would	  have	  a	  profound	  effect	  on	  methamphetamine	  
networks	  across	  the	  country.	  	  After	  that	  date,	  the	  options	  available	  to	  meth	  
producers	  who	  wanted	  to	  stay	  in	  business	  were	  limited	  to	  three	  possibilities.	  	  The	  
first	  was	  to	  make	  their	  own	  P2P.	  	  Frank	  (1982)	  reported	  that	  the	  DEA	  had	  seized	  
only	  two	  P2P	  labs	  in	  1978,	  and	  nine	  in	  1979.	  	  In	  1980,	  however,	  after	  the	  scheduling,	  
they	  seized	  26,	  and	  in	  1981,	  38.	  	  Moreover,	  of	  the	  38	  P2P	  labs	  seized	  in	  1981,	  25	  also	  
made	  meth	  and	  six	  made	  amphetamines.	  Only	  six	  made	  P2P	  alone.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  25	  
of	  the	  total	  of	  73	  meth	  labs	  seized	  in	  the	  first	  three	  quarters	  of	  1981	  were	  producing	  
their	  own	  P2P	  indicates	  that	  this	  was	  a	  fairly	  popular	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  	  Still,	  
fully	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  seized	  labs	  were	  not	  making	  their	  own	  precursors.	  	  Some	  
might	  have	  been	  purchasing	  P2P	  from	  other	  labs,	  but	  the	  small	  number	  that	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produced	  only	  P2P	  indicates	  that	  very	  few	  underground	  cooks	  were	  creating	  
product	  to	  sell	  to	  other	  drug	  manufacturers.	  	  	  
The	  second	  option	  available	  to	  producers	  was	  obtaining	  legally	  produced	  
P2P	  through	  illegal	  means.	  The	  methods	  used	  here	  hearken	  back	  to	  the	  time	  of	  
amphetamine	  diversion,	  and	  involved	  either	  finding	  disreputable	  local	  chemical	  
dealers	  or	  buying	  it	  from	  international	  chemical	  producers	  and	  smuggling	  it	  into	  the	  
country.	  	  	  
It	  should	  not	  be	  surprising	  that	  the	  scheduling	  of	  the	  P2P	  precursor	  in	  the	  
increasingly	  lucrative	  methamphetamine	  industry	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  black	  
market.	  	  In	  fact,	  even	  before	  this	  scheduling	  (perhaps	  because	  of	  measures	  like	  the	  
Precursor	  Liaison	  Program),	  producers	  had	  begun	  to	  consider	  alternative	  sources	  
for	  the	  chemical.	  	  For	  example,	  a	  small	  meth-­‐making	  operation	  run	  by	  members	  of	  
the	  Los	  Angeles	  Hell’s	  Angels	  was	  infiltrated	  by	  an	  undercover	  agent	  in	  1979	  after	  
he	  claimed	  to	  be	  a	  burglar	  who	  could	  steal	  P2P	  for	  their	  lab	  (Maxwell	  1975).	  	  The	  
Richmond	  Times	  Dispatch	  reported	  that	  the	  Confederate	  Angels	  (a	  smaller	  
motorcycle	  gang	  operating	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  region)	  sent	  one	  of	  their	  members	  
across	  the	  country	  to	  Los	  Angeles	  to	  purchase	  four	  cases	  of	  P2P	  for	  $10,850	  well	  
before	  it	  was	  scheduled	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1980).	  	  	  
After	  February	  11,	  many	  more	  producers	  turned	  to	  unscrupulous	  chemical	  
dealers	  to	  obtain	  legally	  produced	  P2P,	  and	  whenever	  a	  viable	  source	  of	  the	  
precursor	  was	  found,	  word	  spread	  quickly.	  	  The	  success	  of	  a	  1981	  DEA	  sting	  
operation	  illustrates	  the	  high	  demand	  for	  P2P	  sources	  created	  by	  the	  scheduling.	  	  	  In	  
1981,	  they	  set	  up	  an	  undercover	  operation	  around	  a	  front	  supply	  store	  called	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“Precision	  Organic	  Chemicals”	  in	  a	  southern	  Chicago	  suburb.	  	  The	  original	  plan	  was	  
to	  keep	  the	  shop	  open	  for	  only	  a	  few	  weeks	  to	  entice	  a	  few	  suspected	  cooks	  into	  
purchasing	  precursors.	  	  However,	  word	  of	  a	  shop	  that	  was	  willing	  to	  sell	  P2P	  spread	  
quickly	  and	  attracted	  producers	  from	  all	  over	  the	  country;	  the	  DEA	  kept	  the	  
operation	  running	  for	  months.	  	  Among	  those	  ensnared	  was	  a	  couple	  from	  Arlington,	  
Texas,	  who	  were	  convicted	  of	  manufacturing	  P2P	  after	  one	  of	  their	  employees	  called	  
the	  store	  to	  get	  advice	  on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  precursor.	  The	  same	  employee	  later	  tried	  
to	  trade	  an	  ounce	  of	  meth	  and	  $35,000	  for	  a	  55-­‐gallon	  drum	  of	  P2P	  from	  the	  
company	  (Emmerman	  1981).	  	  	  
In	  April	  1986	  the	  DEA	  arrested	  58	  year-­‐old	  Bud	  Farrell,	  owner	  and	  operator	  
of	  Chemical	  Shed,	  Inc.	  of	  Southern	  California.	  	  Farrell	  had	  been	  a	  DEA	  informant	  
since	  1977,	  but	  had	  begun	  to	  stray	  after	  1983,	  preferring	  to	  sell	  glassware,	  essential	  
chemicals,	  and	  precursors	  to	  clandestine	  cooks	  at	  inflated	  prices.	  	  Federal	  officials	  
estimated	  that	  seventy	  to	  eighty	  percent	  of	  Chemical	  Shed’s	  business	  went	  to	  illicit	  
drug	  makers.	  The	  company	  also	  was	  the	  largest	  national	  purchaser	  of	  ether,	  a	  
volatile	  liquid	  used	  in	  production	  of	  meth	  and	  several	  other	  synthetic	  drugs.	  	  	  
Between	  1983	  and	  July	  1985,	  41	  of	  the	  85	  illegal	  drug	  labs	  raided	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  
contained	  chemicals	  from	  Chemical	  Shed.	  	  	  In	  the	  indictment,	  one	  producer	  testified	  
that	  he	  drove	  from	  Minneapolis	  to	  LA	  to	  buy	  chemicals	  from	  Farrell	  because	  it	  was	  
so	  much	  easier	  than	  trying	  to	  get	  them	  in	  Minnesota	  (Palermo	  1986).	  
In	  Oregon,	  where	  meth	  lab	  seizures	  rose	  from	  10	  in	  1983	  to	  131	  in	  1987,	  the	  
assistant	  U.	  S.	  attorney	  in	  Eugene,	  Thomas	  Coffin,	  began	  prosecuting	  chemical	  
companies	  that	  wittingly	  sold	  drug	  precursors	  to	  methamphetamine	  dealers	  as	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coconspirators	  in	  drug	  production.	  	  In	  one	  particular	  case,	  Eugene	  Scientific	  
reportedly	  saw	  such	  a	  significant	  uptick	  in	  their	  sales	  related	  to	  methamphetamine	  
precursors	  in	  1984	  or	  1985	  that	  almost	  their	  entire	  clientele	  (95	  percent	  according	  
to	  Coffin)	  were	  cooks	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1988).	  	  
	  As	  was	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Chemical	  Shed	  investigation,	  all	  of	  the	  chemicals	  
involved	  in	  meth	  production	  were	  significantly	  marked	  up	  in	  price	  at	  Eugene	  
Scientific.	  	  One	  of	  the	  company’s	  most	  popular	  chemicals	  was	  phenylacetic	  acid.	  	  	  
Used	  primarily	  as	  a	  precursor	  for	  the	  production	  of	  P2P,	  phenylacetic	  acid	  has	  few	  
other	  applications,	  none	  of	  which	  could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  industries	  of	  Oregon	  in	  the	  
mid	  to	  late	  1980s.	  	  However,	  in	  1985	  and	  1986	  Eugene	  Scientific	  sold	  5,000	  lbs.	  of	  
the	  chemical,	  enough	  to	  produce	  2,000	  lbs.	  of	  meth	  with	  a	  wholesale	  value	  of	  
$20,000,000.	  	  By	  comparison,	  California,	  which	  had	  a	  reporting	  law	  in	  place	  during	  
those	  years,	  sold	  a	  total	  of	  10	  lbs.	  of	  phenylacetic	  acid	  for	  legitimate	  purposes	  in	  the	  
same	  time	  span	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1988).	  
If	  one	  were	  operating	  at	  the	  wholesale	  level,	  P2P	  was	  an	  expensive	  
proposition.	  	  On	  the	  black	  market,	  a	  55-­‐gallon	  drum	  of	  the	  oily	  substance	  sold	  for	  
between	  $200,000	  and	  $500,000.	  	  With	  that	  55-­‐gallon	  drum,	  an	  experienced	  cook	  
could	  expect	  to	  produce	  400	  pounds	  of	  methamphetamine.	  	  At	  the	  wholesale	  level,	  
on	  the	  East	  Coast	  in	  1980,	  a	  single	  pound	  of	  meth	  sold	  for	  roughly	  $10,000.	  	  So,	  for	  
an	  investment	  of	  $500,000,	  an	  enterprise	  capable	  of	  moving	  400	  pounds	  of	  meth	  
could	  extract	  a	  profit	  of	  $3,500,000	  minus	  the	  other	  lab-­‐related	  costs.	  	  However,	  this	  
calculation	  presumes	  an	  organization	  with	  the	  wherewithal	  to	  acquire	  such	  a	  drum	  
and	  the	  money	  to	  make	  the	  purchase.	  	  On	  the	  East	  Coast,	  the	  Pagans	  Motorcycle	  Club	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looked	  to	  traditional	  organized	  crime	  in	  Philadelphia	  to	  help	  bankroll	  their	  
investment	  and	  coordinate	  the	  smuggling	  of	  such	  drums	  into	  the	  country	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1980;	  Lyman	  1989;	  Jenkins	  1992).	  	  	  
The	  third	  option	  available	  for	  methamphetamine	  producers	  to	  obtain	  
precursors	  involved	  innovation.	  	  The	  P2P	  method	  of	  methamphetamine	  
manufacture	  is	  not	  the	  only	  way	  to	  make	  the	  drug,	  and	  the	  foundations	  for	  other	  
methods	  have	  been	  explained	  in	  academic	  chemical	  literature	  since	  the	  1920s	  
(Skinner	  1990).	  	  Enterprising	  criminals	  with	  a	  sound	  knowledge	  of	  chemical	  
processes	  and	  access	  to	  pertinent	  literature	  soon	  found	  new	  ways	  to	  make	  meth.	  	  
Some	  of	  these	  methods	  were	  in	  use	  even	  before	  P2P	  was	  scheduled,	  but	  they	  
represented	  a	  very	  small	  percentage	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  (Frank	  1982).	  	  After	  1980,	  
however,	  two	  “new”	  methods	  appeared	  with	  increasing	  frequency.	  	  The	  first	  was	  the	  
Red-­‐Phosphorous	  (Red-­‐P)	  method,	  which	  first	  appeared	  in	  1981.	  	  The	  second	  
method	  was	  observed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  Vacaville,	  California,	  in	  1989,	  and	  would	  
come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  “Nazi	  Method”	  (Ely	  and	  McGrath	  1990).	  	  	  	  
From	  its	  introduction	  to	  today,	  methamphetamine	  has	  proven	  difficult	  to	  
control.	  	  Seemingly	  every	  act	  of	  regulation	  by	  the	  government	  has	  been	  met	  by	  a	  
response	  from	  users	  and	  producers	  that	  results	  in	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  desired	  effect.	  	  
Just	  as	  the	  removal	  of	  methamphetamine	  ampoules	  from	  the	  market	  in	  the	  early	  
1960s	  resulted	  in	  the	  first	  methamphetamine	  labs,	  the	  scheduling	  of	  P2P	  had	  
similarly	  unforeseen	  consequences.	  	  On	  the	  West	  Coast,	  it	  led	  to	  innovation	  in	  the	  
supply	  chain,	  the	  loosening	  of	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels’	  control	  of	  the	  market,	  and	  a	  boom	  in	  
the	  clandestine	  methamphetamine	  production	  business.	  	  On	  the	  East	  Coast	  the	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scheduling	  further	  entrenched	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Pagans	  and	  traditional	  
organized	  crime,	  and	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  drug’s	  fall	  from	  favor	  among	  eastern	  drug	  
users.	  	  The	  spatial	  variation	  in	  those	  responses	  rewrote	  the	  drug’s	  geography,	  
leading	  to	  the	  agglomeration	  of	  methamphetamine	  production	  in	  the	  West	  and	  
Southwest	  and	  setting	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  eastward-­‐moving	  epidemic	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  
2000s.	  
	  
West	  Coast	  Boom	  
Meth	  producers	  on	  the	  West	  Coast	  responded	  nimbly	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  P2P,	  and	  
the	  region	  became	  the	  center	  of	  methamphetamine	  innovation	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  In	  
1981,	  producers	  there	  began	  to	  adopt	  the	  Red-­‐Phosphorous	  method	  of	  
methamphetamine	  production.	  	  This	  new	  recipe,	  which	  required	  no	  P2P	  or	  any	  
other	  scheduled	  substances,	  and	  relied	  instead	  on	  ephedrine	  and	  later,	  
pseudoephedrine,	  as	  a	  precursor,	  proved	  to	  be	  incredibly	  popular.	  	  Today,	  we	  
associate	  ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  with	  cold	  pills,	  but	  in	  the	  1980s	  cooks	  
could	  easily	  buy	  such	  chemicals	  in	  bulk	  from	  wholesalers	  like	  Chemical	  Shed	  and	  
Eugene	  Scientific.	  Most	  other	  necessary	  ingredients	  could	  be	  purchased	  from	  
hardware	  stores.	  	  	  
As	  the	  decade	  wore	  on,	  more	  and	  more	  meth	  producers	  adopted	  the	  Red-­‐P	  
method.	  	  A	  1990	  report	  on	  the	  procedure	  by	  a	  DEA	  chemist	  described	  it	  as	  “the	  most	  
common	  method	  of	  manufacture	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  United	  States”	  
(Skinner	  1990).	  	  This	  was	  true,	  but	  only	  by	  a	  slim	  margin	  nationally.	  	  Of	  the	  416	  labs	  
seized	  in	  1989	  for	  which	  the	  manner	  of	  production	  was	  determined,	  53	  percent	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used	  the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  and	  47	  percent	  used	  P2P	  (Irvine	  and	  Chin	  1990).	  	  
Regionality	  was	  strong,	  however.	  	  In	  Southern	  California,	  the	  percentage	  of	  labs	  
using	  Red-­‐P	  was	  as	  high	  as	  90	  percent	  in	  1988	  (Derlet	  and	  Heischober	  1990).	  
Using	  1988	  seizure	  data	  from	  Irvine	  and	  Chin	  (1990),	  we	  can	  derive	  just	  how	  
significant	  Red-­‐P	  production	  in	  Southern	  California	  was	  to	  the	  national	  total.	  	  In	  
1988	  the	  DEA	  seized	  315	  labs	  in	  California	  and	  629	  nationwide.	  	  If	  we	  assume,	  based	  
on	  comments	  from	  California	  Attorney	  General	  John	  Van	  De	  Camp,	  that	  meth-­‐lab	  
seizures	  in	  San	  Diego	  made	  up	  approximately	  one	  quarter	  of	  the	  national	  total	  
(Weintraub	  1987a),	  we	  can	  estimate	  that	  San	  Diego	  was	  responsible	  for	  157	  labs	  in	  
1988,	  roughly	  half	  of	  California’s	  total.	  	  Using	  the	  90	  percent	  guideline,	  approximate	  
142	  of	  those	  labs	  would	  have	  employed	  the	  Red-­‐P	  procedure.	  	  Assuming	  that	  use	  of	  
the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  grew	  between	  1988	  and	  1989,	  one	  can	  estimate	  that	  the	  division	  
between	  the	  two	  methods	  was	  50/50	  (rather	  than	  the	  53/47	  total	  given	  for	  1989)	  
and	  that	  nationwide,	  315	  Red-­‐P	  abs	  were	  seized.	  	  This	  means	  that	  in	  1988,	  45	  
percent	  of	  all	  the	  Red-­‐P	  labs	  seized	  nationally	  were	  found	  in	  San	  Diego.	  
The	  new	  method	  caught	  on	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  First,	  it	  circumvented	  
the	  need	  for	  P2P.	  	  Not	  only	  did	  this	  eliminate	  much	  of	  the	  telltale	  odor	  of	  the	  cooking	  
process,	  but	  it	  also	  democratized	  meth	  production.	  	  Before	  scheduling,	  only	  large	  
criminal	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  or	  traditional	  mafia	  could	  find	  
black-­‐market	  sources	  of	  P2P	  and	  avoid	  being	  detected	  by	  the	  DEA.	  	  That	  option	  was	  
not	  readily	  available	  to	  small-­‐scale	  producers.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  
ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  were	  not	  even	  on	  the	  government’s	  radar,	  meaning	  
any	  individual	  could	  purchase	  them	  and	  their	  sales	  were	  not	  monitored.	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The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  ran	  a	  story	  in	  1985	  that	  illustrates	  the	  increasing	  
diversity	  of	  meth	  producers.	  	  It	  was	  about	  a	  teenager	  who	  made	  meth	  in	  his	  
suburban	  garage	  using	  the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  (Omundson	  1985)	  and	  offered	  insight	  into	  
how	  rapidly	  the	  Red-­‐P	  technique	  spread.	  	  The	  young	  cook,	  Duane,	  then	  17,	  
described	  how	  he	  learned	  to	  make	  meth	  by	  knowing	  “older	  guys	  who	  were	  really	  
into	  it,	  and	  they	  let	  me	  watch	  them	  do	  it.	  	  I	  watched	  very,	  very	  carefully,	  and	  after	  
three	  or	  four	  times	  I	  knew	  how	  to	  do	  it.”	  	  This	  is	  significant	  because	  Duane	  learned	  
to	  make	  meth	  when	  he	  was	  thirteen,	  meaning	  that	  he	  was	  using	  the	  Red	  Phosphorus	  
recipe	  just	  as	  it	  was	  appearing	  in	  1981.	  	  	  
Duane	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  freelance	  producers	  who	  entered	  the	  market	  after	  
the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  took	  hold.	  	  Small-­‐scale	  cooks	  operating	  in	  groups	  of	  two	  or	  three	  
appeared	  in	  large	  numbers,	  each	  producing	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  product	  for	  personal	  
use	  and	  resale.	  	  This	  type	  of	  network	  was	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  the	  vast,	  vertically	  
integrated,	  interstate	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  that	  previously	  had	  controlled	  
production	  (Morgan	  and	  Beck	  1997).	  DEA	  agent	  Ron	  D’Ulisse	  lamented	  how	  the	  new	  
method	  had	  changed	  the	  drug	  market	  in	  San	  Diego:	  ‘“Everyone	  and	  anyone	  can	  do	  it.	  	  
We	  were	  dealing	  with	  the	  motorcycle	  gangs,	  but	  now	  we	  find	  it’s	  amateur	  hour,	  with	  
people	  who	  don’t	  belong	  in	  the	  business	  cooking	  methamphetamine’”	  (Lait	  1988,	  
A14).	  	  	  
The	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  associated	  the	  transition	  with	  increased	  volatility	  in	  
the	  city.	  “Virtually	  unlimited	  access	  to	  precursor	  chemicals	  drew	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  
unsophisticated	  criminals	  into	  the	  methamphetamine	  business.	  	  It	  was	  these	  
entrepreneurs,	  cooking	  drugs	  in	  their	  suburban	  garages	  and	  city	  homes,	  who	  were	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largely	  responsible	  for	  making	  the	  explosions,	  fires,	  and	  other	  dangers	  of	  drug	  
manufacture	  virtually	  an	  everyday	  part	  of	  life	  in	  San	  Diego”	  (Schachter	  1987,	  A5).	  	  	  	  
The	  transition	  away	  from	  P2P	  also	  meant	  that	  the	  drug	  could	  be	  produced	  in	  
increasingly	  varied	  locations.	  	  Whereas	  prope	  dope	  had	  to	  be	  made	  in	  remote	  areas	  
where	  fumes	  could	  disperse	  without	  being	  smelled,	  the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  allowed	  
production	  to	  occur	  wherever	  there	  was	  enough	  privacy	  to	  set	  up	  a	  lab.	  	  In	  the	  
1980s	  labs	  were	  found	  in	  places	  as	  varied	  as	  private	  residences,	  garages,	  storage	  
facilities,	  vehicles,	  houseboats,	  and	  horse	  trailers	  (Irvine	  and	  Chin	  1990).	  
Quality	  was	  another	  reason	  for	  the	  increasing	  popularity	  of	  the	  new	  Red-­‐P	  
method.	  The	  Red	  Phosphorous	  method	  produces	  meth	  that	  is	  entirely	  d-­‐
methamphetamine,	  rather	  than	  the	  50/50	  racemic	  mixture	  found	  in	  prope	  dope.	  	  
Meth	  that	  is	  made	  entirely	  of	  dextrorotary	  isomers	  is	  significantly	  more	  
psychoactive	  than	  racemic	  methamphetamine,	  meaning	  that	  users	  get	  much	  more	  of	  
the	  desired	  central	  nervous	  system	  stimulation	  with	  each	  dose	  (Taylor	  and	  Snyder	  
1970;	  Lukas	  1970;	  Skinner	  1990;	  Miller	  and	  Heischober	  1990).	  	  	  	  
The	  Red-­‐P	  recipe	  also	  produces	  a	  purer	  end	  product.	  	  To	  producers,	  this	  
meant	  that	  the	  meth	  coming	  out	  of	  the	  newer	  labs	  could	  be	  “stepped	  on,”	  or	  
degraded	  with	  other	  products,	  at	  a	  higher	  rate	  than	  P2P	  meth.	  This	  translates	  into	  
higher	  yields	  and	  profits.	  	  To	  users,	  the	  purity	  meant	  that	  the	  meth	  being	  made	  in	  
Southern	  California	  after	  1981	  was	  a	  significantly	  more	  appealing	  stimulant	  than	  
anything	  that	  had	  come	  before	  or	  was	  still	  being	  made	  in	  other	  locations.	  	  	  	  	  
It	  does	  not	  seem	  coincidental	  then,	  that	  Southern	  California	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  
the	  West	  Coast	  experienced	  a	  methamphetamine	  boom	  after	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	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Red-­‐P	  method.	  	  Nationally,	  the	  DEA	  seized	  88	  labs	  in	  1981.	  	  By	  1989	  that	  number	  
had	  jumped	  to	  652,	  with	  the	  West	  Coast	  making	  up	  a	  disproportionate	  segment	  of	  
that	  number.	  	  In	  1987	  California	  and	  Oregon	  accounted	  for	  61.7	  percent	  of	  all	  meth	  
labs	  seized	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  	  In	  1988	  that	  number	  grew	  to	  66	  percent	  (69	  percent	  if	  
Washington	  state	  were	  included	  in	  the	  calculation)	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1988;	  
Irvine	  and	  Chin	  1990)	  (Figure	  3.3).	  	  
	  
Figure	  3.3:	  The	  rate	  of	  labs	  seized	  per	  100,000	  people	  in	  1988	  using	  1990	  census	  
data	  (Irvine	  and	  Chin	  1990).	  
	  
The	  percentage	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  that	  were	  making	  methamphetamine	  also	  
grew	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  	  In	  1981,	  methamphetamine	  labs	  made	  up	  48	  percent	  of	  
the	  drug	  labs	  seized	  by	  the	  DEA.	  In	  1987	  that	  number	  was	  80	  percent	  (Puder	  et	  al.	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1988;	  Irvine	  and	  Chin	  1990).	  	  On	  the	  streets	  in	  the	  1980s	  methamphetamine	  
emerged	  as	  the	  best	  bet	  among	  street	  stimulants	  (not	  including	  cocaine)	  to	  contain	  
what	  it	  claimed.	  	  Puder	  et	  al.	  (1988)	  found	  that	  drugs	  purporting	  to	  contain	  
methamphetamine	  did	  so	  93	  percent	  of	  the	  time	  in	  1983,	  up	  from	  roughly	  23	  
percent	  in	  1972.	  	  
Many	  drug	  researchers	  agree	  that	  Americans	  have	  a	  predilection	  for	  
stimulant	  drugs	  (Newmyer	  1977;	  Edison	  1971;	  Grinspoon	  and	  Hedblom	  1975).	  	  We	  
have	  had	  a	  series	  of	  epidemics	  on	  this	  front	  over	  the	  years,	  and	  the	  1980s	  saw	  a	  rise	  
in	  stimulant	  abuse	  nationwide	  (Musto	  1997).	  	  In	  many	  places	  this	  was	  cocaine	  or	  
crack.	  	  However,	  “among	  marginalized	  working–class	  residents	  of	  economically	  
declining	  suburban	  communities”	  on	  the	  West	  Coast,	  methamphetamine	  began	  to	  
gain	  in	  popularity	  (Morgan	  and	  Beck	  1997).	  	  	  
In	  San	  Diego,	  where	  purely	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  was	  introduced,	  meth	  was	  
certainly	  the	  drug	  of	  choice.	  	  As	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  using	  the	  Red-­‐P	  technique	  
increased,	  so	  too	  did	  methamphetamine	  use.	  	  In	  1979	  methamphetamine	  mentions	  
in	  the	  Drug	  Abuse	  Warning	  Network	  system	  in	  San	  Diego	  were	  statistically	  
insignificant	  (Figure	  3.4).	  	  In	  1984	  they	  represented	  3.6	  percent	  of	  emergency	  room	  
drug	  mentions,	  but	  by	  1989,	  it	  was	  the	  drug	  mentioned	  second	  most	  frequently	  in	  
local	  ERs,	  and	  represented	  12	  percent	  of	  all	  drug	  mentions	  for	  the	  metropolitan	  area	  
(NIDA	  1980b;	  1985;	  1990a).	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  given	  that,	  in	  1988,	  the	  National	  
Institute	  on	  Drug	  Abuse	  concluded	  that	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  the	  spread	  of	  
methamphetamine	  abuse	  was	  the	  presence	  of	  methamphetamine	  labs	  within	  a	  
community	  (NIDA	  1988).	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Based	  on	  its	  usage	  rates	  and	  a	  steadily	  increasing	  number	  of	  lab	  seizures,	  San	  
Diego	  soon	  began	  to	  attract	  national	  attention	  as	  “the	  meth	  capital	  of	  the	  United	  
	  
Figure	  3.4:	  	  Emergency	  room	  mentions	  for	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  DAWN	  system	  
(NIDA	  1980b,	  1985,	  1990a)15	  	  
	  States.”	  	  DEA	  operatives	  in	  the	  area	  did	  much	  to	  encourage	  that	  reputation.	  	  One	  in	  
particular,	  Ron	  D’Ulisse,	  was	  quoted	  in	  newspapers	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  	  It	  was	  
agent	  D’Ulisse	  who	  compared	  San	  Diego	  to	  Bogota	  in	  a	  conversation	  with	  the	  
Chicago	  Tribune	  in	  1987	  (Wiedrich	  1987).	  	  In	  1988,	  he	  estimated	  to	  the	  Washington	  
Post	  that	  San	  Diego	  produced	  20,000	  pounds	  of	  methamphetamine	  per	  year,	  or	  as	  
he	  put	  it,	  enough	  to	  keep	  every	  man	  woman	  and	  child	  in	  the	  city	  high	  for	  six	  months	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  For	  1979	  and	  1984,	  methamphetamine	  mentions	  in	  the	  graph	  represent	  the	  combination	  of	  
specific	  methamphetamine	  mentions	  (prescription	  form)	  as	  well	  as	  mentions	  of	  “speed,”	  which	  was	  a	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(Lait	  1988).16	  	  	  Later	  in	  that	  same	  year,	  he	  repeated	  those	  statistics	  to	  the	  New	  York	  
Times	  in	  an	  article	  that	  warned	  that	  meth	  was	  going	  to	  spread	  across	  the	  country	  
(Gross	  1988).	  	  
Usage	  rates	  rose	  spectacularly	  but	  not	  evenly	  across	  California.	  Between	  
1982-­‐1983	  and	  1987-­‐1988	  the	  California	  Drug	  Abuse	  Data	  System	  (which	  
monitored	  admissions	  in	  publicly	  supported	  treatment	  programs)	  showed	  
consistently	  low	  usage	  rates	  for	  most	  of	  the	  state,	  but	  two	  poles	  of	  abuse:	  San	  Diego	  
and	  San	  Francisco.	  	  In	  San	  Diego	  County,	  methamphetamine	  was	  the	  most	  
frequently	  represented	  drug	  in	  the	  treatment	  population	  between	  1986	  and	  1990.	  	  
The	  typical	  user	  there	  was	  white	  (74	  percent)	  and	  age	  21-­‐30	  (62	  percent)	  (Miller	  
and	  Heischober	  1990).	  	  
In	  the	  counties	  of	  the	  San	  Francisco	  MSA,	  where	  amphetamine	  abuse	  had	  
been	  endemic	  since	  the	  1960s,	  methamphetamine	  ranked	  third	  among	  treatment	  
admissions	  between	  1986	  and	  1990,	  behind	  cocaine	  and	  heroin	  but	  increasing	  
steadily.	  	  The	  typical	  user	  there	  was	  white	  (84	  percent)	  and	  male	  (73	  percent),	  with	  
homosexual	  males	  disproportionately	  represented.	  	  A	  similar	  demographic	  
characterized	  West	  Hollywood	  in	  Los	  Angeles	  County.	  	  	  Nationally,	  the	  typical	  user	  
at	  this	  time	  was	  white	  and	  from	  a	  lower	  middle-­‐class	  income	  group.	  He/she	  had	  a	  
high	  school	  education	  and	  was	  between	  20	  and	  35	  years	  old.	  	  Among	  Californians,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  This	  comment	  was	  repeated	  frequently	  in	  the	  press	  and	  is	  almost	  certainly	  hyperbole.	  	  Just	  the	  
year	  before,	  Representative	  Bill	  Lowry	  had	  testified	  before	  Congress	  that	  San	  Diego	  produced	  
between	  eight	  and	  ten	  thousand	  pounds	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  1987,	  and	  described	  how	  that	  could	  
keep	  every	  man	  woman	  and	  child	  in	  the	  city	  high	  for	  three	  months.	  	  D’Ulisse	  was	  claiming	  this	  total	  
doubled	  in	  a	  year	  (Voreacos	  1987).	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the	  most	  common	  method	  of	  methamphetamine	  use	  was	  inhalation	  (snorting),	  17	  
followed	  by	  injection.	  	  Nationally,	  the	  typical	  user	  injected	  their	  meth	  (NIDA	  1985,	  
1990b;	  Miller	  and	  Heischober	  1990).	  	  
As	  the	  number	  of	  meth	  labs	  grew	  in	  California,	  the	  business	  of	  supplying	  
precursor	  chemicals	  and	  equipment	  to	  cooks	  became	  a	  big	  business.	  In	  Southern	  
California,	  ephedrine	  was	  being	  sold	  for	  $20	  a	  pound	  wholesale	  and	  $150-­‐$230	  a	  
pound	  retail,	  a	  markup	  that	  yielded	  profits	  from	  $10,000	  wholesale	  to	  $50,000	  retail	  
(Wiedrich	  1987).	  	  The	  DEA	  estimated	  that	  wholesalers	  were	  selling	  more	  than	  
10,000	  pounds	  of	  ephedrine	  per	  year	  in	  Southern	  California,	  enough	  to	  make	  8,000	  
to	  10,000	  pounds	  of	  meth.	  	  In	  1986,	  the	  California	  Legislature	  sought	  to	  end	  this	  
business	  and	  the	  clandestine	  labs	  themselves	  by	  scheduling	  the	  chemicals	  involved.	  	  
Chemical	  companies	  (in	  this	  case	  wholesalers	  and	  retailers	  rather	  than	  producers)	  
were	  quick	  to	  fight	  the	  new	  law.	  
One	  chemical	  supply	  storeowner,	  Robert	  J	  Miskinis,	  hired	  a	  lobbyist	  to	  
successfully	  delay	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  law	  from	  1986	  until	  October	  1987.	  	  
However,	  when	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  this	  lobbyist	  had	  been	  hired	  by	  a	  man	  whose	  
company,	  RJM	  Laboratories,	  had	  sold	  all	  of	  the	  essential	  ingredients	  to	  cook	  meth	  on	  
at	  least	  142	  separate	  occasions	  between	  1982	  and	  1984,	  the	  law’s	  implementation	  
was	  pushed	  up	  to	  April	  1,	  1987	  (Weintraub	  1987b).	  	  The	  new	  law	  required	  that	  
chemical	  sellers	  report	  all	  sales	  of	  meth	  precursors	  to	  the	  state	  justice	  department.	  	  
It	  also	  	  installed	  a	  21-­‐day	  waiting	  period	  between	  reporting	  the	  purchase	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  This	  snorting	  technique	  may	  have	  contributed	  to	  the	  drug’s	  popularity.	  	  The	  need	  to	  inject	  drugs	  
often	  serves	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  recreational	  users.	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delivering	  the	  chemicals.	  	  Over-­‐the-­‐counter	  cold	  medicine	  preparations	  were	  
excluded	  from	  the	  new	  law.	  	  
The	  California	  law	  was	  tough,	  but	  of	  course	  West	  Coast	  methamphetamine	  
production	  was	  not	  confined	  California	  (Figure	  3.3).	  	  In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  predictably,	  
Oregon	  and	  Washington	  experienced	  major	  upsurges	  in	  meth	  activity.	  	  Between	  
1983	  and	  1987	  lab	  seizures	  in	  Oregon	  grew	  from	  10	  to	  131,	  while	  in	  Washington	  
they	  grew	  from	  zero	  to	  27	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1988).	  	  	  Observers	  saw	  such	  
growth	  as	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  producers	  fleeing	  persecution	  in	  California,	  and	  in	  1987	  
both	  states	  passed	  chemical	  reporting	  laws	  almost	  identical	  to	  those	  of	  California	  in	  
an	  effort	  to	  push	  production	  out	  of	  their	  states.18	  	  	  
The	  chemicals	  listed	  in	  the	  new	  laws	  included	  anthranilic	  acid,	  ephedrine,	  
methylamine,	  phenylacetic	  acid,	  pseudoephedrine,	  lead	  acetate,	  and	  methyl	  
formamide.	  	  As	  was	  the	  case	  in	  California,	  the	  laws	  scheduled	  ephedrine	  and	  
pseudoephedrine	  except	  in	  the	  form	  of	  cold	  pills,	  a	  loophole	  that	  was	  quickly	  
discovered	  by	  cooks.	  	  San	  Diego	  Police	  reported	  that	  lab	  seizures	  dipped	  for	  only	  
three	  months	  after	  the	  law’s	  implementation	  in	  California	  before	  they	  saw	  
production	  return	  to	  its	  previous	  levels	  (Schachter	  1987).	  	  Nationally,	  law	  
enforcement	  people	  feared	  that	  the	  new	  laws	  would	  simply	  push	  producers	  into	  
states	  east	  of	  the	  West	  Coast	  that	  had	  not	  yet	  implemented	  precursor-­‐tracking	  laws	  
(Farney	  1989).	  These	  fears	  were	  allayed	  when	  the	  federal	  government	  passed	  the	  
Chemical	  Diversion	  and	  Trafficking	  Act	  of	  1988.	  	  Though	  that	  law	  was	  primarily	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  new	  reporting	  laws	  contributed	  to	  the	  increase	  in	  lab	  seizures	  on	  the	  West	  
Coast	  by	  improving	  the	  ability	  of	  police	  to	  catch	  cooks,	  and	  that	  the	  new	  numbers	  do	  not	  reflect	  an	  
actual	  increase	  in	  production.	  	  However,	  given	  the	  actual	  growth	  in	  labs	  in	  San	  Diego	  before	  the	  1987	  
law,	  I	  do	  not	  believe	  this	  to	  be	  the	  case.	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aimed	  at	  stopping	  American	  companies	  from	  selling	  the	  chemicals	  necessary	  to	  
process	  cocaine,	  it	  also	  regulated	  the	  importing,	  exporting,	  and	  sales	  of	  the	  
chemicals	  included	  in	  the	  California,	  Oregon,	  and	  Washington	  laws	  (DEA	  2012).	  	  
	  
East	  Coast	  Busts	  
Before	  the	  scheduling	  of	  P2P,	  methamphetamine	  use	  and	  production	  on	  the	  
East	  Coast	  was	  most	  prominent	  in	  the	  Delaware	  Valley,	  in	  the	  counties	  surrounding	  
Philadelphia.	  	  As	  was	  the	  case	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  country,	  clandestine	  production	  had	  
begun	  there	  in	  the	  1960s	  as	  the	  police	  cut	  down	  on	  diversion	  of	  legally	  produced	  
meth.	  	  Also	  following	  national	  trends,	  methamphetamine	  declined	  in	  most	  former	  
East	  Coast	  hot	  spots	  during	  the	  1970s,	  including	  the	  East	  Village	  of	  New	  York.	  	  Most	  
drug	  users	  in	  this	  section	  of	  the	  country	  turned	  to	  heroin	  or	  cocaine	  and	  did	  not	  
return	  to	  meth	  as	  the	  decade	  wore	  on.	  	  Eastern	  Pennsylvania	  was	  the	  exception.	  
Philadelphia,	  in	  fact,	  was	  the	  only	  city	  in	  the	  entire	  DAWN	  system	  to	  have	  a	  
significant	  number	  of	  mentions	  for	  prescription	  methamphetamine	  in	  1979(Figure	  
3.4).	  	  	  It	  was	  also	  the	  only	  metropolitan	  area	  for	  which	  mentions	  of	  “speed”	  (the	  
term	  used	  for	  nonprescription	  methamphetamine)	  ranked	  in	  the	  top	  ten	  of	  drugs	  
mentioned	  at	  admission	  (NIDA	  1980b).	  	  Meth’s	  popularity	  in	  Philadelphia	  makes	  
sense	  given	  the	  drug’s	  demographics.	  	  In	  the	  1980s	  it	  had	  a	  large,	  white,	  working-­‐
class	  population.	  	  As	  Jenkins	  (1992)	  explained:	  “It	  was	  almost	  inevitable	  that	  any	  
city	  with	  a	  history	  of	  well-­‐entrenched	  labor	  racketeering	  [like	  Philadelphia]	  would	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By	  1980	  clandestine	  meth	  production	  had	  become	  enough	  of	  a	  problem	  
locally	  that	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Narcotics	  Abuse	  and	  Control	  held	  a	  
meeting	  in	  Philadelphia	  to	  assess	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  labs.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  testimony	  
focused	  on	  the	  Pagans	  Motorcycle	  Club	  and	  the	  partnership	  it	  had	  formed	  with	  
traditional	  organized	  crime.	  	  Robert	  Walker,	  the	  congressman	  from	  the	  area,	  
described	  the	  Pagans	  as	  simply	  hired	  muscle	  for	  the	  mob.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  
some	  members	  of	  Pagans	  had	  acted	  as	  paid	  assassins	  for	  members	  of	  the	  Scarfo-­‐
Testa	  Mob,	  the	  overall	  relationship	  was	  far	  more	  complicated	  (Lyman	  1989;	  Jenkins	  
1992).	  Sergeant	  Robert	  Collison	  of	  the	  Delaware	  State	  Police	  argued	  that	  the	  Pagans	  
had	  cornered	  the	  market	  on	  meth	  in	  the	  area,	  testifying	  that:	  “the	  street	  word	  is	  if	  
you	  do	  not	  sell	  Pagan	  dope,	  or	  Pagan	  methamphetamine	  or	  crank,	  you	  do	  not	  sell	  it”	  
(House	  of	  Representatives	  1980,	  95).	  	  	  
The	  head	  of	  the	  intelligence	  division	  of	  the	  DEA,	  Frank	  Wickes,	  testified	  that	  
traditional	  organized	  crime	  partnered	  with	  the	  Pagans	  to	  finance	  methamphetamine	  
operations,	  obtain	  the	  necessary	  precursors,	  and	  find	  chemists	  to	  do	  the	  cooking.	  	  
The	  Pagans	  handled	  lab	  setup,	  security,	  and	  distribution	  of	  the	  final	  product.	  The	  
Special	  Agent	  in	  Charge	  of	  the	  DEA	  in	  Philadelphia,	  Norton	  Wilder,	  predicted	  that	  
the	  scheduling	  of	  P2P	  would	  only	  entrench	  that	  relationship	  as	  the	  market	  for	  P2P	  
became	  increasingly	  lucrative	  and	  precarious	  (Hazlett	  1979;	  House	  of	  
Representatives	  1980).	  	  
Wilder’s	  prediction	  proved	  prescient.	  	  	  As	  the	  1980s	  wore	  on,	  the	  Pagans	  
formed	  partnerships	  with	  various	  organized	  crime	  units	  within	  Philadelphia.	  	  The	  
groups	  involved	  included	  not	  only	  members	  of	  the	  traditional	  Cosa	  Nostra	  Italian	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Mafia,	  but	  also	  ones	  from	  the	  Greek	  Mob,	  a	  Jewish	  and	  Irish	  group	  known	  as	  the	  
“K&A”	  gang,	  and	  African-­‐American	  groups	  (Jenkins	  1992,	  Lyman	  1989).	  	  The	  
associations	  these	  mob	  members	  formed	  with	  the	  Pagans	  were	  not	  top-­‐down,	  
corporate	  models	  one	  might	  expect	  from	  traditional	  organized	  crime,	  but	  rather	  
reflected	  an	  opportunistic	  and	  temporary	  coming	  together	  of	  motivated	  parties	  
described	  by	  Natarajan	  (2006).	  	  The	  mob	  members	  who	  interacted	  with	  the	  Pagans	  
did	  so	  of	  their	  own	  accord,	  rather	  than	  at	  the	  instruction	  of	  higher-­‐ups	  within	  the	  
organizations,	  indicating	  that	  the	  market	  had	  a	  cottage-­‐industry	  organization	  (Eck	  
and	  Gersh	  2000).	  	  Interactions	  were	  fluid	  and	  temporary	  and	  almost	  always	  dealt	  
with	  the	  smuggling	  and	  trade	  of	  P2P.19	  	  
Because	  of	  the	  relationships	  formed	  between	  the	  Pagans	  and	  various	  
members	  of	  organized	  crime,	  methamphetamine	  production	  and	  distribution	  on	  the	  
East	  Coast	  remained	  dependent	  on	  P2P	  and	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  very	  few	  individuals	  in	  
the	  1980s.	  	  This	  lack	  of	  diversity	  directly	  contributed	  to	  the	  decline	  of	  the	  East	  Coast	  
methamphetamine	  market	  because	  police	  could	  more	  easily	  identify	  and	  target	  
important	  operators.	  	  Federal	  officials	  had	  been	  monitoring	  the	  activities	  of	  
traditional	  (that	  is	  to	  say	  ethnically	  based)	  organized	  crime	  since	  the	  1920s.	  	  In	  
1970,	  they	  passed	  the	  Racketeer	  Influenced	  and	  Corrupt	  Organizations	  Act	  (RICO)	  
as	  a	  tool	  for	  prosecution.	  	  At	  approximately	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  government	  also	  
began	  to	  view	  Outlaw	  Motorcycle	  Gangs	  as	  an	  organized	  criminal	  threat.	  	  With	  all	  
groups	  involved	  the	  market	  already	  under	  government	  investigation	  in	  the	  1980s,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Well	  into	  the	  early	  1990s,	  arrests	  involving	  methamphetamine	  in	  Philadelphia	  still	  involved	  the	  
precursor	  P2P,	  a	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  West	  Coast.	  	  In	  the	  pre-­‐Internet	  era,	  it	  appears	  that	  knowledge	  
of	  new	  methods	  simply	  did	  not	  travel	  across	  the	  country	  like	  they	  do	  today.	  	  This	  also	  indicates	  that	  
East	  Coast	  meth	  did	  not	  improve	  like	  it	  did	  on	  in	  the	  West.	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the	  methamphetamine	  networks	  around	  Philadelphia	  felt	  the	  full	  brunt	  of	  	  
governmental	  scrutiny.	  	  	  
Government	  officials	  were	  unsuccessful	  at	  prosecuting	  mob	  bosses	  such	  as	  
Nicodemo	  Scarfo	  for	  drug	  dealing	  under	  the	  Kingpin	  provisions	  of	  RICO	  because	  the	  
members	  of	  their	  organizations	  who	  entered	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  did	  so	  
on	  their	  own	  accord,	  seizing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  quick	  profit.	  	  However	  prosecutors	  
proved	  adept	  at	  convicting	  smugglers	  of	  P2P.	  	  Throughout	  the	  1980s	  members	  of	  
the	  Greek	  Mob,	  the	  K&A	  gang,	  and	  key	  Italian-­‐American	  P2P	  suppliers	  from	  within	  
the	  Bruno	  and	  Scarfo	  organizations	  were	  all	  successfully	  prosecuted	  (Jenkins	  1992).	  
The	  Pagans	  faced	  a	  similar	  fate.	  	  In	  1984-­‐1985,	  government	  officials	  arrested	  
over	  fifty	  members	  of	  the	  gang	  in	  the	  Philadelphia,	  Delaware,	  and	  Virginia	  region.	  	  	  
Prosecutors	  focused	  on	  the	  group’s	  mother	  club,	  and	  by	  1985,	  had	  successfully	  
convicted	  the	  group’s	  president,	  Paul	  “Ooch”	  Ferry	  to	  eighteen	  years	  in	  prison.	  	  The	  
vice	  president,	  sergeant	  at	  arms,	  and	  treasurer	  along	  with	  about	  half	  of	  the	  mother	  
club	  also	  received	  sentences	  of	  at	  least	  fifteen	  years.	  Because	  their	  national	  
organization	  was	  perhaps	  the	  most	  centralized	  and	  hierarchical	  of	  the	  Big	  Four,	  
these	  arrests	  were	  particularly	  crippling	  to	  the	  organization.	  	  Some	  members	  of	  the	  
police	  even	  predicted	  that	  the	  group	  might	  not	  recover	  (O’Neill	  1985;	  Barker	  2005).	  	  	  
While	  predictions	  of	  the	  Pagans’	  demise	  proved	  premature,	  the	  successful	  
actions	  against	  methamphetamine	  on	  the	  East	  Coast	  had	  a	  rapid	  and	  permanent	  
effect	  on	  the	  market.	  	  By	  1989	  the	  government	  had	  eliminated	  the	  body	  that	  
controlled	  most	  methamphetamine	  distribution	  there	  as	  well	  most	  sources	  for	  the	  
precursor.	  	  Seizures	  declined	  in	  stepwise	  fashion.	  	  Philadelphia	  Police	  seized	  105	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pounds	  of	  meth	  in	  1987,	  but	  only	  14	  pounds	  in	  1988.	  	  In	  1989	  that	  number	  grew	  
again	  to	  77	  pounds,	  all	  but	  two	  of	  which	  originating	  in	  one	  high	  profile	  bust.	  	  With	  a	  
low-­‐grade	  product	  in	  limited	  supply,	  drug	  users	  moved	  on	  to	  other	  stimulants.	  	  In	  
testimony	  before	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Narcotics	  Abuse	  and	  Control,	  
Robert	  F.	  Armstrong,	  the	  special	  assistant	  to	  the	  mayor	  for	  drug	  control,	  stated	  that	  
crack	  had	  replaced	  methamphetamine	  as	  the	  drug	  of	  choice	  in	  Philadelphia	  (House	  
of	  Representatives	  1990).	  	   	  
Data	  from	  the	  National	  Institute	  of	  Drug	  Abuse’s	  Drug	  Abuse	  Warning	  
Network	  (DAWN)	  reflected	  the	  West	  Coast	  agglomeration	  and	  East	  Coast	  decline	  of	  
methamphetamine	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s	  (Figures	  3.4,	  3.5).	  	  Among	  the	  cities	  
included	  in	  the	  DAWN	  system,	  six	  had	  significant	  rates	  of	  methamphetamine	  
reporting	  between	  1985	  and	  1988:	  Dallas,	  Los	  Angeles,	  Philadelphia,	  Phoenix,	  San	  
Diego,	  and	  San	  Francisco.	  	  Between	  1985	  and	  1989	  the	  number	  of	  emergency	  
mentions	  of	  methamphetamine	  rose	  from	  726	  to	  2,336	  nationally.	  	  Three	  cities,	  
Dallas,	  Philadelphia,	  and	  San	  Diego,	  accounted	  for	  74	  percent	  of	  those	  mentions	  in	  
1985,	  63	  percent	  in	  1986,	  and	  68	  percent	  in	  1987.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  number	  of	  
mentions	  increased	  for	  San	  Diego	  (+501	  percent)	  and	  Dallas	  (+271	  percent),	  the	  
number	  of	  mentions	  in	  Philadelphia	  declined	  by	  41.5per	  cent	  (NIDA	  1988).	  	  
Philadelphia’s	  portion	  of	  national	  emergency	  room	  mentions	  dropped	  from	  53	  











Figure	  3.5:	  	  The	  changing	  geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  according	  to	  the	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The	  Epidemic	  to	  Come	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  1980s	  methamphetamine	  was	  only	  beginning	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  
national	  concern.	  	  In	  the	  entire	  DAWN	  system	  it	  ranked	  eleventh	  in	  emergency	  room	  
mentions,	  appearing	  in	  only	  1.77	  percent	  of	  drug-­‐related	  ER	  visits.	  	  	  This	  put	  it	  
behind	  not	  only	  the	  big	  three	  of	  alcohol,20	  cocaine,	  and	  heroin,	  but	  also	  the	  much	  less	  
infamous	  morphine,	  PCP,	  diazepam	  (Valium),	  aprizolam	  (Xanax),	  acetaminophen,	  
and	  ibuprofen.	  NIDA	  described	  meth	  abuse	  in	  1988	  as	  a	  “regional	  phenomenon,”	  but	  
one	  with	  the	  potential	  of	  “expanding	  to	  the	  entire	  nation”	  (NIDA	  1990b,	  1).	  	  	  
Stories	  in	  the	  national	  media,	  too,	  began	  to	  express	  concern	  over	  the	  drug’s	  
spread	  (Gross	  1988;	  Isikoff	  1989;	  Thompson	  1989).	  Much	  of	  this	  concern	  came	  from	  
the	  way	  Red-­‐P	  meth	  had	  exploded	  on	  the	  West	  Coast.	  	  Another	  factor	  was	  the	  
emergence	  of	  “ice,”	  the	  smokable	  form	  of	  methamphetamine,	  in	  Hawaii.	  Coming	  as	  it	  
did	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  the	  crack	  cocaine	  epidemic	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  smokable	  
form	  of	  methamphetamine	  that	  was	  cheaper	  and	  longer	  acting	  than	  cocaine	  was	  
terrifying.	  	  Many	  thought	  its	  eastward	  diffusion	  was	  inevitable.	  	  Daniel	  Akaka,	  the	  
representative	  from	  Hawaii,	  warned	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  Narcotics	  
Abuse	  and	  Control	  that	  if	  ice’s	  spread	  was	  not	  stopped	  in	  Honolulu,	  the	  mainland	  
would	  experience	  an	  epidemic	  he	  called	  an	  “ice	  age.	  ”	  James	  Hall,	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  
Up	  Front	  Drug	  Information	  Center,	  testified	  that	  meth	  was	  the	  logical	  replacement	  
drug	  for	  crack	  that	  would	  soon	  be	  taken	  up	  by	  the	  four	  million	  users	  who	  had	  
moved	  away	  from	  that	  drug	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1989).	  Although	  these	  dire	  
predictions	  did	  not	  come	  to	  pass,	  the	  emergence	  of	  ice	  in	  Hawaii	  did	  presage	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  In	  the	  DAWN	  system,	  alcohol	  is	  only	  included	  if	  it	  is	  mentioned	  in	  combination	  with	  other	  drugs.	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involvement	  of	  international	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  in	  U.	  S.	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Chapter	  4	  	  	  
From	  “Made	  in	  America”	  to	  “Hecho	  in	  Sinaloa”:	  
Meth	  Networks	  Go	  International	  
	  
The	  1980s	  were	  characterized	  by	  two	  important	  trends	  in	  
methamphetamine.	  	  The	  first,	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3,	  was	  the	  increasing	  
concentration	  of	  its	  domestic	  production,	  distribution,	  and	  use	  in	  the	  western	  
United	  States.	  	  The	  second	  was	  market	  penetration	  by	  international	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations	  from	  Asia	  and	  later	  Mexico.	  	  This	  new	  trend	  should	  not	  have	  been	  a	  
surprise.	  	  Heroin,	  cocaine,	  and	  marijuana	  have	  long	  been	  controlled	  by	  international	  
organized	  crime,	  and	  the	  problem	  of	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  has	  
always	  had	  international	  roots.	  	  Methamphetamine	  was	  first	  synthesized	  in	  Japan,	  
and	  abused	  there	  and	  in	  Germany	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  was	  Japan	  that	  
suffered	  the	  world’s	  first	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  epidemic	  and	  housed	  the	  world’s	  
first	  clandestine	  labs.	  	  America’s	  intravenous	  speed	  injection	  outbreak	  of	  the	  1960s	  
began	  after	  veterans	  of	  the	  Korean	  War	  brought	  home	  this	  practice	  that	  they	  had	  
learned	  while	  on	  R-­‐and-­‐R	  in	  Tokyo.	  	  With	  endemic	  usage	  in	  Japan	  creating	  a	  vibrant	  
illicit	  market,	  it	  was	  only	  matter	  of	  time	  before	  Asian	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  
(DTOs)	  began	  to	  expand	  their	  operations	  into	  the	  U.	  S.	  	  	  
	  
Hawaiian	  Ice	  
Given	  the	  strong	  cultural	  and	  economic	  connections	  of	  Hawaii	  to	  Asia,	  it	  is	  
not	  surprising	  that	  this	  was	  the	  initial	  American	  market	  penetrated	  by	  their	  drug-­‐
trafficking	  organizations.	  	  Asian	  DTOs	  in	  the	  1980s	  introduced	  a	  new	  form	  of	  
methamphetamine	  made	  of	  large,	  rock-­‐candy-­‐like	  crystals	  of	  methamphetamine	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called	  ice.	  	  Like	  the	  West	  Coast	  meth	  of	  the	  1980s,	  ice	  is	  derived	  from	  ephedrine	  or	  
pseudoephedrine,	  and	  as	  the	  product	  of	  an	  ephedrine	  reduction	  method,	  it	  is	  highly	  
pure	  (greater	  than	  90	  percent)	  dextrorotary-­‐methamphetamine.	  	  However,	  rather	  
than	  snorting	  or	  injecting,	  users	  of	  ice	  smoke	  the	  substance.	  	  	  
Historically,	  Hawaii	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  methamphetamine	  problem.	  In	  
the	  early	  1980s,	  the	  drugs	  of	  choice	  there	  were	  marijuana	  and	  cocaine.	  	  What	  little	  
meth	  existed	  was	  primarily	  imported	  from	  the	  mainland	  and	  used	  by	  whites,	  where	  
it	  earned	  the	  reputation	  as	  the	  “poor	  man’s	  cocaine.”	  	  In	  fact,	  evidence	  suggests	  that,	  
when	  ice	  first	  became	  available,	  many	  of	  its	  users	  did	  not	  associate	  it	  with	  the	  
methamphetamine	  from	  the	  mainland,	  but	  rather	  perceived	  it	  as	  a	  new	  drug	  
altogether	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1989;	  Laidler	  and	  Morgan	  1997).	  	  
Drug	  rehabilitation	  centers	  in	  Hawaii	  had	  seen	  people	  seeking	  treatment	  for	  
smoking	  methamphetamine	  only	  sporadically	  before	  the	  mid	  1980s	  (Miller	  1991).	  
However,	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  began	  to	  rise	  significantly	  in	  1987.	  Concurrently,	  
authorities	  at	  the	  Honolulu	  International	  Airport	  saw	  a	  60	  percent	  rise	  in	  ice	  
seizures,	  and	  ice-­‐related	  arrests	  by	  the	  Honolulu	  Police	  Department	  doubled	  
between	  1987	  and	  1988.	  	  	  In	  a	  hearing	  before	  the	  House	  Select	  Committee	  on	  
Narcotics	  Abuse	  and	  Control,	  the	  U.	  S.	  attorney	  in	  Honolulu,	  Daniel	  Bent,	  testified	  
about	  the	  new	  problem:	  “It	  descended	  on	  us	  very,	  very	  suddenly.	  	  It	  was	  in	  the	  
community	  and	  established	  well	  before	  we	  had	  a	  real	  grasp	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  
problem”	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1989,	  6).	  
In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  crack	  epidemics	  of	  the	  1980s,	  the	  introduction	  of	  any	  new	  
smokable	  drug	  was	  bound	  to	  attract	  attention.	  	  National	  news	  stories	  on	  the	  subject	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were	  rife	  with	  hyperbole,	  predicting	  that	  this	  new	  form	  of	  meth	  would	  sweep	  the	  
nation,	  penetrating	  even	  more	  communities	  than	  had	  crack	  cocaine.	  	  	  A	  headline	  
from	  USA	  Today	  was	  typical,	  warning	  that	  the	  “‘Ice	  Age’	  May	  Dwarf	  Crack	  Crisis”	  
(Kelley	  1989).	  	  Government	  officials	  stoked	  these	  fears	  by	  emphasizing	  two	  aspects	  
of	  ice,	  neither	  of	  which	  were	  new	  or	  unique	  to	  smokable	  meth.	  	  The	  first	  was	  that	  
the	  high	  from	  smoking	  ice	  lasted	  significantly	  longer	  than	  that	  from	  smoking	  crack.	  	  
This	  was	  true;	  the	  high	  from	  ice	  could	  last	  as	  long	  as	  fourteen	  hours.	  	  However,	  this	  
was	  also	  true	  of	  every	  other	  form	  of	  methamphetamine	  when	  taken	  in	  high	  dosages.	  	  
The	  second	  concern	  was	  based	  on	  the	  assertion	  that	  a	  smokable	  form	  of	  meth	  would	  
be	  significantly	  more	  popular	  with	  users	  than	  injecting	  the	  drug	  had	  been	  (Bishop	  
1989;	  House	  of	  Representatives	  1989;	  Kelley	  1989;	  Thomson	  1989).	  	  This,	  too,	  was	  
true.	  	  However,	  intranasal	  inhalation	  had	  been	  the	  preferred	  method	  of	  use	  on	  the	  
West	  Coast	  since	  the	  introduction	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  in	  the	  
early	  1980s	  (Miller	  and	  Heischober	  1991).	  	  	  There	  was	  no	  reason	  to	  suspect	  that	  
smoking	  would	  be	  more	  appealing	  than	  snorting	  to	  most	  users,	  particularly	  after	  the	  
storm	  of	  negative	  press	  that	  crack	  had	  received	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  	  	  
A	  1991	  National	  Institute	  on	  Drug	  Abuse	  study	  by	  Cook	  did	  indeed	  find	  that	  
smoking	  methamphetamine	  was	  a	  remarkably	  efficient	  manner	  of	  taking	  the	  drug.	  	  
Ice	  volatizes	  at	  between	  200°	  and	  400°	  Celsius,	  but	  98	  percent	  of	  the	  product	  is	  
recoverable,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  made	  volatile	  but	  does	  not	  burn	  off.	  	  The	  study	  
showed	  that	  smoking	  ice	  was	  far	  more	  efficient	  than	  smoking	  heroin,	  PCP,	  or	  
cocaine,	  and	  the	  author	  warned	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  smokable	  version	  of	  
methamphetamine	  might	  increase	  its	  adoption	  in	  the	  public	  by	  removing	  the	  barrier	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of	  intravenous	  use.	  	  Contrary	  to	  coverage	  in	  the	  press	  at	  the	  time,	  however,	  the	  
study	  did	  not	  find	  that	  smoking	  ice	  produced	  a	  more	  powerful	  effect	  than	  traditional	  
injection	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1989;	  Cook	  1991).	  	  
	  	  	   	  
Ice	  Networks	  
Ice	  came	  to	  Hawaii	  from	  production	  centers	  in	  Japan,	  Korea,	  the	  Philippines,	  
and	  Hong	  Kong.	  	  At	  the	  international	  trafficking	  level,	  highly	  organized	  enterprises	  
like	  Japan’s	  Yakuza	  or	  similar	  such	  organizations	  from	  Korea	  controlled	  the	  market.	  	  
Once	  on	  the	  islands,	  midlevel	  and	  retail	  sales	  were	  controlled	  by	  socially	  bonded	  
networks,	  typically	  those	  of	  ethnic	  gangs.	  	  Laidler	  and	  Morgan’s	  (1997)	  informants	  
stated	  that	  such	  networks	  were	  aggressive	  in	  marketing	  the	  new	  drug,	  encouraging	  
its	  use	  to	  fill	  a	  void	  in	  the	  Hawaiian	  drug	  market	  that	  had	  been	  created	  by	  successful	  
governmental	  marijuana	  eradication	  programs	  in	  the	  1980s.	  	  One	  of	  their	  
informants	  described	  an	  early	  meeting	  that	  was	  called	  to	  introduce	  ice:	  
They	  had	  gatherings	  to	  advertise	  the	  ice.	  	  It	  was	  mostly	  Filipino	  
immigrants	  who	  spoke	  bad	  English	  and	  you	  had	  to	  smoke	  ice.	  .	  .	  .	  It	  
started	  with	  a	  few	  guys	  and	  then	  it	  became	  bigger.	  	  Nationalities	  stick	  
together,	  so	  everybody	  was	  solid	  at	  the	  time	  (Laidler	  and	  Morgan	  
1997,	  172).	  
	  
The	  story	  of	  Paciano	  “Sonny”	  Guerero,	  is	  illustrative	  of	  how	  these	  socially	  
bonded	  ice	  networks	  operated.	  	  A	  native	  Hawaiian	  of	  Filipino	  origins,	  Guerero	  began	  
distributing	  ice	  in	  late	  1986.	  	  Before	  that	  he	  had	  installed	  tires	  on	  cars.	  	  At	  the	  outset,	  
he	  had	  no	  network	  working	  with	  him,	  but	  within	  two	  years	  he	  had	  developed	  a	  
multimillion	  dollar	  business.	  	  Guerero	  purchased	  his	  ice	  from	  Asian	  criminal	  
organizations	  at	  a	  cost	  of	  $90,000	  per	  kilo.	  	  He	  then	  resold	  the	  drug	  to	  fifteen	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Filipino	  associates	  for	  between	  five	  and	  nine	  thousand	  dollars	  per	  ounce.	  	  These	  
associates,	  whom	  federal	  agents	  referred	  to	  as	  “lieutenants,”	  would	  then	  use	  
members	  of	  Filipino	  youth	  gangs	  to	  sell	  the	  ice	  on	  the	  streets	  at	  $950	  to	  $1,400	  per	  
eighth	  of	  an	  ounce,	  and	  $50	  per	  “paper,”	  which	  is	  a	  tenth-­‐of-­‐a-­‐gram	  dosage	  unit.	  	  
Between	  June	  1987	  and	  December	  1988,	  Guerero’s	  business	  tripled.	  	  Over	  that	  time,	  
he	  purchased	  	  $4,933,600	  of	  ice	  that	  he	  then	  sold	  for	  $7,440,985,	  giving	  him	  a	  three-­‐
year	  profit	  of	  $2,507,385.	  	  At	  the	  time	  of	  his	  arrest	  in	  March	  1989,	  Guerero’s	  
network	  was	  estimated	  to	  have	  sold	  fifty-­‐five	  kilograms	  of	  pure	  ice	  over	  the	  course	  
of	  its	  operation	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1989).	  	  
Other	  types	  of	  dealer	  networks	  existed	  outside	  of	  these	  socially	  bonded	  
networks.	  	  Laidler	  and	  Morgan’s	  (1997)	  informants	  helped	  to	  identify	  their	  
typologies.	  	  “Hotel	  dealers”	  were	  similar	  to	  Guerero.	  	  They	  had	  steady	  supply	  
sources	  and	  sold	  ounce	  quantities	  through	  ethnic	  ties.	  	  “Neighborhood	  dealers”	  
operated	  within	  a	  social-­‐network	  typology,	  selling	  small	  quantities	  to	  family	  and	  
friends.	  	  They	  were	  most	  often	  Native	  Hawaiians,	  Samoans,	  or	  Filipinos.	  	  These	  
neighborhood	  dealers	  operated	  at	  a	  freelance	  level,	  hoping	  simply	  to	  sell	  enough	  to	  
keep	  themselves	  in	  free	  drugs.	  	  “Hustler	  dealers”	  operated	  in	  open	  markets	  and	  sold	  
to	  anyone.	  	  Their	  activity	  in	  the	  market	  represented	  just	  one	  of	  many	  ways	  they	  
were	  trying	  to	  make	  money	  through	  illicit	  means.	  	  	  
Abuse	  in	  Hawaii	  was	  concentrated	  on	  Oahu.	  	  Since	  the	  distribution	  networks	  
were	  largely	  Filipino,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  this	  ethnic	  group	  was	  over-­‐
represented	  in	  the	  treatment	  population.	  	  Hawaiian	  islanders	  were	  also	  
disproportionately	  present	  in	  this	  population,	  while	  Japanese	  and	  whites	  showed	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the	  opposite	  trend	  (Table	  4.1).	  	  Compared	  to	  all	  Hawaiian	  drug	  treatment	  patients,	  
ice	  users	  had	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  females,	  were	  significantly	  younger,	  and	  were	  
more	  ethnically	  diverse	  (Morgan	  1991).	  	  
	  
Table	  4.1:	  Demographics	  of	  people	  seeing	  treatment	  for	  ice	  addiction	  in	  Hawaii	  




While	  the	  racial	  demographics	  of	  ice	  were	  different	  from	  meth	  users	  on	  the	  
mainland,	  the	  groups	  were	  similar	  socioeconomically.	  	  Laidler	  and	  Morgan	  (1997)	  
described	  their	  ice-­‐using	  informants	  as	  “the	  most	  disenfranchised	  groups	  on	  the	  
islands”	  (171).	  	  According	  to	  Honolulu	  Chief	  of	  Police	  Daniel	  Gibbs,	  most	  users	  on	  
Oahu	  were	  blue-­‐collar	  workers	  who	  began	  taking	  meth	  to	  help	  increase	  
productivity,	  especially	  for	  menial,	  repetitive	  tasks.	  	  The	  fact	  that	  ice	  was	  odorless	  
allowed	  them	  to	  smoke	  out	  in	  the	  open	  and	  then	  return	  to	  work.	  	  Gibbs	  feared	  that	  
the	  trend	  would	  move	  up	  the	  corporate	  ladder.	  	  U.	  S.	  attorney	  Daniel	  Bent	  testified	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before	  Congress	  that	  ice	  was	  likely	  to	  become	  more	  popular	  than	  crack	  because	  of	  
its	  popularity	  among	  the	  working	  class,	  forgetting	  or	  ignoring	  the	  then	  forty-­‐year-­‐
old	  connection	  between	  amphetamine	  abuse	  and	  the	  working	  class	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1989)21.	  	  
Though	  residents	  of	  Hawaii	  had	  reasons	  to	  be	  concerned	  at	  the	  introduction	  
of	  ice,	  the	  mainland	  was	  little	  threatened.	  	  News	  reports	  at	  the	  time,	  however,	  
exaggerated	  the	  extent	  of	  ice’s	  prevalence	  and	  created	  a	  panic.	  	  Even	  though	  David	  
Westrate,	  the	  assistant	  administrator	  for	  operations	  of	  the	  DEA,	  testified	  before	  
Congress	  that	  a	  1989	  study	  had	  shown	  that	  ice	  was	  not	  available	  anywhere	  in	  the	  U.	  
S.	  outside	  of	  Hawaii,	  articles	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  and	  USA	  Today	  both	  made	  
exaggerated	  claims	  about	  its	  presence	  that	  were	  later	  parroted	  in	  other	  publications	  
(House	  of	  Representatives	  1989;	  Bishop	  1989;	  Kelley	  1989).	  	  Fortunately,	  some	  
media	  outlets	  maintained	  their	  composure.	  	  The	  Washington	  Post	  noted	  that	  most	  of	  
the	  actual	  activity	  surrounding	  ice	  was	  “in	  newspaper	  reports	  heralding	  its	  arrival”	  
(Thompson	  1989,	  F11).	  	  	  The	  Philadelphia	  Daily	  News	  compared	  the	  coverage	  of	  ice	  
to	  the	  overwrought	  furor	  drummed	  up	  by	  the	  movie	  “Reefer	  Madness,”	  and	  quoted	  
several	  police	  officers	  who	  were	  skeptical	  of	  all	  the	  attention.	  	  One	  undercover	  
investigator	  in	  Philadelphia	  had	  this	  to	  say:	  
I	  think	  (addicts)	  will	  stick	  with	  the	  drug	  they're	  already	  using.	  .	  .	  .	  Ice	  
isn't	  going	  to	  have	  any	  major	  impact.	  I	  don't	  think	  everybody	  is	  going	  
to	  go	  nuts.	  	  It	  will	  be	  the	  new	  thing	  on	  the	  block,	  then	  it	  will	  die	  out.	  .	  .	  .	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  Gibbs	  and	  Bent	  were	  right	  to	  worry	  for	  Hawaii.	  	  Ice	  abuse	  there	  is	  common	  today.	  	  The	  
number	  of	  people	  seeking	  treatment	  for	  its	  abuse	  rose	  140%	  between	  1994	  and	  2000,	  and	  since	  
2004,	  methamphetamine	  has	  been	  the	  most	  frequently	  cited	  drug	  for	  which	  people	  seek	  treatment	  
on	  the	  Islands	  (NDIC	  2002a,	  2011b).	  	  Abuse	  there	  continues	  to	  be	  concentrated	  on	  Oahu	  in	  the	  same	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Look	  at	  heroin.	  There's	  tons	  of	  it	  out	  there,	  and	  you	  don't	  hear	  that	  
much	  about	  it.	  It's	  just	  as	  bad	  as	  ever	  (Brennan	  1989,	  8).	  	  
	  
Roger	  E.	  Smith	  of	  the	  Haight-­‐Ashbury	  Free	  Clinic	  was	  also	  clear-­‐headed,	  predicting	  
that	  smokable	  meth	  would	  not	  replace	  crack	  so	  much	  as	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  
people	  who	  chose	  to	  smoke	  their	  drugs	  (Thompson	  1989).	  
All	  of	  this	  hand-­‐wringing	  over	  the	  fact	  that	  ice	  was	  a	  smokable	  form	  of	  
methamphetamine	  missed	  the	  true	  significance	  of	  its	  appearance.	  Ice	  did	  not	  
displace	  crack	  in	  Hawaii,	  so	  there	  was	  never	  a	  reason	  to	  believe	  it	  would	  do	  so	  on	  
the	  mainland.	  	  It	  also	  never	  led	  directly	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  people	  using	  
the	  drug	  in	  the	  contiguous	  states.	  	  Smoking	  did	  slowly	  emerge	  as	  the	  preferred	  
method	  of	  administration	  in	  the	  2000s,	  but	  preferences	  in	  that	  regard	  are	  highly	  
regionalized	  to	  this	  day.	  	  The	  true	  significance	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  ice	  in	  Hawaii	  is	  that	  
it	  marked	  the	  first	  penetration	  of	  the	  U.	  S.	  methamphetamine	  market	  by	  
international	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations.	  	  
However,	  the	  situation	  in	  Hawaii	  was	  unique	  for	  a	  number	  of	  reasons.	  	  First,	  
the	  actors	  in	  that	  network	  created	  a	  market	  where	  none	  had	  existed,	  taking	  
advantage	  of	  the	  ignorance	  of	  the	  population	  regarding	  the	  dangers	  of	  
methamphetamine	  and	  filling	  a	  void	  left	  by	  successful	  policing	  of	  marijuana.	  	  
Second,	  the	  overwhelmingly	  Asian	  population	  of	  the	  islands	  allowed	  the	  Asian	  DTOs	  
to	  rely	  on	  close	  ethnic	  ties	  to	  move	  their	  product.	  	  Outside	  of	  the	  West	  Coast	  and	  a	  
few	  other	  regionalized	  pockets,	  such	  opportunities	  did	  not	  exist	  on	  the	  mainland,	  
and	  Asian	  groups	  were	  never	  able	  to	  seize	  a	  significant	  market	  share	  there.	  	  In	  fact,	  
Asian	  DTOs	  were	  eventually	  displaced	  even	  in	  Hawaii.	  	  In	  the	  early	  1990s,	  
individuals	  excluded	  from	  the	  Asian	  networks	  began	  traveling	  to	  the	  West	  Coast	  to	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buy	  methamphetamine,	  bring	  it	  back	  to	  Hawaii,	  and	  convert	  it	  into	  ice	  to	  be	  sold.	  	  
The	  source	  of	  that	  methamphetamine	  was	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  
who,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  only	  a	  few	  years,	  had	  come	  to	  dominate	  the	  U.	  S.’s	  
methamphetamine	  market	  (Laidler	  and	  Morgan	  1997;	  DEA	  1996,	  NDIC	  2002a).	  	  	  
	  
A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Mexican	  Drug	  Trafficking	  
	   Mexico	  has	  long	  history	  as	  a	  source	  country	  for	  U.	  S.	  drugs.	  	  The	  extended	  
border	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  marking	  differentiated	  wealth	  and	  opportunity,	  
has	  for	  decades	  inspired	  organizations	  to	  its	  south	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  illicit	  
demand	  to	  its	  north.	  	  In	  the	  1920s	  alcohol	  produced	  in	  Mexico	  slaked	  the	  thirst	  of	  
many	  Americans	  suffering	  through	  prohibition.	  	  Drug	  production	  and	  smuggling	  in	  
Mexico	  began	  even	  before	  that,	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  when	  the	  country’s	  
growing	  Chinese	  immigrant	  population	  began	  cultivating	  poppies	  to	  produce	  opium	  
for	  both	  domestic	  demand	  and	  that	  of	  Chinese	  Americans	  living	  in	  California	  
(Castillo	  and	  Unsinger	  2000;	  Sadler	  2000).	  	  	  
By	  the	  1920s,	  Mexican	  producers	  began	  to	  use	  the	  same	  poppy	  plants	  to	  
make	  a	  low-­‐quality	  heroin	  known	  as	  “Mexican	  Brown.”	  	  When	  World	  War	  II	  
disrupted	  the	  heroin	  trade	  from	  Asia,	  U.	  S.	  organized	  criminal	  groups	  from	  the	  East	  
Coast	  came	  to	  Mexico	  to	  make	  large	  heroin	  purchases.	  	  This	  was	  a	  watershed	  event	  
in	  Mexico’s	  drug-­‐trafficking	  history.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  meet	  demand,	  production	  had	  to	  be	  
increased	  (primarily	  in	  Sinaloa	  and	  Baja	  California)	  and	  efficient	  smuggling	  routes	  
established.	  	  Early	  smuggling	  occurred	  primarily	  at	  the	  crossings	  between	  Mexicali	  
and	  Calexico,	  Tijuana	  and	  San	  Diego,	  and	  Juarez	  and	  El	  Paso.	  	  The	  increase	  in	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business	  also	  led	  to	  increased	  profits	  and	  power	  for	  these	  proto-­‐DTOs.	  	  After	  World	  
War	  II	  they	  continued	  to	  produce	  heroin	  and	  marijuana	  for	  U.	  S.	  consumption,	  their	  
market	  share	  waxing	  and	  waning	  with	  the	  fortunes	  of	  other	  international	  drug	  
producers	  and	  smugglers	  (Castillo	  and	  Unsinger	  2000).	  	  	  
In	  the	  fall	  of	  1975,	  the	  Mexican	  government,	  under	  pressure	  from	  the	  U.	  S,	  
stepped	  up	  its	  “Campaña	  Permanente”	  against	  illicit	  drugs	  by	  targeting	  domestic	  
cultivation	  (Craig	  1978;	  Smith	  1999).	  	  The	  result	  of	  that	  campaign,	  according	  to	  
Smith	  (1999),	  was	  mixed.	  	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  reduction	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
groups	  controlling	  the	  drug	  supply	  in	  Mexico,	  but	  the	  ones	  that	  remained	  were	  
“stronger	  in	  resources,	  and	  more	  dangerous	  to	  society	  and	  government”	  (195).	  	  The	  
DTOs22	  that	  had	  formed	  around	  heroin	  and	  marijuana	  had	  been	  primarily	  small	  
organizations	  dealing	  and	  smuggling	  locally	  grown	  and	  processed	  drugs,	  but	  the	  
groups	  that	  survived	  the	  campaña	  began	  to	  look	  to	  expand	  their	  operations	  and	  
influence.	  	  
Two	  processes	  in	  the	  1980s	  further	  empowered	  the	  DTOs.	  	  The	  first	  was	  the	  
decline	  of	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  and	  the	  devaluation	  of	  the	  peso	  by	  President	  José	  
López	  Portillo	  in	  1982	  (Sadler	  2000).	  	  The	  decline	  of	  the	  peso	  (to	  as	  low	  as	  one	  
thousand	  per	  dollar	  at	  its	  nadir)	  not	  only	  brought	  financial	  hardship	  to	  many,	  but	  it	  
also	  put	  a	  damper	  on	  what	  had	  been	  a	  lucrative	  border	  industry	  of	  smuggling	  legally	  
purchased	  American	  products	  into	  Mexico	  to	  avoid	  taxes.	  	  Such	  contraband	  had	  
been	  a	  major	  source	  of	  income	  for	  both	  smugglers	  and	  Mexican	  customs	  officials,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  There	  is	  a	  certain	  temptation	  to	  use	  the	  term	  “cartel”	  when	  discussing	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations.	  Both	  Beittel	  (2011)	  and	  Smith	  (1999)	  argue	  against	  it,	  however,	  because	  the	  term	  
implies	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  collusion	  and	  cooperation	  that	  Mexican	  DTOs	  do	  not	  consistently	  exhibit.	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	   134	  
who	  had	  built	  a	  cottage	  industry	  around	  getting	  paid	  to	  look	  the	  other	  way.	  	  The	  loss	  
of	  that	  business	  meant	  that	  numerous	  individuals	  along	  the	  border	  were	  looking	  for	  
a	  way	  to	  create	  new	  income.	  	  DTOs	  were	  well	  positioned	  to	  replace	  that	  loss	  
Concomitant	  to	  the	  dramatic	  dip	  in	  the	  Mexican	  economy	  was	  an	  important	  
shift	  in	  the	  activity	  of	  Columbian	  cocaine	  cartels.	  	  Prior	  to	  the	  early	  1980s	  these	  
groups	  had	  shipped	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  cocaine	  destined	  for	  the	  U.	  S.	  through	  the	  
Caribbean	  to	  Florida.	  	  However,	  as	  the	  1980s	  began,	  the	  DEA	  and	  Coast	  Guard	  
effectively	  shut	  down	  that	  point	  of	  entry.	  	  Sitting	  on	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  
lucrative	  product,	  the	  Columbians	  looked	  to	  Mexican	  organized	  crime	  for	  help,	  and	  
after	  a	  brief	  proving	  period,	  they	  began	  to	  rely	  solely	  on	  the	  Mexicans	  for	  smuggling.	  	  
At	  the	  height	  of	  their	  success,	  the	  cartels	  reportedly	  sent	  entire	  Boeing	  727s	  filled	  
with	  cocaine	  into	  central	  Mexico	  for	  transshipment	  to	  the	  U.	  S.	  (Smith	  1999).	  	  	  
The	  Columbians	  brought	  a	  level	  of	  entrepreneurship	  to	  their	  operation	  that	  
the	  DTOs	  of	  Mexico	  had	  never	  before	  seen.	  	  Every	  step	  in	  the	  supply	  chain	  from	  
production	  to	  distribution	  to	  money	  laundering	  was	  highly	  regimented	  no	  matter	  
the	  country	  in	  which	  it	  took	  place.	  	  Each	  link	  in	  the	  chain	  was	  organized	  into	  
individual	  cells,	  and	  each	  cell	  had	  a	  manager.	  	  Furthermore,	  these	  cells	  were	  each	  
kept	  ignorant	  of	  the	  operations	  of	  others	  so	  that,	  in	  the	  event	  that	  one	  of	  them	  got	  
caught,	  they	  could	  not	  testify	  against	  any	  of	  the	  cartel’s	  other	  operations.	  The	  
Columbians	  also	  taught	  the	  Mexicans	  to	  divide	  their	  shipments	  into	  small	  loads	  so	  
that	  any	  single	  intercepted	  shipment	  had	  little	  impact	  on	  the	  overall	  trade.	  	  	  
The	  Mexican	  traffickers	  initially	  were	  paid	  in	  cash.	  	  However,	  as	  time	  moved	  
on,	  they	  began	  to	  think	  bigger	  and	  to	  request	  payment	  in	  cocaine	  (House	  of	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Representatives	  1994).	  	  The	  Mexican	  DTOs	  then	  used	  that	  cocaine	  to	  enlarge	  their	  
own	  drug	  distribution	  networks,	  which	  they	  modeled	  after	  those	  of	  the	  Columbians.	  
	  
The	  Rise	  of	  Mexican	  Meth	  
	   Drug	  traffickers	  along	  the	  border	  have	  long	  known	  the	  appeal	  that	  
amphetamines	  hold	  for	  Americans.	  	  In	  the	  1960s,	  licitly	  produced	  amphetamines	  
and	  bootleg	  versions	  of	  Benzedrine	  both	  were	  shipped	  from	  U.	  S.	  producers	  to	  
Mexico,	  where	  they	  were	  smuggled	  back	  across	  the	  border	  or	  sold	  in	  Mexican	  
pharmacies	  (Wall	  Street	  Journal	  1969;	  McGlothlin	  1973).	  Mexican	  producers	  
responded	  to	  the	  Controlled	  Substances	  Act	  of	  1970	  by	  ramping	  up	  production	  of	  
Mexican	  Bennies	  and	  selling	  them	  throughout	  the	  western	  United	  States	  (Smith	  
1973;	  Farber	  1974).	  	  When	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations	  was	  presented	  with	  an	  opportunity	  to	  enter	  the	  burgeoning	  U.	  S.	  meth	  
market,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  they	  took	  almost	  immediate	  advantage.	  	  	  
	  	   The	  opportunity	  to	  reenter	  the	  market	  came	  in	  1988	  when	  Congress	  passed	  
the	  Chemical	  Diversion	  and	  Trafficking	  Act	  (CDTA).	  	  Although	  the	  primary	  goal	  of	  
the	  CDTA	  was	  to	  stop	  U.	  S.	  companies	  from	  exporting	  the	  chemicals	  necessary	  for	  
cocaine	  processing,	  the	  law	  also	  put	  restrictions	  on	  the	  sale	  of	  powdered	  ephedrine	  
and	  pseudoephedrine	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  curb	  domestic	  methamphetamine	  production	  
(DEA	  2012).	  	  Initially,	  it	  was	  quite	  successful.	  	  Labs	  seizures	  dropped	  steadily	  after	  
the	  bill’s	  implementation	  in	  1989,	  and	  stayed	  low	  well	  into	  the	  1990s	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1994,	  Figure	  4.1).	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Figure	  4.1:	  Labs	  seized	  nationally	  between	  1981	  and	  1993	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1994).	  
	  
As	  the	  1990s	  progressed,	  however,	  law	  enforcement	  officials	  noticed	  that	  the	  
amount	  of	  methamphetamine	  available	  on	  the	  streets	  rebounded	  much	  more	  
quickly	  than	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  being	  seized	  (DEA	  1996).	  They	  also	  noticed	  
increasing	  methamphetamine	  seizures	  along	  the	  border	  that	  indicated	  that	  the	  
source	  of	  this	  new	  meth	  was	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  that	  had	  moved	  
in	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  dip	  in	  the	  market.	  
Other	  indicators	  existed	  as	  well.	  	  At	  a	  1994	  hearing	  before	  a	  subcommittee	  of	  
the	  House	  of	  Representatives,	  DEA	  administrator	  Thomas	  Constantine	  testified	  that	  
indicators	  of	  ephedrine	  smuggling	  from	  Mexico	  had	  begun	  to	  rise	  shortly	  after	  the	  
CDTA	  went	  into	  effect	  in	  late	  1989.	  In	  1990	  225	  lbs.	  of	  ephedrine	  were	  seized	  
nationwide,	  but	  in	  1992	  this	  rose	  to	  2,648	  lbs.	  In	  1993	  the	  number	  was	  1,546,	  and	  
an	  additional	  1,014	  lbs.	  had	  been	  seized	  in	  the	  first	  quarter	  of	  1994	  (House	  of	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Figure	  4.2:	  	  Methamphetamine	  and	  ephedrine	  seizures	  along	  the	  Southwest	  border	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The	  full	  extent	  of	  Mexican	  involvement	  in	  precursor	  smuggling	  and	  
methamphetamine	  production,	  however,	  did	  not	  become	  apparent	  until	  March	  
1994,	  when	  customs	  officials	  intercepted	  120	  barrels	  containing	  3.4	  metric-­‐tons	  of	  
ephedrine	  at	  the	  Dallas-­‐Fort	  Worth	  International	  Airport	  (DFW).	  That	  ephedrine	  
had	  been	  manufactured	  by	  Malladi	  Drugs,	  a	  firm	  in	  Madras,	  India,	  and	  shipped	  by	  an	  
intermediary	  chemical	  broker	  in	  Frankfurt.	  	  Its	  destination	  was	  Mexico.	  	  In	  October	  
customs	  officials	  at	  DFW	  seized	  an	  additional	  eighty	  barrels	  containing	  2.3	  tons	  of	  
the	  precursor	  that	  were	  again	  headed	  for	  Mexico	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1995;	  
Dillon	  1995;	  Suo	  2004g).	  Further	  investigation	  revealed	  that	  the	  seized	  ephedrine	  
had	  been	  merely	  part	  of	  a	  seventy-­‐ton	  shipment	  purchased	  by	  the	  DTOs	  and	  sent	  to	  
Mexico	  for	  production	  there	  (DEA	  1996).	  	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  
seizure,	  the	  former	  deputy	  director	  of	  the	  DEA’s	  office	  of	  diversion	  control,	  Terry	  
Woodworth,	  admitted:	  “We	  were,	  to	  be	  candid,	  not	  as	  aware	  of	  that	  situation	  as	  we	  
should	  have	  been	  until	  the	  Dallas-­‐Forth	  Worth	  seizure”	  (Suo	  2004a).	  	  	  
From	  the	  onset,	  Mexican	  DTOs	  have	  been	  polydrug	  operations.	  	  They	  began	  
smuggling	  heroin	  and	  marijuana	  and	  then	  incorporated	  cocaine	  into	  the	  mix.	  The	  
ephedrine	  seized	  in	  Dallas	  was	  attributed	  to	  a	  single	  drug-­‐trafficking	  operation	  run	  
by	  the	  Amezcua	  brothers	  of	  Guadalajara,	  Jalisco.	  	  These	  brothers	  had	  been	  
prominent	  in	  cocaine	  trafficking	  and	  were	  indicted	  on	  such	  charges	  in	  California	  in	  
1993.	  	  However,	  by	  the	  early	  1990s,	  they	  had	  diversified	  their	  drug	  empire.	  	  In	  this	  
context,	  the	  move	  to	  include	  methamphetamine	  in	  their	  suite	  of	  products	  made	  
perfect	  sense.	  	  The	  Amezcua	  brothers	  got	  ahead	  of	  the	  game	  by	  establishing	  a	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worldwide	  network	  of	  ephedrine	  suppliers	  and	  importing	  it	  directly	  into	  Mexico	  
(Suo	  2004a,	  2004g).	  	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  1990s	  the	  few	  global	  ephedrine	  producers	  that	  existed	  were	  located	  in	  
China,	  the	  Czech	  Republic,	  Germany,	  India,	  and	  Japan	  (UNODC	  1996).	  	  The	  
enterprising	  Amezcua	  brothers,	  Luis	  and	  Jesus,	  found	  ways	  to	  establish	  trade	  with	  
several	  of	  those	  producers	  either	  directly	  or	  through	  middlemen.	  	  Their	  relationship	  
with	  Malladi	  Drugs	  began	  in	  January	  1994,	  when	  Jesus	  Amezcua	  visited	  the	  firm	  as	  
part	  of	  a	  global	  trip	  to	  establish	  ephedrine	  sources	  (Suo	  2004g).	  	  To	  avoid	  detection	  
by	  an	  increasingly	  vigilant	  international	  community,	  they	  used	  intermediary	  
chemical	  purchasers	  in	  Western	  Europe	  to	  buy	  the	  product	  and	  arrange	  shipment.	  It	  
was	  an	  error	  on	  the	  part	  of	  a	  German	  firm	  in	  Frankfurt	  that	  had	  led	  to	  the	  first	  DFW	  
seizure.	  	  Normally,	  the	  precursors	  were	  shipped	  to	  Honduras	  or	  Guatemala	  rather	  
than	  through	  the	  U.	  S.	  and	  then	  smuggled	  into	  Mexico	  for	  production	  in	  Michoacán	  
and	  along	  the	  Sierra	  Madres.	  	  
By	  being	  the	  single	  large-­‐scale	  source	  for	  methamphetamine	  precursors	  in	  
North	  America,	  the	  Amezcuas	  cornered	  the	  market.	  	  As	  one	  police	  official	  noted	  at	  
the	  time:	  “‘They	  control	  the	  ephedrine	  coming	  into	  Mexico—which	  means	  that	  even	  
if	  they	  don’t	  produce	  all	  the	  methamphetamine,	  they	  get	  a	  piece	  of	  the	  action	  from	  
anybody	  else	  who	  is,	  because	  they	  have	  to	  go	  to	  (the	  Amezcuas)	  for	  ephedrine’”	  
(Gross	  1996).	  	  The	  Amezcua	  organization	  remained	  in	  control	  of	  precursors	  until	  
Luis	  and	  Jesus	  were	  arrested	  in	  Mexico	  in	  1998	  and	  their	  operation	  began	  to	  
unravel.	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Although	  the	  Amezcuas	  had	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  the	  precursor	  market,	  
several	  other	  important	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  were	  purported	  to	  
be	  involved	  in	  the	  methamphetamine	  business	  in	  the	  1990s.	  	  In	  western	  Mexico,	  the	  
Arrellano-­‐Felix	  organizations,	  which	  controlled	  most	  smuggling	  along	  the	  California	  
border,	  was	  rumored	  to	  be	  heavily	  involved.	  	  They	  reportedly	  moved	  anywhere	  
from	  50	  to	  100	  lbs.	  of	  meth	  through	  the	  San	  Ysidro	  border	  crossing	  every	  month	  
(DEA	  1996).	  	  The	  Amado	  Carrillo-­‐Fuentes	  Organization,	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Juarez	  
Cartel,	  controlled	  smuggling	  in	  and	  around	  Jaurez	  and	  also	  had	  a	  significant	  
presence	  in	  Arizona	  and	  New	  Mexico.	  	  In	  1995	  a	  shipment	  of	  315	  kilograms	  of	  98	  
percent	  pure	  meth	  attributed	  to	  their	  operation	  was	  intercepted	  in	  Las	  Cruces,	  New	  
Mexico.	  	  These	  drugs	  were	  intended	  for	  distribution	  as	  far	  afield	  as	  Georgia,	  Illinois,	  
Oklahoma,	  and	  Washington	  (DEA	  1996).	  	  	  
	  
Mexican	  Methamphetamine	  Networks	  
Mexican	  DTOs	  did	  much	  more	  than	  simply	  smuggle	  meth	  through	  their	  
territory.	  	  They	  controlled	  the	  supply	  chain	  from	  acquisition	  of	  precursors	  all	  the	  
way	  to	  wholesale	  distribution.	  	  Interestingly,	  retail	  distribution	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  (the	  least	  
profitable	  portion	  of	  any	  drug	  supply	  chain)	  remained	  with	  many	  of	  the	  groups	  who	  
had	  controlled	  the	  market	  before	  the	  Mexicans	  got	  involved.	  	  Many	  outlaw	  
motorcycle	  gangs,	  for	  example,	  began	  to	  buy	  meth	  from	  Mexican	  wholesalers	  during	  
the	  1990s	  when	  they	  realized	  that	  those	  organizations	  produced	  a	  product	  
significantly	  better	  and	  less	  expensive	  than	  the	  one	  they	  themselves	  were	  capable	  of	  
manufacturing	  (Weaver	  1997;	  House	  of	  Representatives	  2003).	  	  In	  general,	  the	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transition	  was	  a	  bloodless	  one.	  	  The	  effect	  on	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  
however,	  was	  profound,	  as	  Mexican	  DTOs	  flooded	  the	  system	  with	  high-­‐purity,	  
ephedrine-­‐based	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  in	  industrial	  quantities.	  	  
Like	  the	  Columbian	  cartels	  before	  them,	  Mexican	  DTOs	  divide	  their	  
organizations	  into	  cells	  where	  roles	  and	  knowledge	  of	  the	  operation	  are	  
compartmentalized.	  	  Recruitment	  for	  cells	  focuses	  on	  families,	  increasing	  loyalty	  
through	  both	  kinship	  bonds	  and	  the	  threat	  to	  harm	  family	  in	  Mexico.	  Multiple	  
independent	  cells	  exist	  for	  each	  link	  in	  the	  commodity	  chain.	  	  Meth	  produced	  on	  the	  
Mexican	  side	  of	  the	  border	  comes	  from	  labs	  that	  produce	  on	  a	  continuous	  cycle,	  
rather	  than	  waiting	  for	  wholesalers	  to	  request	  more	  shipments.	  	  Production	  cells	  
then	  pass	  the	  product	  off	  to	  ones	  that	  control	  transportation.	  	  These	  groups	  store	  
product	  in	  stash	  houses	  along	  the	  border	  to	  await	  transshipment.	  	  Evidence	  exists	  
that	  some	  of	  the	  smuggling	  cells	  may	  be	  their	  own	  smaller	  organizations	  that	  
contract	  out	  to	  numerous	  different	  DTOs	  (Castillo	  and	  Unsinger	  2000).	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  
case,	  they	  still	  operate	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  whichever	  large	  organization’s	  
territory	  they	  work	  in	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2000c).	  	  	  
Most	  meth	  smuggling	  occurs	  in	  small	  quantities	  hidden	  within	  secret	  
compartments	  built	  into	  privately	  owned	  vehicles.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  traffickers	  hedge	  
their	  bets.	  Rather	  than	  send	  a	  single	  trailer	  filled	  with	  hundreds	  of	  pounds	  of	  
methamphetamine	  across	  the	  border,	  they	  send	  hundreds	  of	  pound-­‐size	  shipments	  
individually,	  thus	  hiding	  the	  shipment	  among	  the	  throng	  of	  drivers	  who	  cross	  every	  
day.	  	  In	  1998,	  the	  head	  of	  customs	  at	  the	  San	  Ysidro	  port	  of	  entry	  testified	  that	  
45,000	  passenger	  cars	  entered	  the	  U.	  S.	  through	  that	  point	  daily	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	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1998a).	  	  Even	  if	  an	  occasional	  courier	  were	  stopped,	  many	  more	  would	  make	  it	  
through.	  	  
Once	  on	  the	  American	  side	  of	  the	  border,	  meth	  travels	  to	  one	  of	  several	  
transportation	  hubs	  for	  further	  distribution	  to	  wholesalers	  in	  smaller	  cities	  in	  the	  
national	  urban	  hierarchy.	  	  Since	  2001,	  the	  major	  hubs	  have	  been	  Los	  Angeles,	  the	  
Central	  Valley	  of	  California,	  and	  Phoenix,	  Arizona	  (NDIC	  2002b;	  2005a).	  	  These	  
distribution	  centers	  serve	  as	  collection	  points	  where	  the	  relatively	  small	  packages	  of	  
methamphetamine	  that	  have	  been	  smuggled	  into	  the	  country	  are	  reaggregated,	  then	  
divided	  into	  bunches	  of	  differing	  sizes,	  and	  delivered	  to	  one	  of	  many	  cells	  that	  
control	  wholesale	  distribution.	  	  Such	  trafficking	  cells	  can	  be	  easily	  hidden	  among	  the	  
various	  agricultural	  workers	  of	  Mexican	  descent	  who	  make	  up	  a	  significant	  portion	  
of	  that	  work	  force	  in	  the	  western	  U.	  S.	  	  	  
According	  to	  Castillo	  and	  Unsinger	  (2000)	  drug	  wholesalers,	  once	  
established,	  often	  work	  on	  credit,	  repaying	  the	  trafficker	  after	  they	  have	  sold	  the	  
delivered	  drugs,	  rather	  than	  having	  to	  front	  the	  cash.	  	  The	  threat	  of	  violence	  is	  
enough	  to	  ensure	  repayment.	  	  Wholesalers	  have	  carte	  blanche	  to	  recruit	  retailers	  as	  
they	  see	  fit.	  	  They	  simply	  request	  larger	  quantities	  of	  the	  drug	  in	  their	  next	  delivery.	  	  
Though	  these	  wholesale	  cells	  often	  appear	  to	  the	  police	  or	  media	  as	  “kingpins,”	  they	  
are	  but	  small	  cogs	  in	  the	  overall	  operations.	  	  Their	  relative	  independence	  means	  
that,	  if	  one	  of	  them	  is	  eliminated,	  the	  impact	  is	  little	  felt	  by	  the	  DTO,	  because	  
numerous	  other	  midlevel	  cells	  exist	  that	  are	  constantly	  recruiting	  other	  retailers.	  	  
Furthermore,	  because	  the	  wholesale	  operator	  is	  ignorant	  of	  the	  activities	  of	  any	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other	  cell,	  he	  can	  provide	  little	  useful	  information	  to	  police.	  	  Some	  are	  even	  unaware	  
of	  which	  DTO	  they	  work	  for.	  
Some	  Mexican	  traffickers	  choose	  to	  produce	  their	  meth	  on	  the	  American	  side	  
of	  the	  border.	  	  This	  process	  involves	  the	  smuggling	  of	  precursors,	  but	  limits	  the	  risk	  
of	  any	  finished	  product	  being	  intercepted	  while	  crossing	  the	  border.	  	  Organizations	  
choosing	  this	  option	  in	  the	  1990s	  most	  frequently	  established	  their	  labs	  in	  
California,	  generally	  in	  remote	  parts	  of	  San	  Bernardino	  and	  Riverside	  counties,	  but	  
also	  as	  far	  north	  as	  Sacramento.	  	  These	  labs	  were	  easily	  distinguished	  from	  those	  of	  
the	  networks	  that	  came	  before	  them	  for	  two	  reasons:	  first,	  illegal	  Mexican	  
immigrants	  rather	  than	  whites	  operated	  the	  labs,	  and	  second,	  they	  produced	  
methamphetamine	  in	  quantities	  theretofore	  unseen	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  	  The	  DEA	  defines	  a	  
“superlab”	  as	  any	  capable	  of	  producing	  10	  lbs.	  of	  methamphetamine	  in	  a	  single	  
production	  cycle	  (DEA	  2005).	  	  The	  labs	  associated	  with	  Mexican	  DTOS	  are	  often	  
capable	  of	  producing	  ten	  times	  that	  amount	  in	  a	  single	  batch	  (DEA	  1996).	  	  	  	  
Superlabs	  run	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  southern	  California	  in	  the	  
early	  1990s.	  	  By	  July	  1992,	  they	  had	  arrived	  in	  the	  Central	  Valley	  (Suo	  2004b).	  	  	  	  
These	  labs	  were	  characterized	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  “22s,”	  round	  22-­‐liter	  flasks	  that	  
were	  used	  to	  combine	  the	  ephedrine	  (and	  later	  pseudoephedrine)	  with	  red	  
phosphorus	  and	  hydroiodic	  acid.	  	  	  	  The	  largest	  labs	  would	  string	  together	  as	  many	  as	  
twelve	  of	  these	  flasks,	  each	  surrounded	  by	  a	  copper	  heating	  coil.	  	  Each	  coil	  and	  flask	  
has	  combined	  value	  of	  roughly	  $3,500.	  	  The	  total	  output	  of	  such	  a	  superlab	  could	  be	  
as	  much	  as	  144	  pounds	  of	  pure	  meth	  per	  batch.	  	  One	  such	  lab	  seized	  in	  Sutter	  
County,	  California,	  used	  eight	  22s,	  and	  had	  110	  pounds	  of	  iodine	  crystals,	  ninety	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five-­‐gallon	  cans	  of	  denatured	  alcohol,	  thirty	  pounds	  of	  processed	  ephedrine	  pills,	  
three	  five-­‐foot-­‐tall	  hydrogen	  chloride	  gas	  cylinders,	  and	  two	  75-­‐gallon	  separatory	  
funnels	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2000b).	  	  Jerry	  Massetti,	  a	  chemist	  with	  the	  
California	  Bureau	  of	  Forensic	  Sciences	  at	  the	  time,	  recalled	  thinking	  that	  the	  
superlabs	  were	  probably	  just	  rumors:	  “You’d	  wonder	  if	  it	  was	  an	  exaggeration.	  	  
Then	  you’d	  hear	  similar	  stories	  of	  labs	  in	  Riverside,	  Orange	  County,	  Los	  Angeles”	  
(Suo	  2004b).	  	  Uniformity	  among	  labs,	  down	  to	  the	  quality	  and	  brand	  of	  sheet	  used	  to	  
screen	  solid	  meth	  from	  its	  surrounding	  liquids,	  indicated	  that	  all	  the	  operations	  
were	  related	  to	  each	  other.	  	  	  
Though	  related,	  each	  lab	  operating	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  did	  so	  as	  a	  single	  cell.	  	  
Frequently,	  only	  one	  or	  two	  persons	  involved	  in	  its	  operation	  would	  have	  any	  
connection	  to	  the	  sponsoring	  organization.	  	  Mexican	  workers	  arrested	  at	  lab	  sites	  
have	  testified	  that	  they	  were	  picked	  up	  at	  day-­‐laborer	  recruitment	  corners	  by	  
people	  associated	  with	  the	  DTOs	  and	  told	  on	  the	  way	  to	  a	  production	  site	  that	  they	  
were	  going	  to	  make	  $500	  a	  day	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  usual	  $40)	  working	  at	  a	  drug	  lab.	  	  
When	  they	  arrived	  on	  site,	  they	  were	  shown	  chemicals	  and	  given	  instructions	  by	  an	  
overseer	  who	  was	  also	  the	  DTO’s	  chemist.	  	  These	  chemists	  were	  in	  high	  demand.	  	  
National	  Drug	  intelligence	  Center	  analyst	  Randy	  Weaver	  stated	  that	  very	  few	  
chemists	  were	  skilled	  enough	  to	  make	  batches	  of	  fifty	  pounds	  or	  more.	  	  As	  such,	  
these	  chemists	  would	  work	  for	  multiple	  DTOs,	  traveling	  from	  site	  to	  site	  to	  oversee	  
production	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  (Weaver	  1997).	  The	  migrant	  laborers	  at	  the	  
labs,	  in	  contrast,	  were	  expendable,	  and	  as	  such,	  were	  given	  no	  safety	  equipment	  and	  	  
made	  to	  sleep	  close	  to	  their	  isolated	  lab	  locations.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  police	  have	  found	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detailed	  instructions	  and	  presorted,	  color-­‐coded	  bags	  of	  chemicals	  designed	  to	  
facilitate	  the	  production	  of	  methamphetamine	  by	  these	  untrained	  workers	  (Castillo	  
and	  Unsinger	  2000,	  Suo	  2004b).	  	  	  
In	  general,	  the	  DTOs	  maintained	  all	  their	  chemicals	  in	  centrally	  located	  stash	  
houses,	  so	  that	  at	  each	  site,	  only	  the	  supplies	  necessary	  for	  that	  particular	  batch	  
were	  available,	  once	  again	  limiting	  their	  potential	  losses	  should	  a	  lab	  be	  discovered	  
(DEA	  1996).	  	  Some	  of	  these	  labs	  produce	  upwards	  of	  100	  lbs.	  over	  4-­‐5	  days.	  	  
Laborers	  made	  $2,500	  for	  their	  time.	  	  
Mexican	  lab	  operators	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  often	  rent	  out	  remote	  farm	  property	  
through	  migrant	  laborers.	  	  They	  set	  up	  an	  individual	  operation	  for	  only	  a	  short	  
amount	  of	  time,	  usually	  over	  the	  weekend	  when	  farm	  workers	  are	  not	  present,	  and	  
then	  shut	  it	  down	  and	  move	  to	  a	  new	  location.	  	  Reportedly,	  a	  cottage	  industry	  grew	  
up	  in	  the	  1990s	  around	  people	  who	  specialized	  in	  grooming	  permanent	  sites	  for	  
labs	  and	  then	  renting	  them	  out	  to	  various	  groups	  needing	  a	  place	  to	  cook	  (DEA	  
1996).	  Ed	  Mayer,	  a	  taskforce	  commander	  for	  Jackson	  County,	  Oregon’s	  narcotics	  
enforcement	  team,	  testified	  before	  Congress	  about	  that	  system:	  
An	  organized	  Hispanic	  group,	  whether	  it’s	  by	  blood	  or	  by	  their	  
criminal	  association,	  can	  come	  in	  and	  rent	  a	  methamphetamine	  lab	  for	  
a	  period	  of	  time.	  	  It’s	  kind	  of	  like	  a	  condo,	  you	  can	  rent	  it	  with	  or	  
without	  sheets.	  	  In	  this	  case	  you	  rent	  it	  with	  or	  without	  chemicals.	  	  It	  is	  
so	  sophisticated	  that	  it	  has	  reached	  this	  level	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1995,	  33).	  
	  
Mexican	  superlabs	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  were	  small	  in	  number,	  but	  disproportionately	  
significant	  in	  their	  output.	  	  In	  1994,	  the	  California	  Bureau	  of	  Narcotics	  Enforcement	  
seized	  419	  clandestine	  labs.	  	  Of	  those	  419,	  52	  were	  superlabs.	  	  The	  output	  from	  
those	  52	  surpassed	  the	  output	  for	  the	  other	  367	  labs	  combined	  (DEA	  1996).	  	  The	  
	  
	  
	   146	  
flood	  of	  high-­‐purity	  methamphetamine	  that	  they	  produced	  caused	  prices	  in	  
California	  to	  be	  half	  of	  what	  they	  were	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1995).	  	  Such	  industrial	  production	  levels	  also	  severed	  the	  tie	  
between	  meth	  use	  and	  local	  production.	  	  With	  meth	  made	  for	  export,	  markets	  began	  
to	  emerge	  far	  from	  the	  sites	  of	  production.	  
By	  1998,	  the	  impact	  of	  Mexican-­‐produced	  meth	  was	  being	  felt	  almost	  
anywhere	  the	  drug	  was	  used.	  	  The	  DEA’s	  Methamphetamine	  Situation	  Report	  for	  
1996	  stated	  that	  Mexican	  DTOs	  had	  made	  methamphetamine	  widely	  available	  in	  the	  
Pacific	  Northwest,	  the	  Midwest,	  and	  the	  Southeast	  (particularly	  in	  Georgia),	  thereby	  
significantly	  increasing	  the	  size	  and	  expanse	  of	  the	  U.	  S.	  methamphetamine	  market.	  	  
This,	  in	  turn,	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  domestic	  production	  (discussed	  in	  the	  next	  
chapter)	  across	  the	  country	  as	  entrepreneurs	  who	  operated	  on	  the	  periphery	  of	  
established	  Mexican	  methamphetamine	  market	  sought	  “to	  exploit	  the	  expanding	  
demand	  for	  the	  drug”	  (DEA	  1996).	  	  
In	  1998	  testimony,	  Ken	  Carter,	  the	  director	  of	  the	  Iowa	  Division	  of	  Narcotics	  
Enforcement,	  estimated	  that	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  meth	  in	  Iowa	  was	  of	  Mexican	  origin.	  	  
The	  head	  of	  the	  Des	  Moines	  office	  of	  the	  DEA	  agreed,	  adding	  that	  small-­‐scale	  
independent	  operations,	  which	  had	  dominated	  the	  market	  between	  the	  decline	  of	  
outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  now	  existed	  only	  to	  “feed	  
the	  habits	  of	  customers	  typically	  found	  outside	  the	  Mexican	  trafficking	  
organizations’	  predominant	  areas	  of	  influence”	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1998a,	  23).	  	  The	  
detectives	  in	  the	  Independence,	  Missouri,	  Drug	  Taskforce	  placed	  the	  transition	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Since	  at	  least	  1995,	  federal	  government	  officials	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  cut	  off	  
precursor	  supplies	  from	  Mexican	  methamphetamine	  producers	  both	  north	  and	  
south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  Unfortunately,	  just	  as	  was	  the	  case	  during	  the	  previous	  fifty	  
years	  of	  clandestine	  methamphetamine	  production	  by	  their	  American	  counterparts,	  
Mexican	  DTOs	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  remarkably	  adaptive	  in	  the	  face	  of	  restrictions.	  	  
When	  the	  Mexicans	  first	  entered	  the	  market,	  precursors	  were	  not	  particularly	  
difficult	  to	  acquire	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  border.	  	  The	  U.	  S.	  had	  restricted	  bulk	  
ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  products,	  but	  the	  same	  chemicals	  stamped	  into	  pill	  
form	  were	  unregulated.	  	  Unscrupulous	  chemical	  suppliers	  such	  as	  Nationwide	  
Purveyors,	  of	  Pittsburgh,	  Pennsylvania,	  responded	  to	  the	  loophole	  by	  producing	  
massive	  amounts	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  pills,	  and	  making	  them	  available	  Mexican	  
superlab	  operators	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  55-­‐pound	  barrels	  (Suo	  2004c).	  	  	  When	  the	  
Domestic	  Chemical	  Diversion	  and	  Control	  Act	  of	  1993	  closed	  this	  pill	  loophole	  for	  
ephedrine,	  the	  DTOs	  then	  moved	  to	  international	  suppliers.	  	  	  
In	  early	  1995	  representatives	  from	  the	  DEA	  requested	  that	  the	  International	  
Narcotics	  Control	  Board	  monitor	  ephedrine	  producers	  and	  report	  strange	  
shipments.	  	  	  This	  step	  was	  effective.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  that	  year,	  the	  DEA	  and	  its	  
international	  counterparts	  had	  successfully	  intervened	  in	  the	  transshipment	  of	  
between	  170	  and	  200	  tons	  of	  ephedrine	  (Suo	  2004a).	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  closure	  of	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that	  avenue,	  Mexican	  DTOs	  switched	  to	  pseudoephedrine	  as	  a	  precursor.	  	  In	  1994,	  
pseudoephedrine	  was	  found	  in	  only	  11	  percent	  of	  all	  labs	  seized.	  	  By	  1995,	  that	  
percentage	  had	  doubled	  to	  22	  (Suo	  2004c).	  	  Over-­‐the-­‐counter	  pseudoephedrine	  
could	  be	  acquired	  easily	  within	  the	  United	  States	  for	  labs	  operating	  within	  its	  
borders.	  	  
In	  1996,	  the	  Comprehensive	  Methamphetamine	  Control	  Act	  required	  all	  
vendors	  of	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  pseudoephedrine	  pills	  to	  register	  with	  the	  DEA.	  	  
However,	  the	  agency	  was	  ill-­‐prepared	  for	  the	  rush	  of	  applications	  and	  understaffed	  
for	  monitoring	  all	  of	  the	  vendors	  they	  approved.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  vendors	  who	  
registered	  did	  so	  with	  the	  express	  purpose	  of	  selling	  pseudoephedrine	  to	  the	  DTOs	  
at	  marked-­‐up	  prices.	  It	  was	  not	  difficult	  to	  discern	  the	  intentions	  of	  pill	  producers.	  
Companies	  that	  made	  cold	  pills	  containing	  pseudoephedrine	  typically	  sold	  them	  in	  
blister	  packs	  of	  30	  pills	  each.	  	  Those	  producing	  for	  meth	  manufacturers	  sold	  their	  
products	  in	  bottles	  containing	  120	  pills	  each,	  packed	  into	  crates	  of	  140	  bottles	  or	  
more.	  	  In	  1997,	  five	  such	  relatively	  unknown	  chemical	  companies	  had	  sales	  that	  
rivaled	  those	  of	  Sudafed,	  the	  leading	  brand	  of	  cold	  pill	  containing	  pseudoephedrine.	  	  
From	  1994	  to	  1997,	  imports	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  to	  the	  United	  States	  jumped	  41	  
percent	  to	  160	  metric	  tons	  per	  year	  (Suo	  2004c).	  	  	  
The	  DEA	  moved	  to	  attack	  the	  suspect	  companies	  in	  2000	  through	  a	  series	  of	  
operations	  known	  as	  Mountain	  Express	  I	  and	  II.	  	  These	  operations	  specifically	  
targeted	  the	  sales	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  to	  Mexican	  DTOs	  operating	  California.	  	  
Investigators	  found	  that	  wholesalers	  in	  Arkansas,	  Colorado,	  Florida,	  Illinois,	  
Kentucky,	  Michigan,	  New	  York,	  and	  Ohio	  were	  shipping	  multiton	  quantities	  of	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tablets	  to	  California,	  where	  they	  could	  get	  a	  $3,000	  profit	  per	  pound.	  	  The	  list	  of	  
cities	  in	  which	  arrests	  took	  place	  provides	  further	  definition	  of	  this	  “loosely	  
structured	  national	  network”	  that	  had	  developed	  to	  sell.	  	  Arrests	  occurred	  in	  
Denver,	  Fort	  Lauderdale,	  Houston,	  Lodi	  (California),	  Los	  Angeles,	  Orlando,	  and	  San	  
Diego.	  	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  DEA’s	  crackdown	  on	  domestic	  pseudoephedrine	  
producers	  caused	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs	  that	  operated	  labs	  within	  the	  U.	  S.	  to	  seek	  other	  
precursor	  sources.	  	  Their	  solution	  became	  apparent	  on	  April	  11	  2001,	  when	  
customs	  inspectors	  in	  Detroit	  found	  43	  million	  pseudoephedrine	  pills	  (roughly	  
twelve	  tons)	  in	  the	  back	  of	  a	  semi-­‐trailer	  that	  purported	  to	  be	  empty.	  Apparently,	  
representatives	  from	  either	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs	  or	  middlemen	  operating	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  
had	  become	  aware	  that	  Canada	  did	  not	  regulate	  pseudoephedrine	  once	  it	  was	  
stamped	  into	  pill	  form.	  They	  therefore	  established	  contact	  with	  several	  Canadian	  
companies,	  which	  in	  turn,	  ramped	  up	  production	  to	  supply	  the	  illicit	  demand	  to	  
their	  south.	  	  Between	  1997	  and	  2001	  the	  amount	  of	  unprocessed	  pseudoephedrine	  
imported	  into	  Canada	  quadrupled	  to	  140	  tons	  (Suo	  2004g).	  	  	  
In	  the	  year	  following	  that	  initial	  seizure	  of	  Canadian	  pills,	  a	  new	  DEA	  
operation,	  Mountain	  Express	  III,	  intercepted	  127	  million	  tablets	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  
as	  they	  were	  being	  smuggled	  into	  the	  U.	  S.	  in	  semi-­‐trailers	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  2004b).	  	  	  In	  a	  second	  operation,	  called	  Northern	  Star,	  the	  DEA	  along	  
with	  the	  Royal	  Canadian	  Mounted	  Police	  arrested	  six	  executives	  from	  three	  
Canadian	  companies	  who	  were	  knowingly	  exporting	  pseudoephedrine	  to	  meth	  
producers	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  Some	  108	  million	  pills	  from	  one	  of	  those	  companies,	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Frega,	  Inc.,	  were	  found	  at	  meth	  labs	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2004b).	  	  
Canada	  eventually	  closed	  this	  source	  by	  enacting	  much	  stricter	  regulations	  on	  
pseudoephedrine-­‐based	  products	  in	  2003.	  
Without	  a	  consistent	  supply	  of	  precursors	  within	  the	  United	  States,	  Mexican	  
DTOS	  began	  to	  move	  production	  of	  methamphetamine	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  In	  March	  
and	  April	  of	  2003,	  22	  million	  pseudoephedrine	  tablets	  intended	  for	  Mexico	  were	  
intercepted	  in	  Laredo,	  Texas,	  and	  Panama.	  	  From	  2001	  to	  2009,	  the	  number	  of	  
superlabs	  seized	  in	  the	  United	  States	  dipped	  from	  244	  to	  14.	  	  Concurrent	  to	  the	  
reduction	  in	  Mexican-­‐sponsored	  lab	  production	  in	  the	  U.	  S.,	  Mexican	  importation	  of	  
pseudoephedrine	  rose	  from	  66	  to	  224	  tons	  between	  1999	  and	  2004.	  	  In	  2003	  alone,	  
the	  DEA	  knew	  of	  at	  least	  85	  pseudoephedrine	  shipments	  totaling	  420	  million	  tablets	  
going	  from	  the	  Far	  East	  to	  fictitious	  companies	  in	  Mexico	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  
2004b)	  
The	  few	  Mexican-­‐sponsored	  superlabs	  still	  operating	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
today	  currently	  use	  cold	  pills	  packed	  in	  blister	  packs	  for	  individual	  sales.	  	  This	  is	  not	  
efficient,	  because	  ever	  since	  the	  Combat	  Methamphetamine	  Epidemic	  Act	  of	  2005,	  
the	  sale	  of	  such	  pills	  has	  been	  strictly	  monitored	  and	  regulated.	  	  To	  get	  around	  sales	  
limits	  and	  customer	  registries,	  superlab	  operators	  in	  California	  have	  established	  
large-­‐scale	  smurfing	  networks	  (NDIC	  2009b).	  	  “Smurfing,”	  a	  term	  that	  comes	  from	  
money	  laundering,	  in	  the	  world	  of	  methamphetamine,	  means	  the	  repeated	  
purchasing	  of	  small	  amounts	  of	  precursors	  to	  avoid	  detection.	  	  	  It	  is	  believed	  that	  the	  
turn	  to	  smurfing	  for	  superlab	  production	  began	  in	  2007	  when	  precursors	  became	  
scarce	  both	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Mexico.	  	  The	  first	  known	  example	  of	  large-­‐scale	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smurfing	  was	  found	  in	  Fresno	  in	  October	  2007.	  	  An	  investigation	  there	  revealed	  that	  
a	  single	  couple	  had	  created	  an	  operation	  in	  which	  they	  paid	  homeless	  people	  $30	  to	  
travel	  from	  store	  to	  store	  making	  the	  maximum	  allowable	  purchase	  of	  cold	  pills	  in	  
each.	  	  Police	  found	  multiple	  cell	  phones,	  pseudoephedrine,	  and	  pharmacy	  listings	  
torn	  form	  a	  phonebook	  in	  the	  couple’s	  car	  (NDIC	  2009B).	  	  	  
Officers	  at	  lab	  sites	  in	  California	  report	  finding	  “pseudoephedrine	  product	  
price	  lists,	  store	  receipts,	  coupons	  for	  pseudoephedrine	  products,	  pseudoephedrine	  
product	  packaging,	  paper	  shredders,	  gallon-­‐size	  freezer	  bags,	  and	  five-­‐gallon	  plastic	  
buckets	  filled	  with	  various	  commercial	  brands	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  tablets”	  (NDIC	  
2009b,	  4).	  	  The	  National	  Drug	  Intelligence	  Center	  reports	  that	  these	  smurfing	  
operations	  have	  become	  so	  efficient	  that	  some	  have	  begun	  shipping	  
pseudoephedrine	  into	  Mexico	  to	  supply	  labs	  there.	  	  	  	  
	  
Mexican	  Meth	  Today	  
The	  significance	  of	  Mexican	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  U.	  S.	  has	  only	  increased	  
over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  decade.	  Despite	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  domestic	  lab	  
seizures	  plus	  police	  action	  and	  turf	  wars	  on	  the	  Mexican	  side	  of	  the	  border	  that	  have	  
created	  turmoil	  within	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  that	  country	  is	  still	  responsible	  for	  the	  
vast	  majority	  of	  the	  drug	  on	  the	  American	  market	  (greater	  than	  80	  percent	  in	  2007	  
(U.	  S.	  Senate	  2007)).	  The	  trafficking	  patterns	  Mexican	  DTOs	  have	  created	  reflect	  
both	  the	  1980s	  hearth	  of	  methamphetamine	  production	  and	  the	  significant	  markets	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Figure	  4.3:	  Methamphetamine	  trafficking	  routes	  identified	  in	  the	  National	  Drug	  
Threat	  Assessment:	  2011	  (NDIC	  2011).	  	  	  The	  thickness	  of	  lines	  represents	  the	  
estimated	  volume	  traveling	  along	  those	  particular	  highways	  as	  assessed	  through	  
seizures.	  
	  
Faced	  with	  rising	  violence	  and	  drug	  use,	  particularly	  in	  the	  border	  provinces,	  
the	  Mexican	  government	  has	  taken	  significant	  steps	  to	  reduce	  methamphetamine	  
production	  (Brouwer	  et	  al.	  2006;	  NDIC	  2010;	  Biettel	  2011).	  	  After	  two	  years	  of	  
increasing	  restrictions	  on	  ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  importation,	  they	  totally	  
prohibited	  their	  importation	  beginning	  in	  2008.	  	  Any	  products	  containing	  those	  
chemicals	  were	  removed	  from	  shelves	  entirely	  in	  2009.	  	  Mexican	  authorities	  have	  
also	  increased	  their	  efforts	  to	  shut	  down	  active	  labs,	  as	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  
increasing	  number	  of	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  there	  (Figure	  4.4,	  NDIC	  2010,	  
2011a).	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Figure	  4.4:	  Methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  in	  Mexico	  (NDIC	  2010;	  2011a)	  	  
	  
Faced	  with	  precursor	  scarcity	  at	  home,	  Mexican	  DTOs	  recently	  have	  also	  
turned	  to	  a	  modification	  of	  an	  old	  recipe.	  	  Both	  the	  National	  Methamphetamine	  
Threat	  Assessment	  	  (NDIC	  2010)	  and	  the	  Community	  Epidemiology	  Work	  group	  
(CEWG	  2011)	  report	  that	  Mexican	  DTOs	  are	  increasingly	  producing	  
methamphetamine	  using	  the	  P2P	  method.	  	  Because	  production	  with	  this	  set	  of	  
precursors	  makes	  racemic	  meth,	  cooks	  there	  now	  include	  an	  additional	  production	  
step	  that	  uses	  tartaric	  acid	  to	  isolate	  the	  dextrorotary	  isomers	  in	  the	  final	  product.	  	  
This	  makes	  a	  version	  of	  P2P	  meth	  that	  is	  comparable	  in	  power	  to	  that	  from	  the	  
ephedrine-­‐reduction	  methods.	  	  That	  this	  modified	  P2P	  process	  was	  first	  observed	  in	  
samples	  seized	  in	  Guadalajara	  in	  2006	  demonstrates	  the	  forward-­‐thinking	  nature	  of	  
the	  Mexican	  DTOs.	  They	  were	  clearly	  testing	  new	  processes	  and	  planning	  for	  the	  
scarcity	  of	  precursors	  at	  least	  three	  years	  before	  the	  chemicals	  were	  scheduled	  to	  go	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Since	  finding	  that	  initial	  sample	  of	  modified	  P2P	  meth	  in	  2006,	  Mexican	  
authorities	  have	  seen	  a	  consistent	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  nonephedrine	  
superlabs.	  	  In	  a	  one-­‐week	  period	  in	  April	  2010,	  they	  seized	  four	  such	  P2P	  facilities,	  
two	  in	  Jalisco	  and	  two	  in	  Sinaloa.	  	  Seizures	  of	  tartaric	  acid	  and	  phenyl	  acetic	  acid	  (a	  
P2P	  precursor)	  within	  Mexico	  have	  also	  skyrocketed	  (NDIC	  2010).	  	  Perhaps	  because	  
of	  these	  new	  production	  techniques,	  seizures	  of	  methamphetamine	  along	  the	  border	  
have	  shown	  no	  significant	  decline,	  and	  the	  National	  Drug	  Intelligence	  Center	  
predicts	  that	  Mexican	  methamphetamine	  will	  remain	  widely	  available	  in	  the	  United	  
States	  (Figure	  4.5)(NDIC	  2011a).	  
	  	  	  
Figure	  4.5:	  Seizures	  by	  kilogram	  of	  methamphetamine	  along	  the	  Southwest	  Border	  
for	  fiscal	  years	  2006-­‐2010	  (NDIC	  2011a).	  	  
	  
The	  geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  that	  was	  established	  in	  the	  1980s	  is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  location	  of	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs	  involved	  in	  methamphetamine	  
production	  today.	  The	  organizations	  that	  control	  the	  western	  edge	  of	  the	  border	  are	  
also	  those	  that	  are	  the	  involved	  with	  methamphetamine	  production	  and	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significant	  methamphetamine	  traffickers:	  the	  Tijuana	  DTO	  made	  up	  of	  the	  remnants	  
of	  the	  Arellano-­‐Felix	  organization,	  the	  Sinaloa	  DTO,	  and	  La	  Familia	  Michoacána23	  	  
(Beittel	  2011;	  NDIC	  2011a)(Figure	  4.6).	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4.6:	  Mexican	  DTOs	  most	  prominently	  involved	  in	  methamphetamine	  
production	  and	  distribution	  as	  of	  2010	  (Biettel	  2011).	  	  	  
	  
In	  2009,	  La	  Familia	  Michoacána	  (LFM)	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  half	  
of	  the	  estimated	  200	  tons	  of	  methamphetamine	  that	  entered	  the	  U.	  S.	  from	  Mexico	  
every	  year.	  	  They	  smuggle	  precursors	  into	  Mexico	  through	  the	  large	  Michoacán	  port	  
of	  Lázaro	  Cárdenas,	  where	  police	  seized	  nineteen	  tons	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  in	  2006.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  La	  Familia	  Michoácana,	  with	  no	  physical	  connection	  to	  the	  border,	  occupies	  terrain	  previously	  held	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In	  addition	  to	  being	  the	  lone	  “narco-­‐evangelical”	  group	  among	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  
the	  LFM	  has	  a	  reputation	  for	  starting	  distribution	  cells	  in	  suburban	  areas	  on	  the	  
periphery	  of	  large	  urban	  centers	  in	  the	  United	  States	  (DEA	  2009;	  Grillo	  2009).	  
The	  recent	  seizure	  of	  fifteen	  tons	  of	  finished	  methamphetamine	  at	  a	  ranch	  
outside	  of	  Guadalajara	  was	  attributed	  to	  the	  Sinaloa	  group	  (Cave	  2012).	  	  That	  
seizure	  demonstrated	  the	  scale	  of	  production	  that	  still	  occurs	  south	  of	  the	  border.	  	  
Beittel	  (2011)	  characterizes	  the	  Sinaloa	  DTO	  as	  the	  dominant	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organization	  in	  Mexico	  in	  2011.	  The	  group	  combines	  the	  geographic	  advantage	  of	  
controlling	  the	  agricultural	  territory	  for	  poppy	  and	  marijuana	  cultivation	  with	  a	  
willingness	  to	  exert	  “brutal	  force”	  in	  order	  to	  acquire	  and	  maintain	  territory	  (Biettel	  
2011).	  	  Composed	  of	  numerous	  smaller	  organizations,	  it	  is	  estimated	  to	  control	  
forty-­‐five	  percent	  of	  the	  entire	  Mexican	  drug	  trade.	  	  Its	  portion	  of	  the	  
methamphetamine	  trade	  is	  unknown.	  The	  Tijuana	  DTO	  has	  remained	  relevant	  




	   157	  
	  
Chapter	  5	  
Eastward	  the	  Course	  of	  Empire:	  Small	  Toxic	  Labs	  and	  the	  Eastward	  Spread	  of	  
Methamphetamine	  
	  
One	  time	  we	  were	  sitting	  on	  a	  box	  lab	  in	  a	  Rubbermaid	  container	  out	  
in	  a	  rural	  area.	  And	  we	  had	  an	  informant	  that	  had	  given	  us	  information	  about	  
whose	  lab	  it	  was	  and	  when	  they	  were	  coming	  to	  pick	  it	  up.	  	  And	  so	  we	  were	  
sitting	  there,	  greened	  up,	  waiting	  for	  this	  person	  to	  show	  up	  all	  in	  our	  
camouflage,	  so	  that	  we	  couldn’t	  be	  seen.	  	  While	  we	  were	  there,	  this	  vehicle	  
pulls	  up	  to	  the	  intersection	  where	  we	  were	  at,	  stops,	  takes	  something	  out	  of	  
the	  car,	  lays	  it	  out	  on	  a	  rock	  down	  in	  a	  ditch	  beside	  us	  in	  the	  sun.	  	  And	  all	  of	  a	  
sudden	  we	  smell	  ether,	  which	  is	  a	  very	  characteristic	  odor.	  	  Well,	  it’s	  not	  the	  
car	  we’re	  expecting,	  so	  I	  call	  the	  sheriff’s	  office	  to	  come	  stop	  them.	  	  They	  
come	  stop	  them,	  and	  it	  turns	  out	  they	  had	  just	  manufactured	  
methamphetamine,	  and	  wanted	  to	  smoke	  while	  it	  dried.	  	  So	  they	  laid	  it	  out	  in	  
the	  sun,	  so	  they	  could	  smoke	  in	  the	  car.	  	  Had	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  the	  lab	  that	  
we	  were	  sitting	  on.	  	  There	  were	  that	  many	  labs	  in	  southeast	  Kansas,	  that	  you	  
could	  just	  pick	  a	  random	  intersection	  and	  happen	  to	  have	  someone	  come	  by	  
and	  do	  something	  stupid	  in	  front	  of	  you.	  	  They	  happened	  to	  pick	  the	  most	  
policed	  intersection	  in	  rural	  Kansas	  that	  day.	  	  But	  that	  gives	  you	  an	  idea	  of	  
how	  many	  folks	  were	  involved	  in	  it	  at	  that	  time.	  –David	  Hutchings,	  Special	  
Agent	  in	  Charge,	  Special	  Operations	  Division,	  Kansas	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  
(2010)	  
	  
In	  1989,	  at	  the	  peak	  of	  the	  Southern	  California	  methamphetamine	  lab	  boom,	  
and	  before	  the	  effects	  of	  either	  Mexican	  Drug	  Trafficking	  Organizations	  (DTOs)	  or	  
the	  Chemical	  Diversion	  and	  Trafficking	  Act	  had	  been	  felt,	  the	  DEA	  seized	  652	  labs	  
nationwide.	  	  Eleven	  years	  later,	  despite	  new	  legislations	  to	  limit	  the	  availability	  of	  
precursors	  and	  almost	  total	  market	  domination	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  the	  number	  of	  
labs	  seized	  by	  the	  DEA	  had	  grown	  to	  1,832,	  an	  increase	  of	  280	  percent	  (Figure	  5.1).	  	  
The	  total	  of	  reported	  lab	  seizures	  by	  all	  policing	  agencies	  for	  2000	  was	  much	  larger	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still,	  totaling	  6,891	  (NCLSS	  2011).24	  	  At	  their	  peak	  in	  2003	  and	  2004,	  domestic	  lab	  
seizures	  were	  over	  10,200	  per	  year	  (Figure	  5.2).	  




Figure	  5.2:	  Lab	  seizures	  reported	  to	  the	  El	  Paso	  Intelligence	  Center	  (NCLSS	  2011)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Because	  no	  good	  data	  source	  exists	  for	  labs	  seized	  by	  all	  police	  agencies	  prior	  to	  2000,	  we	  cannot	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The	  vast	  majority	  of	  the	  seized	  labs	  were	  small,	  producing	  less	  than	  eight	  
ounces	  of	  final	  product	  for	  cooks	  and	  a	  small	  network	  of	  users	  operating	  on	  the	  
fringes	  of	  the	  larger	  markets	  created	  by	  the	  Mexican	  DTOs.	  	  Since	  those	  drug	  
traffickers	  established	  market	  dominance	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  domestic	  labs25	  have	  
never	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  20	  percent	  of	  the	  meth	  available	  on	  American	  streets	  
(House	  of	  Representatives	  2004a,	  U.	  S.	  Senate	  2007).	  	  However,	  to	  many	  observers,	  
the	  epidemic	  growth	  in	  the	  number	  of	  domestic	  meth	  labs	  (as	  exemplified	  by	  Agent	  
Hutchings’	  anecdote	  at	  the	  start	  of	  this	  chapter)	  has	  been	  the	  enduring	  legacy	  of	  
America’s	  eighty-­‐year	  experience	  with	  the	  drug.	  	  The	  impact	  on	  the	  communities	  in	  
which	  these	  labs	  proliferate	  has	  been	  profound,	  exacting	  incredible	  social	  and	  
economic	  tolls	  (Reding	  2009;	  Garriott	  2011).	  	  The	  clean-­‐up	  of	  small	  toxic	  labs	  (STLs)	  
is	  estimated	  to	  have	  cost	  the	  U.	  S.	  $61	  million	  in	  2005	  alone	  (Niciosa	  et	  al.	  2009).	  	  	  
The	  proliferation	  of	  small	  domestic	  methamphetamine	  labs	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  
2000s	  is	  confounding	  on	  a	  number	  of	  levels.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  lab	  production	  
persisted	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  seemingly	  inexhaustible	  stream	  of	  methamphetamine	  
coming	  into	  this	  country	  from	  Mexico.	  	  Why	  would	  a	  person	  risk	  imprisonment	  and	  
forfeiture	  of	  property	  to	  cook	  meth	  when	  they	  can	  simply	  buy	  it?	  	  Furthermore,	  and	  
flying	  in	  the	  face	  of	  most	  criminological	  understanding	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  drug	  
markets,	  it	  appears	  that	  small-­‐scale	  independent	  production	  using	  one	  of	  several	  
ephedrine-­‐based26	  methods	  of	  methamphetamine	  cooking	  actually	  appeared	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  use	  the	  term	  “domestic	  labs”	  to	  refer,	  not	  to	  any	  lab	  operating	  within	  the	  United	  
States	  (which	  would	  include	  superlabs	  operated	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs),	  but	  to	  labs	  operated	  by	  
independent	  operators	  (presumably	  citizens)	  within	  the	  U.	  S.	  Governmental	  literature	  refers	  to	  these	  
independent	  operations	  as	  small	  toxic	  labs	  or	  STLs.	  
26	  Or	  pseudoephedrine-­‐based	  methods.	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many	  places	  after	  more	  advanced	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  had	  established	  a	  
market	  for	  the	  d-­‐methamphetamine.	  	  In	  most	  cases,	  drug	  markets	  evolve	  in	  the	  
exact	  opposite	  manner.	  	  Finally,	  the	  number	  of	  methamphetamine	  labs	  has	  
skyrocketed	  despite	  at	  least	  five	  attempts	  by	  the	  federal	  government	  since	  1981	  to	  
curb	  production	  by	  reducing	  the	  availability	  of	  precursors.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Red-­P	  and	  Nazi	  Methods	  
The	  epidemic	  growth	  in	  domestic	  methamphetamine	  production	  was	  
spurred	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  methamphetamine	  recipes,	  first	  the	  
red	  phosphorus	  (Red-­‐P)	  family	  of	  methods,	  and	  later	  the	  Birch	  reduction,	  or	  Nazi	  
Method.	  	  These	  production	  techniques,	  the	  first	  of	  which	  appeared	  in	  Southern	  
California	  in	  the	  early	  1980s,	  had	  been	  of	  increasing	  importance	  in	  domestic	  meth	  
manufacture	  since	  the	  scheduling	  of	  phenyl-­‐2-­‐propanone	  in	  1981.	  	  Among	  labs	  for	  
which	  the	  method	  of	  production	  was	  known,	  ephedrine-­‐based	  methods	  passed	  P2P	  
in	  percentage	  of	  labs	  seized	  nationwide	  in	  the	  late	  1980s,	  and	  by	  1993	  they	  made	  up	  
82	  percent	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1994).	  	  In	  that	  same	  year,	  
California	  accounted	  for	  80	  percent	  of	  all	  meth	  labs	  seized	  in	  the	  United	  States	  
(House	  of	  Representatives	  1994).	  	  That	  ratio	  would	  soon	  change,	  as	  d-­‐
methamphetamine,	  and	  the	  various	  recipes	  to	  make	  it,	  began	  to	  spread.	  	  	  
A	  number	  of	  reasons	  exist	  why	  ephedrine-­‐based	  production	  methods	  might	  
spark	  an	  increase	  in	  domestic	  production.	  	  First,	  they	  are	  much	  easier	  to	  execute	  
than	  P2P	  methods,	  meaning	  high	  quality	  meth	  could	  be	  cooked	  by	  someone	  without	  
any	  real	  chemical	  skill.	  	  The	  Red-­‐P	  methods	  also	  require	  less	  time.	  	  Whereas	  a	  P2P	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cook	  would	  need	  several	  days	  and	  sophisticated	  equipment,	  a	  Red-­‐P	  manufacturer	  
could	  finish	  in	  just	  a	  few	  hours.	  	  Red-­‐P	  cooks	  also	  produced	  pure	  d-­‐
methamphetamine,	  which	  is	  a	  significantly	  better	  product	  than	  racemic	  
methamphetamine.	  	  But,	  perhaps	  most	  important	  of	  all,	  the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  was	  
preferred	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs.	  	  	  Suo	  (2004b)	  credited	  the	  Mexicans	  with	  deliberately	  
expanding	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐methamphetamine.	  “The	  cartels’	  prodigious	  supply	  of	  
methamphetamine	  sent	  out	  across	  the	  Plains	  as	  far	  east	  as	  North	  Carolina,	  created	  
demand	  where	  none	  existed	  before”	  (A12).	  	  	  
Others	  corroborated	  this	  notion,	  and	  explained	  its	  connection	  to	  the	  increase	  
in	  labs.	  In	  testimony	  before	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  2003,	  the	  chief	  of	  
operations	  for	  the	  DEA,	  Rogelio	  E.	  Guevara,	  testified	  that	  the	  boom	  in	  Midwestern	  
methamphetamine	  production,	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  1990s,	  came	  
after	  the	  market	  for	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  had	  been	  established	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  
when	  users	  discovered	  that	  they	  could	  produce	  their	  own	  meth	  rather	  than	  buy	  it	  
(House	  of	  Representatives	  2003).27	  	  A	  2005	  report	  by	  the	  Committee	  on	  
Government	  Reform	  made	  a	  similar	  claim,	  stating	  that	  STL	  production	  began	  to	  
grow	  in	  response	  to	  increasing	  methamphetamine	  addiction,	  which	  was	  initially	  
created	  by	  the	  appearance	  of	  Mexican	  meth	  (Committee	  on	  Government	  Reform	  
2005).	  	  	  
Agent	  David	  Hutchings	  of	  the	  Kansas	  Bureau	  of	  Investigation	  (KBI)	  noted	  a	  
similar	  process.	  	  Before	  the	  arrival	  of	  Red-­‐P	  methods,	  the	  state	  of	  Kansas	  had	  been	  
generally	  unconcerned	  with	  methamphetamine.	  	  The	  primary	  drug	  foci	  for	  the	  KBI	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Recall	  that	  prior	  to	  the	  ephedrine-­‐based	  recipes,	  all	  meth	  was	  racemic.	  	  Therefore,	  even	  
experienced	  meth	  users	  in	  older	  markets	  had	  to	  be	  introduced	  to	  d-­‐methamphetamine.	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in	  the	  early	  1990s	  were	  cocaine	  and	  marijuana.	  	  What	  little	  meth	  there	  had	  been	  in	  
the	  state	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  was	  P2P	  meth	  sold	  by	  bikers.	  	  However,	  according	  to	  
Hutchings,	  the	  arrival	  of	  Mexican	  DTOs	  and	  the	  introduction	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  
cooking	  methods	  occurred	  nearly	  simultaneously	  around	  1995	  (Hutchings	  2010).	  
Meth	  lab	  seizures	  began	  to	  boom	  shortly	  after	  that	  introduction.	  	  	  David	  Waller,	  a	  
special	  agent	  for	  the	  Florida	  Department	  of	  Law	  Enforcement,	  testified	  before	  
Congress	  that	  the	  same	  process	  had	  occurred	  in	  Florida,	  where	  DTOs	  first	  shipped	  in	  
meth	  from	  superlabs	  in	  California,	  and	  then	  local	  labs	  began	  to	  appear	  (House	  of	  
Representatives	  1995).	  
The	  second	  family	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  recipes,	  which	  would	  not	  arrive	  in	  
areas	  outside	  of	  the	  West	  Coast	  until	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  was	  discovered	  in	  
northern	  California	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  	  It	  was	  there,	  in	  Vacaville,	  northeast	  of	  San	  
Francisco,	  that	  members	  of	  the	  DEA’s	  Western	  Regional	  Laboratory,	  along	  with	  
representatives	  from	  the	  San	  Francisco	  Clandestine	  Laboratory	  Task	  Force,	  raided	  a	  
trailer	  where	  they	  suspected	  people	  were	  making	  methamphetamine.	  	  Inside	  the	  
trailer	  they	  found	  the	  usual	  chemical	  glassware	  and	  ephedrine,	  but	  in	  addition,	  
other	  chemicals	  that	  did	  not	  match	  any	  known	  recipe	  for	  methamphetamine.	  	  
Instead	  of	  red	  phosphorus	  and	  iodine,	  they	  found	  a	  large	  canister	  of	  anhydrous	  
ammonia	  and	  25	  pounds	  of	  lithium	  metal	  wire.	  	  Further	  exploration	  uncovered	  
numerous	  recipes,	  both	  typed	  and	  handwritten,	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  processes.	  	  
Included	  among	  them	  was	  one	  involving	  anhydrous	  ammonia	  and	  lithium.	  	  	  
Though	  the	  anhydrous	  ammonia/lithium	  method	  of	  methamphetamine	  
synthesis	  had	  never	  been	  seen	  in	  a	  clandestine	  lab	  before,	  it	  was	  based	  on	  a	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chemical	  reaction,	  the	  Birch	  reduction,	  commonly	  used	  in	  organic	  chemistry.	  The	  
Drug	  Enforcement	  Administration’s	  forensic	  scientists	  found	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  
create	  high	  purity	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  easily	  from	  the	  instructions	  (Ely	  and	  
McGrath	  1990).	  	  A	  possibly	  apocryphal	  story	  that	  one	  of	  the	  early	  labs	  using	  this	  
method	  had	  been	  run	  by	  a	  neo-­‐Nazi	  biker	  spawned	  a	  nickname	  for	  the	  new	  recipe:	  
“Nazi	  method.”	  	  Initially	  regarded	  simply	  as	  a	  curiosity	  to	  be	  tested	  by	  DEA	  
scientists,	  this	  new	  recipe	  and	  nickname	  quickly	  rose	  in	  prominence.	  	  Today,	  it	  is	  the	  
most	  common	  form	  of	  lab	  seized	  by	  police	  (NDIC	  2011a).	  
The	  Birch	  reduction,	  or	  Nazi	  method,	  offers	  several	  advantages	  over	  even	  
Red-­‐P	  methods,	  particularly	  for	  small-­‐scale	  producers.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  a	  more	  compact	  
means	  of	  production	  than	  that	  of	  red	  phosphorus.	  	  Birch	  labs	  are	  frequently	  referred	  
to	  as	  box	  labs	  because	  they	  are	  often	  small	  enough	  to	  fit	  into	  a	  cooler	  or	  suitcase.	  	  A	  
second	  advantage	  is	  that	  the	  reaction	  process	  requires	  no	  open	  flame.	  The	  
combination	  of	  small	  size	  and	  “cold	  cooking”	  make	  the	  method	  incredibly	  mobile.	  
Rather	  than	  being	  stuck	  in	  homes	  or	  outbuildings,	  cooks	  can	  pack	  all	  the	  necessary	  
ingredients	  into	  a	  suitcase	  and	  set	  up	  in	  a	  hotel	  room	  or	  the	  trunk	  of	  a	  car	  with	  only	  
the	  pungent	  smell	  of	  the	  anhydrous	  ammonia	  to	  give	  them	  away	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1999).	  	  
In	  the	  early	  2000s,	  Birch	  reduction	  labs	  were	  found	  in	  cooler	  chests	  so	  often	  that	  
members	  of	  the	  Missouri	  Highway	  Patrol	  joked	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  Rubbermaid	  
cooler	  in	  the	  bed	  of	  a	  truck	  was	  sufficient	  probable	  cause	  to	  pull	  that	  truck	  over	  
(Hutchings	  2010).	  	  	  	  
A	  final	  advantage	  of	  the	  Nazi	  method	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  ingredients.	  	  
Lithium	  can	  be	  easily	  extracted	  from	  batteries.	  	  Anhydrous	  ammonia	  has	  a	  number	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of	  commercial	  uses,	  but	  is	  most	  often	  found	  in	  fertilizers.	  	  Farm	  supply	  stores	  will	  
often	  have	  large	  tanks	  of	  this	  chemical	  on	  site,	  and	  farmers	  maintain	  supplies	  as	  
well.	  	  The	  fertilizer	  connection	  has	  made	  the	  Birch	  reduction	  method	  particularly	  
attractive	  in	  rural	  areas	  where	  the	  precursor	  is	  available	  to	  be	  stolen.	  	  Anhydrous	  
theft	  became	  such	  an	  issue	  in	  Iowa	  that	  the	  state	  began	  supplying	  farmers	  with	  locks	  
for	  their	  supply	  tanks	  while	  Iowa	  State	  scientists	  looked	  for	  ways	  to	  create	  a	  similar	  
compound	  that	  did	  not	  react	  in	  Birch	  reductions	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  2007).	  	  In	  the	  absence	  
of	  anhydrous	  to	  steal,	  the	  chemical	  can	  be	  synthesized	  easily.	  	  
Another	  advantage	  inherent	  to	  both	  the	  Red-­‐P	  and	  Nazi	  methods	  is	  that	  they	  
are	  cheap.	  	  For	  a	  small	  outlaying	  of	  cash,	  a	  cook	  could	  make	  a	  sizeable	  profit.	  	  Table	  
5.1	  reflects	  the	  best	  estimate	  of	  the	  costs	  of	  producing	  3	  ounces	  of	  meth	  with	  the	  
Red-­‐P	  and	  Nazi	  methods	  in	  the	  year	  2000	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2000a).	  	  	  	  
Nazi	  Method	   	  
Pseudoephedrine	   20	  boxes	   $60.00	  
Lithium	  batteries	   5	  packages	   $50.00	  
Ammonia	   1	  qrt.	   $300.00	  
Denatured	  alcohol*	   1	  gallon	   $16.00	  
Starting	  fluid	  (ether)	   5	  cans	   $10.00	  
	   	   	  
	   Manufacturing	  cost	   $426.00	  
	   Retail	  price**	   $7,200.00	  
	   	   	  
	   Profit	   $6,774.00	  
	   	   	  
Red-­‐P	  Method	   	   	  
Pseudoephedrine	   20	  boxes	   $60.00	  
Denatured	  alcohol*	   1	  gallon	   $16.00	  
7%	  Iodine	  tincture	  solution***	   1	  gallon	   $38.00	  
Hydrogen	  peroxide***	   1	  bottle	   $2.00	  
Red	  phosphorus	  powder	   25	  grams	   $55.00	  
Coleman	  fuel	   1	  gallon	   $2.50	  
Red	  Devil	  lye	  (sodium	  hydroxide)	   1	  can	   $1.50	  
	   	   	  
	   Manufacturing	  cost	   $175.00	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   Retail	  Price**	   $7,200.00	  
	   	   	  
	   Profit	   $7,125.00	  
*	  Used	  in	  extraction	  of	  precursor	   	   	  
**(72	  grams	  at	  40%	  purity)($100/gram)	   	   	  
Table	  5.1:	  The	  cost	  of	  making	  a	  single	  batch	  of	  methamphetamine	  using	  the	  Nazi	  
and	  Red-­‐P	  methods	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  (2000a).	  
	  
Eastward	  the	  Course	  of	  Methamphetamine	  
The	  first	  region	  to	  be	  hit	  by	  the	  diffusion	  of	  ephedrine-­‐based	  STLs	  was	  the	  
Midwest.	  	  Owen	  (2007)	  argued	  that	  diffusion	  began	  when	  a	  number	  of	  Californians	  
moved	  to	  Missouri	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  brought	  the	  ephedrine-­‐based	  methods	  with	  
them.	  	  One	  person	  in	  particular,	  Willi	  Olsen,	  came	  to	  the	  city	  of	  Independence	  and	  
began	  to	  ship	  in	  meth	  from	  California	  in	  pound	  quantities.	  	  As	  he	  was	  establishing	  
demand,	  he	  also	  recruited	  cook	  friends	  to	  join	  the	  operation.	  	  One	  of	  these	  friends,	  
Hugh	  Escobar,	  reportedly	  then	  split	  with	  Olsen	  and	  began	  to	  teach	  the	  Red-­‐P	  
method	  to	  others	  in	  the	  area.	  	  Detective	  Bill	  Sweeney	  of	  the	  Independence	  Drug	  Task	  
Force	  corroborated	  this	  story	  as	  he	  recalled	  when	  the	  Red-­‐P	  method	  took	  off	  in	  
Kansas	  City:	  	  
We	  were	  told,	  and	  it	  might	  just	  be	  tweaker	  talk,	  but	  there	  was	  a	  dude	  
who	  came	  from	  California,	  and	  that’s	  where	  all	  the	  meth	  labs	  came	  
from,	  with	  the	  Hell’s	  Angels	  and	  all	  that.	  	  And	  he	  came	  from	  California	  
and	  he	  kind	  of	  got	  things	  started.	  	  Well,	  he’d	  sell	  his	  recipes,	  and	  they	  
just	  went	  like	  wildfire,	  and	  in	  a	  matter	  of	  months,	  everyone	  was	  trying	  
to	  cook	  dope	  (Sweeney	  2010).	  	  	  
	  
The	  spread	  was	  so	  rapid	  that	  by	  1998,	  Rolling	  Stone	  Magazine	  was	  calling	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Methamphetamine	  production	  boomed	  in	  the	  lower	  Midwest	  in	  the	  latter	  
half	  of	  the	  1990s.	  	  Even	  from	  a	  distance,	  the	  numbers	  are	  staggering.	  	  Missouri	  had	  
two	  labs	  seized	  in	  1992,	  fourteen	  in	  1994,	  and	  421	  in	  1997	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1999).	  In	  
1993,	  three	  labs	  were	  seized	  in	  Iowa,	  but	  the	  numbers	  rose	  to	  103	  in	  1997,	  and	  320	  
in	  1998	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1998a).	  	  In	  Arkansas,	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  taken	  down	  by	  police	  
rose	  from	  three	  in	  1992	  to	  244	  by	  1997	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2000a).	  	  In	  
Kansas,	  there	  were	  4	  labs	  discovered	  in	  1994,	  99	  in	  1997,	  and	  189	  in	  1998	  (U.	  S.	  
Senate	  1999).	  	  	  In	  all	  cases,	  it	  appears	  that	  demand	  was	  established	  before	  local	  
production	  began.	  	  
In	  the	  Midwest,	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  progressed	  first	  from	  small-­‐
scale	  P2P	  dealing	  to	  a	  rapid	  influx	  of	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  and	  the	  appearance	  of	  
Red-­‐P	  labs.	  	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  lab	  boom	  spurred	  by	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Nazi	  
method.	  	  Detective	  Terry	  Story,	  of	  the	  Independence,	  Missouri,	  Police	  Department	  
described	  the	  transition	  in	  terms	  of	  changes	  in	  the	  labs	  themselves:	  “We	  had	  big	  labs	  
when	  we	  first	  started.	  	  We	  had	  mad	  scientist	  labs.	  	  And	  they	  were	  beautiful	  to	  look	  
at.	  	  Now	  it’s	  all	  small.	  They	  went	  from	  labs	  as	  big	  as	  this	  room	  to	  something	  you	  
could	  set	  on	  this	  notebook”	  (Storey	  2010).	  	  	  
The	  Midwest	  was	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  the	  diffusion	  of	  methamphetamine	  
markets	  and	  STLs,	  but	  the	  processes	  that	  occurred	  there	  were	  soon	  repeated	  in	  
other	  regions	  of	  the	  country.	  	  In	  the	  initial	  stage	  of	  recipe	  diffusion,	  information	  
exchange	  was	  dependent	  upon	  personal	  contact.	  	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Internet,	  
cooks	  had	  to	  learn	  from	  other	  cooks.	  	  Kirk	  Thompson	  of	  the	  KBI	  compared	  this	  
networking	  process	  to	  the	  mythical	  Hydra:	  “Our	  investigations	  reveal	  that	  these	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meth	  cooks	  come	  into	  our	  state	  and	  establish	  contact	  with	  our	  resident	  violators.	  	  
They	  pass	  along	  knowledge	  of	  their	  trade	  and	  move	  on	  and	  establish	  contact	  in	  
another	  area.	  	  It’s	  like	  a	  nightmarish	  chain	  letter.	  	  The	  problem	  is	  increasing	  
geometrically	  just	  like	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  Hydra”	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1999	  16).	  	  	  
With	  the	  proliferation	  of	  the	  Internet,	  aspiring	  cooks	  no	  longer	  had	  to	  rely	  on	  
direct	  contact	  with	  producers.	  	  They	  could	  order	  a	  book	  such	  as	  Uncle	  Fester’s	  
Secrets	  of	  Methamphetamine	  Manufacture	  (Fester	  2009),	  watch	  instructional	  videos	  
on	  YouTube,	  or	  engage	  in	  a	  conversation	  on	  a	  list	  serve.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  pace	  of	  
diffusion	  quickened.	  	  In	  2000,	  the	  first	  year	  for	  which	  the	  El	  Paso	  Intelligence	  Center	  
(EPIC)28	  has	  data,	  there	  were	  6,918	  labs	  seized.	  	  By	  2003,	  there	  were	  10,332	  (Figure	  
5.2).	  	  	  If	  we	  divide	  the	  numbers	  by	  region	  as	  designated	  by	  the	  Organized	  Crime	  
Drug	  Enforcement	  Task	  Force	  (OCDETF,	  Figure	  5.3),	  we	  can	  see	  that,	  as	  the	  decade	  
of	  the	  2000s	  progressed,	  the	  proportion	  of	  lab	  seizures	  in	  areas	  further	  from	  the	  
methamphetamine	  hearth	  of	  the	  West	  Coast	  grew	  significantly	  (Figures	  5.4).	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  EPIC	  is	  the	  national	  clearinghouse	  for	  clandestine	  laboratory	  seizure	  data.	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Figure	  5.3:	  OCDETF	  Regions	  
	  
By	  the	  year	  2000,	  methamphetamine	  markets	  in	  the	  West	  Central	  Region	  
were	  already	  well	  established.	  	  However,	  STL	  production	  was	  still	  diffusing	  to	  other	  
regions,	  and,	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  decade,	  the	  proportion	  of	  lab	  seizures	  belonging	  
to	  the	  Southeast	  and	  Great	  Lakes	  regions	  grew	  significantly	  as	  methamphetamine	  
markets	  in	  those	  regions	  grew	  (Figures	  5.4	  and	  5.5).	  	  By	  2005,	  a	  survey	  of	  law	  
enforcement	  officials	  nationwide	  reported	  that	  methamphetamine	  ranked	  as	  either	  
the	  first	  or	  second	  greatest	  drug	  threat	  for	  every	  region	  of	  the	  country	  but	  the	  
Northeast29	  (NDIC	  2005a).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  The	  National	  Drug	  Threat	  Assessment:	  2005	  uses	  a	  different	  region	  system	  than	  the	  OCDETF.	  	  In	  
this	  case,	  the	  region	  that	  did	  not	  list	  methamphetamine	  as	  a	  serious	  threat	  (it	  ranked	  fourth	  out	  of	  
five)	  was	  comprised	  of	  Connecticut,	  Delaware,	  Maine,	  Maryland,	  Massachusetts,	  New	  Hampshire,	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Figure	  5.4:	  Proportion	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  for	  the	  contiguous	  48	  states	  displayed	  by	  
OCDETF	  region	  (NCLSS	  2011).	  	  
	  
Reports	  by	  the	  National	  Institute	  on	  Drug	  Abuse’s	  Community	  Epidemiology	  
Working	  Group	  (CEWG)	  confirmed	  the	  spread.	  	  In	  1999	  that	  body	  saw	  only	  
negligible	  indications	  of	  a	  meth	  market	  in	  Chicago,	  Minneapolis/St.	  Paul,	  and	  
Atlanta.	  	  Five	  years	  later,	  the	  situation	  had	  changed.	  	  In	  2005,	  the	  CEWG	  reported	  
significant	  increases	  in	  usage	  indicators	  for	  the	  Midwest,	  South,	  and	  East.	  	  
Admissions	  for	  methamphetamine	  treatment	  in	  Atlanta	  were	  growing	  faster	  than	  
for	  any	  other	  drug,	  and	  enforcement	  officials	  in	  suburban	  Fulton	  and	  Dekalb	  
counties	  described	  methamphetamine	  as	  the	  biggest	  threat	  to	  their	  populations.	  
Informants	  in	  South	  Florida	  reported	  that	  meth	  prices	  there	  were	  the	  highest	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  They	  claimed	  that	  the	  drug	  was	  being	  imported	  from	  Georgia	  and	  North	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Figure	  5.5.	  	  Lab	  seizures	  by	  OCDETF	  region	  (NCLSS	  2011).	  
	  
In	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region,	  methamphetamine	  was	  not	  of	  significant	  concern	  
in	  Chicago	  itself,	  but	  50	  percent	  of	  Illinois	  counties	  were	  reporting	  increased	  
seizures	  of	  the	  drug.	  	  In	  Minneapolis/St.	  Paul	  treatment	  rates	  for	  methamphetamine	  
surpassed	  10	  percent	  of	  all	  admissions	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  2004.	  	  The	  CEWG	  
attributed	  most	  of	  the	  increase	  in	  labs	  (if	  not	  usage)	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  Nazi	  
method	  to	  the	  upper	  Midwest	  and	  rural	  South	  (CEWG	  1999a;	  2005).30	  	  	  
Another	  way	  to	  document	  the	  spread	  of	  methamphetamine	  markets	  over	  the	  
course	  of	  the	  2000s	  is	  to	  map	  the	  mean	  center	  of	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures.	  	  
There	  is	  no	  way	  to	  know	  the	  actual	  number	  of	  labs	  operating	  in	  an	  area,	  but	  lab	  
seizures	  offer	  an	  often-­‐used	  proxy	  (Weisheit	  and	  Wells	  2010).	  	  By	  weighting	  the	  
center	  coordinates	  of	  every	  county	  in	  the	  United	  States	  by	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  seized	  
within	  its	  borders,	  and	  then	  averaging	  those	  weighted	  values,	  we	  can	  track	  the	  mean	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Methamphetamine	  markets	  never	  again	  successfully	  penetrated	  the	  Northeast	  after	  the	  
drug’s	  brief	  heyday	  in	  the	  1960s.	  	  The	  CEWG	  has	  attributed	  this	  lack	  of	  penetration	  to	  “the	  
entrenched	  tradition	  of	  cocaine	  and	  heroin	  trafficking,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  lack	  local	  manufacture”	  (CEWG	  
1999b).	  	  Only	  in	  2011	  did	  government	  documents	  begin	  to	  warn	  of	  possible	  market	  expansion	  into	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center	  of	  domestic	  production	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  	  In	  the	  year	  2000,	  that	  center	  
was	  located	  in	  central	  Colorado,	  already	  pulled	  eastward	  from	  the	  West	  Coast	  by	  
surging	  production	  in	  Midwest	  (Figure	  5.6).	  	  	  By	  2010,	  it	  had	  migrated	  all	  the	  way	  to	  
western	  Kentucky,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  growing	  numbers	  of	  seizures	  in	  the	  Southeast	  and	  
Great	  Lakes	  regions.	  
	  
Figure	  5.6:	  The	  migration	  of	  the	  mean	  center	  of	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  
from	  2000	  to	  2010.	  	  The	  centers	  begin	  with	  the	  year	  2000	  in	  central	  Colorado,	  and	  
migrate	  eastward.	  
	  
	   The	  eastward	  expansion	  of	  methamphetamine	  markets	  was	  also	  reflected	  in	  
usage	  and	  treatment	  statistics.	  	  Emergency	  department	  visits	  in	  the	  DAWN	  system	  
involving	  methamphetamine	  grew	  by	  54	  percent	  from	  1995	  to	  2002	  (SAMHSA	  
2004a).	  	  Figure	  5.7	  shows	  MSAs	  with	  statistically	  significant	  increases	  in	  
methamphetamine	  mentions	  at	  admission	  to	  emergency	  departments.	  	  Admittedly,	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many	  of	  these	  percentages	  are	  exaggerated	  because	  the	  MSAs	  had	  extremely	  low	  
rates	  in	  1995,	  but	  the	  increase	  east	  of	  the	  Mississippi	  is	  still	  significant.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  5.7:	  Statistically	  significant	  increases	  in	  methamphetamine	  mentions	  for	  
emergency	  department	  visits	  in	  the	  DAWN	  system	  from	  1995	  to	  2002	  (SAMHSA	  
2004a).	  
	  
Primary	  admission	  rates	  for	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  Treatment	  Episode	  
Data	  Sets	  also	  showed	  significant	  increases	  (Figure	  5.8).	  	  Between	  1993	  and	  2005	  
the	  proportion	  of	  people	  seeking	  treatment	  for	  methamphetamine	  as	  their	  primary	  
drug	  of	  abuse	  increased	  from	  two	  percent	  of	  all	  admissions	  in	  1993	  to	  nine	  in	  2005.	  	  
The	  majority	  of	  these	  admissions	  (64-­‐76	  percent)	  were	  still	  located	  in	  the	  West.	  
Much	  of	  this	  increase	  is	  because	  of	  court-­‐mandated	  treatment.	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  
people	  referred	  to	  treatment	  by	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system	  increased	  from	  38	  in	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1997	  to	  56	  in	  2007	  as	  drug	  courts	  became	  more	  prevalent	  (SAMHSA	  2009a).	  Over	  
this	  time	  period	  the	  Northeast	  never	  accounted	  for	  more	  than	  a	  single	  percent	  of	  
methamphetamine	  treatment	  admissions.	  
	  
Figure	  5.8:	  Percentage	  change	  in	  primary	  treatment	  admissions	  for	  
methamphetamine	  in	  the	  TEDS	  system	  between	  1993	  and	  2005	  (SAMHSA	  2006d,	  
2011a).	  
	  
	   User	  demographics	  for	  methamphetamine	  over	  the	  past	  decade	  have	  
remained	  much	  as	  they	  had	  been	  earlier.	  	  The	  drug’s	  consumers	  were	  
predominantly	  white,	  though	  that	  percentage	  decreased	  from	  83	  in	  1993	  to	  65	  in	  
2007.	  The	  percentage	  of	  Hispanics	  who	  sought	  treatment,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
expanded	  from	  9	  to	  21	  over	  the	  same	  time	  span.	  This	  probably	  reflected	  the	  
increasing	  prevalence	  of	  Mexican	  meth.	  	  The	  method	  of	  administration	  for	  the	  drug	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experienced	  a	  significant	  change	  as	  well,	  with	  smoking	  replacing	  injection	  and	  
inhalation	  as	  the	  preferred	  method	  by	  1998	  (Figure	  5.9).	  
	  
Figure	  5.9:	  Changes	  in	  the	  method	  of	  administration	  for	  people	  seeking	  treatment	  
for	  methamphetamine	  abuse	  (SAMHSA	  2005;	  2009a).	  	  
	  
	  
	  Small	  Labs,	  Big	  Problems	  	  
	   No	  matter	  where	  they	  were	  found,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  STLs	  presented	  an	  
array	  of	  problems	  to	  the	  communities	  that	  had	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
the	  actual	  proportion	  of	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  that	  they	  supplied	  was	  fairly	  
small,	  estimated	  at	  roughly	  20	  percent	  on	  a	  national	  level.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  such	  
labs	  garnered	  a	  lot	  of	  public	  attention	  and	  demanded	  action.	  	  Joseph	  Corcoran,	  the	  
special	  agent	  in	  charge	  of	  the	  St.	  Louis	  DEA	  office	  identified	  three	  problems	  created	  
by	  the	  small	  labs.	  	  First	  was	  that	  the	  chemicals	  used	  in	  the	  production	  process	  were	  
highly	  volatile	  and	  could	  potentially	  result	  in	  explosions	  or	  fires.31	  	  Second	  was	  that	  
the	  chemicals	  used	  in	  production,	  whether	  they	  exploded	  or	  not,	  were	  highly	  toxic,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  This	  fear	  is	  often	  overstated.	  	  According	  to	  DEA	  statistics	  for	  2002,	  1.4	  percent	  of	  labs	  exploded	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and	  resulted	  in	  significant	  environmental	  damage	  when	  disposed	  of	  improperly.	  	  
These	  two	  factors	  combined	  to	  make	  meth	  labs	  expensive	  to	  clean	  up.	  	  Corcoran	  put	  
the	  cost	  of	  disposing	  of	  the	  chemicals	  at	  $2,500	  per	  lab.	  	  According	  to	  him,	  “the	  
amount	  of	  drugs	  that	  these	  labs	  produce”	  was	  “perhaps	  the	  least	  significant”	  
problem	  associated	  with	  STLs	  (U.	  S.	  Senate	  1999,	  35).	  	  
Corcoran’s	  concern,	  although	  presented	  in	  a	  flippant	  way,	  was	  important:	  the	  
public’s	  desire	  to	  close	  down	  domestic	  meth	  labs	  took	  attention	  and	  funding	  away	  
from	  the	  more	  significant	  methamphetamine	  problem,	  which	  was	  the	  distribution	  of	  
methamphetamine	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs.	  	  As	  my	  informant	  in	  the	  KBI	  explained	  it:	  	  
The	  meth	  lab	  is	  kind	  of	  like	  the	  fire	  for	  firemen.	  	  When	  we	  get	  a	  meth	  lab,	  law	  
enforcement	  has	  to	  respond.	  	  And	  so,	  all	  the	  time	  we	  spend	  on	  that	  
methamphetamine	  lab	  crime	  scene	  is	  time	  we	  can’t	  spend	  on	  cases	  that	  
would	  be	  interdiction	  cases	  for	  methamphetamine,	  so	  that	  we	  could	  maybe	  
try	  to	  get	  some	  of	  those	  other	  sources	  of	  supply	  under	  control	  (Hutchings	  
2010).	  
	  
This	  meant	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  small	  toxic	  labs	  might	  actually	  help	  rather	  than	  hurt	  
the	  business	  of	  DTOs,	  as	  it	  diverts	  attention	  and	  funds	  away	  from	  their	  persecution	  
without	  significantly	  reducing	  their	  market	  share.	  
	   Indiana	  Representative	  Mark	  Souder	  spent	  much	  of	  the	  early	  2000s	  holding	  
hearings	  regarding	  methamphetamine	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Subcommittee	  on	  Criminal	  
Justice,	  Drug	  Policy,	  and	  Human	  Resources	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives’	  
Committee	  on	  Government	  Reform.	  	  He	  viewed	  the	  visibility	  of	  methamphetamine	  
labs	  in	  a	  similar	  light	  to	  that	  of	  Agent	  Corcoran:	  “It’s	  a	  political	  problem,	  because	  if	  
you	  see	  the	  number	  of	  headlines,	  the	  community	  starts	  to	  think	  that	  they	  have	  a	  
bigger	  meth	  problem	  proportionately	  than	  it	  is	  actually	  there,	  and	  you	  could	  also	  
misallocate	  funds	  chasing	  the	  smaller	  [lab	  seizure]	  numbers”	  (House	  of	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Representatives	  2003,	  82).	  In	  a	  report	  submitted	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  House,	  his	  
committee	  warned	  that	  targeting	  STLs	  alone	  was	  futile:	  	  “Merely	  tackling	  the	  small	  
clandestine	  labs	  is	  like	  squeezing	  a	  balloon—the	  meth	  supply	  will	  expand	  elsewhere	  
to	  meet	  demand.	  	  Mexican	  meth	  will	  more	  than	  replace	  the	  supply	  from	  small	  labs,	  
unless	  Congress	  addresses	  the	  problem	  in	  a	  comprehensive	  way”	  (Committee	  on	  
Government	  Reform	  2005,	  6).	  	  
The	  explosion	  in	  small	  meth	  labs	  was	  a	  strain	  not	  just	  on	  field	  operatives	  and	  
legislators,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  forensic	  scientists	  whose	  duty	  it	  was	  to	  identify	  the	  
chemicals	  and	  drugs	  found	  at	  lab	  sites.	  	  As	  an	  example,	  in	  1998	  the	  Indiana	  State	  
Police	  lab	  handled	  400	  meth	  cases.	  	  By	  2002	  their	  number	  was	  2,800,	  surpassing	  the	  
total	  of	  even	  cocaine	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2004a).	  	  The	  director	  of	  the	  Kansas	  
City	  crime	  lab	  estimated	  that	  the	  processing	  of	  meth	  labs	  required	  ten	  to	  twenty	  
times	  the	  man-­‐hours	  of	  a	  traditional	  drug	  arrest.	  	  The	  explosion	  in	  the	  number	  of	  
labs	  seized	  meant	  that	  state	  forensic	  labs	  had	  to	  reduce	  the	  time	  spent	  on	  drug,	  rape,	  
homicide,	  and	  robbery	  cases	  they	  would	  normally	  have	  worked.	  	  The	  seizures	  also	  
created	  massive	  backlogs	  of	  lab	  work,	  which	  meant	  that	  prosecutors	  had	  to	  put	  off	  
trials	  as	  they	  waited	  for	  analyses	  to	  come	  in.	  	  	  
Small	  toxic	  labs	  differ	  from	  their	  super	  brethren	  in	  a	  number	  of	  important	  
ways	  that	  impact	  the	  communities	  in	  which	  they	  are	  found.	  	  Superlabs	  are	  an	  
industrial	  affair.	  	  They	  tend	  to	  be	  hidden	  away	  in	  remote	  areas	  because	  their	  size	  
makes	  them	  both	  difficult	  to	  move	  and	  easy	  to	  identify.	  	  In	  the	  U.	  S.	  they	  are	  
frequently	  found	  on	  public	  lands	  or	  in	  remote	  agricultural	  land	  in	  the	  Central	  Valley	  
of	  California.	  	  Their	  operation	  harms	  only	  the	  land,	  the	  cooks	  (potentially),	  and	  the	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people	  who	  use	  the	  meth	  they	  produce.	  	  Small	  toxic	  labs,	  in	  contrast,	  have	  the	  
potential	  to	  inflict	  far	  more	  harm.	  	  	  Their	  mobility	  increases	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  
innocent	  bystander	  coming	  into	  contact	  with	  them.	  Often,	  this	  is	  a	  police	  officer	  
accustomed	  to	  standard	  traffic	  stops	  and	  generally	  unprepared	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
operational	  meth	  lab	  he	  finds	  in	  the	  trunk	  of	  a	  car.	  	  	  At	  other	  times	  it	  is	  park	  rangers	  
or	  regular	  citizens	  out	  for	  a	  stroll.	  	  	  
Small	  size	  also	  means	  that	  the	  domestic	  labs	  are	  temporary	  affairs.	  	  In	  more	  
densely	  populated	  areas	  they	  have	  often	  been	  set	  up	  in	  hotel	  rooms.	  	  Although	  some	  
hotel	  operators	  knowingly	  lease	  rooms	  to	  meth	  cooks,	  others	  do	  so	  unsuspectingly,	  
and	  are	  then	  stuck	  with	  the	  significant	  cost	  of	  decontamination	  while	  they	  lose	  
income	  as	  these	  rooms	  sit	  idle.	  	  The	  price	  of	  such	  decontamination	  is	  significantly	  
more	  than	  the	  chemical	  disposal	  cost	  incurred	  by	  the	  DEA	  or	  local	  police.	  
Perhaps	  no	  group	  suffers	  more	  from	  the	  existence	  of	  small	  toxic	  labs	  than	  the	  
children	  of	  meth	  cooks	  or	  meth-­‐addicted	  parents.	  	  In	  2002,	  some	  2,000	  children	  
were	  present	  during	  meth	  lab	  seizures	  and	  69	  percent	  of	  them	  had	  been	  exposed	  to	  
hazardous	  chemicals	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2003).	  The	  knowledge	  these	  kids	  
were	  exposed	  to	  is	  probably	  even	  more	  damaging.	  	  Terry	  Williams,	  the	  director	  of	  
the	  North	  Central	  (Missouri)	  Drug	  Task	  Force,	  testified	  before	  Congress	  about	  a	  time	  
in	  the	  mid	  1990s	  that	  she	  was	  contacted	  by	  school	  officials	  in	  Ray	  County	  because	  
there	  was	  a	  nine	  year-­‐old	  in	  the	  school	  who	  claimed	  to	  know	  how	  to	  make	  meth:	  	  
Now	  we	  could	  barely	  pronounce	  it	  at	  the	  time,	  let	  alone	  spell	  it	  .	  .	  .	  
[But]	  this	  child	  sat	  and	  began	  talking	  to	  us.	  	  He	  told	  us	  how	  the	  
process	  worked,	  and	  “Make	  sure	  you	  get	  the	  heat	  right	  here,	  and	  turn	  
it	  down	  here,	  because	  if	  it	  gets	  too	  hot	  you	  may	  have	  a	  fire.”	  This	  was	  a	  
child	  who	  knew	  what	  he	  was	  talking	  about,	  because	  he	  had	  watched	  	  
(U.S.	  Senate	  1999	  21).	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Later,	  when	  the	  task	  force	  raided	  that	  child’s	  home,	  he	  reportedly	  asked	  the	  police	  
what	  had	  taken	  them	  so	  long.	  	  	  
	   	  
Small	  Toxic	  Networks	  
Though	  not	  affiliated	  with	  specific	  organized	  crime	  groups	  in	  the	  way	  that	  
the	  superlabs	  of	  California	  were	  directly	  connected	  to	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations,	  the	  independent	  cooks	  and	  users	  that	  coalesced	  around	  small	  labs	  
still	  formed	  a	  network	  of	  sorts.	  	  First,	  there	  was	  the	  information	  exchange	  that	  
occurred	  in	  the	  early	  years	  of	  meth	  market	  diffusion.	  	  Kirk	  Thompson,	  the	  director	  
of	  the	  KBI	  in	  1999,	  described	  the	  network	  of	  methamphetamine	  cooks	  in	  his	  region	  
as	  the	  most	  troublesome	  development	  to	  have	  occurred	  around	  the	  drug.	  	  He	  argued	  
that	  the	  spread	  of	  techniques	  and	  expertise	  relating	  to	  methamphetamine	  made	  the	  
prosecution	  of	  individual	  cooks	  pointless	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  disruption.	  	  A	  new	  cook	  
would	  simply	  rise	  to	  take	  their	  place.	  	  To	  Thompson,	  the	  only	  effective	  way	  to	  stop	  
methamphetamine	  was	  the	  removal	  of	  precursors	  from	  the	  market.	  	  	  
The	  Missouri	  Highway	  Patrol	  reported	  similar	  interaction	  between	  cooks:	  
“While	  these	  local	  producers	  do	  not	  maintain	  an	  organized	  hierarchy,	  it	  has	  been	  
found	  through	  various	  investigations	  that	  these	  local	  producers	  have	  friendships	  or	  
other	  criminal	  ties	  to	  individuals	  within	  their	  immediate	  or	  adjoining	  states”	  (U.	  S.	  
Senate	  1999,	  56).	  	  Rogelio	  Guevara	  of	  the	  DEA	  believed	  the	  Internet	  increased	  the	  
scope	  of	  meth	  cook	  networks:	  “While	  in	  the	  past	  methamphetamine	  ‘chemists’	  
closely	  guarded	  their	  ‘recipes,’	  today’s	  age	  of	  modern	  computer	  technology	  has	  
made	  ‘chemists’	  more	  willing	  to	  share	  their	  ‘recipes’	  of	  death.	  	  	  This	  form	  of	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information	  sharing	  allows	  wide	  dissemination	  of	  the	  techniques	  to	  anyone	  with	  
computer	  access”	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2003,	  55).	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  loosely	  affiliated	  web	  of	  recipe	  sharing,	  smaller	  networks	  
coalesce	  around	  individual	  cooks.	  	  Lab	  operation	  has	  never	  been	  a	  solitary	  activity.	  	  
Sergeant	  John	  Sanchez	  of	  the	  Arizona	  Department	  of	  Public	  Safety	  described	  the	  
division	  of	  labor	  associated	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  even	  a	  small	  lab:	  “You	  have	  ten	  or	  
twelve	  people	  involved.	  	  One	  that’s	  supplying	  the	  money,	  one	  that’s	  supplying	  the	  
chemicals,	  one	  that’s	  supplying	  the	  glassware,	  one	  that’s	  supplying	  the	  place,	  one	  
that’s	  supplying	  the	  recipe,	  and	  on	  and	  on	  and	  on”	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  1995,	  
42).	  	  Cooking	  then,	  becomes	  a	  social	  activity	  and	  a	  culture	  evolves	  around	  it.	  	  John	  C.	  
Horton	  of	  the	  ONDCP	  described	  that	  society	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives	  in	  
2003:	  
For	  users	  and	  dealers,	  cooking	  methamphetamine	  has	  developed	  into	  
a	  social	  activity	  where	  methamphetamine	  users	  can	  share	  information	  
on	  methods	  of	  cooking	  and	  using	  methamphetamine,	  who	  in	  the	  
“meth	  world”	  may	  be	  working	  undercover	  for	  police,	  and	  what	  sort	  of	  
criminal	  enterprise,	  such	  as	  identity	  theft,	  may	  be	  feasible	  to	  
criminally	  enable	  the	  acquisitions	  of	  the	  ingredients	  used	  in	  
methamphetamine	  (House	  of	  Representatives	  2003,	  71).	  
	  
Detective	  Gary	  Tucker	  of	  the	  Independence	  Police	  Drug	  Task	  Force	  told	  me	  of	  
the	  pride	  the	  early	  ephedrine	  cooks	  took	  in	  their	  work	  and	  the	  networks	  that	  
formed	  around	  them:	  	  
Guys	  initially	  that	  were	  in	  it,	  they	  were	  perfectionists.	  	  They	  had	  a	  
product	  that	  they	  were	  proud	  of.	  	  Because	  they	  would	  tell	  us.	  	  We	  
would	  talk	  to	  them	  in	  interviews	  and	  they	  would	  tell	  us,	  “Yeah	  man,	  
I’ve	  got	  the	  best	  stuff	  here.	  	  Mine’s	  about	  99,	  98	  percent	  pure.	  	  You’re	  
not	  gonna	  find	  anything	  better	  here,	  so	  I	  can	  pretty	  much	  dictate	  my	  
price.	  	  And	  my	  customers	  are	  repeat	  customers.”	  So	  they	  had	  a	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Generally	  speaking,	  the	  networks	  that	  form	  around	  a	  small	  lab	  are	  not	  profit-­‐
driven	  entities.	  	  The	  group	  goal	  is	  to	  produce	  enough	  meth	  for	  their	  own	  personal	  
use	  and	  to	  have	  just	  enough	  to	  sell	  to	  fund	  the	  next	  cook.	  	  The	  limited	  sales	  that	  
occur	  do	  so	  through	  a	  social	  network	  model,	  meaning	  that	  the	  cook	  or	  other	  
members	  of	  the	  small	  lab	  network	  sell	  only	  to	  personal	  acquaintances.	  	  These	  sales	  
occur	  off	  the	  street	  in	  private	  residences.	  	  All	  of	  these	  factors	  combine	  to	  make	  small	  
lab	  operations	  difficult	  to	  penetrate	  and	  disrupt.	  Undercover	  operations	  or	  
traditional	  buy	  and	  busts	  simply	  do	  not	  work.	  	  More	  often	  than	  not,	  labs	  are	  
discovered	  via	  the	  vigilance	  of	  neighbors	  or	  merchants	  who	  sell	  the	  known	  
ingredients	  necessary	  for	  a	  cook.	  	  	  Other	  times,	  the	  erratic	  behavior	  of	  meth	  cooks	  
and	  users	  brings	  attention	  to	  themselves	  and	  their	  activities.	  	  	  	  
	  
Correlates	  of	  Methamphetamine	  Lab	  Seizures	  
As	  Figure	  5.2	  shows,	  the	  peak	  years	  of	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  
United	  States	  were	  from	  2000	  to	  2004.	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  lab	  location	  better,	  I	  
conducted	  a	  spatial	  regression	  analysis	  of	  seizures	  during	  this	  time	  period	  (Figure	  
5.10).	  	  Tables	  5.2	  and	  5.3	  show	  the	  covariates	  associated	  with	  such	  seizures	  at	  the	  
peak	  of	  STL	  production	  for	  the	  contiguous	  United	  States	  at	  the	  county	  level.	  The	  
method	  used	  to	  determine	  the	  covariates	  was	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  negative	  binomial	  
spatial	  regression,	  and	  the	  results	  are	  presented	  in	  two	  separate	  tables.	  32	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32	  For	  an	  in-­‐depth	  explanation	  of	  the	  data	  for	  these	  analyses,	  methods	  used,	  and	  complete	  results,	  see	  
Appendix.	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Figure	  5.10:	  Cumulative	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  for	  2000-­‐2003	  by	  county	  
(NCLSS	  2011).	  
	  
	   The	  first	  table	  (Table	  5.2)	  displays	  the	  logistic	  zero-­‐inflation	  portion	  of	  the	  
model.	  	  Covariates	  in	  this	  table	  help	  to	  determine	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  county	  having	  
zero	  labs	  seized	  within	  its	  borders.	  	  A	  negative	  value	  of	  the	  coefficient	  of	  these	  
variables	  indicates	  that	  they	  increase	  the	  likelihood	  of	  labs	  being	  present	  in	  a	  
county.	  	  Nationally,	  the	  most	  significant	  predictor	  of	  meth	  labs	  being	  seized	  within	  a	  
county	  was	  their	  presence	  within	  neighboring	  counties.	  	  High	  dissimilarity	  indexes	  
for	  a	  county’s	  white	  population	  (DisSim),	  high	  property	  crime	  rates	  (Prop),	  and	  
population	  turnover	  since	  1995	  (DIFCTY95)	  were	  also	  correlated	  with	  the	  presence	  
of	  meth	  labs.	  	  In	  contradiction	  to	  the	  frequently	  repeated	  assertion	  that	  meth	  use	  
and	  production	  are	  predominantly	  rural,	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  population	  living	  in	  
rural	  areas	  (RurPCT)	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  that	  no	  labs	  would	  be	  found	  within	  a	  
county’s	  borders.	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Zero-­inflation	  Model	   	   	   	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   4.210	   0.935	   4.502	   0.000	  
LAG	   -­1.262	   0.117	   -­10.780	   0.000	  
Prop	   -­0.084	   0.033	   -­2.542	   0.011	  
RurPCT	   0.016	   0.004	   4.433	   0.000	  
DIFCTY95	   -­0.028	   0.015	   -­1.889	   0.059	  
DisSim	   -­0.039	   0.010	   -­3.819	   0.000	  
Table	  5.2:	  Covariates	  associated	  with	  the	  probability	  that	  no	  labs	  will	  be	  seized	  
within	  a	  county.	  
	  
Count	  Model	  Coefficients	   	   	  
Variables	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   1.029	   0.682	   1.509	   0.131	  
LAG	   0.028	   0.002	   16.661	   0.000	  
WhtPCT	   0.034	   0.004	   9.569	   0.000	  
Vacant	   -­0.018	   0.004	   -­4.168	   0.000	  
SingMom	   0.141	   0.030	   4.745	   0.000	  
Prop	   0.040	   0.012	   3.253	   0.001	  
farm	   -­0.434	   0.095	   -­4.558	   0.000	  
manf	   -­0.179	   0.063	   -­2.845	   0.004	  
PCTBACH	   -­0.030	   0.006	   -­4.800	   0.000	  
RurPCT	   -­0.005	   0.002	   -­2.660	   0.008	  
SpanPCT	   -­0.023	   0.004	   -­6.049	   0.000	  
DIFCTY95	   -­0.013	   0.006	   -­2.022	   0.043	  
RentOcc	   0.018	   0.006	   3.062	   0.002	  
DisSim	   -­0.030	   0.005	   -­6.365	   0.000	  
PDZ	   -­0.108	   0.051	   -­2.125	   0.034	  
Interstate	   0.001	   0.001	   1.650	   0.099	  
PopZ	   0.286	   0.046	   6.177	   0.000	  
Log(theta)	   -­‐0.196	   0.036	   -­‐5.389	   0.000	  
Table	  5.3:	  Covariates	  associated	  with	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  meth	  labs	  being	  found	  
within	  a	  county.	  
	  
Table	  5.3	  shows	  the	  factors	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  changes	  in	  the	  quantity	  
of	  labs	  seized	  within	  a	  county	  once	  the	  hurdle	  of	  having	  zero	  labs	  within	  it	  has	  been	  
overcome.	  	  In	  this	  table,	  a	  positive	  value	  indicates	  the	  variable	  has	  positive	  impact	  
on	  meth	  lab	  seizures.	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  presence	  of	  labs	  in	  neighboring	  counties	  
(LAG)	  is	  positively	  associated	  with	  increasing	  meth	  lab	  seizures.	  	  This	  may	  be	  
evidence	  of	  the	  diffusion	  of	  labs	  or	  of	  increased	  policing	  in	  the	  face	  of	  nearby	  meth	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problems.	  More	  probably,	  it	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  both	  factors.	  	  Increasing	  lab	  seizures	  
were	  also	  positively	  associated	  with	  counties	  where	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  the	  
population	  was	  white	  (WHTPCT),	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  families	  had	  a	  single	  mother	  
as	  the	  head	  of	  household	  (SINGMOM),	  property	  crime	  rates	  were	  higher,	  and	  a	  
larger	  number	  of	  homes	  were	  occupied	  by	  renters	  (RentOcc).	  	  Most	  of	  these	  
correlates	  are	  associated	  with	  social	  disorganization,	  a	  condition	  common	  to	  high-­‐
crime	  areas	  containing	  drug	  markets.	  	  The	  lone	  exception,	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  
white	  residents,	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  white	  people	  make	  up	  a	  disproportionately	  
large	  percentage	  of	  meth	  users	  (SAMHSA	  2009).	  	  Interestingly,	  a	  higher	  population	  
(PopZ)	  is	  correlated	  with	  increasing	  meth	  lab	  seizures.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  relationship	  
indicates	  that	  a	  sufficient	  market	  needs	  to	  exist	  in	  order	  for	  cooks	  to	  bother	  
producing.	  	  	  
The	  negative	  relationships	  between	  education	  levels	  (PCTBACH)	  and	  
percentage	  of	  the	  population	  that	  speaks	  Spanish	  at	  home	  (PCTSPN)	  were	  expected.	  	  
Meth	  users	  (and	  cooks)	  tend	  to	  be	  undereducated.	  	  Spanish	  speaking	  was	  included	  
in	  the	  model	  as	  an	  indicator	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  market	  penetration	  by	  Mexican	  
DTOs.	  	  Its	  significance	  and	  negative	  correlation	  would	  seem	  to	  validate	  this	  
assumption,	  and	  to	  suggest	  that	  meth	  production	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  
demand	  is	  not	  met	  by	  importation.	  	  	  
Several	  of	  the	  other	  negative	  correlates	  were	  surprising.	  	  Rural	  counties,	  ones	  
dependent	  upon	  farms	  (farm),	  and	  ones	  with	  large	  numbers	  of	  vacant	  properties	  
were	  all	  associated	  with	  decreasing	  meth	  labs,	  once	  again	  arguing	  against	  a	  
connection	  between	  meth	  production	  and	  rural	  areas.	  	  However,	  population	  density	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(PDZ)	  was	  also	  negatively	  correlated.	  	  	  This	  would	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  
relationship	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  previously	  mentioned	  variables.	  	  Perhaps	  a	  fine	  
line	  between	  population	  density	  and	  highly	  rural	  population	  must	  be	  met	  for	  meth	  
labs	  to	  occur.	  	  Finally,	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  increasing	  segregation	  of	  whites	  
from	  other	  ethnicities	  and	  the	  meth	  lab	  count	  is	  opposite	  from	  what	  it	  was	  for	  the	  
zero-­‐inflation	  portion	  of	  the	  model.	  	  That	  is	  to	  say	  that	  segregation	  of	  whites	  
increases	  the	  probability	  that	  a	  county	  will	  have	  at	  least	  one	  meth	  lab	  seized	  within	  
its	  borders,	  but	  decreases	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  seized	  being	  high.	  	  In	  
both	  cases,	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  variable,	  while	  significant,	  was	  small.	  33	  	  
	  
Precursor	  Legislation,	  Smurfs,	  and	  the	  Advent	  of	  One-­Pot	  Meth	  
	   By	  the	  end	  of	  2004,	  the	  federal	  government	  was	  well	  aware	  of	  the	  explosion	  
in	  domestic	  methamphetamine.	  	  In	  the	  previous	  six	  years	  officials	  had	  held	  at	  least	  
fifteen	  hearings	  on	  the	  topic.	  	  However,	  the	  best	  way	  to	  attack	  the	  problem	  was	  not	  
entirely	  clear.	  	  Since	  1981,	  state	  and	  federal	  agencies	  had	  attempted	  to	  stop	  
methamphetamine	  by	  restricting	  access	  to	  precursor	  chemicals	  on	  a	  number	  of	  
occasions.	  	  In	  1981	  they	  restricted	  sales	  of	  phenyl-­‐2-­‐propanone,	  sparking	  the	  switch	  
to	  ephedrine-­‐based	  recipes,	  and	  thereby	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  explosion	  in	  
production	  and	  usage	  that	  continues	  today.	  	  In	  1988	  they	  passed	  the	  Chemical	  
Diversion	  and	  Trafficking	  Act	  (CDTA),	  another	  attempt	  to	  limit	  access	  to	  precursors.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  after	  heavy	  lobbying	  by	  pharmaceutical	  companies,	  exceptions	  were	  
made	  in	  this	  law	  to	  allow	  unlimited	  sales	  of	  ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  as	  long	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  See	  Appendix	  for	  the	  full	  tables	  and	  discussion	  of	  the	  results	  for	  the	  individual	  OCDETF	  regions.	  	  
	  
	  
	   185	  
as	  they	  were	  in	  pill	  form	  (Suo	  2004c).	  	  Also,	  of	  course,	  dips	  in	  production	  caused	  by	  
such	  restrictions	  opened	  the	  market	  to	  penetration	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs	  and,	  within	  a	  
year,	  producers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  border	  had	  begun	  using	  pills	  rather	  than	  bulk	  
ephedrine	  to	  make	  their	  meth.	  Moreover,	  unscrupulous	  chemical	  suppliers	  were	  
making	  ephedrine	  pills	  with	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  selling	  them	  to	  meth	  producers.	  	  	  
	   In	  1993	  the	  federal	  government	  tried	  to	  close	  the	  pill	  exception	  loophole	  by	  
passing	  the	  Domestic	  Chemical	  Diversion	  and	  Control	  Act	  (DCDCA).	  	  However,	  
additional	  lobbying	  by	  the	  pharmaceutical	  corporations	  thwarted	  the	  original	  intent	  
and	  the	  pill	  exception	  for	  pseudoephedrine	  was	  maintained	  in	  the	  new	  law	  (Suo	  
2004c).	  	  At	  the	  time,	  meth	  cooks	  had	  not	  yet	  made	  the	  switch	  from	  ephedrine	  to	  
pseudoephedrine,	  so	  pharmaceutical	  companies	  could	  reasonably	  argue	  that	  there	  
was	  no	  need	  to	  cover	  that	  particular	  chemical,	  which	  was	  the	  key	  ingredient	  in	  their	  
$3	  billion	  cold	  medicine	  business.	  	  It	  would	  not	  take	  producers	  long	  to	  make	  the	  
switch.	  	  	  
In	  1995,	  the	  DEA	  raided	  the	  warehouses	  of	  Clifton	  Pharmaceuticals,	  a	  
company	  they	  believed	  had	  sold	  over	  70	  tons	  of	  ephedrine	  pills	  to	  
methamphetamine	  manufactures.	  	  Examination	  of	  Clifton’s	  records	  showed	  that,	  
after	  the	  ban	  on	  ephedrine	  pill	  sales,	  the	  company	  purchased	  110	  tons	  of	  
pseudoephedrine,	  which	  they	  then	  stamped	  into	  unregulated	  pills	  and	  sold	  to	  meth	  
manufacturers.	  	  Other	  suppliers	  followed	  suit.	  	  In	  1995,	  pseudoephedrine	  labs	  made	  
up	  22	  percent	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  by	  the	  DEA.	  	  By	  1997,	  they	  accounted	  for	  over	  57	  
percent	  (Suo	  2004c)	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   Legislators	  thought	  they	  had	  finally	  closed	  the	  pseudoephedrine	  loophole	  in	  
1996	  when	  they	  passed	  the	  Comprehensive	  Methamphetamine	  Control	  Act.	  	  Still	  
another	  exception,	  however,	  this	  time	  for	  pills	  in	  blister	  packs34	  meant	  that	  
producers	  (particularly	  those	  operating	  small	  labs)	  could	  still	  easily	  acquire	  
sufficient	  product	  for	  their	  needs.	  	  Blister	  packs	  were	  found	  at	  47	  percent	  of	  meth	  
labs	  seized	  in	  1999	  and	  2000	  (Suo	  2004c).	  
	   	  	  Although	  methamphetamine	  producers	  have	  shown	  themselves	  to	  be	  
incredibly	  resourceful	  over	  time,	  each	  of	  these	  legislative	  attempts	  at	  curbing	  meth	  
production,	  and	  therefore	  abuse,	  was	  at	  least	  temporarily	  successful.	  	  The	  
government’s	  report	  on	  “The	  Price	  and	  Purity	  of	  Illicit	  Drugs:	  1981-­‐2007,”	  noted	  
peaks	  in	  price	  and	  drops	  in	  purity	  “coincident	  with	  the	  introductions	  of	  
methamphetamine	  precursor	  chemical	  regulations”	  (Fries	  et	  al.	  2008,	  10).	  
Cunningham	  and	  Liu	  (2003)	  found	  that	  the	  laws	  directed	  at	  ephedrine	  and	  
pseudoephedrine	  caused	  serous	  drops	  in	  the	  number	  of	  methamphetamine-­‐related	  
hospital	  visits	  in	  California,	  Arizona,	  and	  Nevada	  for	  the	  three	  months	  after	  their	  
implementation	  (35	  percent	  after	  DCDCA,	  and	  71	  percent	  MCA).	  	  A	  follow-­‐up	  study	  
of	  methamphetamine	  arrests	  in	  California,	  which	  included	  1988s	  CDTA	  as	  well,	  
produced	  similar	  results.	  	  In	  all	  three	  cases,	  arrests	  declined	  after	  implementation,	  
and	  took	  several	  years	  to	  rebound	  (Cunningham	  and	  Liu	  2005).	  	  	  
Dobkin	  and	  Nicosia	  (2009)	  looked	  at	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  DCDCA	  on	  a	  broad	  
number	  of	  variables	  related	  to	  methamphetamine	  in	  California.	  	  After	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  For	  reasons	  that	  were	  never	  made	  clear,	  legislators	  believed	  that,	  by	  putting	  pills	  into	  blister	  packs	  
(foil	  sheets	  with	  plastic	  bubbles	  on	  them	  to	  contain	  individual	  pills),	  they	  could	  somehow	  deter	  meth	  
producers	  from	  using	  them.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  repetitive	  task	  of	  popping	  pills	  from	  a	  blister	  pack	  is	  perfectly	  
suited	  for	  a	  meth	  user	  on	  a	  run.	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implementation	  of	  the	  legislation	  and	  the	  closure	  of	  two	  significant	  West	  Coast	  
ephedrine	  suppliers,	  methamphetamine	  prices	  per	  gram	  increased	  threefold	  in	  a	  
four-­‐month	  period,	  but	  returned	  to	  previous	  levels	  within	  an	  additional	  four	  
months.	  	  Methamphetamine	  street	  purity	  dropped	  77	  percent	  and	  treatment	  center	  
admissions	  dropped	  35.	  	  	  The	  number	  of	  arrestees	  testing	  positive	  for	  meth	  dropped	  
by	  55	  percent,	  and	  the	  number	  of	  arrests	  for	  possessing	  and	  selling	  meth	  dropped	  
50	  percent.	  	  Purity,	  treatment	  admissions,	  arrestee	  positives,	  and	  meth-­‐related	  
arrests	  all	  took	  roughly	  eighteen	  months	  to	  rebound.	  	  That	  number	  of	  months	  is	  
roughly	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  Suo	  (2004c)	  estimated	  that	  it	  took	  for	  producers	  to	  
switch	  almost	  entirely	  from	  ephedrine	  to	  pseudoephedrine	  in	  their	  production	  
techniques.	  
By	  2005	  it	  had	  been	  eight	  years	  since	  the	  last	  significant	  federal	  effort	  to	  
regulate	  precursors	  had	  taken	  effect.	  	  Perhaps	  fed	  up	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  action,	  29	  
states	  had	  enacted	  laws	  limiting	  the	  retail	  sale	  of	  pseudoephedrine	  either	  by	  weight	  
or	  number	  of	  packages	  that	  could	  be	  purchased	  at	  a	  time	  (Figure	  5.11),	  and	  15	  had	  
done	  so	  for	  ephedrine	  (McBride	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  McBride	  et	  al.	  (2008)	  found	  that	  the	  
implementation	  of	  those	  state	  precursor	  laws	  produced	  an	  immediate	  significant	  
decline	  in	  STL	  seizures.	  	  However,	  cooks	  quickly	  adapted.	  	  Shortly	  after	  precursor	  
legislation	  passed	  in	  Missouri,	  for	  example,	  Jefferson	  County	  officials	  reported	  that	  
cooks	  in	  their	  county	  had	  begun	  traveling	  as	  far	  as	  Chicago	  to	  buy	  the	  cold	  pills	  they	  
needed	  for	  a	  cook	  (Hathaway	  2005).	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Figure	  5.11:	  States	  with	  pseudoephedrine	  package	  purchase	  limits	  as	  of	  October	  1,	  
2005	  (O’Connor	  et	  al.	  2007).	  
	  
In	  December	  2005,	  despite	  serious	  infighting	  between	  the	  Food	  and	  Drug	  
Administration	  and	  the	  DEA	  over	  the	  necessity	  of	  the	  legislation,	  the	  federal	  
government	  followed	  the	  example	  of	  the	  states	  and	  passed	  the	  Combat	  
Methamphetamine	  Epidemic	  Act	  (CMEA)	  (Harris	  2005).	  This	  law,	  which	  was	  
actually	  an	  addendum	  to	  legislation	  renewing	  the	  Patriot	  Act,	  required	  that	  any	  
products	  containing	  pseudoephedrine	  be	  removed	  from	  public	  access	  and	  placed	  
under	  lock	  and	  key	  behind	  the	  counter.	  	  Furthermore,	  those	  products	  could	  only	  be	  
packaged	  in	  blister	  packs	  containing	  no	  more	  than	  two	  sheets	  of	  pills,	  and	  
customers	  were	  limited	  to	  3.6	  grams	  of	  product	  per	  day	  and	  a	  maximum	  of	  7.5	  
grams	  per	  month.	  	  To	  track	  sales,	  each	  purchase	  had	  to	  be	  entered	  into	  a	  logbook	  
along	  with	  the	  purchaser’s	  name,	  address,	  the	  quantity	  and	  product	  purchased,	  and	  
the	  date	  and	  time	  of	  the	  sale.	  	  	  The	  law	  was	  written	  so	  that	  it	  would	  not	  preempt	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more	  stringent	  state	  legislation,	  but	  still	  closed	  the	  possibility	  of	  cooks	  simply	  
traveling	  out	  of	  state	  to	  get	  the	  pills	  they	  needed	  (DEA	  2006,	  McBride	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  	  
When	  looking	  at	  the	  raw	  numbers	  of	  labs	  seized,	  it	  would	  appear	  that	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  CMEA	  was	  temporary	  (Figure	  5.2).	  	  	  Although	  lab	  seizures	  began	  to	  dip	  
with	  the	  implementation	  of	  state	  precursor	  laws	  in	  2004,	  and	  did	  so	  even	  more	  
dramatically	  with	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  federal	  legislation,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  lab	  
seizures	  in	  2011	  was	  95	  percent	  of	  year	  2000	  totals.	  	  Clearly	  the	  market	  has	  
rebounded.	  	  	  Still,	  the	  numbers	  of	  labs	  seized	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  types	  of	  labs	  found	  or	  
the	  quantity	  of	  methamphetamine	  produced.	  	  Other	  indicators	  suggest	  that	  the	  
CMEA	  dramatically	  and	  permanently	  altered	  the	  domestic	  methamphetamine	  
market.	  	  	  
The	  various	  provisions	  of	  the	  CMEA	  greatly	  limited	  cooks’	  access	  to	  
pseudoephedrine.	  	  But,	  as	  had	  been	  the	  case	  for	  every	  other	  piece	  of	  precursor	  
legislation	  before	  it,	  producers	  found	  a	  way	  to	  adapt.	  	  In	  this	  instance,	  they	  quickly	  
realized	  that	  most	  of	  the	  logbooks	  they	  were	  required	  to	  sign	  were	  not	  centrally	  
monitored.	  	  A	  CVS	  pharmacy,	  for	  example,	  might	  (at	  best)	  know	  if	  a	  person	  had	  
already	  reached	  their	  limit	  on	  pseudoephedrine	  purchases	  at	  other	  CVS	  stores,	  but	  
they	  had	  no	  record	  of	  whether	  those	  limits	  had	  already	  been	  met	  at	  Walgreen’s,	  
Wal-­‐Mart,	  or	  any	  other	  of	  the	  myriad	  of	  stores	  from	  gas	  stations	  to	  Dollar	  Generals	  
that	  sold	  pseudoephedrine	  products.	  	  This	  loophole	  gave	  rise	  to	  “smurfing.”	  	  	  
Smurfing	  is	  the	  process	  of	  going	  from	  store	  to	  store	  and	  buying	  from	  each	  the	  
permissible	  3.6	  grams	  of	  pseudoephedrine.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  producers	  could	  evade	  the	  
sales	  limit.	  	  In	  some	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  particularly	  in	  California,	  smurfing	  has	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become	  a	  highly	  organized	  cottage	  industry	  and	  produces	  enough	  product	  to	  
operate	  superlabs.	  	  Elsewhere,	  a	  cook	  might	  rely	  on	  just	  the	  small	  network	  of	  people	  
associated	  with	  the	  lab	  in	  order	  to	  get	  the	  precursors	  he	  or	  she	  needs.	  	  Often,	  cooks	  
will	  trade	  precursors	  for	  some	  portion	  of	  final	  product	  (NDIC	  2009b;	  2011a).	  	  
Though	  effective,	  smurfing	  from	  shop	  to	  shop	  takes	  a	  significant	  amount	  of	  time,	  
particularly	  in	  areas	  of	  low	  population.	  	  For	  many	  cooks	  such	  a	  restraint	  has	  greatly	  
reduced	  their	  production	  capacity.	  	  	  
The	  limitations	  created	  by	  the	  necessity	  of	  smurfing	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  types	  
of	  labs	  that	  are	  being	  seized.	  	  Since	  the	  implementation	  of	  CMEA,	  police	  officials	  
have	  seen	  an	  increase	  in	  “one-­‐pot,”	  or	  “shake	  and	  bake”	  meth	  production.	  	  This	  type	  
of	  production	  does	  not	  rely	  on	  a	  new	  recipe.	  	  The	  ingredients	  are	  the	  same	  as	  in	  the	  
Birch	  reduction	  method.	  	  However,	  rather	  than	  going	  through	  a	  sequence	  of	  steps	  
from	  the	  breakdown	  of	  pills	  to	  careful	  crystallization	  of	  the	  final	  product,	  cooks	  
using	  the	  one-­‐pot	  method	  simply	  place	  a	  small	  amount	  of	  all	  ingredients	  into	  a	  
single	  vessel	  (usually	  a	  2-­‐liter	  soda	  bottle)	  and	  shake	  it	  until	  a	  tiny	  amount	  of	  
methamphetamine	  precipitates	  out.	  	  
The	  NDIC	  attributes	  the	  increase	  in	  meth	  lab	  seizures	  since	  2007	  to	  an	  
increase	  in	  this	  particular	  type	  of	  lab,	  seizures	  of	  which	  have	  grown	  from	  1,538	  in	  
2007	  to	  4,089	  in	  2009	  (roughly	  69	  percent	  of	  all	  labs	  seized	  in	  that	  latter	  year)	  
(NDIC	  2011a).	  	  In	  fact,	  at	  least	  81	  percent	  of	  all	  the	  labs	  taken	  down	  by	  police	  since	  
2006	  have	  produced	  less	  than	  two	  ounces	  at	  a	  time,	  while	  most	  of	  the	  remaining	  
labs	  had	  capacities	  of	  less	  than	  eight	  ounces	  (Figure	  5.12).	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Figure	  5.12:	  Methamphetamine	  labs	  seizures	  by	  production	  capacity.	  	  Most	  of	  the	  
labs	  capable	  of	  producing	  greater	  than	  2	  oz.	  were	  still	  producing	  less	  than	  8	  oz.	  
(NDIC	  2011a)	  
	  
Other	  methamphetamine	  indicators	  have	  declined	  along	  with	  the	  size	  of	  labs.	  	  
Street	  purity	  of	  the	  drug	  has	  decreased	  by	  almost	  40	  percent	  (Fries	  et	  al.	  2008).	  	  The	  
number	  of	  people	  reporting	  usage	  in	  the	  past	  month	  in	  National	  Survey	  of	  Drug	  Use	  
and	  Health	  also	  declined	  steadily	  from	  2006	  to	  2010,	  from	  731,000	  to	  353,000,	  and	  
the	  rate	  of	  new	  initiates	  similarly	  dropped	  from	  pre-­‐CMEA	  levels	  (Figure	  5.13).	  	  
Data	  from	  the	  Dawn	  system	  reflected	  decline	  as	  well,	  where	  the	  number	  of	  
methamphetamine	  mentions	  in	  emergency	  department	  visits	  declined	  from	  132,576	  
in	  2004	  to	  64,117	  in	  2009	  (SAMHSA	  2011a).	  	  Treatment	  data	  were	  slower	  to	  catch	  
up,	  climbing	  to	  ten	  percent	  of	  all	  admissions	  by	  2009.	  	  It	  is	  possible	  that,	  as	  the	  drug	  
became	  scarce,	  more	  individuals	  were	  seeking	  treatment	  to	  break	  their	  addiction	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Figure	  5.13:	  	  Past	  year	  methamphetamine	  initiates	  in	  thousands.	  
	  
	   Although	  the	  CMEA	  did	  not	  end	  small	  clandestine	  methamphetamine	  
production	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  it	  certainly	  slowed	  its	  epidemic	  growth.	  	  Still,	  as	  the	  
previous	  two	  chapters	  have	  discussed,	  domestic	  production	  now	  makes	  up	  only	  a	  
small	  portion	  of	  the	  national	  meth	  marketplace.	  Despite	  the	  decline	  in	  volume	  of	  
production	  from	  domestic	  labs,	  the	  National	  Drug	  Threat	  Assessment:	  2011	  recently	  
described	  the	  availability	  of	  methamphetamine	  as	  increasing	  in	  every	  region	  of	  the	  
country	  (NDIC	  2011a).	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Conclusion	  
The	  Methamphetamine	  Palimpsest	  
	  
	  
This	  project	  has	  explained	  the	  present	  uneven	  geography	  of	  
methamphetamine	  through	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  various	  types	  of	  networks	  that	  
have	  formed	  around	  the	  drug’s	  production	  and	  distribution	  over	  its	  eighty-­‐year	  
history.	  	  It	  has	  done	  so	  by	  following	  the	  tenets	  of	  Actor-­‐Network	  Theory	  (ANT);	  
tracing	  associations,	  jumping	  scales,	  and	  respecting	  the	  crucial	  role	  of	  non-­‐human	  
actors	  (in	  this	  case	  that	  of	  precursors).	  	  With	  ANT	  guiding	  the	  analysis,	  I	  have	  
demonstrated	  that	  radically	  different	  commodity	  network	  types	  have	  formed	  
around	  the	  drug.	  	  Changes	  in	  network	  dominance,	  that	  is	  the	  translation	  of	  actors	  
from	  one	  network	  into	  another,	  usually	  occurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  government	  action.	  	  
The	  relatively	  rigid	  (though	  clearly	  susceptible	  to	  diversion)	  network	  of	  legal	  
pharmaceutical	  production	  of	  methamphetamine	  gave	  way	  to	  clandestine	  
production	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Controlled	  Substances	  Act	  of	  1971.	  	  Users	  were	  forced	  
to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  networks	  established	  by	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  (OMGs),	  or	  
smaller,	  less	  organized	  producers.	  	  	  
The	  networks	  controlled	  by	  OMGs	  were	  characterized	  by	  inter-­‐gang	  warfare	  
and	  strict	  market	  control	  through	  the	  use	  of	  their	  hierarchical	  gang	  structure.	  	  The	  
gangs	  maintained	  dominance	  as	  long	  as	  they	  controlled	  access	  to	  the	  precursor	  P2P.	  	  
When	  that	  control	  was	  disrupted	  by	  governmental	  action,	  the	  market	  dominance	  of	  
the	  OMG	  network	  waned	  as	  ephedrine-­‐based	  methods	  became	  popular,	  allowing	  
other	  producers	  to	  enter	  the	  market	  and	  compete.	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Laws	  restricting	  ephedrine	  sales	  in	  the	  United	  States	  allowed	  for	  market	  
penetration	  by	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations	  from	  Mexico	  and	  Asia.	  	  The	  most	  
successful	  of	  these	  networks,	  those	  of	  the	  various	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  are	  highly	  
organized	  and	  cellular	  in	  their	  structure.	  	  Much	  like	  a	  car	  manufacturer	  might	  
subcontract	  with	  many	  different	  parts	  producers,	  the	  Mexican	  drug-­‐trafficking	  
organizations	  rely	  on	  numerous	  small	  groups	  or	  operators	  to	  produce,	  smuggle,	  and	  
distribute	  their	  products.	  	  Their	  organization,	  learned	  from	  the	  Columbian	  drug	  
cartels	  for	  whom	  they	  once	  worked,	  has	  allowed	  them	  to	  dominate	  and	  expand	  
North	  American	  methamphetamine	  markets.	  	  Their	  deliberate	  effort	  to	  expand	  their	  
networks	  has	  resulted	  in	  a	  steady	  eastward	  shift	  in	  methamphetamine’s	  geography.	  	  	  
Deliberate	  market	  expansion	  by	  the	  Mexicans	  resulted	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
still	  another	  methamphetamine	  network.	  	  As	  demand	  for	  dextrorotary	  
methamphetamine	  grew,	  tiny	  individual	  networks	  began	  to	  form	  around	  meth	  
production	  in	  small	  toxic	  labs	  (STLs).	  	  These	  STL	  networks	  individually	  rarely	  
exceed	  more	  than	  a	  dozen	  people,	  but	  taken	  together	  account	  for	  a	  significant	  
portion	  of	  the	  national	  methamphetamine	  market	  (approximately	  20	  percent).	  	  
Loose	  affiliations	  between	  individual	  networks	  have	  produced	  a	  subculture	  of	  
methamphetamine	  information	  exchange	  in	  the	  states	  that	  have	  been	  hardest	  hit	  by	  
the	  spread	  of	  these	  small	  toxic	  labs.	  
Without	  an	  understanding	  of	  these	  networks,	  the	  geography	  of	  
methamphetamine	  cannot	  be	  explained.	  	  Had	  this	  study	  focused	  on	  usage	  rather	  
than	  production	  and	  distribution,	  it	  would	  have	  been	  descriptive	  at	  best.	  	  The	  
explosive	  growth	  in	  methamphetamine	  use	  in	  the	  West,	  for	  example,	  would	  have	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been	  obvious,	  but	  not	  the	  dependency	  of	  this	  expansion	  upon	  the	  introduction	  of	  
non-­‐racemic,	  purely	  dextrorotary	  methamphetamine.	  	  Similarly,	  declines	  in	  usage	  in	  
the	  East	  might	  have	  been	  attributed	  solely	  to	  questions	  of	  preference	  rather	  than	  to	  
the	  production	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  networks	  that	  controlled	  manufacture	  and	  
distribution	  there,	  which	  prompted	  their	  own	  demise.	  	  Without	  knowledge	  of	  the	  
long	  history	  of	  drug	  smuggling	  from	  Mexico	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  and	  the	  particular	  
history	  of	  amphetamine	  diversion	  through	  Mexico,	  the	  reasons	  for	  Mexican	  
penetration	  of	  the	  methamphetamine	  market	  might	  have	  been	  lost	  to	  this	  analysis.	  	  
The	  diffusion	  of	  methamphetamine	  from	  west	  to	  east	  could	  have	  easily	  been	  
misattributed	  to	  growth	  in	  small	  toxic	  methamphetamine	  labs,	  rather	  than	  to	  
deliberate	  market	  expansion	  by	  drug-­‐trafficking	  organizations.	  	  Clearly,	  the	  present	  
geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  various	  
networks	  that	  have	  controlled	  its	  markets.	  	  	  
In	  tracking	  the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  the	  various	  methamphetamine	  networks,	  it	  
becomes	  clear	  that,	  despite	  the	  best	  efforts	  of	  law	  enforcement,	  none	  of	  the	  different	  
forms	  discussed	  have	  been	  entirely	  eliminated.	  	  Historian	  Samuel	  Truett	  (2006)	  has	  
used	  the	  metaphor	  of	  a	  palimpsest,	  a	  document	  that	  has	  been	  written	  over	  but	  
which	  still	  shows	  traces	  of	  what	  was	  written	  before,	  as	  a	  metaphor	  for	  the	  
landscapes	  of	  the	  Arizona/Sonora	  borderlands.	  	  This	  metaphor	  is	  apt	  for	  
methamphetamine	  networks	  as	  well.	  	  Though	  various	  systems	  of	  production	  and	  
distribution	  have	  achieved	  prominence	  in	  either	  the	  market	  or	  the	  public	  
imagination,	  no	  network	  has	  been	  erased	  from	  the	  land.	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Brownstein	  et	  al.’s	  (2010)	  recent	  study	  reflects	  the	  diversity	  of	  
methamphetamine	  markets	  today.	  In	  a	  survey	  of	  1,367	  police	  agencies	  from	  
communities	  of	  varying	  size	  across	  the	  U.	  S.,	  investigators	  asked	  about	  the	  source	  of	  
methamphetamine	  in	  communities	  and	  whether	  changes	  in	  sourcing	  had	  occurred	  
in	  the	  respondent’s	  regional	  markets.	  	  Sixty-­‐seven	  percent	  said	  that	  more	  meth	  was	  
imported	  into	  their	  districts	  and	  65	  percent	  said	  that	  fewer	  labs	  existed.	  	  Regarding	  
the	  origin	  of	  meth,	  52	  percent	  of	  informants	  said	  that	  the	  meth	  they	  saw	  was	  
imported	  from	  Mexico,	  while	  64	  percent	  said	  it	  was	  produced	  locally	  in	  labs.	  	  The	  
authors	  argued	  that	  these	  numbers	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  	  Instead,	  they	  
“demonstrate	  that	  jurisdictions	  with	  meth	  markets	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  more	  than	  one	  
type	  of	  market	  based	  on	  the	  source	  of	  the	  drug”	  (11).	  	  This	  argument	  was	  buttressed	  
by	  a	  cluster	  analysis	  (data	  clusters,	  not	  spatial	  clusters)	  that	  showed	  16.4	  percent	  of	  
respondents	  reported	  Mexican	  and	  local	  production	  together,	  and	  19.3	  percent	  
reported	  local	  production	  and	  importation	  from	  both	  Mexico	  and	  other	  locales.	  	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  networks	  operating	  around	  methamphetamine	  today	  are	  even	  
more	  diverse	  that	  the	  broad	  categories	  presented	  by	  Brownstein	  et	  al.	  The	  very	  first	  
methamphetamine	  market,	  for	  example,	  that	  of	  legal	  production	  and	  medical	  
distribution,	  still	  exists.	  	  The	  drug	  is	  available	  for	  prescription	  under	  the	  brand	  name	  
Desoxyn.	  	  Similarly,	  outlaw	  motorcycle	  gangs	  still	  produce	  and	  traffic	  in	  
methamphetamine.	  	  As	  late	  as	  2005,	  some	  of	  these	  groups	  in	  the	  Philadelphia	  region	  
persisted	  in	  making	  P2P	  dope	  even	  though	  recipes	  for	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  were	  
widely	  available	  (NDIC	  2005a).	  	  Their	  own	  preferences	  and	  that	  of	  their	  clientele	  
still	  leaned	  towards	  the	  racemic	  mixture.	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   The	  preferred	  production	  method	  of	  the	  OMGs	  has	  shown	  a	  resurgence	  
recently	  in	  Mexico	  as	  well.	  	  A	  crackdown	  by	  the	  government	  there	  on	  the	  smuggling	  
of	  ephedrine	  and	  pseudoephedrine	  has	  caused	  DTOs	  to	  shift	  production	  to	  a	  new	  
version	  of	  the	  P2P	  recipe	  that	  incorporates	  a	  final	  step	  to	  increase	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  
racemic	  mixture,	  making	  it	  nearly	  as	  potent	  as	  d-­‐methamphetamine.	  	  The	  
persistence	  of	  small-­‐scale	  producers	  in	  the	  face	  of	  effective	  legislation	  and	  market	  
saturation	  by	  meth	  produced	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs	  suggests	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  act	  
of	  cooking	  has	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  subculture	  of	  some	  users.	  	  	  
If	  any	  of	  the	  networks	  shows	  the	  potential	  for	  total	  elimination,	  it	  is	  that	  of	  
STL	  production,	  but	  the	  necessary	  steps	  require	  political	  will.	  	  Oregon	  showed	  the	  
requisite	  steel	  in	  2006	  when	  legislators	  there	  made	  all	  cold	  pills	  available	  only	  by	  
prescription.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  this	  move	  was	  immediate	  and	  profound.	  Between	  2000	  
and	  2004,	  that	  state	  had	  averaged	  360	  lab	  seizures	  per	  year.	  	  Since	  2007,	  they	  have	  
averaged	  less	  than	  12.	  	  Unfortunately,	  little	  reason	  supports	  the	  belief	  that	  
eliminating	  or	  drastically	  reducing	  domestic	  production	  nationwide	  would	  
significantly	  reduce	  availability	  of	  the	  drug.	  	  At	  best,	  it	  would	  eliminate	  many	  of	  the	  
strains	  that	  local	  production	  places	  on	  communities.	  	  	  
	   A	  recurring	  theme	  in	  the	  history	  of	  methamphetamine	  has	  been	  the	  ability	  
for	  producers	  to	  adapt	  in	  the	  face	  of	  government	  efforts	  to	  stop	  production	  through	  
supply-­‐side	  interventions.	  	  Every	  piece	  of	  precursor	  legislation	  has	  been	  met	  by	  an	  
adept	  move	  by	  drug	  networks	  that	  significantly	  altered	  the	  market	  in	  ways	  that	  the	  
government	  did	  not	  envision,	  be	  it	  transitioning	  to	  the	  recipes	  that	  produced	  pure	  d-­‐
methamphetamine	  or	  opening	  the	  market	  to	  penetration	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs	  and	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thereby	  contributing	  to	  the	  continuing	  destabilization	  of	  that	  country.	  	  Given	  these	  
results,	  one	  major	  conclusion	  from	  this	  work	  should	  be	  that	  methamphetamine	  
networks	  will	  persist	  as	  long	  as	  there	  are	  people	  willing	  to	  pay	  for	  the	  drug.	  	  The	  
only	  real	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  has	  got	  to	  be	  on	  the	  demand	  side	  of	  the	  drug	  
market	  equation.	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  significant	  reduction	  in	  demand,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  say	  
whether	  the	  future	  geography	  of	  methamphetamine	  will	  change	  significantly	  from	  
its	  current	  distribution.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	  distribution	  of	  markets	  has	  shown	  a	  
remarkable	  propensity	  to	  evolve	  over	  time.	  	  In	  the	  last	  forty	  years,	  it	  has	  
mushroomed,	  contracted,	  and	  expanded	  again.	  	  Figure	  5.5	  demonstrates	  just	  how	  
far	  methamphetamine	  markets	  have	  diffused	  since	  the	  year	  2000.	  	  However,	  that	  
illustration	  also	  suggests	  that	  the	  rate	  of	  their	  spread	  has	  declined.	  	  The	  National	  
Drug	  Threat	  Assessment	  2011(NDIC	  2011a)	  predicted	  increasing	  availability	  
throughout	  the	  country,	  but	  given	  that	  the	  drug	  has	  been	  available	  for	  eighty	  years	  
and	  has	  yet	  to	  significantly	  penetrate	  the	  drug	  markets	  of	  the	  Northeast,	  is	  there	  any	  
reason	  to	  assume	  that	  that	  reality	  will	  change?	  	  The	  answer,	  since	  it	  depends	  on	  
many	  variables	  of	  various	  scales,	  from	  the	  evolution	  of	  upper-­‐level	  drug	  trafficking	  
patterns	  to	  the	  localized	  preferences	  of	  drug	  using	  subcultures,	  is	  virtually	  
impossible	  to	  answer.	  	  However,	  given	  the	  drug’s	  persistence,	  I	  would	  not	  bet	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Appendix	  
Spatial	  Regressions	  of	  Amphetamine	  Lab	  Seizures	  in	  the	  Contiguous	  Unites	  
States:	  2000-­2003	  
	  
This	  appendix	  discusses	  spatial	  analyses	  of	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  
within	  the	  United	  States.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction	  and	  in	  chapter	  5,	  
methamphetamine	  labs	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  be	  found	  anywhere.	  	  However,	  as	  this	  
dissertation	  has	  demonstrated,	  ubiquitous	  methamphetamine	  production	  has	  never	  	  
occurred.	  	  Figure	  A.1	  shows	  cumulative	  methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  for	  the	  each	  
county	  in	  the	  contiguous	  United	  States	  for	  the	  years	  2000	  to	  2010.	  	  593	  of	  3,078	  
counties	  (19.3%)	  had	  zero	  labs	  seized	  within	  their	  borders.	  	  1,990	  counties	  (64.7%)	  
seized	  less	  than	  one	  lab	  per	  year	  over	  the	  decade.	  	  Given	  the	  myriad	  of	  problems	  
created	  by	  methamphetamine	  labs,	  it	  is	  critical	  that	  we	  improve	  our	  understanding	  
of	  the	  factors	  that	  influence	  meth	  lab	  location.	  
	  
Figure	  A.1:	  Total	  lab	  seizures	  2000-­‐2010(NLCSS	  2011).	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This	  appendix	  is	  another	  step	  towards	  that	  understanding.	  	  Because	  the	  
actual	  number	  and	  location	  of	  all	  methamphetamine	  labs	  is	  unknown	  and	  
unknowable,	  I	  use	  lab	  seizures	  as	  a	  proxy.	  	  Obviously,	  no	  proxy	  is	  perfect,	  but	  
seizures	  are	  the	  best	  measure	  available	  for	  domestic	  production	  and	  precedent	  
exists	  in	  the	  literature	  for	  using	  such	  data	  to	  assess	  the	  spatial	  correlates	  of	  such	  
production.	  Unfortunately,	  previous	  attempts	  at	  such	  spatial	  analyses	  have	  not	  been	  
satisfactory.	  	  	  Lu	  and	  Burnum	  (2008)	  analyzed	  lab	  seizures	  in	  Colorado	  Springs,	  
using	  a	  Poisson	  regression	  model,	  but	  did	  not	  account	  for	  spatial	  effects	  in	  their	  
model.	  	  As	  will	  be	  made	  clear	  below,	  any	  analysis	  of	  spatial	  data	  that	  does	  not	  
explicitly	  assess	  and	  account	  for	  spatial	  effects	  within	  its	  model	  is	  inherently	  flawed.	  	  
Weisheit	  and	  Wells	  (2010)	  attempted	  a	  regression	  analysis	  of	  lab	  seizures	  for	  the	  
entire	  United	  States,	  but	  similarly	  failed	  to	  incorporate	  spatial	  effects	  in	  the	  
regression	  portion	  of	  their	  analysis.	  	  Smaller	  regional	  studies,	  such	  as	  that	  of	  
Gilbreath	  (2012),	  which	  did	  account	  for	  spatial	  effects	  are	  a	  good	  first	  step,	  but	  more	  
analysis	  is	  required.	  	  	  
	  
Spatial	  Regression	  Models	  
	   To	  assess	  the	  covariates	  associated	  with	  lab	  seizures,	  this	  study	  uses	  a	  
modified	  version	  of	  spatial	  regression	  models	  developed	  by	  Anselin	  (1988)	  and	  
outlined	  in	  Ward	  and	  Gleditsche	  (2008).	  	  Such	  regression	  techniques	  are	  necessary	  
because	  spatial	  data	  frequently	  exhibit	  what	  Getis	  (2008)	  has	  called	  the	  
fundamental	  concept	  of	  spatial	  analysis:	  spatial	  autocorrelation.	  	  Spatial	  
autocorrelation	  is	  the	  clustering	  of	  similar	  values	  in	  space.	  	  It	  is	  frequently	  present	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in	  spatial	  data	  because	  collection	  units	  such	  as	  census	  tracts	  or	  neighborhoods	  have	  
porous	  borders	  or	  exist	  only	  on	  maps.	  	  Human	  beings,	  biological	  vectors,	  economic	  
forces,	  information	  and	  infrastructure	  all	  cross	  them	  at	  will.	  	  Actors	  in	  one	  area	  thus	  
frequently	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  their	  neighbors.	  	  This	  impact	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  the	  
literature	  as	  spatial	  dependence.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  spatial	  dependence,	  indicated	  by	  
the	  significant	  clustering	  of	  similar	  values	  (significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation),	  is	  a	  
sign	  of	  the	  violation	  of	  the	  independence	  assumptions	  inherent	  in	  most	  parametric	  
inferential	  statistics.	  	  If	  significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  exists	  and	  is	  not	  taken	  into	  
account	  within	  a	  multivariate	  analysis,	  then	  “false	  indications	  of	  significance,	  biased	  
parameter	  estimates,	  and	  misleading	  suggestions	  of	  fit”	  can	  result	  (Messner	  et	  al.	  
1999,	  427).	  	  All	  of	  the	  dependent	  variables	  in	  this	  study	  exhibited	  significant	  global	  
and	  local	  autocorrelation.	  	  	  
Fortunately,	  several	  ways	  exist	  to	  account	  for	  spatial	  dependence	  within	  a	  
model.	  If	  an	  investigator	  believes	  such	  spatial	  dependence	  is	  a	  result	  of	  actual	  
interaction	  between	  observations,	  then	  he/she	  should	  consider	  using	  a	  spatial	  lag	  
model.	  In	  such	  a	  model,	  a	  new	  independent	  variable	  is	  added	  to	  the	  regression	  
equation	  to	  account	  for	  the	  existing	  spatial	  dependence.	  	  The	  lag	  variable,	  created	  
using	  a	  spatial	  weights	  matrix,	  is	  usually	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  value	  of	  the	  
dependent	  variable	  for	  all	  nearby	  units	  to	  each	  observation.	  	  Depending	  on	  the	  
understanding	  one	  has	  of	  the	  process	  being	  modeled,	  the	  weights	  matrix	  can	  be	  
based	  on	  some	  order	  of	  contiguous	  neighbors	  or	  on	  a	  distance-­‐decay	  threshold.	  	  	  
It	  makes	  sense	  to	  use	  a	  lagged	  variable	  when	  one	  thinks	  of	  a	  dependent	  
variable	  as	  continuous	  and	  potentially	  influenced	  by	  its	  neighbors.	  	  Baller	  et	  al.	  
	  
	  
	   202	  
(2001)	  have	  associated	  a	  significant	  lag	  variable	  in	  the	  study	  of	  homicide	  with	  
processes	  of	  diffusion,	  while	  Mennis	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  considered	  it	  evidence	  of	  spatial	  
spillover	  in	  their	  study	  of	  juvenile	  delinquent	  recidivism.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  drug	  
markets,	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  associated	  a	  significant	  lag	  variable	  with	  
agglomeration.	  	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  one	  assumed	  that	  the	  spatial	  effects	  in	  their	  model	  
derive	  not	  from	  actual	  evidence	  of	  interaction	  between	  observations,	  but	  rather	  
from	  model	  misspecification,	  missing	  independent	  variables,	  or	  some	  other	  
statistical	  nuisance,	  then	  he/she	  might	  consider	  a	  spatial	  error	  model,	  in	  which	  the	  
spatial	  dependence	  is	  accounted	  for	  in	  the	  error	  term.	  	  	  	  
In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  spatial	  effects	  almost	  certainly	  result	  from	  
interaction	  between	  counties	  because	  producers,	  suppliers,	  and	  information	  all	  
travel	  across	  borders.	  	  As	  such,	  a	  spatial	  lag	  model	  is	  most	  appropriate,	  and	  so	  I	  
included	  such	  a	  variable	  (based	  on	  first-­‐order	  queen	  contiguity).	  	  For	  each	  county,	  
the	  spatial	  lag	  variable	  is	  the	  average	  value	  of	  labs	  seized	  in	  all	  the	  neighboring	  
counties	  it	  touches.	  	  This	  type	  of	  analysis	  has	  a	  long	  history	  in	  the	  study	  of	  crime,	  
and	  was	  recommended	  by	  Anselin	  et	  al.	  (2000).	  	  A	  recent	  special	  issue	  of	  The	  
Professional	  Geographer	  on	  the	  spatial	  analysis	  of	  crime	  also	  contains	  several	  good	  
examples	  (e.g.	  Mennis	  et	  al.	  2011,	  Andresen	  2011).	  	  Baller	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  produced	  a	  
spatial	  regression	  analysis	  of	  nationwide	  homicide	  rates	  that	  used	  county-­‐level	  data	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Zero-­Inflated	  Regression	  Models	  
Most	  of	  the	  studies	  cited	  above	  used	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  regression	  (OLS)	  
for	  their	  analyses.	  However,	  count	  data	  (such	  as	  the	  number	  of	  labs	  seized)	  have	  
several	  characteristics	  that	  make	  them	  ill-­‐suited	  for	  OLS	  techniques.	  They	  often	  
contain	  a	  large	  number	  of	  zeros	  (areas	  with	  no	  observations	  of	  the	  dependent	  
variable)	  and	  exhibit	  a	  severe	  positive	  skew.	  The	  independent	  variable	  included	  
here	  is	  no	  exception.	  	  When	  data	  have	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  zeroes,	  a	  zero-­‐
inflated	  model	  should	  be	  substituted	  for	  the	  OLS	  one	  (McDonald	  and	  Lattimore	  
2010).	  	  Generally,	  either	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  Poisson	  regression	  or	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  
negative	  binomial	  regression	  is	  necessary.	  	  	   	  
One	  chooses	  between	  these	  two	  regression	  models	  based	  upon	  whether	  the	  
distribution	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  overdispersed	  or	  not.	  	  In	  order	  to	  use	  a	  
zero-­‐inflated	  Poisson	  regression,	  the	  dependent	  variable’s	  mean	  should	  be	  close	  in	  
value	  to	  its	  variance.	  	  If	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case,	  and	  the	  variance	  is	  significantly	  larger	  
than	  the	  mean,	  then	  the	  distribution	  is	  said	  to	  be	  overdispersed,	  and	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  
negative	  binomial	  model	  should	  be	  used	  (Atkins	  and	  Gallop	  2007).	  	  In	  this	  study,	  lab	  
seizures	  in	  most	  regions	  were	  over-­‐dispersed,	  making	  a	  zero-­‐inflated	  negative	  
binomial	  model	  the	  appropriate	  tool.	  
A	  zero-­‐inflated	  regression	  model	  produces	  two	  different	  equations.	  	  For	  this	  
reason	  it	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  mixed	  model.	  	  The	  first	  equation,	  sometimes	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  hurdle	  function,	  is	  essentially	  a	  logistic	  regression	  that	  determines	  
the	  covariates	  associated	  with	  the	  probability	  of	  finding	  zero	  labs	  within	  a	  county.	  	  A	  
negative	  relationship	  in	  the	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  indicates	  that	  the	  probability	  of	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zero	  labs	  being	  seized	  within	  a	  region	  goes	  down	  as	  values	  of	  the	  independent	  
variable	  increase.	  	  The	  second	  model,	  which	  is	  similar	  to	  a	  traditional	  OLS	  model	  (or	  
a	  Poisson	  regression),	  determines	  which	  independent	  variables	  account	  for	  
increasing	  lab	  seizures	  within	  those	  counties	  that	  have	  passed	  the	  hurdle	  of	  having	  
no	  labs	  within	  them.	  	  It	  is	  entirely	  permissible	  to	  include	  different	  predictors	  in	  the	  
two	  different	  models,	  although	  in	  this	  case	  I	  did	  not.	  	  A	  spatially	  lagged	  variable	  can	  
be	  included	  in	  either	  side	  of	  the	  equation	  to	  account	  for	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  
within	  the	  data.	  	  McCord	  and	  Ratcliffe	  (2007)	  and	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  have	  used	  
zero-­‐inflated	  models	  with	  a	  spatial	  lag	  variable	  in	  their	  analyses	  of	  crime-­‐count	  data.	  	  	  
For	  this	  study,	  I	  used	  Open	  GeoDa	  (Anselin	  et	  al.	  2006)	  to	  create	  a	  spatial	  
weights	  matrix	  based	  on	  first-­‐order	  county	  contiguity,	  and	  then	  used	  this	  weights	  
matrix	  to	  calculate	  a	  spatial	  lag	  variable	  for	  each	  county	  (mean	  labs	  seized	  in	  
neighboring	  counties),	  	  which	  I	  then	  included	  in	  the	  zero-­‐inflated	  regression	  models.	  	  
The	  zero-­‐inflated	  models	  were	  conducted	  using	  R.	  	  I	  ran	  regressions	  for	  the	  
contiguous	  United	  States35	  as	  a	  whole,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  individual	  Organized	  Crime	  
Drug	  Enforcement	  Task	  Force	  Regions	  (Figure	  A.2),	  to	  determine	  whether	  
covariates	  differed	  by	  region.36	  	  Not	  all	  regions	  could	  be	  modeled.	  	  New	  England	  and	  
New	  York/New	  Jersey	  had	  too	  few	  seizures	  for	  such	  work,	  and	  Florida	  had	  no	  
county-­‐level	  crime	  data	  available.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Florida,	  Illinois,	  and	  Wyoming	  were	  not	  included	  in	  the	  models	  because	  crime	  
data	  were	  not	  available.	  	  	  
36	  Ideally,	  a	  geographically	  weighted	  regression	  would	  be	  used	  to	  test	  for	  spatial	  
heterogeneity.	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  distribution	  of	  the	  data	  did	  not	  allow	  it	  to	  be	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  existing	  GWR	  software.	  Analysis	  of	  separate	  regions	  
represents	  the	  best	  possible	  compromise.	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  Variables	  to	  explain	  lab	  location	  can	  come	  from	  number	  of	  different	  
criminological	  perspectives	  (Shaw	  and	  McKay	  1942;	  Cohen	  and	  Felson	  1973;	  Clarke	  
1980;	  Clarke	  and	  Felson	  1993).	  	  But,	  given	  the	  scale	  of	  operation	  here	  (that	  of	  entire	  
counties),	  variables	  associated	  with	  routine	  activity	  and	  rational-­‐choice	  
perspectives	  are	  not	  easily	  incorporated.	  	  We	  can,	  however,	  assess	  the	  efficacy	  of	  
traditional	  social	  disorganization	  variables	  in	  predicting	  lab	  seizure	  locations.	  	  	  
Higher	  crime	  rates	  and	  drug	  markets	  tend	  to	  cluster	  in	  areas	  where	  a	  
community	  has	  little	  ability	  to	  organize	  against	  them.	  	  Such	  lack	  of	  neighborhood	  
efficacy	  is	  termed	  social	  disorganization.	  	  It	  frequently	  occurs	  in	  areas	  with	  high	  
population	  turnover,	  a	  large	  number	  of	  renters,	  and	  high	  percentages	  of	  poverty,	  
minorities,	  and	  single	  mothers	  (Shaw	  and	  McKay	  1942;	  Sampson	  and	  Groves	  1989;	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Kubrin	  and	  Weitzer	  2003;	  Rengert	  et	  al.	  2005,	  McCord	  and	  Ratcliffe	  2007;	  Banerjee	  
et	  al.	  2008;	  Grattet	  2009).	  	  
For	  these	  models,	  I	  selected	  potential	  variables	  that	  reflected	  social	  
disorganization,	  known	  methamphetamine	  user	  characteristics,	  or	  other	  
environmental	  traits	  commonly	  associated	  with	  methamphetamine	  production	  (i.e.	  
percent	  rural).	  The	  variables	  selected	  for	  inclusion	  and	  my	  rationale	  for	  selecting	  
them	  were	  as	  follows:	  	  Median	  Age	  (MedAge),	  the	  percentage	  of	  a	  county	  that	  is	  
white	  (Wht	  PCT),	  and	  the	  percentage	  with	  a	  bachelor’s	  degree	  (PCTBACH)	  were	  
included	  as	  user	  characteristics.	  	  Methamphetamine	  users	  tend	  to	  be	  white,	  
undereducated,	  and	  young	  (though	  this	  is	  changing).	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  properties	  
that	  are	  vacant	  (Vacant),	  percentage	  of	  households	  with	  a	  single	  mother	  (SingMom),	  
percentage	  of	  people	  living	  below	  the	  poverty	  level	  (PocPCT),	  violent	  crime	  rate	  per	  
1,000	  people	  (Viol),	  property	  crime	  rate	  per	  1,000	  people	  (Prop),	  percentage	  of	  
households	  occupied	  by	  renters	  (RentOcc),	  Dissimilarity	  Index	  (DisSim),37	  and	  the	  
percentage	  of	  the	  population	  who	  lived	  in	  a	  different	  county	  in	  1995	  (DIFCTY95)	  
were	  all	  included	  as	  indicators	  of	  social	  disorganization.	  	  	  Farm	  dependence	  (farm),	  
manufacturing	  dependence	  (manf),	  and	  services	  dependence	  (serv)	  as	  measured	  by	  
the	  Department	  of	  Agriculture’s	  Economic	  Research	  Services	  2004	  County	  Typology	  
Codes	  (USDA	  2004)	  were	  included	  to	  test	  a	  connection	  between	  lab	  location	  and	  
deindustrialization.	  	  Total	  Population	  (PopZ)and	  Population	  Density	  (PDZ)	  were	  
included	  to	  control	  for	  different	  sizes	  between	  counties.	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  a	  county	  
living	  in	  a	  rural	  area	  (RurPCT)	  was	  included	  to	  test	  the	  frequently	  asserted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  Dissimilarity	  Index	  value	  is	  the	  mean	  of	  the	  values	  for	  whites	  
with	  other	  ethnicities.	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connection	  between	  methamphetamine	  production	  and	  rural	  areas,	  as	  was	  the	  
distance	  from	  the	  county’s	  center	  to	  the	  nearest	  interstate	  highway	  (Interstate).	  	  
The	  percentage	  of	  the	  county’s	  population	  that	  speaks	  Spanish	  at	  home	  was	  
included	  as	  a	  potential	  indicator	  of	  market	  penetration	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  which	  
might	  eliminate	  the	  need	  to	  local	  methamphetamine	  production.	  The	  lagged	  
variable	  (LAG)	  represented	  the	  average	  value	  of	  labs	  seized	  for	  all	  of	  a	  county’s	  
contiguous	  neighbors.	  All	  demographic	  data	  were	  retrieved	  from	  the	  Decennial	  
Census	  or	  USDA	  Economic	  Research	  Service.	  	  Crime	  data	  came	  from	  the	  FBI’s	  
Uniform	  Crime	  Reporting	  Program	  (USDOJ	  2006).	  Data	  for	  the	  year	  2000	  were	  used.	  	  
All	  of	  these	  potential	  covariates	  were	  regressed	  against	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  of	  total	  labs	  seized	  between	  2000	  and	  2003	  (Figure	  A.3).38	  	  As	  the	  results	  
for	  the	  contiguous	  United	  States	  have	  already	  been	  discussed	  within	  the	  body	  of	  this	  
text,	  the	  content	  of	  this	  appendix	  focuses	  on	  the	  separate	  OCDETF	  regions.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  A.3:	  Total	  lab	  seizures	  by	  county	  2000-­‐2003.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  2003	  was	  the	  last	  year	  before	  states	  began	  to	  implement	  precursor	  laws.	  	  	  
	  
	  
	   208	  
Results	  by	  Region	  with	  Discussion	  
Great	  Lakes	  Region	  
The	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  experienced	  the	  methamphetamine	  boom	  later	  than	  
the	  regions	  to	  the	  west	  of	  it,	  and	  the	  model	  for	  the	  region	  appears	  to	  reflect	  the	  
diffusion	  effect	  that	  brought	  methamphetamine	  to	  it	  (Figure	  A.4).	  The	  only	  
significant	  covariate	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  methamphetamine	  lab	  within	  a	  county	  
(zero-­‐inflation	  model)	  was	  the	  lag	  variable,	  which	  is	  associated	  with	  
methamphetamine	  lab	  diffusion	  (Table	  A.1a).	  Once	  the	  hurdle	  of	  a	  lab	  being	  
discovered	  within	  the	  county	  has	  been	  passed,	  several	  variables	  encouraged	  
increasing	  lab	  numbers.	  	  Increasing	  methamphetamine	  seizures	  were	  associated	  
with	  young	  populations	  with	  higher	  percentages	  of	  single	  mothers	  and	  high	  
property	  crime	  rates.	  	  The	  lag	  variable	  also	  contributed	  to	  increasing	  
methamphetamine	  lab	  seizures	  (Table	  A.1b).	  	  	  
Table	  A.1a:	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   0.936	   0.859	   1.090	   0.276	  
LAG	   -­‐1.162	   0.294	   -­‐3.957	   0.000	  
Vacant	   -­‐0.015	   0.019	   -­‐0.767	   0.443	  
PCTBACH	   -­‐0.076	   0.044	   -­‐1.720	   0.086	  
DIFCTY95	   0.068	   0.041	   1.630	   0.103	  
	  
	  
Table	  A.1b:	  Great	  Lakes	  region	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  Value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   2.789	   0.904	   3.086	   0.002	  
LAG	   0.083	   0.006	   12.981	   0.000	  
MedAge	   -­‐0.076	   0.021	   -­‐3.602	   0.000	  
SingMom	   0.089	   0.046	   1.946	   0.052	  
Prop	   0.110	   0.026	   4.167	   0.000	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Figure	  A.4:	  Lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  region,	  2000	  -­‐	  2003.	  	  The	  data	  showed	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =.434;	  p<.000).	  	  	  
	  
Mid-­Atlantic	  
The	  data	  for	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  were	  not	  over	  dispersed,	  and	  as	  such,	  a	  zero-­‐
inflated	  Poission	  regression	  was	  used	  (Figure	  A.5).	  	  Results	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  same	  
manner.	  	  This	  region	  has	  yet	  to	  be	  completely	  penetrated	  by	  modern	  
methamphetamine	  markets.	  	  However,	  the	  lag	  variable	  was	  still	  the	  most	  significant	  
predictor	  of	  any	  lab	  being	  found	  within	  the	  region.	  	  High	  percentages	  of	  renters	  and	  
large	  populations	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  presence	  of	  at	  least	  one	  lab	  as	  well.	  	  On	  
the	  other	  hand,	  the	  higher	  the	  percentage	  of	  single	  mothers	  in	  a	  county,	  the	  greater	  
the	  probability	  that	  no	  labs	  would	  be	  found	  (Table	  A.2a,).	  
Curiously,	  renters	  had	  the	  opposite	  effect	  on	  counties	  in	  which	  at	  least	  one	  
lab	  was	  seized.	  	  The	  number	  of	  labs	  seized	  also	  showed	  a	  negative	  relationship	  with	  
population	  turnover,	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  speaking	  Spanish	  at	  home,	  and	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violent	  crime.	  	  Perhaps	  meth	  cooks	  looked	  for	  a	  stable	  environment	  in	  which	  to	  
produce	  their	  product.	  Increasing	  lab	  counts	  were	  associated	  with	  diffusion	  
processes,	  counties	  that	  were	  highly	  white,	  dependence	  on	  manufacturing	  and	  
services	  jobs,	  and	  population	  density.	  	  All	  of	  these	  relationships	  are	  as	  one	  would	  
expect	  (Table	  A.2b).	  	  	  
Table	  A.2a:	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   0.202	   1.790	   0.113	   0.910	  
LAG	   -­‐0.536	   0.145	   -­‐3.706	   0.000	  
SingMom	   0.801	   0.323	   2.481	   0.013	  
serv	   1.185	   0.812	   1.460	   0.144	  
PCTBACH	   0.161	   0.089	   1.802	   0.072	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.103	   0.090	   -­‐1.150	   0.250	  
RentOcc	   -­‐0.208	   0.090	   -­‐2.323	   0.020	  
PopZ	   -­‐2.010	   0.776	   -­‐2.590	   0.010	  
	  
Table	  A.2b:	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  region	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   -­‐4.643	   2.517	   -­‐1.845	   0.065	  
LAG	   0.066	   0.027	   2.465	   0.014	  
WhtPCT	   0.054	   0.022	   2.441	   0.015	  
SingMom	   0.866	   0.136	   6.385	   0.000	  
Viol	   -­‐0.909	   0.145	   -­‐6.251	   0.000	  
manf	   0.699	   0.189	   3.692	   0.000	  
serv	   1.518	   0.269	   5.650	   0.000	  
PCTBACH	   0.030	   0.016	   1.951	   0.051	  
SpanPCT	   -­‐0.217	   0.091	   -­‐2.376	   0.017	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.090	   0.023	   -­‐3.897	   0.000	  
RentOcc	   -­‐0.104	   0.027	   -­‐3.827	   0.000	  




	   211	  
	   	  
Figure	  A.5:	  Lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  Mid-­‐Atlantic	  region,	  2000-­‐2003.	  	  The	  data	  showed	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =	  .168;	  p<.001)	  
	  
Pacific	  Region	  	  
	   The	  Pacific	  region	  has	  the	  longest	  history	  with	  methamphetamine	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  As	  such,	  we	  would	  expect	  for	  the	  covariates	  for	  this	  model	  to	  accurately	  
reflect	  those	  for	  well-­‐established	  methamphetamine	  markets,	  and	  the	  variables	  that	  
significantly	  increase	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  methamphetamine	  lab	  being	  found	  within	  
a	  county	  are	  exactly	  what	  we	  might	  expect.	  	  A	  county	  was	  more	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  lab	  if	  
it	  had	  a	  high	  percentage	  of	  white	  residents	  and	  high	  poverty	  rates,	  along	  with	  large	  
numbers	  of	  neighboring	  meth	  lab	  seizures	  (Figure	  A.6,	  Table	  A.3.a).	  
	   The	  variables	  associated	  with	  increasing	  lab	  seizure	  counts	  were	  different	  
from	  those	  for	  the	  zero-­‐inflation	  model.	  	  	  The	  Pacific	  region	  is	  where	  the	  largest	  
meth	  labs	  are	  found,	  so	  it	  makes	  sense	  for	  superlabs	  to	  locate	  in	  counties	  with	  high	  
vacancy	  rates,	  but	  still	  be	  located	  close	  to	  interstate	  highways	  so	  that	  product	  can	  be	  
shipped	  easily.	  	  Social	  disorganization	  indicators	  of	  single	  mothers,	  poverty	  and	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property	  crime	  were	  also	  as	  we	  would	  expect.	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  violent	  crime	  rate	  
was	  a	  negative	  covariate.	  	  It	  would	  appear	  that	  cooks	  do	  indeed	  seek	  relatively	  safe	  
places	  to	  cook.	  	  The	  positive	  relationship	  between	  lab	  counts	  and	  population	  would	  
seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  potential	  market	  must	  exist	  for	  production	  to	  
be	  worthwhile	  (Table	  A.3b).	  	  	  
Table	  A.3a:	  Pacific	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   11.412	   4.488	   2.543	   0.011	  
LAG	   -­‐0.261	   0.080	   -­‐3.281	   0.001	  
WhtPCT	   -­‐0.090	   0.043	   -­‐2.116	   0.034	  
PovPCT	   -­‐0.211	   0.117	   -­‐1.801	   0.072	  
	  
Table	  A.3b:	  Pacific	  region	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   7.354	   1.026	   7.170	   0.000	  
Vacant	   0.062	   0.012	   4.934	   0.000	  
SingMom	   0.396	   0.074	   5.327	   0.000	  
PovPCT	   0.033	   0.024	   1.357	   0.175	  
Viol	   -­‐0.266	   0.056	   -­‐4.704	   0.000	  
Prop	   0.134	   0.031	   4.265	   0.000	  
manf	   0.432	   0.198	   2.178	   0.029	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.049	   0.015	   -­‐3.301	   0.001	  
DisSim	   -­‐0.099	   0.010	   -­‐9.678	   0.000	  
Interstate	   -­‐0.005	   0.002	   -­‐2.892	   0.004	  
PopZ	   0.378	   0.079	   4.757	   0.000	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Figure	  A.6:	  Lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  Pacific	  region,	  2000	  –	  2003.	  The	  data	  showed	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =	  0.156;	  p<	  .000).	  
	  
Southeast	  Region	  
	   No	  region	  has	  experienced	  more	  rapid	  growth	  in	  domestic	  
methamphetamine	  production	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years	  that	  the	  Southeast	  (Figure	  A.7).	  	  
Tennessee	  is	  the	  only	  state	  in	  the	  union	  to	  have	  rivaled	  Missouri	  in	  total	  labs	  seized	  
since	  2006	  (NCLSS	  2011).	  	  The	  covariates	  for	  the	  region	  are	  fascinating.	  	  In	  the	  
Southeast,	  Lag,	  once	  again,	  is	  the	  most	  significant	  indicator	  of	  any	  lab	  being	  seized	  
within	  the	  county.	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  people	  who	  speak	  Spanish	  at	  home	  is	  also	  
significant	  (TableA.4a).	  	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  high	  percentages	  of	  Spanish	  speakers	  is	  
concomitant	  with	  the	  potential	  presence	  of	  Mexican	  DTOs,	  then	  this	  relationship	  
confirms	  the	  argument	  that	  meth	  markets	  are	  often	  established	  by	  DTOs	  either	  
before	  or	  simultaneously	  with	  lab	  production.	  	  	  
	   The	  count	  variables	  are	  also	  interesting.	  	  The	  relationships	  between	  lab	  
seizure	  count	  and	  both	  vacancy	  and	  population	  seem	  to	  indicate	  that	  lab	  production	  
requires	  a	  potential	  market,	  but	  the	  population	  density	  value	  argues	  that	  the	  market	  
	  
	  
	   214	  
need	  not	  be	  too	  crowded	  together.	  	  Once	  the	  hurdle	  of	  having	  no	  labs	  seized	  has	  
been	  passed,	  the	  percentage	  of	  a	  county	  that	  speaks	  Spanish	  is	  a	  negative	  covariate.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  necessarily	  a	  contradiction.	  	  Though	  markets	  need	  DTOs	  to	  be	  
established,	  perhaps	  an	  overabundance	  of	  DTO	  presence	  discourages	  production	  in	  
STLs.	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  potential	  for	  violence	  is	  a	  deterrent	  to	  lab	  production	  (Table	  
A.4b).	  
Table	  A.4a:	  Southeast	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   0.645	   0.757	   0.852	   0.394	  
LAG	   -­‐1.413	   0.312	   -­‐4.532	   0.000	  
RurPCT	   0.020	   0.008	   2.548	   0.011	  
SpanPCT	   -­‐0.273	   0.123	   -­‐2.218	   0.027	  
	  
Table	  A.4b:	  Southeast	  region	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   0.883	   0.267	   3.305	   0.001	  
LAG	   0.050	   0.004	   12.096	   0.000	  
WhtPCT	   0.018	   0.003	   5.966	   0.000	  
Vacant	   -­‐0.038	   0.008	   -­‐4.677	   0.000	  
Viol	   -­‐0.010	   0.037	   -­‐0.275	   0.784	  
SpanPCT	   -­‐0.064	   0.024	   -­‐2.668	   0.008	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.012	   0.008	   -­‐1.509	   0.131	  
PDZ	   -­‐0.436	   0.104	   -­‐4.175	   0.000	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Figure	  A.7:	  Lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  Southeast	  region,	  2000	  -­‐	  2003.	  	  The	  data	  exhibited	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =	  0.374;	  p<	  .000).	  
	  
Southwest	  
	   Like	  the	  Pacific,	  the	  Southwest	  has	  a	  long	  history	  with	  methamphetamine,	  
and	  was	  the	  epicenter	  of	  both	  the	  introduction	  of	  d-­‐methamphetamine	  and	  market	  
penetration	  by	  Mexican	  DTOs	  (Figure	  A.8).	  	  Perhaps	  the	  maturity	  of	  market	  is	  
reflected	  in	  the	  positive	  relationship	  with	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  lab	  being	  seized	  within	  
a	  county	  and	  counties	  with	  high	  median	  ages	  (Table	  A.5a).	  	  In	  the	  diverse	  Southwest,	  
high	  percentages	  of	  white	  people	  decreased	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  lab	  seizure.	  	  High	  
vacancy	  rates	  also	  decreased	  that	  eventuality.	  	  	  
	   Meth	  lab	  seizures	  showed	  a	  negative	  relationship	  to	  rural	  areas,	  high	  rates	  of	  
Spanish	  speaking,	  poverty	  rates,	  housing	  segregation	  and	  educational	  attainment	  in	  
the	  Southwest.	  	  The	  positive	  covariates	  were	  whiteness,	  percentage	  of	  single	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Table	  A.5a:	  Southwest	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model39	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   14.952	   12.261	   1.220	   0.223	  
LAG	   -­‐0.522	   0.180	   -­‐2.902	   0.004	  
MedAge	   -­‐0.284	   0.124	   -­‐2.287	   0.022	  
WhtPCT	   0.005	   0.073	   0.065	   0.948	  
Vacant	   0.171	   0.072	   2.377	   0.017	  
SingMom	   -­‐0.858	   0.551	   -­‐1.557	   0.119	  
PovPCT	   -­‐0.283	   0.135	   -­‐2.095	   0.036	  
Viol	   -­‐1.055	   0.635	   -­‐1.661	   0.097	  
Prop	   0.050	   0.387	   0.128	   0.898	  
RurPCT	   -­‐0.022	   0.031	   -­‐0.712	   0.476	  
SpanPCT	   0.109	   0.045	   2.451	   0.014	  
DIFCTY95	   0.082	   0.086	   0.953	   0.341	  
DisSim	   -­‐0.004	   0.081	   -­‐0.051	   0.960	  




Table	  A.5b:	  	  Southwest	  region	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
LAG	   0.006	   0.001	   3.820	   0.000	  
MedAge	   -­‐0.018	   0.031	   -­‐0.583	   0.560	  
WhtPCT	   0.022	   0.011	   2.033	   0.042	  
Vacant	   0.011	   0.014	   0.748	   0.455	  
SingMom	   0.255	   0.104	   2.448	   0.014	  
PovPCT	   -­‐0.049	   0.023	   -­‐2.112	   0.035	  
Viol	   0.007	   0.073	   0.096	   0.923	  
Prop	   0.015	   0.036	   0.410	   0.682	  
farm	   -­‐0.021	   0.231	   -­‐0.090	   0.928	  
manf	   -­‐0.195	   0.190	   -­‐1.025	   0.306	  
serv	   0.231	   0.236	   0.978	   0.328	  
PCTBACH	   -­‐0.032	   0.017	   -­‐1.828	   0.068	  
RurPCT	   -­‐0.008	   0.004	   -­‐1.989	   0.047	  
SpanPCT	   -­‐0.046	   0.006	   -­‐7.250	   0.000	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.024	   0.017	   -­‐1.438	   0.151	  
RentOcc	   0.003	   0.016	   0.178	   0.859	  
DisSim	   -­‐0.074	   0.015	   -­‐5.113	   0.000	  
PDZ	   -­‐0.020	   0.092	   -­‐0.221	   0.825	  
Interstate	   -­‐0.002	   0.002	   -­‐0.921	   0.357	  
PopZ	   0.325	   0.110	   2.946	   0.003	  
Log(theta)	   0.182	   0.099	   1.841	   0.066	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  In	  this	  instance,	  the	  model	  with	  all	  variables	  included	  (whether	  significant	  or	  not)	  
tested	  significantly	  better	  than	  the	  model	  using	  just	  the	  variables	  that	  had	  a	  significant	  
impact.	  	  For	  that	  reason,	  all	  variables	  are	  included	  in	  these	  tables.	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Figure	  A.8:	  Lab	  seizures	  in	  the	  Southwest	  region,	  2000	  -­‐	  2003.	  	  The	  data	  showed	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =	  0.332;	  p<.000).	  
	  
	  
West	  Central	  Region	  	  
	   The	  results	  for	  the	  West	  Central	  Region	  are	  slightly	  different	  from	  the	  other	  
regions	  (Figure	  A.9).	  	  Once	  again,	  the	  presence	  of	  labs	  in	  neighboring	  counties	  is	  the	  
most	  significant	  predictor	  of	  a	  county	  having	  at	  least	  one	  lab	  seized	  within	  its	  
borders.	  	  However,	  in	  the	  West	  Central	  Region,	  a	  high	  population	  is	  also	  extremely	  
significant.	  	  This	  may	  indicate	  that	  meth	  markets	  cluster	  in	  populace	  counties	  in	  this	  
part	  of	  the	  country.	  	  	  The	  relationship	  exhibited	  between	  vacancy	  rates	  and	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  meth	  lab	  reflects	  this	  as	  well	  (Table	  A.6a).	  	  	   	  
	   The	  covariates	  for	  the	  count	  model	  offer	  few	  surprises,	  particularly	  if	  meth	  
markets	  for	  the	  region	  focus	  in	  urban	  or	  suburban	  areas.	  	  Meth	  lab	  seizures	  were	  
likely	  to	  be	  higher	  in	  counties	  with	  largely	  white	  populations,	  neighboring	  lab	  
seizures,	  large	  populations,	  and	  high	  numbers	  of	  renters	  and	  single	  mothers	  (Table	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A.6b).	  	  This	  urban	  market	  type	  is	  also	  reflected	  in	  the	  negative	  relationship	  with	  
economies	  that	  are	  dependent	  on	  farming.	  	  The	  relationship	  to	  Spanish	  speaking	  
once	  again	  reflects	  the	  possibility	  that	  DTO	  penetration	  lessens	  the	  necessity	  of	  lab	  
production	  (but	  does	  not	  preclude	  it).	  	  Population	  turnover	  and	  segregation	  
continued	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  manner	  contrary	  to	  what	  I	  would	  have	  predicted,	  though	  
perhaps	  people	  are	  more	  comfortable	  taking	  the	  risk	  of	  cooking	  if	  they	  know	  their	  
neighbors.	  	  
	  
Table	  A.6a:	  West	  Central	  region	  zero-­‐inflation	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   2.445	   2.560	   0.955	   0.340	  
LAG	   -­‐0.970	   0.186	   -­‐5.210	   0.000	  
Vacant	   0.055	   0.023	   2.338	   0.019	  
DisSim	   -­‐0.078	   0.032	   -­‐2.429	   0.015	  
PopZ	   -­‐16.567	   3.919	   -­‐4.227	   0.000	  
	  
	  
Table	  A.6b:	  West	  Central	  count	  model	  
	   Estimate	   Std.	  Error	   Z	  value	   Pr(>|z|)	  
(Intercept)	   -­‐1.222	   1.280	   -­‐0.954	   0.340	  
LAG	   0.024	   0.003	   8.008	   0.000	  
WhtPCT	   0.050	   0.007	   6.993	   0.000	  
SingMom	   0.295	   0.049	   6.085	   0.000	  
farm	   -­‐0.657	   0.125	   -­‐5.265	   0.000	  
PCTBACH	   -­‐0.034	   0.009	   -­‐3.816	   0.000	  
SpanPCT	   -­‐0.024	   0.010	   -­‐2.355	   0.019	  
DIFCTY95	   -­‐0.029	   0.009	   -­‐3.367	   0.001	  
RentOcc	   0.028	   0.010	   2.692	   0.007	  
DisSim	   -­‐0.030	   0.008	   -­‐3.831	   0.000	  
PopDens	   -­‐0.001	   0.000	   -­‐3.722	   0.000	  
PopZ	   0.438	   0.063	   6.923	   0.000	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Figure	  A.9:	  	  Lab	  Seizures	  in	  the	  West	  Central	  region,	  2000	  -­‐	  2003.	  	  The	  data	  showed	  
significant	  spatial	  autocorrelation	  (Moran’s	  I	  =0.229;	  p<.000).	  
	  
There	  is	  certainly	  more	  work	  to	  be	  done	  with	  this	  dataset.	  	  The	  list	  of	  
potential	  covariates	  is	  endless,	  and	  as	  more	  studies	  on	  meth	  producers	  appear,	  
better	  variables	  may	  become	  evident.	  	  A	  more	  regionalized	  approach,	  with	  smaller	  
area	  	  of	  study	  than	  the	  OCDETF	  regions	  might	  also	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  nuanced	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  results.	  	  These	  models	  represent	  a	  first	  attempt	  at	  an	  accurate,	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